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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the relationship between Enlightenment political thought and the 
conduct of imperial affairs on the Indian subcontinent between 1756 and 1773. It is 
concerned with the ways in which Enlightenment ideas affected the response of politicians, 
thinkers, merchants and East India Company officials, to the Company's actions and 
conduct in Bengal. It seeks therefore to uncover the underlying political principles that 
informed debates regarding the future of Britain's connection with the acquired territories. 
At first, controversy raged between the Company and the British state over the question of 
property rights: in 1767 the British government tried to assert its right to the territorial 
revenues of Bengal that had been acquired by the Company in 1765. The government was 
not successful and the issue of ownership would remain unresolved in this period and 
beyond. However, as the Company began to appear incapable of managing and reforming its 
own affairs, the British government was forced to confront the question of what the best way 
of conducting policy in the east might be. 
This thesis makes use of an array of under-utilised printed sources - pamphlets, books and 
tracts - as well as analysing contemporary parliamentary debate, to recover the ways in 
which empire was both rationalised and theorised. The first part of the dissertation lays out 
the narrative of events, gives a brief sketch of ideologies of empire in Britain after 1690, and 
reviews the historiography on the East India Company's rise to power. It then proceeds, in 
part two, to set out the ways in which Enlightenment conceptions of a science of politics 
underpinned both the condemnation of the Company's government of Bengal and plans for 
its reform. In the third part of the thesis, particular attention is given to the thought of Sir 
James Steuart who was specifically approached by the Company to provide a solution to 
their monetary problems in Bengal. This was a brief that he fulfilled comprehensively, 
making use of the concept of self-interest, and revealing the rationale that he believed should 
inform the Company's commercial policy towards a British dependency. Throughout this 
work, the political ideas examined are situated in the broader context of debate regarding 
sociability, international trade, the nature and obligation of governments in general, and of 
the British constitution in particular. 
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Introduction 
In August 1765, the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II conferred the grant of diwani of Bengal, 
Bihar and Orissa on the East India Company. ' This did not mark the beginning of the 
Company's political power in the region, but it was a date that contemporaries came to recognise 
as having altered the whole tenor of Britain's presence in India. The Company's responsibilities 
had been transformed, in the words of the Annual Register, 'from the management of a counting 
house to the government of an empire'. ' This dissertation is concerned with how that 
transformation was conceptualised and criticised by publicists and reformers. More precisely, it 
is concerned with the extent to which the wider currency of Enlightenment political ideas 
informed the terms in which criticism of the Company, and its relations with the British 
government, was deployed. To that extent, the pages that follow examine the relationship 
between Enlightenment political thought and the conduct of British imperial affairs in India. 
They explore the ways in which characteristically Enlightenment modes of argument affected the 
response of politicians, thinkers, merchants and East India Company officials to the Company's 
activities in Bengal. In the process, I try to uncover the underlying principles that informed 
debate surrounding Britain's responsibilities vis-ä-vis the acquired territories. 
The controversy that the Company's affairs at this time raised in British politics, and the steps 
that were taken by the government to reform them have received treatment in the respective 
works of Lucy Sutherland and H. V. Bowen? Sutherland's work focused on the relationships 
between groups and individuals in parliament and the Company in London, while Bowen has 
looked more broadly at the status of the 'Indian problem' in British political debate. Both of 
these works inform the present study: they provide an essential part of the broader context in 
which the issues I discuss are located. The specific contribution which the argument set out here 
' Diwani was the Mughal branch of government concerned with the collection of taxes. It is 
important to note however that despite the official documentation, Orissa did not come under 
Company control until 1803. Throughout this dissertation Bengal will be used as shorthand for 
Bengal and Bihar. 
'Annual Register. " or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature of the Year, 104 vols (London, 1795- 
1863), no. 16 (1773), p. 66. 
3 Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1952); Bowen, Revenue and Reform: the Indian Problem in British Politics 1757-1773 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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aims to provide is an historical understanding of the principles in terms of which the issues 
fundamental to the controversy were formulated. 
This work therefore builds on the existing historical literature, but it also develops an approach 
which has been under-employed in the historiography of eighteenth-century India. As a result, 
my significant points of departure from the works of Sutherland and Bowen include both the 
material examined and methodology employed in this study. In the first place, this thesis 
provides a detailed and systematic account of the most important contemporary political 
literature - primarily tracts, books and pamphlets - to recover reactions to the territorial 
acquisitions in the sub-continent ° This literature includes a range of commentators from 
Company servants, such as William Bolts (1739-1808), 5 to politicians, such as George Johnstone 
(1730-1787), 6 and philosophers such as Sir James Steuart (1712-1780)' This range of writing, 
though extensive in itself, was nonetheless only one forum in which debates about the empire in 
India took place. Yet while surveys of the arguments that were advanced in parliament and the 
press, as well as the diffusion of information regarding East India affairs in what has been termed 
'A full list of the publications broadly relating to the political reform of the Company that I have 
found in the British Library Oriental and India Office Collections and Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online can be found in the bibliography. For the purposes of comparison they are 
also presented in chronological order in the appendix. 5 He joined the Company's service in Bengal in 1760, but went on to develop his own trading 
activities, which brought him into conflict with other Company servants. His career will be 
further considered in chapters 3 and 4 below; however, for an in-depth consideration of Bolts' 
career see: Willem G. J. Kuiters, The British in Bengal 1756-1771 a Society in Transition Seen 
Through the Biography ofa Rebel William Bolts (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2002). 1 He was Governor of West Florida (1764-67) and NIP for various constituencies between the 
years 1768-87. Later, he was part of the conciliatory commission sent to America in 1778, and 
was elected to the Company's directorate in 1784-85. His varied career is explored in Robin F. A. Fabel, Bombast and Broadsides. the Lives of George Johnstone (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1987). 
7 Steuart was educated at Edinburgh University but his career differed significantly from that of 
the moderate literati of Edinburgh, who are the focus of Richard B. Sher's study (Church and 
University in the Scottish Enlightenment., the Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985)). By contrast to individuals like William Robertson who opposed the 
1745 rebellion and was part of the College Company of Edinburgh Volunteers formed to defend 
the city, Steuart aided the Jacobite cause (he was sent as an ambassador to the French court in 
late 1745), and after its failure in 1746, had to remain in exile in Europe until 1763. During this 
time, he lived variously in Angouldme, Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt and Tilbingen. While this 
experience undoubtedly influenced the development of Steuart's thought, he was significantly 
influenced by David Hume (1711-1776). On this see: S. R. Sen, The Economics ofSir James Steuart 
(London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1957), pp. 45-47; Anthony 
Brewer, 'An Eighteenth-Century View of Economic Development: Hume and Steuart', European 
Journal ofthe History ofEronomir Thought, 4,1 (1997), 1-22. Steuart's career is considered in: A. S. 
Skinner, 'Introduction', in. 4n Inquiry into thePtinciples ofPolitical Economy by SirJames Steuart, ed. 
Skinner with N. Kobayashi and H. Mizuta (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1998). On the 
moderate literati's response to the 1745 rebellion, see: Sher, Church and University, pp. 37-44. 
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the `public sphere', have received comparatively detailed treatment by historians, ' there has been 
relatively little sustained or careful analysis of the arguments contained within the vast body of 
contemporary pamphlet literature, historical writing or contributions to political economy. 
This is a highly significant gap, since it was precisely in works such as these that the plans for the 
reform of the Company, and the government of Bengal, were laid out at length with reference to 
the wider debates of the time regarding the nature and obligation of governments generally, and 
of the British constitution in particular. It is of course true that items in newspapers were collated 
and reprinted in pamphlet form, ' and that speeches given in the houses of parliament and in the 
Company's Court of Proprietors were similarly prepared for publication. " These facts indicate 
that the dissemination of ideas about empire in the eighteenth century is a topic of some 
importance. But my specific aim in this thesis is to show how these ideas were formulated - to 
give an historical account of political argument about empire with reference to the wider context 
of the political thought in the Enlightenment. 
The publication of material relating to East Indian affairs in the eighteenth century was most 
usually the result of specific crises. Between 1766 and the passage of Lord North's Regulating 
Bill of 1773, there were three key periods in which the amount of published material relating to 
8 Sutherland, East, Bowen, Revenue', J. R. Osborn, 'India, Parliament and the Press under George 
III: a Study of English Attitudes Towards the East India Company and Empire in the Late 
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries' (D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1999); 
Osborn, 'India and the East India Company in the Public Sphere of Eighteenth-Century Britain', 
in 77ze Worlds of the East India Company ed. H. V. Bowen, M. Lincoln & N. Rigby (Suffolk: 
Boydell Press, 2002), pp. 201-21. ' For example: Anon., The National Mirror Being a Series ofEssays on the Most Important Concerns but 
Particularly those of the East-India Company (London, 1771), was originally published in the 
Gazetteer in the years 1768-69; Anon., A Letter to the Right Honourable Lord North on the East-India 
Bill now Depending in Parliament (London, 1772), was partially published in the Public Advertiser. 
The opposite was also true; sections of text were excerpted from longer publications and printed 
in serial publications: for example, see Osborn, 'India, Parliament', pp. 117-19. 
11 For example: Speech of Mr George Johnstone in the General Court of Proprietors of East-India Stock 
upon the Subject of the Restitutionfir Pdvate Losses, in the War against Cossim Ali Cawn (Edinburgh, 
1768); Lord Clive's Speech in the House of Commons, on the Motion Madefor an Inquiry into the Nature, 
State, and Conditiot4 of the East India Company, and the British Affairs in the East Indies, in the Fifth 
Session of the Present Parliament (London, 1772). In addition official documentation of the 
Company, such as letters and reports from servants in India were collated and presented to the 
public, for example: Authentic Papers Concerning India Affairs which have been under the Inspection ofa 
Great Assembly (London, 177 1), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 202; Bengal Governor and Council, Extract 
of a Letterfrom the Governor and council at Fort William to the Court of Directors dated 3rd November 
1772 Transmitting a Letterfrom the Committee of Circuit, at Cossimbuzar, and a Plan; framed by that 
Committee, for the Administration ofJustice in Bengal [London(? ), 1772(? )]. 
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the East India Company increased. These were 1767,1769 and 1772-3. In the first period, 
debate was provoked by the Earl of Chatham's attempt to assert the crown's right to the 
territorial revenue of Bengal and his legislation restricting the level of the Company's dividend. 
In the second period, controversy was aroused by the Company's directors' decision to send 
supervisors to India in response to the military defeats suffered by the Company, and the 
servants' insubordination on the sub-continent. In the third period, attention was focused by the 
Company's financial difficulties and continued news of the servants' mismanagement of 
Bengal. " 
The contemporary literature is therefore principally engaged with a specific set of problems, such 
as the right of the government to regulate the Company's dividend, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of a supervisory commission; but the particular occasion also provided the authors 
with the opportunity to advance a more general argument about the conduct of imperial affairs 
on the sub-continent. This was especially true of items published after 1769 when the future 
mode of government for Bengal became the contested issue. Here a formulation of the broad 
political principles that should regulate Britain's connection with the territories could not be 
avoided. However it was the pamphlet form that allowed individuals of diverse backgrounds to 
set out their arguments with a degree of systematisation and length that was not obtainable in 
other forums, namely parliamentary speeches, debates in the Court of Proprietors and newspaper 
articles. " 
This detail enables the historian to recover not merely the outlines of the debate concerning the 
Company and its reform, but also to retrieve the basic principles which informed that debate and 
consequently the fundamental organising premises in terms of which the politics of empire was 
theorised with reference to late-eighteenth century Britain and its possessions in the east. I want 
to stress, however, that in retrieving the ideas contained within the body of literature with which 
I will principally be concerned, it is not my intention to invest them with trans-historical 
" Seethe appendix. 
'Z On the particular value of pamphlet literature as historical evidence in intellectual history and 
the history of political thought, see the arguments developed, in a different context, by Bernard 
Bailyn in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (London: Belknap, 1967; repr. 1992), 
pp. 1-28. 
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meaning, or to ascribe to them a belated coherence that they did not at the time possess. In other 
words, I do not aim to excerpt arguments from their specific context and present them as a 
disembodied ideology of empire for this period. Rather, arguments are placed squarely in the 
historical context of thought and action which generated them. ' 
Sir Lewis Namier is well known for having argued that abstract ideals did not underpin the 
actions of politicians, and therefore cannot provide an explanation for their behaviour. " This 
understanding pervades Sutherland's work who in turn, as P. J. Marshall argues, presents a 
'vision of a British leadership so preoccupied with immediate problems of political survival or 
short-term advantage, that it stumbled into crises, for which it had to evolve solutions in a 
haphazard and confused way'. 15 I do not deny that considerations of immediate interest 
impinged upon the motives of the actors that will figure here, but their actions cannot be wholly 
explained in these terms. Motivating interests are themselves dependent on an antecedent 
interpretation of what an agent's immediate interest might be. Equally, in a society in which 
political action will require a parliamentary defence, the public interest is bound to be cast in a 
recognisable idiom. As Quentin Skinner has argued, individuals seek to legitimise the motives of 
their actions 'by some accepted principle', and even if their motives do not in actuality 
correspond to their professed ideals, people will still feel obliged to act in ways consistent with 
them. 16 That is, individuals are constrained by the range of terms (the 'prevailing morality of 
their society') available to them and therefore, as Skinner concludes, to study 'the principles' that 
individuals invoke in defence of their actions will always be to study 'one of the key 
determinants of their behaviour'. '? British politicians may have been concerned with political 
gain, but they held a core set of ideas about what legitimate gain might be. Implicated in those 
ideas were an array of values connected to property, liberty and the British constitution which 
they felt were at stake during debates on Indian affairs. 
13 Quentin Skinner, Visions ofPolitics, vol. 1, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), ch. 4, see also, pp. 116-17. 
14 Ibid., p. 145; L. B. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, 2nd edn 
(London: Macmillan, 1957), p. x. 
11 P. J. Marshall, 'Empire and Authority in the Later Eighteenth Century', Journal oflmperial and 
Commonwealth History, 15 (1987), 105-17 (p. 105). 
16 Skinner, Visions, pp. 155-56. 
11 Ibid., p. 156. 
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The importance of political thought has, of course, not gone completely unrecognised in the 
historical literature on eighteenth century India. Marshall has pointed to the importance of 
contemporary beliefs regarding politics and society in determining the ways that politicians 
responded to imperial problems. " In various articles, he has charted the shift in British 
perceptions of their empire, and consequently alterations in beliefs about the organising 
principles of the British Empire. 19 More recently, Marshall has analysed the concurrent failure of 
empire in North America and its success in India, thereby rejecting the argument that Vincent T. 
Harlow put forward of a first and second empire2° In his Making and Unmaking of Empires, 
Marshall gives special attention to the assumptions held by Britain's elite leadership - MPs, for 
instance, that made imperial affairs a matter of their concern - in order to uncover the ideas 
which underpinned British imperial policy. " Bowen has also given some consideration to British 
conceptions of empire" and, in addition, political ideas in relation to India in the eighteenth 
century have also received treatment by Thomas R. Metcalf. 23 My work is a contribution to this 
strain of historical writing about the sub-continent, but I focus on a narrower period than has 
been usual, albeit one that was of crucial importance for the development of ideas regarding 
empire in India. This focus enables me to give more space and consideration to the arguments of 
individual works which, in some instances, have been known to historians but which have 
nonetheless not been given the careful analytical scrutiny which they deserve. 
In addition, as I have already indicated, my work adds to the current understanding of 
eighteenth-century ideologies of empire in India by relating those ideologies to the broader 
context of the Enlightenment. It is, I argue, only in this context that the implications of the 
arguments that were advanced at the time can be properly understood. For this reason, in the 
title of this thesis, I refer to the British 'Enlightenment'. The point is not that it was British, but 
'$ Marshall, 'Empire and Authority', pp. 105-06. 
19 See: Marshall, "'A Free Though Conquering People": Britain and Asia in the Eighteenth 
Century', Inaugural Lecture in the Rhodes Chair of Imperial History, King's College, London 
(1981), repr. in 'A Free Though Conquering People. Eighteenth-Century Britain and its Empire, ed. 
Marshall (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), pp. 1-19. 
20 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America c. 1750-1783 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763-1793,2 
vols (London: Longmans, 1952-64). 
21 Marshall, Making and Unmaking, p. 9. 
22 Bowen, 'British Conceptions of Global Empire 1756-83', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 26 (1998), 1-27. 
23 Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 1. 
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that the arguments were of the Enlightenment. However, it is nonetheless the case that the issues 
under consideration here involved the British Empire; the individuals involved have been drawn 
from the British Isles and they believed that they were dealing with a British problem, rather than 
a French, Scottish, Irish or English one. 
What the term 'Enlightenment' itself means is of course a matter of great contention. Sankar 
Muthu, following J. G. A. Pocock and others, has recently argued that 'we should diversify our 
understanding of Enlightenment thought' - that we should refer to 'Enlightenments' rather than 
'the Enlightenment' or an 'Enlightenment Project'. He has used the term as a 'temporal 
adjective' to refer to the long eighteenth century. The anti-imperialist writings that he studies, by 
this definition, are simply a strain of eighteenth-century thought - they constitute one discourse 
amongst many other contrary ones in circulation at the time. He suggests that any attempt to 
define a notion of 'the Enlightenment' is fraught with the danger of masking the variety of 
intellectual endeavours of the period. "' In an altogether different manner, the essays collated in 
The Enlightenment in National Contexts also present cogent arguments against generalising about 
the beliefs and aims of philosophes. The authors here point to the influence of local realities and 
history on the development of ideas. However, while accepting that there was a diversity of 
modes of Enlightenment argument, the term 'Enlightenment' nonetheless requires, as C. J. Berry 
has argued, some minimum definition, a 'core', if it is to serve any purpose at al V' 
Berry points out that intellectuals from all parts of Europe did see themselves as part of a republic 
of letters and regarded their work as dispelling 'ignorance, prejudice and superstition'. J. 
D'Alembert identified four thinkers, whom he believed had been instrumental in enabling 
eighteenth-century advances in knowledge. These were Francis Bacon, Descartes, Newton and 
Locke. What these writers specifically provided were new methods of organisation and 
investigation to the fields of physical and moral sciences! ' The utilisation of the new techniques 
by Montesquieu and Adam Smith led John Millar to declare the former 'the Bacon' and latter 
24 Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 
1-2,264-66. 
u ed. Roy Porter et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
26 C. J. Berry, Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press, 
1997; repr. 2001), p. l. 
21 Ibid., pp. 2-4. 
12 
'the Newton' of their fields 28 In this thesis, the core of Enlightenment political thought is 
understood as the ambition to apply scientific method to moral philosophy, politics and political 
economy. That is, it is understood as the belief that laws regarding (for example) human nature 
and governments could be deduced by reasoning consequentially. As David Hume argued: 'so 
great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have 
they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may 
sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us'29 
In defining the Enlightenment in this manner, I am obviously not suggesting for a moment that 
the body of literature that it gave rise to, such as the works of Montesquieu, Smith, Ferguson and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, were in complete agreement with one another. Clearly they were not. 
Yet without some functioning definition of 'Enlightenment' the term cannot, logically, be 
pluralized. My dissertation shows how the idea of reducing politics to a science - the desire to 
understand the 'system' of modem politics - was an integral feature of the debates surrounding 
the competing entitlements and obligations of the British Parliament and the East India 
Company between 1756 and 1773. It goes on to demonstrate how the commercial relations 
between Britain and India were also theorised with reference to systems of political economy. It 
aims to fill a gap in contemporary scholarship regarding our understanding of the whole range of 
ideas of empire in India that were contested at this time. 
Work has been done on the impact of European assumptions on the development of British 
modes of government in India; Ranajit Guha has shown the mercantilist and physiocratic 
influences that shaped debate in the years leading up to the Permanent Settlement of Bengal 
(1793). " More recently, and more intricately, Robert Travers has demonstrated how the land 
tax, under British rule, was `shaped both by the complex negotiations of the state and society 
within Bengal, and by international flows of political meanings and concepts, capital and 
28 John Millar quoted in J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. II, Narratives of Civil 
Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 159. 
29 David Hume, 'That Politics may be Reduced to a Science', in Essays Moraz Political and 
Literary, rev. edn, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty, 1987), p. 16. 
31 A Rule of Property for Bengal, an Essay on the Idea of the Permanent Settlement (Paris: Mouton, 
1963). 
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credit'" The present study differs from work such as Travers' in that it is more immediately 
concerned with debates about empire in India that took place in Britain - and their relation 
with the Enlightenment - rather than an analysis of the processes by which British rule of 
Bengal came to be implemented by British officials abroad. While a specifically British set of 
imperial ideologies has been investigated by David Armitage 32 his work does not extend into 
this period nor consider the empire in India. This thesis will examine the ideology of the British 
Empire in relation to the sub-continent, and demonstrate the shift in perceptions that took place 
as the eighteenth century advanced. 
The greater part of this dissertation is concerned with reactions in London to events that took 
place largely between 1756 and 1765 in India. Consequently, a narrative of events is given for 
convenience in chapter 1, before it proceeds to analyse British conceptions of empire in India 
from the 1690s onwards. Chapter 2 considers the historiographical debate surrounding the 
Company's rise to power. Here it is emphasised that the Company's perception of what was 
necessary for the security of its trade, played an integral role in the acquisition of empire in India. 
Chapter 3 considers British responses to the Company's government of Bengal, which was 
commonly regarded as despotic. In this section, contemporary understandings of despotism are 
explored and the implications of 'mercantile despotism' are drawn out. Chapter 4 elucidates the 
principles behind the arguments that were put forward for the reform of the Company's affairs, 
and demonstrates their connections with Enlightenment political thought. The actual plans for 
reform that were developed at this time are also considered. 
Chapter 5 turns to the Company's commercial affairs in Bengal. Given that the prime 
importance of the acquisitions resided in the material benefit Britain could derive from her, 
Bengal's economic health was of paramount importance. This chapter considers contemporary 
views regarding the reasons behind the `drain of wealth', and James Steuart's solutions for it. It 
situates his proposals among rival positions in political economy. Chapter 6 studies two concepts 
that were central to Steuart's theories: conjectural history and self-interest. His understanding of 
31 Travers, "`The Real Value of the lands": the Nawabs, the British and the Land Tax in 
Eighteenth-Century Bengal', Modern Asian Studies, 38,3 (2004), 517-58 (p. 558). 
32 The ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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the dynamics of human progress and sociability, which had its precursors in the thought of 
Bernard Mandeville and others, are expounded not only to make apparent the full shape of 
Steuart's proposals for Bengal, but also to shed additional light on the arguments advanced by 
authors in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 1 
Britain, the East India Company and Empire 
In the year 1600, Queen Elizabeth I conferred the first charter on 'The Governor and Company 
of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies'. A subsequent version of this organisation, 
known as the East India Company, would grow to become the rulers of Bengal. This chapter is 
concerned with the ideology of empire in India between 1690 and the early 1770s; it explores the 
foundations on which territorial responsibility in India came to be accepted. This chapter begins 
by providing a narrative of events in India between 1756 and 1765 - the period in which the 
Company's traditional relationship with the nawabs of Bengal broke down, and the Company 
became de facto ruler of the area. It goes on to demonstrate the impact these events had on 
Company politics in London. It is of course true that any narrative, by the very information that 
it includes and omits, offers an interpretation of events that is open to contestation. The narrative 
set out here serves to illustrate the extent of the Company's transformation as well as to provide 
the necessary context for the succeeding pages; chapter two will take into account the 
historiographical debate. 
This chapter will then turn to consider the rationale of Britain's global presence. The ideological 
origins of the British Empire have been studied by Armitage who demonstrates that Britons 
came to regard their empire as Protestant, free, maritime and commercial. ' This chapter will 
explore how this conception was shaped by the history of Rome (as narrated, for instance, by 
Sallust), the thought of Machiavelli, and the acceptance of commerce as a reason of state. It will 
then turn to consider the ideas formulated by Charles Davenant (1656-1714) at the end of the 
seventeenth century, who made explicit connections between commercial (rather than territorial) 
supremacy and the security of England? His argument regarding the East India trade was 
countered by John Pollexfen (1636-1715), ' who will also be considered here, but Davenant's 
I Armitage, Ideological Origins, p. 173. 
Z Davenant, An Essay on the East-India Trade by the Author of the Essay Upon Wayes and Means 
(London 1696), BL, OIOC Tract Vol. 83. 
3 England and East-India Inconsistent in their Manufactures: Being an Answer to the Treatise Intitled "an 
Essay on the East-India Trade"by the Author of the Essay of Wayes and Means (London, 1697), BL, 
OIOC Tract vol. 83. 
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thought, as will be demonstrated, continued to have resonance throughout the eighteenth 
century. Attention will then turn (in section three) to the Walpolean era and the debates 
regarding Britain's foreign policy; here it will be shown that a successful foreign policy was 
measured in terms of the impact it had on the country's international commerce, which in turn 
was regarded as the basis of a state's power. " 
After the fall of Walpole, British attention was focused more specifically on India, when the East 
India Company came into conflict with the French on the sub-continent. Section Four of this 
chapter will analyse the impact British perceptions of French ambitions had upon arguments 
regarding the conduct of commerce on the sub-continent. Many publicists presented increased 
French involvement in Indian politics as not only detrimental to British commercial interests but 
also to Britain's very security. ' The victory of Britain in the Seven Years War temporarily 
soothed British fears of French ambitions but, as in the 1730s and 40s, the level of the national 
debt remained a matter of concern for politicians and thinkers. This chapter will proceed to 
investigate (in section five) the connections that existed between national security, commerce 
and public credit, as demonstrated by David Hume, 6 before finally turning to the legacy of 1765 
(in section six). 
The nature of the British Empire was undoubtedly altered after the Peace of Paris and 
acquisition of diwani, but the objectives of the Company (and Britain) in India, I will argue, had 
not shifted. The Company's aim remained that of profitable commerce; what did change was the 
degree of protection that the Company could demand for its trade. In the 1690s, the servants 
were adamant that they could not trade without forts; by 1765, a wholly new generation of 
° [Daniel Defoe], The Advantages of Peace and Commerce with Some Remarks on the East-India Trade 
(London, 1729); Charles Forman, Some Queries and Observations Upon the Revolution in 1688 and its 
Consequences: Also a Short View of the Rise and Progress of the Dutch East India Company; with Critical 
Remarks in a Letter from Paris to Rt Hon. Sir Robert Walpole (London, 1741), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 
487. 
5 Anon., A Letter to a Proprietor of the East-India Company (London, 1750), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 83; 
Anon., Some Material and Very Important Remarks Concerning the Present Situation of Affairs Between 
Great Britain, France and Spain in Regard to their East and West India Settlements etc. (London, 1755), 
BL, OIOC Tract vol. 487; Anon., Reflection on the Present State of our East-India Affairs with Many 
Interesting Anecdotes Never Before Made Public (London, 1764). 
'Hume, 'Of Public Credit', in Essays. 
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servants was equally convinced that Company trade required political power. ' This is not to 
imply that opposing views were not also expressed by some commentators - counter arguments 
were put forward in both periods - but it is nonetheless true that the necessity of forts, and then 
that of political control, were the views that came to prevail. The change in the realities on the 
ground, which made this alteration possible, will be the subject of the following chapter, my 
purpose here is to show how assumptions regarding commerce and national security, and 
perceptions of French global ambitions - the feeling that Britain had to stay one step ahead of 
France - all meant that in 1773, Britain's leaders accepted that there was no turning back from 
territorial empire in the east. This is not to suggest that British or Company officials came to 
advocate a policy of imperial expansion - they did not: Company directors, after 1765, 
repeatedly stated that they did not want any further extension of responsibility on the sub- 
continent s But Britain's leaders did come to perceive the territories that had been acquired as 
being indispensable for Britain's security. 
I. 
It was a version of the original Company that grew to become the ruler of Bengal, because the 
initial organisation did not enjoy a history of unbroken continuity. At various points in its 
history, the Company found its position undermined by other sets of merchants and by the 
governments of the day. In the late 1630s and 1640s groups of merchants were given permission 
to sail to the Indian Ocean, and the Assada Company was formed with the aim of establishing a 
settlement on an island off Madagascar. During the Civil War and Interregnum, the Company's 
privileges were severely undermined as private merchants were given competing rights. Its status 
was however re-established by 1657 when a new permanent joint-stock was created and 
monopoly privileges to trade to Asia granted. By the end of the century, the Company again 
found itself in a precarious position: its monopoly status became the focus of increasing criticism 
because of the disastrous campaigns fought in India under the leadership of Josiah Child, and the 
For a justification of the Company's policies from late seventeenth century to the acquisition of 
diwani, see: Anon., The Conduct of the East-India Company (London, 1774), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 
50. 
8 Marshall, Making and Unmaking, p. 227. Clive also argued that 'my hopes will always be, to 
confine our assistance, our conquests, and our possessions, to Bengal, Bahar and Orixa. To go 
further, is in my opinion, a scheme so extravagantly ambitious and absurd, that no Governor 
and Council in their senses can ever adopt it' ('Clive to Directors' (30 Sept 1765), in FWIHC, N, 
p. 333). 
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latter's close links to James II. In the post Glorious Revolution era, such links were politically 
damaging and although the Company managed to obtain a renewal of its charter in 1693, in 
1698 a New East India Company was formed with the intention of replacing the existing one. In 
the event, however, both the old and the new Companies were successfully merged in 1709 to 
form the United East India Company. ' The Company's monopoly was not to be threatened 
again until 1813.10 
The British presence in Bengal dated back to the 1650s, but it was in the closing decades of that 
century that the Company established itself in Calcutta, with the building of Fort William being 
completed in 1716. " Through the course of the eighteenth century, the volume of British exports 
from Bengal (predominately in textiles) increased, and the settlement in Calcutta grew 
dramatically. " The Company sought to gain advantages over its European rivals by obtaining 
custom concessions from the Mughal Emperor. In 1717 it gained a farman (imperial grant) from 
the Emperor Farrukhsiyar which gave it impressive benefits: the Company was exempted from 
paying custom duties throughout his territories in return for annual payments at Surat and 
Bengal of Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 3000 respectively; dastaks, or certificates, issued by the Company 
theoretically enabled its goods to pass through the territory custom free. 13 In practice, however, 
the farman required the cooperation of local rulers in order for its benefits to be realised. Between 
1727 and 1749, the British had to make additional payments to the nawabs of Bengal, in order to 
enjoy trade free from interference. '4 
9 Marshall, 'The English in Asia to 1700', in The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. I, The 
Origins of Empire, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 266,276-77, 
282-83. 
11 Om Prakash, 'The English East India Company and India', in The Worlds of the East India 
Company, ed. H. V. Bowen, M. Lincoln & N. Rigby (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2002), p. 2. 
11 Marshall, 'English in Asia', p. 279; J. H. Parry, Trade and Dominion: the European Overseas 
Empires in the Eighteenth Century (1971; London: Phoenix, 2000), p. 70. 
12 For an estimation of the number of people that settled in Calcutta, see the figures cited in 
Marshall, East Indian Fortunes: the British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1976), p. 24. 
13 K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 124. 
14 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, p. 7. 
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Bengal had become a province (suba) of the Mughal Empire in the late sixteenth century, " but by 
the time that the Company had obtained its 1717 farman, Bengal was emerging as a virtually 
independent state. 16 Traditionally, provinces of the Mughal Empire had been governed by the 
subahdar ('responsible for the nizamat, the maintenance of law and order, the command of the 
armed forces, and the administration of criminal justice') and the diwan ('controlled finance and 
taxation and administered civil justice'). However in 1717 Murshid Quli Khan, who had been 
appointed diwan by the emperor in 1700, combined the latter office with that of subahdar and 
became, to all intents and purposes, the first nawab (ruler) of Bengal. " Upon his death he was 
succeeded by members of his family, but each succession was preceded by armed contests. In 
1740, the throne was taken by force by the nawab's deputy in Bihar, Alivardi Khan (who was 
unrelated to Murshid Quli Khan's family); he was succeeded in 1756 by his grandson Siraj ud- 
Daula. 18 
The new nawab, as was consistent with past practise, demanded money from the European 
Companies in return for recognising their privileges. The Dutch and the French ceded to the 
demands but the delay of the British Company led to Siraj ud-Daula attacking and driving the 
British out of Calcutta. " In response, the Company dispatched troops from Madras under the 
command of Robert Clive (1725-1774) who recovered the town and came to an advantageous 
agreement with the nawab in February 1757 20 This proved to be only a fleeting interlude as the 
British went on to attack the French settlement at Chandernagore; in its aftermath, relations 
between the nawab and the British broke down. Each side began to view the other with 
increasing mistrust. In addition, the nawab had also alienated factions within Bengal, who began 
to conspire against him. These factions offered the Company greater privileges in return for their 
15 John F. Richards, The Mughal Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge: University Press, 1993; repr. 
2001), pp. 33-34. 
16 Bihar became a permanent part of Bengal in 1733 (Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, p. 5). 
17 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, p. 6. 
18 Marshall, Bengal. the British Bridgehead (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 49, 
74. 
19 Ibid., p. 76. 
20 See: Brijen K. Gupta, Sirajuddaulah and the East India Company 1756-57" Background to the 
Foundation ofBritish Power in India (Leiden: Brill, 1962), pp. 100-0 1. 
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assistance to depose the nawab, and replace him with Mir Jafar. The old nawab was successfully 
deposed by the Battle of Plassey in June 1757, and killed? ' 
This was the 'revolution' that contemporaries spoke about, and it was a revolution in more far 
reaching ways than simply the replacement of one ruler with another; as the events that followed 
would show, it was now inconceivable that the nawabs would act against the wishes of the 
British - the nawabs now owed their existence to the British Company. Between 1757 and 1765 
there would be a quick succession of rulers: Mir Jafar was deposed in favour of Mir Kasim in 
1760; he in turn was ousted in 1763 and replaced by the former nawab. Mir Kasim did not, 
however, quietly recede into the background but gathered the support of the Wazir of Oudh and 
the Emperor Shah Alam, and returned to regain the throne. The British successfully defeated 
them at the Battle of Buxar in 1764, which resulted in the 1765 Treaty of Allahabad. By this 
treaty, the Wazir of Oudh was restored to his territories and became an ally of the Company; the 
Emperor was installed in the provinces of Cora and Allahabad; the British agreed to pay the 
Emperor an annual tribute, and were made the diwan of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. 7z It is 
important to note however, that despite the official documentation, in practice, Orissa did not 
come under British control until 1803, when it was taken from the Marathas ss 
In theory, as the diwan, the Company became responsible for the civil administration of Bengal 
and Bihar, while the nawab retained the functions of the nizamat. In practice the division of 
authority was not so neat. The nawab had no authority independent of the Company and the 
duties of the nizamat were exercised by a deputy (naib) appointed by the servants 24 In addition, 
the servants did not take over the administrative task of managing the revenue collections 
themselves but left it in the hands of Indian officials. Much official responsibility came to rest 
upon Muhammad Reza Khan, who was referred to by the Company as 'prime minister'. " 
Clive's purpose in establishing this dual system was partly practical - the servants did not have 
21 Ibid., p. 121. 
22 Rajat Kanta Ray, `Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765-1818', in 
The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. II, The Eighteenth Century, ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 511. 
21 Marshall, Bengal, p. 93. 
24 Ibid., pp. 93-94; Prakash, 'English', p. 8. 
25 Abdul Majed Khan, The Transition in Bengal, 1756-1775. " a Study of Saiyid Muhammad Reza Khan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 103. 
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the immediate resources or expertise to act as diwan. It was also partly strategic: Clive realised 
that the Company's position would only acquire legitimacy on the sub-continent if it maintained 
Mughal forms of government21 The latter would continue to influence the development of the 
Company's government of Bengal, but by 1772, the servants would feel confident enough to take 
open control of the revenue administration. " 
This development of the Company's position in India shows that 1765 did not mark the 
beginning of the Company's political power on the sub-continent. It was a process that began 
well before and would continue well after this date. However the formal grant of diwani in this 
year and the events that followed in Bengal - specifically the abuse of the recently acquired 
political power by the servants, the 1769-70 famine and the reforms that the Company 
implemented - would give rise to major controversies in Britain. The immediate news of the 
acquisitions in London resulted in heavy speculation in Company stock, in the expectation of 
significant gains; these were initially realised: Company stock rose, and in September 1766 the 
dividend was set at a new high of 10 percent 28 The increased speculation was also due to the 
factionalism which characterised Company politics in London at this time - specifically the 
contest between Clive and Laurence Sulivan, 29 for dominance within the Company throughout 
the 1760s. This rivalry had led to the Company's Court of Proprietors taking a more dominant 
part in Company affairs, and in the election of the Company's directors. 
The Court of Proprietors, or the General Court, was the `ultimate sovereign body within the 
Company'. It elected the directors, scrutinised policies developed by them, came to decisions on 
26 Ibid., pp. 104-05. For Clive's defence of the dual system, see: OIOC, MSS Eur. E12, pp. 76- 
80. 
27 The Company's take over of the responsibility for collecting the revenues was a gradual 
process. Francis Sykes (bap. 1732, d. 1804) was appointed in August 1765, to oversee Reza 
Khan; Sykes' post was known as the Resident at the durbar (nawab's court), which was located 
in Murshidabad. He was replaced, upon his resignation in January 1769, by Richard Becher. 
Later that year, supervisors were appointed to oversee the collection of revenue in the various 
districts, but late in 1770, they became directly responsible for its administration. Under Warren 
Hastings the supervisors became known as 'collectors'. See: Khan, Transition, pp. 169,200-01, 
264; Marshall, Bengal, pp. 116-19. 
28 Philip Lawson, 'Parliament and the First East India Inquiry', Parliamentary History: a Yearbook, 
1(1982), 99-114 (p. 100). 
29 (1713-1786), director of the Company at various times between 1755-1786; MP for Taunton 
(1762-68) and Ashburton (1768-74), see: James Gordon Parker, 'The Directors of the East India 
Company 1754-1790', (Ph. D thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1977), pp. 270-73. 
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Company policy and it could reverse decisions made by the directors. 30 It also played a 
significant role in the formation of government policy towards Indian affairs during the period 
covered by this dissertation. As Bowen describes the arrangements, legislative proposals relating 
to the Company were most usually drafted by the directors and then given to the General Court 
for examination. Upon their agreement the proposals were submitted to the government. This 
led the earl of Chatham to designate the body as 'little parliaments'; the remark was accurate to 
the extent that the General Court was a forum in which government legislation pertaining to the 
Company was debated" Proprietors who held £500 worth of East India stock were eligible to 
vote in the annual elections of the Company's twenty-four directors, which took place in April 
every year. The directors were the executive component of the Company and in order to conduct 
their business, organised themselves into ten committees. Each director served on a number 
(between two and five) of the committees, while the chairman (elected by the directors) and 
deputy (chosen by the chairman) presided over all the committees. " The General Court could be 
convened by the directors or on the demand of nine proprietors" 
The relationship between the directors and the proprietors, until the 1760s, had not been 
characterised by disagreement and conflict; this changed however in the years following the 
victory at Plassey with the frequency of the General Court's assembly increasing quite 
dramatically. On average, in the 1740s the General Court met approximately five times a year, 
but in the 1760s, this figure rose to 13 and between 1770 and 1773, it rose to 22. The increased 
number of meetings of the Court of Proprietors reflects, firstly, the greater involvement of this 
body in the formulation of Company policy and, secondly, the growth in the degree of 
factionalism that existed within it. In addition, the annual elections of the directors also came to 
30 Bowen, Revenue, p. 40; Parker, `Directors', p. 350. 31 Bowen, Revenue, pp. 38-39 (citation p. 39). In addition, many of the prominent individuals 
who participated in the debates in the Court of Proprietors (between 1766 and 1773) were also 
MPs that took an active part during the debates on East Indian affairs. Foremost amongst such 
individuals (in terms of the number of times they were known to have spoken in both forums) 
were George Dempster and George Johnstone (Bowen, Revenue, pp. 33,42-43). See also: 
Bowen, "`Dipped in the Traffic": East India Stockholders in the House of Commons 1768- 
1774', Parliamentary History, 5 (1986), 39-53. 
32 Bowen, Revenue, pp. 34-35. 
33 The proprietors' ability to call a General Court meeting enabled them to keep the directors in 
check, see: Bowen, `The "Little Parliament": the General Court of the East India Company 
1750-1784', Historical Journal, 34,4 (1991), 857-72 (pp. 859,859n15). 
34 Bowen, Revenue, p. 41; the precise figures that Bowen calculates for the 1740s is 5.4, and 13.3 
for the 1760s. 
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be fiercely contested in the 1760s. By this time, it had become common practise for the directors, 
prior to the elections, to issue a 'house list' of candidates of whom they approved; this was 
normally accepted by the proprietors. In 1758, Sulivan produced a rival list of candidates leading 
to an election battle between the factions. " The reason for this rival list was Sulivan and his 
supporters' disagreement over the decision taken by the majority of the directors regarding the 
succession of governor in Bengal, after Fort-William was re-established following Siraj ud- 
Daula's attack. Sulivan's dissent with the decision the majority of the directors had taken led him 
to cultivate the support of the proprietors and use the General Court in order to reverse their 
resolution 36 
Appeals to the Court of Proprietors were not a common occurrence, but the body was well 
within its rights to overturn policies developed by the directors; however, the tactic did not 
achieve Sulivan's aims, which was why his supporters resorted to issuing a rival list for the 
directorship elections of 1758 - in which Sulivan was ultimately elected as chairman. The 
strategies that were used in this period would be exploited in the decade that followed, as the 
factions of Clive and Sulivan fought for supremacy. The great personal animosity between the 
two had its roots in a disagreement regarding the transmission of the servants' private fortunes 
(made in India) back to England" The quarrel grew to embrace the desire on either side of 
excluding the other from exerting any influence over the Company. In 1758, Sulivan's supporters 
had made use of the strategy of stock-splitting; this was the practice of dividing large holdings of 
stock into £500 units and distributing them amongst friends and supporters in order to qualify 
them to vote in the directorship elections. Following the contest, the stocks were returned to their 
original owners, but the practice obviously increased the number of voters participating in the 
elections. Clearly, by this strategy, the side that could divide the greatest amount of stock 
increased their chances of electing their chosen candidates. 
35 Parker, 'Directors', p. 335. The last contested election, previous to 1758, had been in 1735 
(Bowen, Revenue, p. 45). 
36 Sutherland, East, pp. 66-70. 
37 See: Bruce Lenman and Philip Lawson, 'Robert Clive, the "Black Jagir", and British Politics', 
Historical Journal, 26,4 (1983), 801-29 (pp. 811-12). 
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The practices which developed or became common after 1758, namely contested elections, stock- 
splitting and the increased debates in the Court of Proprietors, had repercussions for the 
development of policies by the directors. Prior to that date, it was not uncommon for directors to 
serve for long periods, enabling some sort of continuity in the Company's organisation in 
London. After this year, long serving directors became rare; in addition, the directors 
increasingly felt obliged to further the interests of the groups that had enabled their election. " 
Throughout the 1760s the General Court was used by factions to advance their private interests. 
For example, Clive and his supporters used their influence in the General Court to ensure the 
continuation of Clive's jaghire. This was a 'gift' that Clive had received from Mir Jafar, which 
assigned to him a portion of the revenues of Bengal. Another example, which occurred after the 
receipt of diwani in 1765, was the way speculators in Company stock worked together in the 
General Court to force the directors to raise the Company's dividend39 As Sutherland points out, 
these developments demonstrated the ways in which organised speculators could wield political 
clout; in addition, she also stresses how the major parties of Clive and Sulivan could make use of 
the proprietors for their own ends, namely by promising them 'short-term financial advantages' 40 
By the 1770s commentators, including Clive and Sulivan, recognised that the Company's 
organisation in London was not equal to its responsibilities: Sulivan condemned the influence of 
the General Court on the directors, while Clive pointed to the transient tenure of the 
directorships 4' Government legislation in 1767 attempted to address the problems that these 
developments gave rise to, 42 but ultimately the administration at this time was more concerned 
with obtaining a share of the Company's new source of wealth. 
38 Bowen, Revenue, p. 34. 
39 See Sutherland, East, pp. 141-46. See also Bowen, 'Investment and Empire in the Later 
Eighteenth Century: East India Stockholding', Economic History Review, New Series, 42,2 (1989), 
186-206 (p. 192). 
40 Sutherland, East, p. 146. 
41 Bowen, Revenue, p. 46. See also: 'Clive to Vereist' (7 Nov 1767), OIOC, MSS Eur. F218/90, 
fols 31"-32'. In addition, see: '[Warren Hastings (? )] to the Court of Directors' (11 Nov 1773), 
BL, Add. MSS 38398, fols 90"-91', where it was argued that the Company's constitution was 
'nowhere to be traced but in ancient charters which were framed for the jurisdiction of your 
trading settlements - the state of your Exports and the provision of your annual Investment [... ] 
observe how incompetent these must prove for the Government of a Great Kingdom'. 
u7 Geo. III, c. 48; 7 Geo. III, c. 49; 8 Geo. III, c. 11. The provisions of these acts are considered 
below in chapter 4. 
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In the aftermath of the Seven Years War, Chatham saw the Company's acquisitions as a means 
of supplementing the Exchequer's income. " He attempted to establish the principle that the 
Company's acquisitions belonged to the crown; the claim however met with fierce resistance - 
even members of his own government doubted the wisdom of his course, especially the means by 
which he set out to achieve his aim: by a parliamentary inquiry. " In 1762, during the course of 
negotiations prior to the Treaty of Paris, the British government had declared to the French that 
any contested territorial possessions held by the Company were the Company's 'exclusive 
property' and the Crown had no right to interfere. " Yet in 1767 Chatham made use of the 
opinion given by the attorney and solicitor generals, Charles Yorke and Charles Pratt, to argue 
that the revenues had been acquired by conquest (rather than by a treaty or a grant) and therefore 
rightfully belonged to the Crown 46 Supporters of the Company, on the other hand, held that the 
revenues had, in fact, been obtained as a grant from the emperor and were, consequently, the 
Company's private property. 47 
Chatham's claim was presented as an assault on private property and chartered rights, and in the 
face of stiff opposition, as well as his lack of parliamentary support, he was forced to climb 
down. The issue would not be resolved until 1813, and Chatham had to be satisfied instead with 
an annual payment by the Company to the government of £400,000. The sanctity of chartered 
rights and private property were to remain the issues that would hamper future attempts of the 
government to regulate the Company's affairs, but at this stage the government was, in any case, 
unwilling to take responsibility for the administration of Bengal. It would later be noted in the 
Annual Register that the government had not seen it fit in 1767 to give the Company additional 
powers or regulations by which to govern the new acquisitions. It had not responded, in other 
words, to the Company's 'amazing change' of 'condition'. 48 The events in India between 1756 
and 1765 had altered the extent and nature of Britain's concern there - Britain's relationship 
43 Bowen, 'A Question of Sovereignty? The Bengal Land Revenue Issue, 1765-67', Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 16 (1988), 155-76 (p. 159). 
44 See: ibid., pp. 169-70. 
as Quoted in ibid., p. 165. 
46 Ibid., pp. 162-64. The 1757 Pratt-Yorke opinion was used to resolve similar disputes in North 
America, see: Bowen, 'British Conceptions', pp. 11-12. 
47 See the argument developed in: Anon., A Letter to the Proprietors of India Stock Relative to the 
Critical Situation of their Affairs (London, 1767), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 133. 
49 Annual Register, no. 16, p. 66. 
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with the sub-continent was transformed from a commercial to an overtly political one, but the 
British government had principally sought to acquire a share of the revenue. 
Company officials, and many other astute observers, recognised that this alteration of the 
Company's affairs called for a reassessment of the British government's role in India or, at the 
very least, the investment of additional powers in the Company. Such arguments were put 
forward by individuals when East India affairs were under the scrutiny of parliament - most 
significantly in 1767 on the occasion provided by Chatham's inquiry, in 1769, when news of 
military defeats in India reached London and the directors responded with the decision to send 
supervisors, and in 1772-3, when news of the 1769-70 Bengal famine and the Company's 
mismanagement of Bengal was widely circulated in the press. It was only by 1772, when the 
Company faced a financial crisis, that North's government recognised that it could no longer 
ignore the problems that the Company's actions had given rise to, and turned its attention to 
reform. The rest of this chapter charts the progress of the ideology of empire in India from the 
late seventeenth century onwards and demonstrates that the security of Britain was its defining 
feature; it was the condition on which commercial and then territorial empire in the east was 
accepted. The chapter concludes by considering the specific challenges that territorial empire on 
the sub-continent presented to the country's policy makers. 
II. 
The victory at Buxar, sealed by the Treaty of Allahabad, came on the heels of the successes that 
Britain had enjoyed in the Seven Years War (1756-63). Together, they transformed the character 
of the British Empire. Linda Colley has observed that British people came to perceive their 
empire as consisting primarily of the thirteen colonies in America, and therefore as 'Protestant 
and Anglophone'. They further regarded it as a 'trading empire', and 'as the beneficent creation 
of a liberty-loving and commercial people'. The British Empire was also commonly contrasted to 
the Roman and Spanish empires of conquest 49 The empire that Britain acquired after the Seven 
Years War, however, made this perception difficult to sustain; most obviously Quebec, with its 
I Linda Colley, Britons. - Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (1992; repr. London: Pimlico, 2003), p. 102. 
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large French Catholic population, and Bengal, inhabited by Hindu, Muslim and Sikhs, could not 
be characterised as Protestant. As Marshall has argued in relation to Britain's acquisitions in the 
closing decades of the eighteenth century: 
Concepts of a British empire over the seas that aspired [... ] to be commercial, maritime, 
Protestant and free were no longer adequate. The British empire was now territorial as 
well as maritime, based on military in addition to naval power, and increasingly 
involved autocratic rule over peoples who were neither Protestant nor, in the British 
view, suited to a free government. 50 
This altered reality presented ideological and practical problems for Britain's leaders. Yet the 
reasoning behind government policy had not changed. The reason why Britain had sought to 
acquire a commercial empire overseas was the same as the one that had led it to accept territorial 
responsibility in India after 1765: the security of Britain. Successive British governments may 
have been slow to confront the problems that the Company faced in India, but North's 
government did ultimately intervene to preserve what it clearly regarded as important to the 
interests of Britain: the Company and Bengal. Undoubtedly, the period after 1765 raised a 
different set of issues than the ones which had preoccupied thinkers earlier in the century; after 
the acquisition of diwani, informed observers debated whether a single body, in this case a 
company, could be sovereign and merchant simultaneously without destroying the foundations 
of trade - they were concerned with the impact that the Company's government of Bengal was 
having upon Bengal's prosperity and desired to construct a system of governing the territories 
that would not harm the British constitution. Issues that had concerned publicists at various 
times previous to 1765 included the amount of bullion that was 'drained' from Britain and sent 
to India, and the impact British foreign policy towards the European continent had on Britain's 
global interests. What remained constant in both periods was a desire to maintain a commercial 
advantage over her European rivals in order to preserve Britain's independence. 
The rationale of Britain's global presence, in the late seventeenth century, was commercial; 
European governments, by this date, recognised that military and naval prowess could only be 
sustained by a successful international trading policy. Trade, in other words, came to be regarded 
sÖ Marshall, `Introduction', in `A Free Though Conquering People'. Eighteenth-Century Britain and its 
Empire, ed. Marshall (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), p. x; Marshall here derives his 
concept of the British empire from: Armitage, Ideological Origins. 
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as central to a state's continued independence and security. This was a view that was shared by 
the full range of political opinion in Britain, although land, as Colley points out, remained the 
'source of power and prestige'. She argues that landed political elites saw the contribution that 
foreign commerce made to the state's wealth and power, but were especially willing to endorse 
the activity because it did not, until the 1760s, undermine their positions' The observation that 
`empire' was an extension of the process of state formation was a central thesis of Armitage's 
Ideological Origins of the British Empire. He pointed out that the forces which had been at play in 
the creation of a composite state such as the United Kingdom - 'conquest, annexation, 
inheritance and secession' - were the same ones that were involved in the creation of empires. 
This was a comparison that he drew with caution by demonstrating the different political and 
economic treatments that the composite elements of a state received next to those of an empire. 
Nevertheless, Armitage argued that in ideological terms, 'the processes of empire-building and 
state-formation' were connected sZ 
Armitage has charted the progress of the perception of the British Empire as free, maritime and 
commercial, which had its origins in a whole discourse of political thought from the late 
sixteenth century. This discourse was concerned with how England could simultaneously 
achieve the mutually incompatible goals of libertas and imperium. Classical history taught that the 
territorial extension of a political community, specifically a republic, was inimical to its liberty. 
That is, the political freedoms and privileges enjoyed by a society under a republican form of 
government would be eroded by territorial acquisitions. The most common example employed 
by ancient historians to illustrate this connection was that of the Roman Empire. As Sallust had 
narrated, in his Bellum Catilinae, when Rome had been organised as a republic it had enjoyed 
liberty, and its people had displayed martial virtue as well as a concern for the common good. 
These conditions had enabled the expansion of the republic, but then: 
Fortune began to grow cruel and to bring confusion into all our affairs. [... ] Avarice 
destroyed honour, integrity, and all other noble qualities; taught in their place insolence, 
cruelty, to neglect the gods, to set a price on everything. [... ] The state was changed and 
a government second to none in equity and excellence became cruel and intolerable 53 
51 Colley, Britons, pp. 60-62. 
52 Armitage, Ideological Origins, pp. 22-23. 
53 Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, in Sallust, ed. and trans. J. C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library (London, 
1920), x. 1-6; Armitage, Ideological Origins, p. 127. 
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The expansion of the republic had led to its political institutions being undermined by the moral 
transformation of the people and of their rulers. By contrast, the policy pursued by Sparta and, in 
modem times, by Venice, of restricting 'territorial expansion' had enabled them 'to maintain 
their political integrity' - to maintain their participatory political institutions . 
54 
The Roman model seemed to demonstrate how imperial expansion inevitably led to a system of 
absolute rule; this model influenced the development of a conception of the British Empire that 
was commercial rather than territorial. Rome was the example of how imperium endangered 
libertas: of how empires were acquired at the cost of the common good. However, at the same 
time, the Roman Empire was associated with greatness; Rome, it was suggested, would never 
have been 'great', if it had not pursued a policy of expansion. This was a problem that 
Machiavelli had turned his attention to; he argued that a republic could be constituted either 
with a view to its remaining within 'narrow limits' or it could be set up for expansion. " In the 
fast case, the state would be exposed to the threat of conquest by othersS6 - leading to the loss of 
its liberty - and, in the second case, the republic faced the dangers that attended territorial 
expansion, which included the establishment of a military dictatorship. 57 However, Machiavelli 
believed that a 'Roman type of constitution' (a republic constituted for expansion) afforded a 
state greater security, because the alternative type was impossible to maintain - it would 
eventually, contrary to its constitution, be forced to expand, leading to its subversion. " 
' Anthony Pagden, Lords ofall the World- Ideologies ofEmpire in SPain, Britain and France 1-500-1800 
(London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 17. 
11 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli, trans. Leslie J. Walker, 2 vols 
(London: Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 1.6.7, p. 225. Armitage, Ideological Oýriins, p. 128. 
1 'It is impossible for a state to remain forever in the peacefid enjoyment of its liberties and its 
narrow confines; for, though it may not molest other states, it will be molested by them, and 
when thus molested, there will arise in it the desire, and the need, for conquest' (Machiavelli, 
Discourses, 11.19.3, p. 415); a republic that was not created for expansion, but found itself with 
the need to do so, would be ruined because the 'basic principles' on which it was established, 
would be 'subverted'. In addition, if the necessity of war never confronted it, the republic would 
still face destruction: 'it will then come about that idleness will either render it effeminate or give 
rise to factions; and these two things, either in conjunction or separately, will bring about its 
downfall' (ibid., 1.6.9, p. 226). 
57 See: ibid., 111.24, pp. 535-36. The republic could also be harmed by the 'luxurious habits, of 
those it conquered, as these habits could be contracted 'by those who have intercourse with it', 
leading to the loss of those qualities that enabled it to conquer in the first place (ibid., H. 19.8-9, 
pp. 417-18). 
58 Ibid., 1.6.9-10, pp. 226-27. 
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Machiavelli presented a choice between a republic created for territorial expansion and one 
intended for preservation, but neither were exempt from the possibility of losing their liberty. It 
was a problem that would continue to confront thinkers in England during the period of the 
Protectorate and, increasingly, after the Restoration. " Yet, as trade became recognised as a 
reason of state, Machiavelli's alternatives no longer appeared adequate. Theorists of political 
economy recognised that the security and greatness of the state required a successful commercial 
policy: trade generated wealth, which in turn could finance the defence expenditure of 
governments. As Istvan Hont has shown, governments through the course of the early modem 
period became forced to engage with commerce 'both as a reliable source of income and as an 
ultimate resource for their own defence and military efficacy'6° Rulers discovered that without 
trade, the costs of modem warfare could not be met. Consequently, a country that traded more 
successfully than its rivals, could afford to expand its military expenditure. Conversely, a country 
whose trading policy proved less successful, could not devote the same sums to its defence, and 
was therefore vulnerable to conquest. While commerce itself might best flourish in times of 
peace, rulers were prepared to fight in order to preserve their trading advantages. Therefore, 
trade and preservation of the state were intimately connected with war and expansion. Yet the 
'empire' that England's rulers hoped to acquire in the late seventeenth, and at the turn of the 
eighteenth century, was not a land based one; rather the prosperity and security of England 
depended on establishing control of the seas, and thereby controlling international trading 
routes. 
The perception of what was central to Britain's security underscored the steps that British policy 
makers took. The developing argument - that a state's security lay not in territorial expansion 
but in a commercial, maritime empire - was clearly articulated by Davenant, the political 
economist, at the close of the seventeenth century. He argued that trade was more of a 'Matter of 
State' than 'any thing in the World': 'Can a Nation be Safe without Strength? And is Power to be 
Compass'd and Secure'd but by Riches? And can a Country become Rich any way, but by the 
Help of a well Managed and Extended Traffick? ' By asking these questions, Davenant revealed 
59 Armitage, Ideological Origins, pp. 134-41. 
60 Istvan Hont, 'Free Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics: Neo-Machiavellian 
Political Economy Reconsidered', in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, ed. John Dunn 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 43. 
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the connections he believed existed between security, power, riches and commerce. International 
trade was the means by which a state acquired strength and riches; it was the means, Davenant 
stated, by which England had raised sufficient funds to finance the cost of what was the Nine 
Years War (1688-97). He argued that the sale of the natural produce of England alone would 
never have generated the wealth necessary for this purpose: 'the Soil of no Country is Rich 
enough to attain a great Mass of Wealth, merely by the Exchange and Exportation of its Own 
Natural Produce'. '" After setting out the centrality of trade to England's sovereignty, Davenant 
complained that the country's leaders had not given commerce the attention that it deserved, but 
had managed it instead as an 'Accidental Ornament', rather than as the 'Chief Strength and 
support of the Kingdom' 62 
Davenant recognised that in the modern world, an indirect form of domination over other 
countries depended on commercial success. Strength and wealth, he suggested, were not 
necessarily acquired by territorial aggrandisement but could be secured through international 
commerce. Yet the benefits of commerce were by no means unmixed - Davenant, as we shall 
see, pointed out that trade could, in the end, harm the state itself. Furthermore, other political 
theorists who accepted the importance of commerce with the East Indies for England, did not 
agree on what the best means of conducting that trade might be. Crucially there existed 
disagreement regarding whether the trade should be conducted freely - that is, open the East 
India trade to all merchants - or if it could only properly be executed by an exclusive company. 
There was also controversy regarding the proper degree of government involvement in the 
workings of the market. Any error in this area by the government would have devastating 
consequences for the country's commerce. 
In a context where rulers saw themselves as being in competition with one another for a world of 
finite resources, commerce did not create mutually beneficial and reciprocal relationships 
61 Davenant, Essay on the East-India Trade, p. 7. See also: John Robertson, 'Universal Monarchy 
and the Liberties of Europe: David Hume's Critique of an English Whig Doctrine', in Political 
Discourse in Early Modern Britain, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 357-61. 
62 Ibid., p. 11. 
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between nations - trade was not the 'antithesis to warfare' 63 However, establishing commercial 
superiority was not something that could be enforced by the government; the novel problem that 
international trade presented to rulers was that it was beyond any individual government's 
sphere of control. Commerce was subject to its own laws - fundamentally, the interaction of 
demand and supply. To be a successful trading nation required supplying goods at low prices 
which necessitated that domestic wages be kept low. ' This confronted governments with a new 
state of affairs: 'for the nation, the state, to submit itself to this kind of arbitration, to ground its 
military strength, national glory, and political stability upon commercial success in foreign 
markets created a wholly new situation'. Governments, as Hont points out, were now obliged to 
train themselves in the realities of market forces 65 The country that did manage to trade 
successfully - that is, according to the laws of trade - could find itself dominating sections of 
the international market. 
The occasion of Davenant's Essay on the East India Trade was provided by the bill introduced by 
parliament in 1696 prohibiting the wearing of East India and Persia silks, printed calicoes and 
other imports, in response to the protests of English manufacturers against them. ' Davenant, 
who in the 1690s was employed by the East India Company (which, at this time, did not enjoy a 
good relationship with the government), 67 believed that any restrictions on the East India trade 
would be harmful to it, and more generally, he argued against government interference in the 
workings of commerce: 'trade is in its Nature Free, finds its own Channel, and best Directeth its 
own Course'. " Among those who had agitated for the bill were English wool manufacturers who 
wanted to encourage the domestic consumption of their product. Davenant argued that 
restricting the use of foreign imports, and expanding the domestic demand for wool, was not the 
way to go about it: 'the Natural Way of promoting the Woollen Manufacture, is not to force its 
63 Hont, 'Free Trade', p. 43. 
64 In Davenant's recommendation for promoting England's woollen trade he argued: 'to make 
'England a true Gainer by the Woollen Manufacture, we should be able to work the Commodity 
so Cheap, as to under-sell all Comers to the Markets abroad' (Essay on the East-India Trade, p. 28). 
65 Hont, 'Free Trade', pp. 43-44. 
66 See: P. J. Thomas, Mercantilism and the East India Trade. an Early Phase of the Protection V. Free 
Trade Controversy (London: P. S. King, 1926), chs lI-V. 
67 Julian Hoppit, "Davenant, Charles (1656-1714), " in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian 
Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) <http: //0- 
www. oxforddnb. com. consull. ull. ac. uk: 80/view/article/7195> [accessed 19 July 2005]. 
68 Davenant, Essay on the East India Trade, p. 25. 
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Consumption at home, but by wholesome Laws to contrive, That it may be wrought cheaply in 
England, which consequently will enable us to command the Markets abroad'. "' This argument 
was denounced by Pollexfen, who was a member of the government's board of trade between 
1696 and 1707.7° He argued that the idea of selling cloth abroad, rather than at home, in order to 
get the best price, was equivalent to arguing that `the best way for a Man to preserve his Life, 
were to Cut his own Throat'? ' 
Pollexfen then proceeded to demonstrate the fallacy of Davenant's argument by pointing out that 
the French had taken the opposite path to the one advocated by Davenant. They had, he argued, 
by an Edict of 26 October 1686, burnt Asian goods and promoted the consumption of domestic 
manufactures. The result of this had been that they had 'increased their Riches, Seamen and 
Navigation, to such a degree in 40 Years time, as hath enabled them to maintain a long War 
with most of the Princes of Europe, without much help from the East-India Trade'. 72 In 
Pollexfen's view, this proved that it was possible for country to 'Thrive by Trade' without having 
anything to do with the eastern trade. 73 He also accepted that trade generally required liberty to 
flourish, but argued that all rules had their exception; the East Indian and woollen trade were 
two instances where he believed the government should interfere. 74 He rejected Davenant's 
calculations that the 'East India Trade did annually add to the gross Stock of England at least 
£600,000 per Annum in times of Peace'; 75 instead, he calculated that the trade had brought an 
annual loss to England of E400000.7" Earlier in the century, Thomas Mun (bap. 1571, d. 1641), 
had justified the East India trade on the basis that it augmented the wealth of the kingdom 
because Indian goods were not consumed at home77 but were either re-exported, or finished at 
home and then also re-exported. 78 However in the 1660s and 1670s, the volume of trade with 
69 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
7° Richard Grassby, "Pollexfen, John (1636-1715), " in ODNB, <http: //0- 
www. oxforddnb. com. consull. ull. ac. uk: 80/view/article/22475> [accessed 19 July 2005]. 
71 Pollexfen, England and East-India Inconsistent, pp. 25-26. 
72 Ibid., p. 42. 
73 Ibid., p. 43. 
74 Ibid., p. 52. 
75 Davenant, Essay on the East India Trade, p. 17. 
76 Pollexfen, England and East-India Inconsistent, p. 6. 
77 This was with the exception of items that Mun regarded as 'essentials', see: William J. Barber, 
British Economic Thought and India 1600-1858. " a Study in the History of Development Economics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 13-14. 
78 See: Barber, British Economic Thought, pp. 10,13-15. 
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Asia had expanded significantly and the number of Indian goods consumed at home increased. 
Pollexfen argued that this development undermined the basis of the Indian trade - Britain was 
not gaining by it 79 
Davenant accepted that Europe annually lost gold and silver to Asia and argued that they would 
have been a 'full Third' richer if they [Europe] had never discovered or engaged in trade with the 
sub-continent 80 Significantly however, Davenant stressed that it was France, Germany and 
Spain - who did not trade directly with India - that actually bore the cost of this trade 8t In 
any case, the trade could not now be prohibited by law, argued Davenant, as the people had 
grown accustomed to Indian goods: 'the Laws of all Countries must be suited to the Bent and 
Inclinations of the People: And (which I am loath to say) there is sometimes a Necessity, they 
should be a little accommodated to their deprav'd Manners, and Corruption'. ' This was an apt 
illustration, as Hont argues, of the way 'commercial society, [... ] set clear limits to ideological 
politics'. " The reservations that Davenant displayed towards the Indian trade stemmed from the 
ideal he cherished of Sparta, which he conceived as a frugal and simple nation. Such qualities, 
according to commonplace trajectory, could not be sustained by extensive foreign commerce: 
'Trade [... ] is in its nature a pernicious thing; it brings in that wealth which introduces luxury; it 
gives a rise to fraud and avarice, and extinguishes virtue and simplicity of manners'. Yet, 
Davenant argued that trade, specifically the East Indian trade, had become a 'necessary evil'; " 
England had to engage in this activity because it was central to her prosperity and safety. He 
argued that if Britain abandoned the Indian trade, the Dutch would 'engross the whole: And if to 
their Naval strength in Europe, such a foreign Strength and wealth be added', England's trade 
would depend on the cooperation of the Dutch 85 
79 Pollexfen, England and East-India Inconsistent, p. 3. 
Davenant, Essay on the East India Trade, pp. 12-14. 
81 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
sz Ibid., p. 48. 
83 Hont, 'Free Trade, ' p. 68. 
s4 Davenant, An Essay upon the Probable Methods of making a People Gainers in the Balance of Trade 
(1669), in The Political and Commercial Works of the Celebrated Writer Charles D'venant, LL. D, ed. 
Sir Charles Whitworth, 5vols (London, 1771), vol. 2, p. 275, quoted in Hont, 'Free Trade', p. 65. 
85 Davenant, Essay on the East India Trade, pp. 18-19. 
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The rationale behind Davenant's argument was twofold. Firstly, very much like Machiavelli, 
who had thought that states faced the alternative of either conquering others or being conquered, 
so Davenant thought that England was obliged to participate in the East India trade and thereby 
enjoy the wealth it would bring; or it could allow other countries to reap the advantages and 
thereby reduce itself to a position of weakness ' Secondly, he argued that the only way that 
England could retain its liberty (from external threats) was by wealth. England required adequate 
resources for military expenditure if she was going to remain free from the threat of conquest. 
Trade was a method by which these funds could be raised: 
The power of our neighbours, both by land and sea, is grown so formidable, that 
perhaps we must be for some time upon our guard, with fleets too big to be maintained 
merely by the natural produce and income of our country. We must therefore have 
recourse to those artificial helps which industry and a well governed trade may 
minister. " 
The important claim that Davenant was making was that England had to establish its 'dominion 
on trade' and his work was concerned with how successful and durable commerce could be 
conducted by a nation. ' Davenant believed 'whatever Country can be in full and undisputed 
Possession of it [East India trade], will give Law to all the Commercial World'. " By establishing 
itself as the foremost traders, England would not enjoy a territorial empire but it would still enjoy 
a form of dominion over other countries. A commercial empire was conceptually more easily 
reconciled with liberty than a territorial and military one - the precondition of trade itself was 
liberty. The importance of commerce to a country's security would theoretically constrain 
governments from attacking the liberties of the people upon which trade depended. 90 
It was the fear of the negative moral and political consequences that attended large land-based 
empires such as Rome, which led to the British Empire being theorised in a different way in the 
early modern period. Machiavelli's concern had been to address the lack of durability of a 
I Davenant argued that if, for whatever reason, English merchants abandoned the India trade, 
the Dutch would take it over 'And such an Addition to their Riches and Power at Sea can by no 
means be consistent with the Welfare, and Safety of this Nation', Essay on the East India Trade, p. 
56. 
87 Davenant, 'That Foreign Trade is beneficial to England, ' Discourses on the Public Revenues, Part 
II, Discourse I, in Works, vol. 1, p. 348, quoted in Hont, 'Free Trade', p. 67. 
88 Hont, 'Free Trade', p. 70. 
89 Davenant, Essay on the East India Trade, p. 18. 
90 See: Armitage, Ideological Origins, pp. 142-43. 
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political community, and this too had informed Davenant's theories and those of political 
economy more generally at this time. We have seen that Davenant argued against interfering in 
the workings of commerce, yet he also believed that action should be taken to undermine the 
trade of England's rivals in order to protect its trading interests. This was illustrated in his 
thought by the policy that he argued should be adopted in relation to Ireland. Poor countries, 
such as Ireland, enjoyed an advantage over richer ones, in the form of low waged workers, which 
reduced their overall production costs. In the context of free trade, Davenant feared that a 
country like Ireland would be able to supply certain goods more cheaply than domestic 
producers. Consequently, allowing the Irish to enjoy free trade, was tantamount to sacrificing the 
good of England. Davenant believed that it was entirely justifiable to `interrupt the too sudden 
growth of any neighbour nation' - if the greater good of the nation demanded it 91 
M. 
Davenant's ideas and claims regarding the extent of the government's role in the workings of the 
market, and concerning the benefits of the East India trade did not, as we have seen, go 
unchallenged. Yet the claim that commerce was integral to the prosperity and sovereignty of 
England was a crucial one for the rationalisation of a commercial empire. Such an empire 
allowed England to enjoy great power without being faced with the prospects of corruption and 
decline associated with territorial expansion. Wealth and the attendant power that commerce 
brought to Britain was celebrated by Joseph Addison (1672-1719) in the Spectator in 1711: 'Our 
English Merchant converts the Tin of his own Country into Gold, and Exchanges his Wooll for 
Rubies' 92 More revealingly still, he pointed out that 'trade, without enlarging the British 
Territories, has given us a kind of additional Empire' 93 This additional kind of empire -a 
maritime empire of trade - had given Britain an advantage in the international arena of a kind 
that, according to Machiavelli, belonged to an aggressive and assertive republic. As Daniel 
Defoe (1660? -1731) remarked in 1729, 'the Trading Nations of the world are now become 
infinitely superior in wealth and power, to those who might properly be call'd the Fighting 
91 Davenant, Balance of Trade, in Works, vol. 2, p. 254; see also Hont, 'Free Trade', pp. 84-89. 
92 The Spectator, ed. D. F. Bond, 5 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), I, no. 69 (19 May 1711), 
p. 296. 
93 Ibid. 
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Nations, and whose grandeur depended upon the Extent of their Dominions, and Number of 
conquer'd countries'. " 
Defoe had been one of Robert Harley's agents, and between 1707 and 1714, he had received a 
salary from the government 95 In the 1720s however, Defoe had turned his literary skills to 
writing about Britain's commerce " Trading nations, Defoe argued, had not attained superiority 
by the 'policy of their Government, the Prudence of their Counsels, or the Valour of their 
Troops', but by the expansion of their commerce. This expansion had 'enlarg'd their Wealth and 
Power, attracted Multitudes to dwell in the most narrow and prescribed Bounds and found 
Subsistence for them, where the Country itself could not maintain the tenth Part of them'. He 
believed that a nation, on the basis of its trade, could establish itself as the foremost naval power 
and could thereby keep the rest of the world in 'awe' 97 The clear equation of naval strength with 
international trade, was further strengthened by Defoe, by the argument that the sailors required 
by a maritime power were ultimately 'nourish'd' and 'increased' by trade. 
In addition, like Davenant, Defoe recognised that whichever country managed to control trade, 
could dictate its terms to its rivals: 'if any one Nation could govern Trade, that Nation would 
govern the world; could it give Laws to the Commerce, it would give Laws to the People, and 
the whole world would be its Dependents and Subjects'. "' Defoe went on to outline his views on 
the potential of trade with Africa and the difference between beneficial and pernicious trade 99 
This was an important distinction as, in Defoe's estimation, the East India trade was more 
pernicious than beneficial to Britain. This was because it undermined Britain's domestic 
industries: bullion rather than British goods were exported to Asia, and finished goods rather 
" Pefbe], 4dvantages ofFeace and Commerce, p. 3. 
15 W. A. Speck, "Harley, Robert, first earl of Oxford and Mortimer (1661-1724), " in ODNB, 
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than bullion were imported into Britain. 10° Defoe argued that the trade was in fact detrimental to 
all of Europe, which was why he believed that it should be carefully controlled; British policy 
makers, he advised, should beware of the Russians and ensure that they did not establish direct 
trading links with China, India, Persia and Turkey, and by carrying goods over land and river 
(rather than via the Cape of Good Hope), open a 'Back-Door' by which East India goods could 
'Flood' into Europe. 101 
Defoe felt that the cost of carrying Indian goods by this back-door route to Europe was much 
lower than the passage via the Cape of Good Hope, and therefore the goods could be sold more 
cheaply on European markets. He argued that it was in the interest of Europe to try if possible to 
prevent the establishment of the Ostend102 and, potentially, a Muscovite Company; further, he 
stressed that Britain should take steps to protect her manufactures (by prohibiting the use of 
Indian wrought silks and calicoes) and to only purchase goods that were 'absolutely necessary 
for Europe', such as salt-petre, pepper and spices: ` 
It were greatly to be wish'd indeed, that the Trade to China and India were in itself a 
profitable Trade to the rest of Europe then the opening these Back-Doors or By- 
Channels might be of some Use to us: but as it is, I must confess it seems to be nothing 
but opening a new Passage to let in more Thieves upon us, to carry away our ready 
Money; and that neither this [Muscovite Company] any more than the Ostend Company 
should be allowed, if it could be help'd, nor our own be allow'd to bring any Goods but 
such as are absolutely necessary for our Use. 104 
By taking such precautions, Defoe suggested that Britain could mitigate the 'harm' the East India 
trade caused to her. His argument revealed that commerce with the east continued to be regarded 
as a mixed blessing for Britain, but even the benefits of this trade could not be realised if peace in 
Europe was not upheld. The overall message that Defoe was trying to impress on his readers was 
100 [Defoe], The Trade to India Critically and Calmly Consider'd and Prov'd to be Destructive to the 
General Trade of Great Britain as well as to the Woollen and Silk Manufactures in Particular (London, 
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101 [Defoe], Advantages ofPeace and Commerce, pp. 28,19. 
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that Britain's 'Wealth and Power, our Fame and Glory' rested upon the preservation of her 
trade, which in turn required the maintenance of peace. "' 
By stressing the importance of peace for British commerce, Defoe was implicitly engaging in the 
current controversy regarding Robert Walpole's government and British foreign policy. British 
politics throughout the 1720s and 30s were dominated by Walpole (1676-1745); his ascendancy 
fostered a proliferation of opposition literature - most notably Bolingbroke's The Craftsman, a 
weekly that was first published in 1726.106 These anti-Walpole tracts, periodicals and papers, 
attacked Walpole's government as corrupt because of his use of patronage and bribery to secure 
influence, by which he then (it was contended) undermined the balance of the constitution. 107 
Walpole was further condemned, among other things, for his foreign policy: throughout the 
1730s, Walpole attempted to avoid involvement in another continental war - remaining 
neutral, for instance, during the War of the Polish Succession. "' Britain also attempted to resolve 
its disputes with the Spanish by negotiation (rather than force), believing it to be in the better 
interests of British commerce. 109 
This was a policy that Defoe endorsed; he argued that although England, as a trading nation, 
enjoyed an advantage in war because of the greater resources it commanded, "" it also had more 
to lose: 'therefore I cannot but pay a great Deference to the Endeavours of those Ministers, who, 
notwithstanding the Murmurs of the People, apply themselves to Preserving the Peace of 
Europe'. '" However, in the wake of Spanish depredations of British ships in the Atlantic, the 
opposition demanded a more robust response. Walpole managed to negotiate a settlement with 
the Spanish (Convention of the Pardo, January 1739) but was forced to declare war in October 
... Ibid., pp. 38,40. 
101 Shelley Burn, Virtue Transformed. Political Argument in England 1688-1740 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 88. 
"' For a treatment of Bolingbroke's argument see: Burtt, Virtue Transformed, ch. 5; Duncan 
Forbes, Hume's PhilosophicalPolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 6. 
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1739 (the War of Jenkins' Ear), when the Spanish seized British ships. "' The opposition argued 
that Walpole's foreign policy had been detrimental to Britain's overseas commercial interests, 
because it had enabled her rivals to increase in strength unopposed; this argument was an 
integral component of their wider case against what they saw as the corruption of the Walpole 
regime. ' 13 
Charles Forman (d. 1739), "' the political pamphleteer, contributed to the ongoing debate 
regarding British foreign policy, on the side of the opposition; in a posthumously published 
pamphlet addressed to Walpole, he argued: 'I [... ] hope you will please to dedicate some small 
portion of your Time to the Preservation of what feeds the Poor, enriches the Industrious, and 
principally supports the State itself. This, Sir, is the Duty of a Minister'. "' Forman here had 
Britain's commerce in mind and felt that Walpole had not given it the attention that it deserved. 
The pamphlet was originally written in 1733, urging Walpole not to sacrifice Britain's 
commercial interests for the sake of maintaining an alliance with the Dutch. Yet it was not 
published in that year because Forman felt that the death of King Augustus II of Poland altered 
the situation on the continent, and Britain then needed to support her European allies. 
This was the explanation given in the preface to the 1741 publication of the work: 'Great Britain 
could not set matters to rights with Holland, without evidently risking the Grand Alliance, and 
consequently leaving France and Spain at full liberty to go through with the project they had 
formed for enriching themselves with the Spoils of the House of Austria'. "" In the event however, 
Britain had not supported her ally, Austria, when she had been attacked by France in 1733, and 
consequently, in the pamphleteer's opinion, allowed France to grow in strength. '" The decision 
to publish Forman's Queries and Observations was taken in 1741 because of the continued currency 
X11 Wilson, 'Empire, Trade', pp. 78-80. Bruce Lehman, Britain's Colonial Wars 1688-1783 (Essex: 
Longman, 2001), pp. 59-60,64-65. 
113 See: Wilson, 'Empire, Trade', p. 96. 
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a number of pamphlets on politics and commerce, see: James Sambrook, "Forman, Charles (d 
1739), " in ODNB, <http: //0-www. oxforddnb. com. consull. ull. ac. uk: 80/view/article/68299> 
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of Forman's argument - the British government had persistently failed to follow a policy on the 
continent that protected Britain's global interests. "8 By 1741, the opposition's grievances against 
Walpole's policy had only been exacerbated; they contended that the government had 
mismanaged affairs on the continent and failed to conduct the Spanish war properly. 119 
These debates demonstrate that neither the opposition, nor the government, denied the 
importance of commerce to the security of Britain. The point they disagreed upon was the 
strategy that best preserved Britain's interests. Forman believed that Britain's commercial 
interests no longer lay in supporting her old European alliances. He reminded Walpole of 
Addison's description of the benefits of commerce, where Addison had described English 
merchants converting tin into gold by engaging in international trade; it was a 'picture', said 
Forman, of what Britain could enjoy if it was encouraged and protected by 'our ministers'. "' On 
other hand, if it was neglected by a 'foolish, a knavish' and 'an ignorant' administration, Britain 
could expect 'poverty and neglect' for herself and for her rivals to gain what she had failed to 
preserve: 'we must [ ... ] unavoidably dwindle 
into Poverty as they encrease in Riches at our 
Expence'. The failure to pay due attention to Britain's trade was tantamount to betraying 
Britain's commercial interests to foreigners - individuals guilty of such neglect, argued Forman, 
could only be considered as 'an enemy to his country as wen as a Traytor to his Prince'221 This 
was a clear illustration of the way the opposition equated patriotism with the preservation of 
Britain's commerce. Forman contended that the Dutch East India Company had risen because 
its government had aggressively pursued its commercial interests and by 'seizing other People's 
Dominions' had become 'Lawgivers to the Universe in regard to the Trade of the East'. ` 
Forman argued that Britain should advance her own interests by not joining the Dutch in 
preventing the Portuguese and Spanish from trading with the East Indies, but in preventing the 
Dutch from further aggrandising themselves. 
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IV. 
The attention of publicists was drawn more specifically to the preservation of Britain's commerce 
in the East Indies, rather than the more general concern displayed by Defoe and Forman with 
Britain's global interests, when in 1744 war broke out with France. This decade, as a whole, 
proved to be an important one for the development of Britain's relationship with India, because 
of the way the Company responded to the perceived French threat. Defoe (and Davenant before 
him) had displayed an ambivalent attitude towards the eastern trade, but accepted its necessity. 
This continued to be the case in the 1740s, when Britain was faced with the prospect of being 
driven out of India by the French; publicists may not have regarded the eastern trade as 
equivalent in importance to the American one, but this did not mean that they were prepared for 
Britain's position on the sub-continent to be eclipsed by the French. British policy makers, in 
turn, by their military response to French actions, made it abundantly clear that Indian trade was 
not an expendable component of British security. 
In 1744, instead of observing the customary neutrality in Asia towards French traders, the British 
seized French ships. In response, the French governor, Joseph Dupleix captured the British Fort 
St. George at Madras in 1746. This was ultimately returned to the British by the Peace of Aix-la- 
Chapelle, in 1748, but the French subsequently began to use their troops in Indian succession 
disputes in the Carnatic - the French realised that they could achieve their objectives 
in India 
by militarily supporting a pliant Indian claimant to the throne who, upon his successful 
accession, would then be willing to grant their requests. 123 One keen observer of Indian affairs at 
mid-century, recognising the threat that French strategy posed to the Company in India, argued 
that the Company directors were not taking the steps necessary for protecting British interests on 
the sub-continent. He argued that the directors had not sent their servants in India sufficient 
troops to protect themselves in 1746, nor allowed them to spend the sums necessary for 
protecting the Madras settlement. He went on to argue that the Company's interests had been 
123 Lenman, Britain's Colonial Wars, pp. 92-96. One contemporary argued: 'The governors of the 
French and English East-India companies on the coast of Coromandel, finding a body of 
European troops at their command and disposal, perceived that this put it in their power to 
acquire an influence among the unwarlike natives. With this view they began to interfere in the 
political government of those countries, in which they had till then peaceably traded. They 
stirred up competitors to form pretensions, and each supported his claimant with the whole force 
of his constituents', Anon., Reflections on the Present State, p. 18; see also pp. 17-19. 
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neglected and that Dupleix was perfectly justified for reportedly having said that Britain's 
directors were 'unqualified for great Affairs! We [French] offered them a Neutrality which they 
refused, then squirted out a little Squadron to surprise our trade; and with this Insult upon us, 
neglected to the last to put their Settlements in any Posture of defence'. "' 
The perception of the threat that the French posed to Britain's interests led observers to urge the 
Company to adopt a more aggressive policy towards preserving its commerce. Nathaniel 
Smith, "' reflecting back upon these events in 1771, would argue that Dupleix had first `opened 
the way to acquiring territorial possessions in India'; his initial success (the loss of Madras), 
suggested Smith, had been the result of Britain's 'inactivity and wretched parsimony'. It was only 
after the 'French and the Indian powers together had almost drove us into the sea' that, he 
believed, Britain had begun to assert its military prowess, under the leaderships of Clive and 
Major Stringer Lawrence. "' In other words, as Smith rationalised the situation, France's policies 
on the sub-continent forced the Company to follow a similar strategy, and ultimately, in order to 
maintain its advantage, the Company was left with no option but to acquire political power. 
Between the peace that was ratified in 1748, and the outbreak of the Seven Years War, the 
perception that France was actively working to advance her interests at Britain's expense was an 
influential one. One 'Friend to the British Flag' argued that while Britain had kept to the terms of 
the 1748 peace, France was daily undermining it. "' He believed that France was secretly 
building up her military presence in Asia, Africa and America (places where Britain's 'chief 
" Anon., A Letter to a Proprietor of the East-India Company (London, 1750), BL, OIOC Tract Vol. 
83, pp. 6-7,11-15, l7n. 
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Dependence lie'), and that unless Britain's leaders implemented measures to preserve her 
interests France would successfully expel Britain from those parts of the world. "' 
One area that he identified as needing the urgent attention of government was the loss of her 
skilled workers to her rivals - his argument revealed the associations that thinkers continued to 
make between commerce and a country's international strength. It was trade, not territory, that 
publicists like the 'Friend of the British Flag' wanted to preserve and expand; any aggressive 
policy on the sub-continent was aimed at securing the Company's commerce - not at gaining 
land for its own sake. He argued that Britain had lost her 'ingenious Ship-Carpenters, brave and 
intrepid sailors' and gained 'Raguamuffons' like 'Italian Singers' and 'French Dancers'. 129 He 
wanted Britain's leaders to create employment for her skilled workers, because he believed that 
their continual exodus to France and Spain strengthened those countries, as well as having 
detrimental effects on Britain's industry, and consequently her wealth, and ability to protect 
herself. 
A similar argument was advanced by Malachy Postlethwayt (1707-1767) in his Universal 
Dictionary of Trade and Commerce. He argued that Britain could attempt to deal with the constant 
threat that the French posed to her interests by resorting to war, but that would not give Britain 
any permanent security. Postlethwayt argued that Britain should instead increase her power by 
improving her industry: 
The art of war is now become a science, and indeed, a trading one, and France is often 
obliged to give their military people diversion abroad, lest they should be troublesome at 
home. War [... ] seems to be necessary to that nation; but it is no way so to us [... ]. Let 
us, so deal with France, and, indeed, with all other nations, by the peaceable arm of 
commerce; let us beat them by our superior industry in the acquisition of such useful arts 
as will not only employ our own people, but invite all hither who are oppressed in other 
countries. 10 
128 Ibid., p. 11. 
129 Ibid., pp. 7-9. 
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Both Postlethwayt and the author of Some Material sought to give advice on how Britain could 
maintain or gain an advantage over France and Spain. Postlethwayt was suggesting that by 
making Britain the centre of industry, she would attract the skilled workers of other countries 
and her rivals would be forced to buy goods from her - they would no longer possess the 
workers by which to compete with her. Whether this was sustainable in the long run was a 
matter of debate; Davenant had argued that the low wage advantage of a poor country would 
undermine the industries of the richer ones, consequently he had advocated taxing the poorer 
countries in order to maintain England's advantage. David Hume on the other hand presented a 
vision of complementary trade between nations based on an international division of labour. "' 
These are debates that will be considered in chapter five below. The important point here is that 
thinkers like Postlethwayt pointed to the indispensability of commerce to Britain's security and 
recognised the East India trade as an essential component of that; he argued that the trade with 
the East Indies was 'one great wheel that moves many other' . 
13' Even Pollexfen, writing in the 
previous century, had regarded the eastern trade as based on the 'worst foundation of all Trades', 
because it adversely affected the home industries, yet still argued that he was not against the re- 
exportation of Indian goods to European markets. In other words, he was not against the trade 
altogether, but against the home consumption of Indian goods '133 while 
Defoe had also stopped 
short of prohibiting the trade altogether. 
The connection between trade and Britain's security would continue to be the theme for the 
ensuing years; commentators recognised that Britain's ability to protect herself depended on her 
ability to finance war. This in turn rested on the prosperity of her commerce - what continued 
to determine the course that Britain took to protect its trade were the actions or the perceived 
intentions of her European rivals. It would be widely argued in the literature published in the 
later 1760s and early 1770s, that France's increased involvement in Indian politics had led 
Britain to follow suit. Territorial control presented itself as the ultimate way of limiting the trade 
of other Europeans, but that in turn raised a whole set of additional problems. 
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Postlethwayt's remark that the East India trade was a wheel that moved many others, was 
possibly the one that the author of the Reflections on the Present State of our East-India Affairs, of 
1764, had in mind when he quoted without attribution the line that the trade with India was the 
'grand wheel of commerce, setting all others in motion'. " By this date, the status of the East India 
Company in Bengal had undergone a revolution. John Caillaud (1726-1812) who wrote a 
narrative of events that occurred in 1760 argued that their actions had placed British interests on 
a solid basis: 'the company is secure, the nabob's government established and in a fair way of 
becoming great and flourishing'. "' This was a positive assessment that was not shared by the 
author of Reflections on the Present State-, he first proceeded to establish the importance of the trade 
with the East Indies, before he turned his attention to the Company's changed state of affairs. 
Many of the arguments that were put forward by the author of the Reflections were similar to the 
ones Davenant had advanced at the end of the preceding century. He argued that the domestic 
consumption of East Indian goods could not be prevented because they were widely used in 
Europe; consequently, even if Britain stopped trading in those goods, demand for them would 
still exist and their prohibition would only lead to them being purchased from other countries 
(France and Holland) at a higher price. Abandoning the trade, he suggested, would only lead to 
it being appropriated by her rival, France, which would be `destructive of the power, safety, and 
independence of this kingdom'. 136 
Having established the importance of the trade to the kingdom, he then turned his attention to 
the way in which it was conducted. The author considered the recent revolution in Company 
affairs as 'destructive of the very being and existence of that trade, the importance of which was 
the subject of my introduction, and to the root of which the ax[e] seems to be already laid'. "' In 
his opinion, political authority had made their commerce with Bengal less profitable. The 
interest of Britain, he continued, required the procurement of Indian goods at the lowest possible 
134 Anon., Reflections on the Present State, p. 2. 
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prices; the way to achieve this, he argued, was 'if they could carry on their trade in India by 
pedlars living in huts and hovels, on the cheapest fare, than by mighty governors, dwelling in 
palaces' - the lower their costs in India, the cheaper the Company could sell the goods in 
Europe. '38 
He did not however advocate that the Company actually forgo their forts and start living in 
hovels. Rather he argued that the Company faced threats on the sub-continent from other 
Europeans and Indians and from an alliance of Europeans and Indians. In the end, he was 
accepting the necessity of political control in Asia, and was arguing for the Company to be made 
equal to the task. He contended that it was a general and just maxim that 'the ruin of all empires 
and governments hath arisen from an enlargement of the superstructure beyond what the basis 
could bear'. "' The preservation of the Company, which he believed remained the means by 
which Britain could best profit from the East India trade, required that it was supported in 
proportion 'to its demands and natural wants'. That is, that the power and privilege of the 
Company had to be expanded in proportion to its increased responsibilities, but without 
destroying'the spirit of its original institution'. "' 
The directors did in fact attempt to obtain support from the government to reform all aspects of 
their affairs after news of the events that had transpired in Bengal reached London. However the 
British government did not desire to be 'drawn into new areas of imperial and legislative activity 
or responsibility. The problems of empire were held to be, initially at least, the problems of the 
East India Company'. "' It was only in 1772, when many commentators thought that the 
acquisitions could be lost, that North's government seriously set about reforming the Company's 
affairs. Yet, despite the government's reluctance to engage with the practical and ideological 
problems bequeathed by the alteration of the Company's affairs, other informed observers did 
turn their attention to them and debate the course that Britain needed to take - that is, they 
debated how Bengal should be governed, but they did not question the desirability of a territorial 
empire itself. 
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V. 
The argument advanced by the author of the Reflections of the Present State demonstrates the full 
range of issues that the debate about Britain's relationship with Bengal involved: the comparative 
benefits and costs of free trade with Asia, as compared to conducting that trade by means of an 
exclusive trading Company, and the viability of a successful commercial venture, while the 
vehicle of that venture also enjoyed political power. It had been argued in the Reflections of the 
Present State, that the Company remained the best way of conducting trade with the East Indies 
- rather than opening the trade up to all who wished to participate; this was also the opinion of 
Postlethwayt. 112 
By this date, the course of this particular debate was a well worn one. Critics of the Company 
had long argued that trading companies were the `Bane of allfair Commerce', arguing that the 
Company's practise of establishing forts was not only expensive, but also a cause of provocation 
between the British and the Indians: 
They [the Company] keep Forts abroad at great Expence, to colour the Necessity of such 
Monopolies, and to oppress and rob the Natives there with security; for 'tis a Jest to imagine they 
can any Ways conduce to fair Trade: Every Nation in the world that has anything to buy or sell, 
will see theirAccount in doing so [... ]; Forts [... ] will only provoke and make them [the Indians] 
Enemies. 143 
In 1754, another publicist also argued that the trade with India should be made free, stating that 
each of the Company's forts should be made into separate colonies, with governors appointed by 
the British Crown, and an elective assembly. These potential Indian colonies, he contended 
would be as 'rich' as 'Virginia, or Jamaica' and would be able not only to 'defray their own 
charges, but also give assistance to paying off the National Debt'. "' 
"I Anon., Reflections on the Present State, p. 74; Posdethwayt, Universal Dictionary, p. 683. See also 
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During the 1750s and 1760s, the anti-monopolist case was argued in parliament by William 
Beckford (bap. 1709, d. 1770), but this strain of argument did not have influence on the policy 
that was developed by the government. "' Rather, opinion, after the servants in Bengal had made 
the decision that the commercial interest of Britain was best served by territorial control, was 
divided between those that wanted the responsibility of government to be separated from the 
Company and those that believed that reform of the Company would secure the territories to 
Britain. The issue that was debated was whether the Company was capable of successfully 
merging the responsibilities of ruler and merchant without destroying the foundations of Britain's 
trade with Bengal. Clive had written to William Pitt early in 1759 arguing that they could not 
trust the nawab of Bengal and his son to keep their agreement with the British and recommended 
that they maintain a force of 2000 troops to 'secure us from any apprehension [... ]; and in case of 
their daring to be troublesome, enable the Company to take the sovereignty upon themselves'. 146 
This could be seen as evidence of a change in Britain's attitudes towards her overseas interests, 
especially in light of the peace making that followed the Seven Years War. Britain's decision to 
retain Canada over the more commercially advantageous Guadeloupe could be presented as a 
shift from 'commerce to "imperialism"". Yet, as Peter Miller has stressed, what defined 'British 
colonial policy' was security - British leaders took the decision they felt would best preserve 
their existing commercial interests rather than seeking additional responsibility. "' Discussions 
regarding Britain's connection with and responsibility towards Bengal subsequent to the 
acquisition of diwani were overshadowed, however, by questions regarding Britain's financial 
health and property rights. The decision to end the war, and the peace that followed was 
influenced by concerns relating to Britain's finances - there existed a strain of contemporary 
opinion that argued that France was deliberately continuing the war in order to bankrupt 
Britain. "' The fear of national insolvency continued after the war, especially as its cost had been 
high. The danger that the growth of public credit presented to the security of the state was 
graphically described by Hume who argued that it would ultimately destroy the nation. 
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That was, of course, unless the nation destroyed public credit. "" Hume rejected the necessity of a 
commercial empire - the principles of which had been developed, for instance, by Davenant. '5o 
However, Hume's argument expounds the connections that contemporaries continued to draw 
between the security of the state and the state's ability to wage war - and, in relation to this, its 
ability to raise finance and the success of its commerce. Hume pointed out that in the modem 
era, wars were financed by the means of public credit, while the ancients had relied upon 
treasure they had stored in times of peace. The problem with the modem system was that its 
abuse led to inescapable, devastating, consequences: 'if the abuses of treasure be dangerous, 
either by engaging the state in rash enterprises, or making it neglect military discipline, in 
confidence of its riches; the abuses of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, 
impotence, and subjection to foreign powers'. 151 Hume went on to describe how he believed that 
the growth of the national debt would inevitably lead to foreign conquest. He argued that a state 
would eventually reach a point where it could no longer raise any further funds, but the need to 
protect the state's interests, that is, its wealth and commerce, would remain: 'we must still 
suppose great commerce and opulence to remain, even after every fund is mortgaged; these 
riches must be defended by proportional power; and whence is the public to derive the revenue 
which supports it? ' The answer to this question was complicated by the fact that by the time that 
a country reached this point, it would have undergone a social transformation; it would be the 
public creditors that would now enjoy the powers of office, displacing the nobility who were the 
bulwark against despotism. '52 
The only option that was open to the public was to tax the bearers of government bonds. Yet, the 
impact of such a measure on the nobility would be such as to confer absolute power on the 
government. This, in turn, would enable the government to appropriate money from the state's 
creditors - leading to the loss of credit altogether - as well as the income of the king. 
Ultimately, a policy of this kind would lead to a `degree of despotism' that even Asia had not 
'a9 Hume, 'Of Public Credit', in Essays, pp. 360-61. See on this Istvan Hont, 'The Rhapsody of 
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seen. On the other hand, if the prince remained limited by the 'national councils' - in which the 
public creditors enjoyed prominence - the creditors would never agree to part with the sums of 
money necessary to defend the government. '" This latter course was the one that Hume argued 
could reasonably be predicted for Britain. Hume's solution for Britain, when faced with the 
prospect of war, and an inability to raise further taxes, was 'voluntary bankruptcy'; this was what 
Hume termed the 'natural death of public credit'. This however was an option that was more 
likely to be taken by an absolute ruler than a popular government; under the latter regime, the 
political influence of the public creditors would prevent any state declaration of bankruptcy. 
Consequently, in popular governments, the outcome was likely to be the 'violent death of our 
public credit'; that is, the inability to raise funds necessary to defend the country, leading to the 
country's conquest. ' It was this fact that gave absolute monarchies an advantage over free and 
moderate governments. "' 
The point of Hume's argument was to show that in order to preserve Britain's independence - 
to cancel the advantage enjoyed by universal monarchies - Britain should follow the example of 
absolute governments and cancel the debt. 156 He argued that France had been prevented from 
establishing a universal monarchy by a coalition of European states that had been maintained by 
Britain. The future growth of the national debt, and Britain's inability to raise any further funds 
to finance wars necessary to maintain the balance of power in Europe, may lead to a situation 
where 'our children, weary of the struggle, and fettered with incumbrances, may sit down secure, 
and see their neighbours oppressed and conquered; till, at last, they themselves and their 
creditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror'. 157 The solution that Hume put forward may not 
have been embraced by all shades of political opinion and he himself demonstrated the failure of 
Ibid., p. 359. 
Ibid., pp. 363-65. 
Hont, 'Rhapsody', p. 324. See also: Michael Sonenscher, 'The Nation's Debt and the Birth of 
the Modem Republic: the French Fiscal Deficit and the Politics of the Revolution of 1789 (Part 
I)', History ofTblitical 77iought, 18,1 (1997), 64-103 (pp. 81-84). 
See: Robertson, 'Universal Monarchy', pp. 354-55. 
Hume, 'Of Public Credit', Essays, p. 365. Hont, 'Rhapsody', pp. 325-26,329-330; on the 
closeness of Hume's solution of 'natural death' to Bolingbroke's 'patriotic bankruptcy', see: 
Hont, 'Rhapsody', p. 334. Cf. Montesquieu who argued that a state (Britain) that boffowed from 
its subjects gave them a reason to defend their country's liberty - that is, to preserve it from 
external conquests. See: Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Sphit of the 
Laws, ed. Anne Cohler, Basia C. Miller and Harold S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989; repr. 2000), p. 327. 
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Britain's commercial policy to promote Britain's true interests, "' but his analysis showed the 
important relationship that existed between war, public credit and the country's independence. 
The growth of the national debt after the Seven Years War made the prospect of financial 
collapse very real. In this context, the acquisition of the territorial revenues of Bengal could only 
have been welcomed by the British government. '59 
V1. 
In light of Britain's financial difficulties, it is not surprising that the acquisitions drew initial 
controversy regarding the mutual rights of the East India Company and government to its 
revenues rather than their mutual responsibilities towards Bengal or its place in Britain's empire. 
In Clive's letter to Pitt of 1759, he had argued that the wealth of Bengal could potentially be 
'appropriated in part as a fund towards diminishing the heavy load of debt under which we at 
present labour'. 160 In the same letter Clive had also urged the British government to take steps to 
'secure' the 'acquisition', rather than leaving the responsibility to the Company; Clive believed 
that 'so large a sovereignty may possibly be an object too extensive for a mercantile company'. 
He argued: 'I leave you to judge whether an income of yearly of upwards of two millions 
sterling, with the possession of three provinces abounding in the most valuable productions of 
161 nature and of art, be an object deserving the public attention'. Clive was of course not 
successful in securing the support of the government for his plan, but in 1767 Chatham would 
attempt to secure the government's rights to the revenue, which would initiate a controversy 
regarding the sanctity of property rights. 
The more comprehensive threat to property rights that some individuals felt were at stake by 
Chatham's actions in 1767, even led an opponent of the Company, who identified himself as an 
`untainted Englishman', to defend the Company's rights to its possessions in Bengal - his 
See: Robertson, 'Universal Monarchy, p. 369. 
It was not, however, welcomed by Hume, who argued: 'I do not ask how the public is to exert 
such a prodigious power as it has maintained during our late wars; where we have so much 
exceeded, not only our natural strength, but even that of the greatest empires. This extravagance 
is the abuse complained of, as the source of all dangers, to which we are at present exposed', ' Of 
Public Credit', in Fssays, p. 359; see also: Robertson, 'Universal Monarchy', pp. 370-73. For 
British views on credit in the eighteenth century see: Julian Hoppit, 'Attitudes to Credit in 
Britain 1680-1790', neHistoricalJoumal, 33,2, (1990), 305-322. 
" 'Clive to Pitt', in Forrest, Life ofLord Clive, II, p. 414. 
... Ibid., p. 413. 
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pseudonym suggested an identification between Englishness and the security of property. " A 
supporter of the Company in a similar vein observed that after squandering the 'public treasure' 
the government was casting a 'lustful eye' on the Company's recent acquisitions, but he hoped 
that in a country of liberty like Britain, the Company's rights were not in any serious danger of 
violation. " In the opinion of informed observers, the government's actions were additionally 
dangerous because, in their view, the government was attempting to take a share of the revenues 
without securing the possessions - that is, the government did not appear to be developing any 
long term imperial policy. During the debates in parliament in 1769, when the 1767 agreement 
between the Company and government was being renegotiated, George Grenville (1712-1770) 
argued: 'I should have wished, before we had tried to lay a rigorous hand upon the money, we 
had tried to secure the country, from whence the money is come'. Grenville wanted British 
policy makers to turn their attention to developing a plan of government for Bengal which would 
secure the possessions to Britain for the long term. Isaac Barr6 (1726-1802) also argued that in 
1767 he had wanted to help 'those who were for pointing out other arrangements, giving new, 
and necessary powers in order to carry on these vast, extensive objects', but this had not come to 
pass, and he warned that 'for want of regulating this object, I apprehend that you will some time 
or other lose it'. '" 
The need to construct a system (or to modify the existing one) became the concern of individuals 
who made East India affairs a matter of their attention. During the course of the same debates 
mentioned above, Clive again provided the government of the day with advice that was not 
immediately heeded. This time Clive did not call for the British government to take control of 
the acquisitions, but rather called for urgent reforms of the Company's organisation in London 
and abroad. Without reform, he argued, the immense riches of Bengal could not be realised by 
the Company or the country. 161 Sir George Colebrooke (1729-1809), ' in turn, stressed the 
162 See: Untainted Englishman, An Address to the Public, Concerning the Business Between the 
Government and the East-India Company Proving that the Government has no Just Demand on the 
Company, Either for Protection Granted or for Territorial Acquisitions (London, 1767), BL, (IOC 
Tract vol. 133, pp. 4-7. 
163 Anon., A Letter to the Proprietors of India Stock Relative to the Critical Situation of their .4 airs (London, 1767), BL, OIOC Tract Vol. 133, p. 1. 
164 BL, Eg. MSS 218, pp. 114,116. 
165 Ibid., pp. 148-156. 
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financial importance of the acquisitions arguing: 'you cannot be sovereigns in one part and 
merchants in another. All India should be combined in one system. There is no other province 
but Bengal worth preserving'. "' It was similarly argued in the True Alann that Bengal had the 
potential to be the 'most [ ... 
] valuable acquisition'. " Its author, however - by contrast to 
Colebrooke - was a critic of the Company, and believed that the British government should 
take over the task of administering the territories. Significantly, by this stage, publicists were no 
longer consumed by the fear that the East India trade was 'draining' Britain of its wealth - it 
was no longer applicable. Instead, one pamphleteer calculated that the Company paid over one 
million pounds annually to 'the interests of the public debts of England' and consequently, it was 
clear that 'England and India must stand or fall together. "" While, it was argued in the Fresent 
State of the British Interest in India that the loss of Bengal would result in 'national bankruptcy', 
which was merely the first calamity that would afflict Britain; following on from it would be 'loss 
of future credit, of trade and navigation, and consequently of naval power and defence'. "' The 
prosperity of Britain now lay in ensuring that regulations were put in place that would prevent 
Company servants from squandering the wealth of Bengal by misgoverning it. All the above 
observers of Indian affairs shared the belief that it was Britain (rather than the Company) that 
had the greatest to lose by the loss of India - therefore it should take the greatest interest in 
preserving the territories. 
Both Clive and Colebrooke were acutely aware of the extent to which the Company's 
responsibilities had changed, and the ideological problems that this posed. Clive argued that 
'fortune' had taken the Company 'in her hand' and had 'raised her to that state of grandeur'. 
While Colebrooke argued that 'No other Country ever had such possessions as England has now 
166 (1729-1809), a director of the East India Company between 1767-1770,1772. He was deputy 
chairman of the Company in 1768, and the chairman in 1769,1770,1772. W for Arundel 
(1754-74), see: Parker, 'Directors', pp. 61-63. 
167 BL, Eg. MSS 218, pp. 133-34. 
168 Anon., The Tme Alarm (London, 1770), p. 2. 
169 Anon., A Plan for the Government of the Prminces of Bengal Addressed to the Directors of the East 
India Company (London, 1772), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 381, p. 1. He went on to argue that if the 
sum he had quoted was 'withdrawn from the creditors of the public, the public must either 
become bankrupt, or such a load of taxes be laid on industry, as could not fail to crush it entirely; 
and either of these calamities, in a nation intoxicated with prosperity, might be attended with a 
revolution in government itself (p. 1). 
"I Anon., 71e Present State of the British Interest in India u4th a Plan for Establishing a Regular System 
in that Country (London, 1773), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 215, pp. 1 1-13. 
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in the East and West Indies'. "I The idea of the British Empire, which had developed as free, 
maritime and commercial, had enabled it to be distinguished from past territorial empires 
(specifically the Roman one) that had ultimately been the cause of each of their mother 
countries' destruction. This was a fact that contemporary observers were aware of; Colebrooke, 
for instance, argued that 'the Romans came to a dissolution by the extent of their Empire'. 172 But 
the plan of reform that he suggested, as well as the many others that were published between 
1769 and 1773, were calculated towards securing for Britain the acquisitions without leading to 
her destruction - 'Go a step further give permanency to these valuable possessions', said 
Colebrooke, by integrating India into one imperial system. " Such writers suggested, as chapter 
four will show, that it was possible for Britain to escape the fate of Rome - that is, preserve the 
British constitution and hold a territorial empire in the east - if they managed to construct an 
appropriate system of rule. 14 
The arguments that individuals ranging from Colebrooke to Barrio put forward demonstrated the 
degree of acceptance that territorial empire in India enjoyed in Britain. Edmund Burke, who 
would later become the Company's most vocal critic, argued in a speech delivered immediately 
after Clive's in February 1769: 'He [Clive] has laid open such a world of commerce, he has laid 
open so valuable an Empire both from our present possessions and future operations, he laid 
open such additional manufactures, and revenue [... ]. The orient sun never laid more glorious 
expectations before us'. Burke went on to state that Britain had been 'plunged into Empire in the 
east' and should 'abide by the consequences'. 15 Smith also argued that 'as this great dominion is 
acquired, it must be maintained; for the politics, not only of Asia, but even of Europe are so 
interwoven with the affairs of our commerce there, that it will be absolutely impossible to return 
171 BL, Eg. MSS 218, pp. 149,133. 
172 Ibid., p. 133. 
173 Ibid. Clive argued, in a letter to the directors written in September 1765, that the Company's 
government of Bengal had to be freed from the grasps of 'luxury, corruption, avarice, rapacity', 
or they would destroy the Company: 'for we cannot expect the same causes which have ruined 
the greatest kingdoms, should have different effects on such a state as ours' (FWHC, IV, pp. 
339-40). 
174 Hume, 'Of Refinement in the Arts, in Essays, p. 276, argued that the collapse of Rome was 
not the result of 'luxury and the arts' but an 'ill modelled government. 
171 ' Speech on East India Settlement' (27 Feb 1769), in The Writings and Speeches OfEdmund Burke, 
vol. II, Party, Parliament, and the American Crisis, ed. Paul Langford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1981), p. 220. 
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back to our former situation with any hopes of profit, or indeed security'. "' The rationale that 
was presented for empire was necessity: the possessions in the east were necessary for the 
security of Britain; the preservation of Britain's finances required the protection of her commerce 
in India from the encroachments of France, which in turn required territorial control. 
Fears regarding the growth of French power had influenced debate regarding British foreign 
policy in the first half of the eighteenth century. After the Seven Years War, individuals like 
Clive thought that France posed an especial threat to Britain's interests on the sub-continent. 
Clive argued that France had 'lost all sight of America ... she will 
look for an equivalent... where 
can she find one but in the East Indies? '" By pointing out the threat that France posed to their 
interests, Clive hoped to galvanise the government into taking steps (in 1769) beyond 
renegotiating the Company's annual payment to the exchequer. The point at issue between 
individuals of opposing political beliefs, after the acquisition of diwani, was not whether 
territorial empire in India was suitable for Britain, but how it could be managed. This was a 
matter that came to the forefront of political debate as news of the Company's mismanagement 
of the territories began to circulate widely in British society. 
A range of political commentators had shown the extent to which the acquisitions were 
necessary for the security of Britain. What mattered to such individuals was how the Company's 
servants abroad could be controlled; how the detrimental effects of the factionalism in the 
Company in London could be brought to an end, and how the Company could exercise the 
powers of sovereign and merchant simultaneously - if at all - without destroying Bengal. 
Immediately after the acquisition of diwani, Britain had been led to expect great monetary 
advantage from it; instead, news of the Company's misgovernment of Bengal especially during 
the 1769-70 famine and then the Company's financial crisis of 1772, had been responsible for 
distorting such complacent expectations. 
16 [Smith], Observations, p. 5. 
177 BL, Eg. MSS 218, p. 157. In a letter to North in November 1772, Clive similarly argued: if 
France has given over all thought of America, she must have some other object in view, 
compatible with the dignity, and ambition of so powerful a Monarchy; and that can be no other 
than conquest in the East Indies' (OIOC, MSS Eur. E12, p. 203). In addition, Colebrooke also 
observed 'it is impossible to conceive, that the power of France will see this power [East India 
trade] remaining in the hands of the English, and not desire to wrest it from them', BL, Eg. MSS 
218, p. 133. 
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Conclusion 
The preservation of Britain's interests on the sub-continent was a matter of increasing national 
concern as the eighteenth century advanced. The truth of this was amply demonstrated in the 
third quarter of the century, when North's government, faced with the very real prospect of the 
loss of Bengal, took steps to preserve and reform the Company. India was firiancially and 
commercially important to Britain - the continuance of her presence in that part of the world 
was regarded as central to her continued security and independence. This is not to deny the 
greater importance that Britain's leaders attached to the American colonies; for much of the 
eighteenth century, the colonies in America were regarded as Britain's most prized commercial 
asset. In the first half of the eighteenth century, Defoe and Forman had pointed to the more 
general importance of Britain's global commercial interests for her security, rather than singling 
out India, during the Seven Years War, as Bowen has argued, 'perceptions of the value and 
potential of the North American colonies altered quite markedly'. He does not thereby suggest 
that the colonies were no longer regarded as an important component of Britain's wealth, but 
rather that the acquisitions in India also began to play an important consideration in 'national 
financial and commercial considerations. "' It was this fact that made territorial empire in the 
east acceptable to a range of political opinion in Britain. 
A territorial empire had been regarded as incompatible with the liberties of the British political 
system. Furthermore, the necessity of such an empire had been undermined by the connection 
that had been established between commerce and the power of the state. As Davenant had 
reflected at the end of the seventeenth century, a successful commercial policy gave a country a 
form of dominion over others without the need of territorial aggrandisement. The success 
enjoyed by European countries that had developed an international trading policy led Defoe to 
argue that commercial countries surpassed the fighting nations in terms of their strength. What 
18 Bowen, 'British Conceptions', p. 9. See also: Anon., The Importance of the British Dominion in 
India Compared with that in America (London, 1770), which argued that in every respect, India was 
a more valuable acquisition than America. Cf. Thomas Mortimer, The Elements of Commerce, 
Politics and Finance in Three Treatises on Those Important Subjects (1780), quoted in Bowen, Revenue, 
p. 27. 
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was decisive in international relations was no longer the land mass and army that a state 
controlled, but the trade and sea power that it commanded. All these arguments were brought 
together in Montesquieu's analysis of Britain in his Spirit of the Laws, he suggested that Britain's 
dominance and liberty were based upon its system of public credit, commerce and navy. He 
argued that Britain, realising that 'overseas conquests would weaken it, had sought to establish 
colonies for the purposes of trade rather than domination. He stated: 
The preservation of its liberty would require it to have neither strongholds, nor fortresses 
nor land armies, it would need an army on the sea to protect itself from invasions; and 
its navy would be superior to that of all other powers, which needing to employ their 
finances for a land war, would no longer have enough for a sea war. 19 
This description could not be applied to the Company's settlements even at the time that 
Montesquieu wrote. The East India Company's trade on the sub-continent did rely on force and 
the existence of fortified settlements. Such measures were justified as necessary for the 
preservation of the Company's trade. 18' This was qualitatively different from the political power 
that the Company acquired in 1765, but nevertheless the reasoning behind the steps that were 
taken at this later date was the same: security. The analysis that Smith provided of the reasons 
why the Company acquired power, was shared by other observers of East India affairs. He 
argued that it was the actions of the French, who, in conjunction with the Indian powers, had 
conspired to oust them from the sub-continent, which had led the British Company to take 
control: 'it was not ambition that first tempted the Company to embark in these wars: necessity 
led the way; and conquest has now brought them to the choice either of dominion or 
expulsion'. 18' 
The perception that territorial control would make the East India trade more secure from actual 
and imagined Mughal and French threats, made the idea of territorial responsibility an 
acceptable one. 'SZ Voices of dissent were heard at various points during parliamentary debates on 
19 Montesquieu, Spirit, pp. 327-29. 
180 Davenant, pp. 50-51. 
181 [Smith], Observations, p. 6. See also: '[Clive] to North' (24 Nov 1772), where it was argued that 
'it was not so much as choice as necessity that drove us progressively into the possessions we at 
present enjoy' (OIOC, MSS Eur. E12, p. 176). 
182 It was argued in [Anon. ], True Alarm, pp. 167-68, that the loss of Bengal would have 
enormous financial implications for Britain, as not only would she lose a source of wealth, but it 
would be taken over by the French and Britain would be forced to buy Indian goods from her 
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Company affairs at this time; '" yet more usually, controversy regarding empire in the east was 
conducted less in terms of whether it should be continued or abandoned and more in terms of 
'the manner and degree' in which Bengal and Bihar should become a part of the British 
Empire. 184 That is, the problem of how the responsibilities of the Company and the British 
government towards the acquisitions ought to be exercised became a major issue around this 
time. Would the Company continue to be the vehicle by which the territories were administered? 
Could commercial and governmental responsibilities be successfully combined in one body? 
Publicists debated the principles on which the acquisitions could be governed and turned their 
attention to stemming the 'drain' of wealth from Bengal - this was, it need hardly be stressed, in 
stark contrast to the 'drain' of treasure from Europe that had preoccupied Defoe. 
Yet, whether the acquisitions in India constituted a component of the 'British Empire', on the 
other hand, was by no means clear. Armitage's study has shown that by the 1740s the 
conception of the British Empire as 'Protestant, commercial, maritime and Free' had become a 
prevalent one. In this scheme of things, the British Empire consisted of the Atlantic community 
and not the East Indies. "' These distinguishing features of the British Empire were no longer 
applicable to the whole extent of Britain's territories after the Seven Years War and the 
acquisition of diwani. 'M However, contemporaries did not always speak of a 'British Empire' in 
the sense of a single entity. Some observers made a distinction between empire in India and an 
empire of the Atlantic community. "' Arthur Young, writing in 1772, formulated a vision of the 
rival. Also, in the St. James ý Chronicle (28 May 1772), it was observed: 'a greater Object [Bengal] 
never came into Competition between the two Nations. Whichever remains in the settled 
Possession of it, will probably be the Arbiter of the other's Fate, as so great a Weight must 
certainly give a decisive Turn into whichever Scale it shall fall', quoted in Osborn, 'India, 
Parliament', p. 121. 
"I See, for instance, the thoughts of Sir George Saville, in ParliamentarY HistorY ofEnglandfirom the 
Earliest Period to the year 1803, vol. 17,1771-1774 (London: C. Hansard, 1813), p. 464. It was 
observed in: Anon., The 0ýigin and Cause of the Continuance of the Disorders in our East India Affairs, 
and the Means ofRestoring them (London, 1772), p. 1: 'That till we return to our original principles, 
the existence of the company, and fate of the trade to this nation, is in danger of being 
annihilated'. Original principles here meant pre-1756 ones. In addition, see: Marshall, Making 
and Unmaking, p. 198. 
114 Marshall, 'Empire and Authority, pp. 113-14. 
185 Armitage, Ideological Oýigins, p. 173. 
116 See also Marshall, Making and Unmaking, p. 117, who argues that after the Seven Years War, 
differing concepts of empire drove Britain and America apart. 
"' Bowen, 'British Conceptions', p. 6. 
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British Empire as 'one nation, united under one sovereign, speaking the same language and 
enjoying the same liberty, but living in different parts of the world'. ' 
Those individuals, however, who recognised the Indian acquisitions as central to the security of 
Britain, such as Thomas Pownall, acknowledged it as an important component of the British 
Empire: 
People now at last begin to view those Indian affairs, not simply as beneficial 
appendages connected to the Empire; but also from the commerce of that country being 
indissolubly interwoven with our whole system of commerce [... ] the downfall of his 
Indian part of our system [... ] must necessarily involve with its fall, the whole edifice of 
the British empire. "' 
Such a view would have been endorsed, for instance, by Colebrooke, Clive and the author of the 
True Alarm. These writers clearly saw the point of empire in the east, like empire in the west, as 
aiding the security of Britain by providing it with wealth by trade - simply by maintaining 
British presence on the sub-continent, Britain could ensure that its main rival, France, did not 
access this rich resource. 
Further evidence of the fact that Bengal was seen by some as part of the British Empire is 
demonstrated by Alexander Dow, who dedicated his History of Hindostan (which contained his 
plan for the reform of the Company's rule of Bengal) to the British crown because a large part of 
India, he argued, 'is now in a manner comprehended within the circle of the British empire, 
there is a propriety of addressing the history of that country to the sovereign'. 190 Other East 
Indian observers identified the acquisitions as part of the British Empire in order to justify 
government intervention into the Company's affairs; one publicist argued: 
Bengal plants and sows, she manufactures and trades, not for herself but for Britain: so 
that Bengal being as effectually and intimately annexed and united to Britain as if it was 
a part of herself, the dictates of sound policy call upon Britain to attend as minutely to 
the interest and concerns of that country as to her own. 191 
11 Arthur Young, Political EssaYs Concerning the Present State of the BHfish Empire (London, 1772), 
P. 1. 
` Thomas Pownall, The Right, Interest, andDuty of Government as Concerned in the Affairs of the East 
Indies (London, 1773), p. 4 
"I Alexander Dow, 'Dedication', in The History of Hindostan: fivm the Death of Akhar to the 
Settlement of the Empire under Aurungzebe. - to which are Prefixed IA Dissertation on the Origin and 
Nature of Despotism in Hindostan II . 4n Enquiry into the State ofBengal; with a Plan for Restoring that 
Kingdom to its Former Prosperity and Splendour, 3 vols; (London, 1770-72; repr. New Delhi: Today 
& Tomorrow Press, 1973), 1, [no pagination]. 
191 [Anon. ], Importance ofthe British Dominion, p. 59-60. 
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While William Knox argued that the inhabitants of Bengal, as those of the American colonies, 
were British subjects, and parliament had full right to tax them. 192 William Bolts, a figure whose 
work was widely circulated in Britain in 1772, stressed Bengal's status as part of the British 
Empire in order to demand equal treatment: 'In England, and other parts of the British 
dominion, while so great a stir has been made about the liberty of the subject and security of 
private property, it is amazing that so little attention has been paid to the situation of British 
subjects in Bengal'. 193 
Jeremy Osborne has argued that British public opinion in the 1770s regarded the acquisition of 
empire in the east with deep anxiety. The public debate, which was conducted for instance in the 
contemporary newspapers and periodicals, revealed that Britons were concerned with the impact 
the territories would have on British social and political life and entertained doubts regarding the 
benefits that would accrue to Britain from a territorial empire. Osborne further argues, however, 
that by the turn of the decade, Britons had become confident empire builders - that British 
attitudes towards empire in India had been wholly transformed. "" It is the argument of this 
dissertation that while doubts were indeed voiced in the 1770s regarding the suitability of a 
landed empire - as Osborne has illustrated - contemporary thinkers and leaders nonetheless 
did not reject it and call for its reversal. The response of informed observers to the revolution in 
the Company's affairs in Bengal was influenced by conceptions of Britain's interest and welfare. 
Their belief that Britain's greater good was served by the Company's altered status on the sub- 
continent led them to accept the change. 
Since 1600, the East India Company had been the vehicle by which trade had been conducted in 
Asia. The acquisition of diwani and the Company's servants' subsequent mismanagement of the 
territories, called into question the continued capacity of the Company to manage the changed 
"I William Knox, The Present State of the Nation: Particularly isith Respect to its Trade, Finances etc., 
Addressed to the King and both Houses of Parliament, 4th edn (Dublin: 1769), p. 47. On the 
importance of the idea of parliamentary sovereignty for the government of the British Empire, 
see: Marshall, Making and Unmaking, pp. 166-67. 
193 William Bolts, Considerations on India Afflairs Particularly respecting the Present State of Bengal 
Dependencies uith a Map of those Countries Chieflyfi-on: Actual Surveys (London 1772), in The East 
India Company 1600-1858, vol. III, ed. Patrick Tuck (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 147. Bolts' 
career is considered in chapter three below. 
" Osborne, 'India, Parliament', pp. 3-6. 
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state of affairs. Successive British administrations between 1766 and 1772 were, however, 
unwilling to reconsider government policy towards the east - they were content to leave the 
Company in charge - but it was an issue that political theorists did engage with. The important 
point is that the debate that took place between the acquisition of the territorial revenues of 
Bengal and the passage of Lord North's Regulating Bill of 1773, was conducted not in terms of 
the suitability of a landed empire but under what arrangement it could be made beneficial for 
Britain. Nathaniel Smith argued in a manner that few could have disagreed with: 
It might be better upon the whole [... ], if we could return back to our commercial 
system; but that is impossible [... ]. That insatiate desire after wealth and power, which 
possesses every civilised nation, will not allow us to retreat; we must preserve our 
consequence, or be trampled under foot. 195 
Individuals that will figure in the pages that follow attempted to demonstrate the principles on 
which a territorial empire could be compatible with Britain without endangering its liberties, and 
how an imperial province could be managed without destroying its commercial value. Prior to 
that however, this dissertation firstly turns to consider the causes which facilitated the 
Company's rise to power, with reference to contemporary historiography. 
'I [Smith], Observations, p. 81. See also: Anon., 'Hints for a Political System for the Government 
of India', OIOC, MSS Eur. E12, p. 38, where it was argued that 'we cannot be less than we are, 
without ceasing to be at all'. This manuscript is part of a number of papers belonging to Clive 
which were collected by Philip Francis (G. R. Kaye and E. H. Johnston, India office Library 
Catalogue of European Manuscripts in European Languages, vol. II, part II, Minor Collections and 
Miscellaneous Manuscripts (London, 1937), p. 245). 
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Chapter 2 
The East India Company's Rise to Power 
A critic of the East India Company remarked in 1773 that 'under the simple name of a 
Company, is a mighty republicY The directors of the Company would have objected to this 
characterisation, but the point that the Company was no longer simply a commercial enterprise 
could not be denied. Quite how this transformation came about is a matter of controversy 
amongst historians. The previous chapter set out the ideology of empire in India between 1690 
and 1773, and demonstrated that Britain's connection with the Indian sub-continent was justified 
in terms of national security. It argued that the perception of what was necessary for the 
continued security of Britain had, by the late 1760s, grown to encompass territorial empire in the 
east. The aim of this chapter is to set out the broad debates in the historiography of the 
Company's acquisition of political authority in Bengal, as well as to consider the factors which 
facilitated the Company's rise. It will show that the aim of Company policy remained 
unchanging: the preservation of their trade - official and private. What altered was the degree 
of security that could be realistically demanded and achieved. Consequently, it was not simply 
ideas regarding empire in India that had shifted by 1765, but also the realities on the ground. 
The well-known argument that the Company's involvement in local politics was the result of the 
collapse of the Mughal Empire, has come to be replaced by more sophisticated theories? 
Relatively recent historians, such as Muzaffar Alam, have focused their attention on specific 
regions of the empire, and presented a more detailed analysis of the processes which led to the 
Mughal Emperor's loss of power over his provinces' - provinces which became the successor 
states to the empire! C. A. Bayly has analysed more closely the specific challenges that 
eighteenth-century India faced, and pointed to the role of ideas regarding 'law' and 'rights', 
I Anon., A Planfor the Government oftheProvincesofBengal, p. 381. 
2 For an example of the argument that explains the Company's rise to power in terms of the 
collapse of the Mughal Empire, see: H. H. Dodwell (ed. ), The Cambridge History ofIndia, vol. V, 
British India 1497-1838 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929). 
3 Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and Punjab 1707-48 (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1986). 
" Cf. Marshall, 'Introduction', in The Eighteenth Century in Indian History. Evolution or Revolution, 
ed. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 10. 
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entertained by Company servants, in the establishment of the Company's regime. ' This chapter 
begins by considering the opposing theses regarding the 'collapse' of the Mughal Empire and the 
foundation of the Company's rule of Bengal in the eighteenth century. It then proceeds to 
evaluate the role of private trade and Anglo-French rivalry in the 'revolution' of Bengal's 
government. 
It ends by considering how British perceptions of the Mughal Empire influenced the actions of 
the Company servants. It will be argued that the Company's attitudes towards the Mughals, as 
well as to the east generally, were an important factor in the formation of the servants' policy on 
the sub-continent. Opinions articulated from Sir Thomas Roe (1581-1644) to Clive, all reveal the 
disdain with which they regarded the Mughal Empire. While such attitudes in themselves do not 
presuppose a policy of conquest, they nevertheless helped shape the decisions that were taken. At 
the crux of the matter was the perception that the Mughals were untrustworthy. This perception 
caused the servants to feel that their private and Company interests could never be wholly secure 
as long as they depended on the good will of nawabs of Bengal. As a result, the servants sought 
privileges to protect their trading interests - the degree of protection that the servants could 
demand changed as the century advanced. 
At the beginning of the century, the Company did not have the position of strength that it was to 
acquire by mid-century; consequently the preservation of its trading concerns had to depend 
(although not exclusively) upon the cooperation of local rulers. The Company's unease with this 
dependence was made apparent by the ways in which the Company constantly sought to 
minimise their obligations to local rulers, such as by obtaining the 1717 fannan. This is not to 
suggest, by any means, that an intentional policy of conquest always existed amongst the 
directors in London, which was shelved until the right circumstances presented themselves - no 
such unanimity existed. Rather policies were often initiated by the servants in India, who at 
times were entrusted with a great deal of discretion .6 It was the servants 
in India who 
S C. A. Bayly, 'The British Military-Fiscal State and Indigenous Resistance India 1750-1820', in 
An Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689-1815, ed. L. Stone (London: Routledge, 1994). 
6 For example, Robert Clive was given extensive powers in 1756 when Siraj ud-Daula drove the 
Company out of Calcutta, and in 1764 when Clive returned to Bengal after the settlement with 
Mir Jafar broke down. See: Philip Lawson, The East India Company: a History (Essex: Longman, 
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increasingly had the resources, and the will, to take the measures that they thought were needed 
to protect the Company's (as well as their own) assets. By 1765 the servants clearly felt that their, 
and the Company's, interests were best preserved by taking control. As one letter (30 September 
1765) from the Council at Fort William stated on the occasion of the acquisition of diwaný 
The time now approaches when we may be able to determine with some degree of 
certainty, whether our remaining as merchants, subjected to the jurisdiction, 
encroachments, and insults of the country government; or supporting your privileges 
and possessions by the sword are likely to prove most advantageous to the Company. ' 
This letter shows that the servants hoped that this settlement would resolve decisively whether 
being defacto ruler was better than being a simple merchant. They were clearly confident that in 
the long run their actions would be vindicated in the eyes of the directors at home. 
L The Mughal Empire and the Successor States 
The story of the rise of the East India Company to power on the sub-continent used to be told in 
terms of chance and the decline of the Mughal Empire. It was argued that the internal 
dissolution of the empire provided the Company with the occasion to take political control - 
the servants had not actively sought it. Such an explanation was given by J. R. Seeley. He argued 
that the Company 'were induced, almost forced, in the anarchy caused by the fall of the Mogul 
Empire, to give themselves a military character and employ troops, and by means of these 
troops, they acquired territory'! This trajectory presents the Company servants as unwilling 
empire builders: the orgy other alternative, it suggests, was for the servants to sit back and watch 
the destruction of their trading concerns. Eighteenth-century Persian writers also shared the 
belief that the Mughal Empire was in decline, but Alarn has argued that their assertions have to 
be questioned. He suggests that Mughal notables confounded private loss with national 
degeneration: 'the decline of their fortunes has been portrayed in these [Persian] chronicles as the 
decline and decay of the entire society'. 9 
Such caution has been more generally applied, and many contemporary historians have 
1993), pp. 104-05. 
Readings in the Constitutional History of India 1757-1947, ed. S. V. Desika Char (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), p. 36. 
$ J. R. Seeley, The Expansion ofEngland (1883; London: Macmillan, 1909), p. 241. 
9 Al am, Crisis, p. 10. Cf. Kumkum Chatterjee, Merchants, Politics and Society in Early Modern India: 
Bihar 1733-1820 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), ch. VIII. 
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discredited theories such as Seeley's as an explanation for the Company's rise, but the theme has 
persisted, as Bayly points out, 'because it seems to offer an easy explanation for the speed with 
which the British were able to penetrate and dominate' India. " Bayly argues, however, that 'it 
seems vacuous to characterise whole societies over centuries as gripped by decline and 
stagnation'; " he has explained the establishment of the British Empire in India by analysing the 
social, political and economic changes that the Mughal Empire underwent through the course of 
the eighteenth century - changes that cannot wholly be characterised by the term 'decline'. In 
retrospect, it is easy to overlook the fact that in 1700, as Bayly demonstrates, the Mughal Empire 
was still a formidable power, and for much of the ensuing century, the name of the emperor 
continued to command respect, but after 1712, the ability of successive emperors to enforce their 
orders would be severely curtailed due to factional disputes at the centre. 12 Bayly's account of the 
crisis of the Mughal Empire in the eighteenth century moves away from the politics of the 
imperial court at Delhi, and looks instead at the wider developments taking place in the region. 
By shifting the focus away from the centre, Bayly reveals the processes that were at work in 
eighteenth-century India, which led to the establishment of separate, autonomous kingdoms. He 
points out that the prosperity of the Mughal Empire led to the creation of new social groups who 
became increasingly important in local politics as the traditional Mughal nobility (umara) were 
transformed or dispersed. The Mughal elite used to exert significant economic influence, but 
they had derived their income fromjagin (assignments of revenue); this system came under strain 
and broke down, under the emperor Aurangzeb, due to the creation of a significant number of 
additional nobles - the consequence of terTitorial expansion. 13 This development enabled the 
new social groups to grow in political importance; they included: revenue farmers, who collected 
the revenue of a given territory and made a cash payment to the ruler, Indian merchants, upon 
whom the local rulers and nobles began to rely for loans, and landholders (zamindars) who 
increased and consolidated their privileges, for instance by turning their temporary landholding 
'0 Bayly, Indian Soci6y and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988; repr. 2001), pp. 43-44. 
" Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780-1830 (Harlow: Longman, 1989), 
p. 23. 
" Bayly, Indian Society, p. 7. 
13 See: Satish Chandra, 'Review of the Crisis of the Jagirdari System', in The Mughal State 1526- 
1750, ed. Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyarn (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1998). 
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rights into hereditary ones, and by obtaining and exercising fiscal rights. " Bayly argues that these 
new social groups, which represented 'new wealth and social power in the provinces', and who 
had prospered under Mughal rule, 'revolted against or surreptitiously withdrew from under the 
Mughal umbrella' in the eighteenth century. 15 
Rulers of the provinces began to rely on these new social groups for upholding and supporting 
their regimes, but the rulers themselves also gained additional power by acquiring functions that 
the Mughal system had kept separate. This process was aided by the factional disputes at the 
centre and the decline in the emperor's power, which further enabled provinces such as Bengal, 
Awadh and Hyderabad to become independent - even though the new kingdoms continued to 
maintain a nominal allegiance to the Mughal emperor. These developments taken together 
demonstrate the ways in which the Mughal Empire was changing, yet at the same time, aspects 
of the empire's mode of government remained in use. In addition to the respect that continued to 
be paid to the name of the emperor, Bayly argues that 'Muslim rule continued to expand', that is, 
Mughal methods of administration continued to be utilised in the regimes established by the new 
regional rulers - even where the rulers did not happen to be Muslim. For instance, the 
Marathas by the 1760s made use of the Mughal system to collect the revenue in their territories. " 
The full range of developments that took place in eighteenth-century India, like the establishment 
of the Smaller kingdoms within or alongside the larger regional ones like Awadh, cannot be 
analysed here, but the point is that the transformation that the Mughal Empire was undergoing 
was too varied to be encapsulated under the terms of decline and anarchy. 17 
It is for this reason that relatively recent historians have focused their attention on the different 
provinces that made up the Mughal Empire, which emerged in the eighteenth century as 
virtually independent states. 18 The in-depth studies of the successor states have shown that they 
Bayly, Indian Society, pp. 9-10. 
Ibid., p. 11. 
See: ibid., pp. 16,22. 
17 See: ibid., pp. 23-26. 
11 See: Marshall, 'Introduction', in Eighteenth Century in Indian, p. 5. Examples of regional studies 
include: Alam, Crisis; Richard B. Barnett, North India Between Empirm- Awadh, the Mughals and the 
British 1720-1801 (London: University of California Press, 1980); Philip B. Callcins, 'The 
Formation of a Regionally Oriented Ruling Group in Bengal, 1700-1740', Journal of Asian 
Studies, 29,4 (1970), 799-806; Karen Leonard, 'The Hyderabad Political System and its 
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enjoyed vastly different experiences from one another; for instance, the transition in Bengal, by 
comparison with the eastern Deccan, was relatively peaceful. In addition, the impact of the 
Maratha invasions has also been revised; their incursions into north and central India in this 
century caused severe damage to those areas, but trade did recover after the invasions were 
complete and a system of tribute was established. " Such detailed regional studies undermine 
arguments such as Seeley's regarding the Company's rise to power - which are based on the 
premise that the Mughal Empire faced universal political and economic degeneration; however, 
the changes that did occur, such as the formation of new social groups, also greatly facilitated the 
Company's acquisition of territorial control. " 
Sushil Chaudhury has concentrated his attention on the condition of Bengal, and tried to 
demonstrate that the Company's acquisition of power cannot be explained with reference to a 
political crisis in Bengal, or a deterioration of economic conditions - both prcmises that he sets 
out to disprove. He contends that powerful factions may have opposed Siraj ud-Daula, but there 
also existed 'another group including merchant princes, zamindars and military aristocrats which 
supported the young nawab'. He has further argued forcefully that it was the 'very prosperity of 
Bengal, not its decline or weakness, which made its conquest so lucrative to the Europeans'. 21 
Philip Calkins has also shown that Bengal enjoyed a state of economic health; he has argued that 
in the years after the death of Aurangzeb, the traditional point from which the decline of the 
Empire has been dated, Bengal did not grow weaker, either economically or politically, but in 
both respects actually grew stronger. 21 The decline in the emperor's control over Bengal's internal 
affairs, between 1700 and 1740, argues Calkins did not see 'a decline in administrative 
efficiency', but an 'orderly transformation. He points out, as Bayly's study of the formation of 
Indian society has endorsed, that under the provincial ruler, Murshid Quli Khan, the political 
stability of Bengal came to depend upon the appeasement and cooperation of local commercial 
and landed groups. Quli Khan had been appointed by the emperor in 1700, but by the time of his 
Participants', Journal of Asian Studies, 30,3 (1971), 569-82. John R. McLane, Land and Local 
Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Bengal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
" Marshall, 'Introduction', in Eighteenth Century in Indian, pp. 11-12; On the Maratha invasions 
in Bengal see: Marshall, Bengal, pp. 70-71. 
11 Bayly, Indian Society, p. 44. 
21 Sushil Chaudhury, From Prv4wdty to Decline. Eighteenth Century Bengal (New Dclhi: Manohar 
Publishers, 1995), p. 328. 
22 Calkins, 'Formation, p. 799. 
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death he had become (unintentionally) independent; ` during his period of rule, he had allowed a 
number of zamindars to grow in influence, and size, by permitting them to amalgamate together 
smaller zamindaris to their territories. In addition, his revenue policy had allowed the Jagat Seth 
banking house to grow in political importance. By 1730, Calkins concludes 'the government of 
Bengal began to look [... ] like government by cooperation of the dominant forces in Bengal' 2' 
The later period of rule of Alivardi Khan continued to be similarly based on an assumed contract 
between the rulers, and the large zamindats and merchants. The contract allowed discretion to the 
zamindars in the administration of their territory and the right to keep a part of the revenue, in 
return for collecting and remitting it. 25 The stability of government rested upon the acquiescence 
of the large landholders and bankers. 2' Alienation of these powerful factions by the nawabs could 
lead to violent confrontations. This, argues Calkins, was what occurred in 1740, which brought 
Alivardi Khan to power. The overthrown nazim (ruler), Sarfaraz Khan, had antagonised key 
groups, who had then combined together with Sarfaraz's rival to overthrow him: 'in a very broad 
sense, we might say that the coup of 1739 was brought about because the interests of the 
principal landholders, bankers, and many military men coincided' . 
27 
This is also what some historians argue transpired in Bengal in the late 1750s, which led to the 
overthrow of Siraj ud-Daula and the Company becoming the effective sovereign of Bengal. Rajat 
Kanta Ray has argued that Siraj was extremely unpopular at court due to his 'dissolute and 
violent conduct'. He had managed to keep opposition in check by fear (one of his rivals to the 
throne was assassinated), but his actions and behaviour left him with very few allies. Ray argues 
that 'practically no one among the courtiers and commanders of Alivardi Khan could be counted 
upon to support Siraj in a crisis'? This was proved true when the conspiracy that culminated in 
Marshall, Bengal, p. 49. 
Calkins, 'Formation', pp. 803-05; Bayly, Indian Society, p. 49. This is an argument that has 
been questioned by Muzaffar Aarn and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, who argue that Quli Khan 
asserted greater control over the zamindars. See their 'Introduction', in Mughal State, ed. Alarn 
and Subrahmanyam, pp. 46-49. 
11 Marshall, Bengal, p. 56. 
26 Calkins, 'Formation', pp. 804-06. 
21 Ibid., p. 806. 
21 Rajat Kanta Ray, 'Colonial Penetration and the Initial Resistance: the Mughal Ruling Class, 
the English East India Company and the Struggle for Bengal 1756-1800', Indian Historical Review, 
12 (1985-6), p. 7. Cf. Marshall, Bengal, p. 75; Chaudhury, Prosperity, pp. 307-08. 
70 
the defeat of Siraj, at the battle of Plassey, gathered momentum. The conspirators included: the 
Jagat Seth banking family, whose relations with the nawab had not been fully cordial, and who 
began to fear that their wealth might be appropriated by Siraj; as well as high ranking court 
nobles who had been antagonised by the nawab's appointment of what they saw as upstarts to 
'important bureaucratic and military' posts 29 Ray suggests that the conspirators were 'merely 
playing a fresh hand at an old game'. Some of them had helped Alivardi Khan into power, and 
they had also attempted to organise a conspiracy in 1756, which Siraj had successfully 
thwarted30 
The idea of employing the British in their coup arose, argues Ray, because the Company had 
demonstrated their military strength by defeating the French at Chandernagore. In addition, 
wealthy merchants with connections at the nawab's court, Amirchand and Khwaja WaJeed, also 
participated in the conspiracy. Kumkum Chatteýee points out that 'Amirchand had extensive 
dealings with the English Company and therefore had a strong interest in helping it to re- 
establish itself in Bengal'. While WaJeed had close ties to Siraj and the French Company, but 
political realties led him to join the plot in order to preserve his status. Chattedee argues that 
although these merchants were influenced by their trading considerations and their perception of 
the growing influence of the Company, their primary motivation in participating in the plot was 
to preserve their 'connections with politically potent groups at the nawab's darbar'. 1' Ray 
similarly stresses that the conspirators had not intended to give the Company any share of 
power, but only to use the Company for their own purposes . 
32 
By Ray's line of interpretation, the Company would appear to be hired mercenaries - this 
practice was not unusual in succession disputes on the sub-continent. Stewart Gordon points out 
that the Maratha Bands had been hiring themselves out in western Malwa, in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, " and European troops had been used in the Camatic. Therefore, Ray 
contends, it was not the conspirators that were the 'hirelings and dependents of the English', 
21 Chattedee, Merchants, pp. 102-03. 
31 Ray, 'Colonial Penetration', p. 12. 
31 Chattedee, Merchants, pp. 103-05. 
31 Ray, 'Colonial Penetration', p. 12. 
33 Stewart Gordon, The Marathas 1600-1818 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 
137. 
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rather it was the Company who were dependent on the banking house of Jagat Seth, who had 
often acted as their political mediators with the court in times of disputes . 
3' Bayly argues that the 
'coup resembled many other incidents in Indo-Islamic history'. However he qualifies this point 
by stating that the 1757 events took place in the context of world trade, in which the British were 
emerging as the dominant force . 
31 Further, Bayly does not suggest, in the same manner as Ray, 
that the Company were in some sense an instrument of the Indian factions. Rather, he stresses 
the inter-relationships that had come to exist between the merchants, bankers and the Company: 
through the course of the 1730s and 40s, Indian merchants came to rely on British protection at 
sea, Calcutta grew in commercial importance, and close links were established between the 
Company and the Indian banking houses. In this context, the crisis and conspiracy that took 
shape in 1757 would inevitably have drawn in the East India Company, but it was by no means a 
passive actor in the events that took place, rather it exploited the conflict to its advantage. Bayly 
suggests that the Company was the 'great beneficiary of this age of war, flux and opportunity' 
because it was 'able to play off one state against another and offer its own formidable services for 
sale in the all-Indian military bazaar'. " 
The suggestion that the Bengali factions willingly collaborated with the British to oust Siraj ud- 
Daula has been criticised by M. Athar Ali who argues that 'British conquest' cannot, by any 
stretch of the imagination, be seen as a 'joint Anglo-Indian enterprise'. He sees the events that 
took place as having their origins in British ambitions - the Indians who participated were 
merely preserving themselves. " It is certainly true that the Company servants were fully aware of 
the ways in which they could potentially benefit from the 'revolution'. It provided an excellent 
opening for furthering, not only the interests of the Company, but also that of their private trade. 
In a letter to the directors from Fort William, the select committee wrote that the overthrow of 
Siraj ud-Daula, was a great opportunity for advancing and consolidating their privileges; they 
also pointed to the unreliability of Siraj, demonstrated by his suspect relationship with the 
-'Ray, 'Colonial Penetration', p. 13. 
35 Bayly, Indian Society, pp. 49-5 L 
36 Ibid., p. 48; see also pp. 46-51. On the Company's relationship with the Jagat Seth's see: 
Leonard, 'The "Great Firm" Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire', in Mughal State, pp. 
411-13 
37 M. Athar Ali, 'Recent Theories of Eighteenth-Century India', in Eighteenth Century in Indian 
History, p. 97. 
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French Company, which in their view, made it reasonable to suspect that he would not keep to 
the terms of the treaty that had so recently been signed between them. In the end, the letter 
concluded that the revolution was certain to take place; by participating, they argued, they could 
ensure that they benefited from the alteration: 
By joining Jaffir Aly Khan to supplant him [Siraj], we should obtain in all probability 
very beneficial terms for the Company as well as live free of any apprehensions from the 
country government. [ ... ] 
Motives [... ] founded upon the prime law of self-preservation determined us to embrace 
the proposal made by Jaffir Aly Khan provided adequate terms were granted'. "' 
These adequate tein s included confirmation of the privileges agreed by Siraj, compensation for 
the Company's and other Europeans' recent losses and the assignment of revenue of certain 
districts of land to the Company. " Ray implies that Mir War had envisaged freeing himself from 
the demands of the servants by distributing 'large presents' after the revolution was complete. 
However, in this expectation, he gravely miscalculated: 
The East India Company was an impersonal, corporate organisation, the real nature of 
which the Mughal ruling class could not quite grasp as yet. Its drive for profit and its 
impersonal bureaucratic organisation were unremitting and instead of being absorbed in 
the Mughal system, it eroded that framework and took over the real levers of power one 
by one. 40 
By this argument, Ray demonstrates that he believes that the Company's government provides a 
break in Indian history. Historians, such as Bayly, have stressed the 'continuities between the 
Post-Mughal indigenous polities and the East India Company state', " but Ray and Athar Ali, for 
instance, point to the Company's organising premises regarding commerce and government as 
evidence against such arguments, which will be considered below. Recent scholarship has 
however shown that the making of the Company's regime was more complicated than has 
38 'Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Secret Committee, London' (14 July 1757), 
Indian Records, H, pp. 446-48. 
" Ibid.; The Select Committee, Fort William had earlier in 1756, already been advised of the 
advantages of courting dissident factions: 'we need not represent to you the great advantage 
which we think it will be to the military operations, and the influence it win have in the Nabob's 
councils to effect a junction with any Powers in the provinces in Bengal that may be dissatisfied 
with the violence of the Nabob's Government, or that may have pretensions to the Nabobship'. 
Thus, the Select Committee would not have needed much persuasion to participate or even to 
encourage conspiracy in Bengal. See: 'Letter from the Select Committee, Fort St. George, to the 
Select Committee, Fort William' (13 Oct 1756), in Indian Records, I, pp. 239-40. 
" Ray, 'Colonial Penetration', p. 17. See also: Marshall, 'Introduction', in Eighteenth Century in 
Indian, pp. 27-28. 
11 Ian Barrow and Douglas E. Haynes, 'The Colonial Transition: South Asia 1780-1840', Modern 
Asian Studies, 38,3 (2004), 469-78, (p. 472). 
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previously been appreciated. " What is clear, whether or not the Company maintained a nominal 
allegiance to the Mughal Emperor or refused to share the responsibility of government with 
Indian officials, is that what defined Company policy at every point was security: once the 
Company had achieved a position of great political and military strength within Bengal, it was 
unwilling to have it compromised. This can be seen in its conflict with Mir Qasim, who 
attempted to redress the balance between himself and the Company. Further, the rationale of 
maintaining a garrison of two thousand men in Bengal after the 1757 revolution was to ensure 
that their interests could not be threatened. The servants contended that the continued security of 
their trade depended upon them maintaining a military presence in Bengal: 
As it is the Company's interest to exert themselves on this occasion, we make no doubt 
you will immediately enlist and send out a sufficient number of recruits to make a 
respectable garrison in Bengall, which should consist of a body of two thousand 
Europeans at least; which expenses we think will be overpaid by the advantages of our 
acquisitions. We flatter ourselves therefore you will not on any account neglect the 
sending of such a body of Europeans as we have mentioned to be necessary. Ibis we are 
of opinion will be the only method of preventing in future the encroachments of the 
country government, to make our friendship and alliance courted, to carry on our trade 
on the securest footing, and to oppose the resettlement of the French in these 
provinces. 43 
The conspirators, including Mir Jafar and the Jagat Seth House, may have only seen their 
arrangement with the British as a temporary one, but the servants desired to place their trade on 
the 'securest footing'. In addition, as we shall see, individuals such as Robert Clive (as the above 
quotation shows), did not trust the nawabs to keep to any treaty without the threat of coercion; 
he argued in a letter to Laurence Sulivan that Muslims were incapable of keeping promises. " In 
this scheme of things, de facto sovereignty was the securest foundation upon which the 
Company's trade could be carried on. 
Il. Successor States and the East India Company 
For historians of the East India Company and the sub-continent in the late eighteenth century, 
the observation that the Company, in this period, was transformed from trader into ruler is a 
commonplace one - it was also a fact that was reiterated by contemporaries. However, in many 
crucial respects, the Company throughout its pre-1756 history was never a 'mere trader'. An 
See for instance: Travers, "'The Real Value of the lands"', pp. 517-58. 
'Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Secret Committee, London' (14 July 1757), 
Indian Records, II, p. 45 1. 
44 (30 Dec 1758), quoted in: Forrest, Life ofLord Clive, Il, p. 120-2 1. 
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analysis of the organisation of the various Company settlements in India in the seventeenth 
century shows that they have to be considered more than just trading stations. Some were 
effectively sovereign communities - they were self-governed and independent from the 
authority of the local rulers. For example, Bombay had been acquired in 1662 as part of the 
dowry for Charles II's Portuguese bride; " it was ruled and had its coins minted in the name of 
the English monarch as opposed to the Mughal Emperor. The Company also administered 
justice to both Indians and Europeans, and established a public gallows. "" The Company had 
obtained a charter from James 11 (1686), enabling it, amongst other things, to use force, and 
under George III's charter, it was invested with the right to make by-laws and ordinances. " 
Beyond the right to use force, the Company also received 'military aid from the Crown' when it 
was required. " 
Madras was also similarly claimed as a sovereign territory beholden to no one except the British 
King. In a letter from the Court of Directors to Fort St. George (1687), it was argued that the 
territory of Madras was independent from the local ruler, and whilst they recognised his 
authority in his remaining regions, they reserved the right to act and govern Madras as they 
wished: 
If nevertheless he pretend to any dominion over your city, you may, when you are in a 
good condition, tell him in plain terms that we own him for our good friend and any, 
and confederate, and sovereign [ ... ] of all that country, excepting the small territory belonging to Madras, of which we claim the sovereignty and will maintain and defend 
against all persons, and govern by our own laws, without any appeal to any prince 
whatsoever, except our sovereign Lord the King. " 
Madras was organised as a town with 'a mayor and twelve aldermen who had police powers and 
operated outside the authority of local rulers'. 5" The Company in Madras continued to pay the 
local rulers tribute until 1752 when the then ruler, Muhammad Ali, chose to forgo the favour. 
This abolished 'the last fragment of dependence upon an Indian Prince at Madras'. " In Calcutta 
(by 1717) the servants had obtained a charter (fannan) from the Mughal Emperor, which allowed 
"I Bombay was ceded to the Company in 1688, see: Holden Furber, Rival Empires of Trade 1600- 
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them to trade custom free in return for an annual payment. 
The East India Company's status in the sub-continent has been analysed by Bayly who argues 
that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Company was 'more than just another Indian 
trading community'. " He stresses that 'from the mid-seventeenth century, the East India 
Company had the capacity, will and legal right to wage war and had an intermittent interest in 
53 territorial power and revenue'. A case in point is the policies pursued by the Company's 
chairman, Sir Josiah Child. It was however the ideas that the Company's servants held which, 
Bayly argues, that were decisive in the Company's take over of power. He contends that the 
Company displayed two core characteristics of the domestic state (as these have been elucidated 
by John Brewer), which underpinned the Company's expansion in India. These were a 'rigorous 
tradition of administrative accountancy' and a belief in an 'ideology of transcendent law and 
sovereignty'. "' By this argument Bayly does not deny the role of individual actors and their 
private concerns in the rise of the Company to power, but stresses that ideas shared by the 
servants regarding law and sovereignty, as well as their ability and willingness to use force, 
played a crucial role in the establishment of British rule of Bengal. 51 
This is a point that Marshall has endorsed in his introduction to The Eighteenth Century in Indian 
History. Here, Marshall argued that the 'ideological assumptions behind British intervention' in 
Bengal was what rendered 'it especially potent'. m This argument has been developed not only by 
Bayly but also, for instance, by Sudipta Sen. They both have shown the contrary ways in which 
the concept of sovereignty was understood by the Company and Mughal officials. They have 
suggested that the Company entertained absolute notions of right whereas the Mughal rule 
appeared to be based on a system of concurrent rights - the Mughal Emperor was perceived as 
the king of kings, rather than as the sole king. " 
In this scheme of things, any grant that the Company obtained, such as the 1717 fannan from the 
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Emperor Farrukhsiyar, was not absolute, but rather required the endorsement of local rulers. 
However Sen argues that company officials saw the fannan as a legal document - they 'infused 
it with the legal intent of a contract'. " From the Mughal point of view, the farman was a personal 
favour from the Emperor, not a charter equivalent to the ones they had received from the British 
state. John Surman, for instance, when he had been sent on the mission in 1715 to obtain the 
fartnan, had been rejected at least twice, partly because 'the first drafts of the farman were [ ... I 
written as a legal document - lengthy and tedious'. "' Yet, this farman was the subsequent 
foundation upon which the Company servants would derive many of the Company's 'rights'. In 
times of dispute between the Company and local Indian rulers, the servants pointed to thefarynan 
and argued 'repeatedly [ ... ] that the Company traded in India by right and not by any favour of 
the imperial officers'. ` This can be further illustrated by the Council of Fort William's claims 
after they had been ousted from Calcutta by the nawab: they argued that Siraj ud-Daula's actions 
amounted to a violation of the 1717 farman, which they had purchased'frorn the great Mogul, at 
more than the expense of one hundred thousand pounds'. " 
The Company had anticipated that the 1717 grant would free it from an obligations to local 
rulers and enable it 'to trade as Englishmer4 and enjoy theirprMleges without hindrance. ' However, 
between the date of obtaining the grant and Siraj ud-Daula's attack on the Company's settlement 
in Calcutta, the Company was fully aware that the implementation of its grant required the 
cooperation of the local nawabs. From this period on, the servants clearly demonstrated their 
understanding of the structures of power that existed in the Mughal regime by their ability to 
function within and manipulate them. Cooperation between the Company servants and the 
nawabs broke down when the Company became capable of enforcing its interpretation of its 
rights. " In addition, opposed to the idea of concurrent rights that has been formulated by Sen 
and others, was the accepted paramount sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor in this period: local 
nawabs and Rajas may have contested each others' rights, but they recognised the superiority of 
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the Emperor. Richard Barnett argues that kingship ideology was just one example of the way the 
Mughal Empire achieved centralisation. " This argument undermines the idea that the Mughals 
did not recognise notions of absolute sovereignty. The power of the Emperor was a myth in 
point of practice by the mid-eighteenth century - the emperors were no longer in a position to 
enforce their orders - yet regional nawabs still sought recognition from Delhi even after they 
were virtually independent from the Mughal Empire in order to legitimise their power. For 
example, until the battle of Panipat, the Marathas recognised the emperor as 'lord of all land', 
and they 'also gave the impression at all times that they were to be servants of the empire'. ` The 
ruler of Awadh, Safdar Jang, also calculated that it was in his best interests to remain 'legally' 
within the structure of the empire. ' Such powerful, regional rulers found it in their interest to 
maintain the authority of the emperor. 
The myth of the emperor was a ploy used by the local rulers to prevent each other from 
dominating the region. Yet this strategy worked precisely because the players accepted the 
emperor's authority. Another example of this strategy at work can be seen in the actions of Shuja 
ud-daula, the nawab of Awadh: while the Afghans occupied the Emperor's capital, and the 
Emperor himself was engaged in a war against the Company for Bihar (1760-61), Shuja was 
offered the title of wazir by the Afghan conqueror, Abdali Shah; he refused and instead chose to 
maintain the authority of Shah Alam Il. This, Barnett argues, 'renewed the pretence of Mughal 
authority'. Shuja also used the 'Mughal name as a shield to protect his own resources, in that he 
avoided paying tribute to the Afghan invader by refusing to recognise his authority. " The East 
India Company clearly recognised the importance of gaining the sanction of the Emperor in 
order to gain legitimacy, which was why the Company, in common with Shuja and the 
Marathas, all courted and maintained him. Barnett argues that Company military commanders 
knew 'that the prospects of consolidating their victory [at Baksar] depended on how well they 
could manipulate the authority of the Emperor'. " 
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The Company's understanding of the politics of the region enabled them to use the system to 
their advantage. After the Battle of Baksar, the emperor was publicly respected but he had no 
independent powers. Various examples in support of this reality can be found including the fact 
that it was the Company who decided that Shuja would be restored to Awadh, wherein they had 
previously installed the Emperor. Similarly, while the Company made a great fanfare of the fact 
that the position of diwan had been bestowed upon them, the reality was that the Emperor was in 
no position to either grant or withhold it. As Barnett argues, the position was not bestowed by 
the Emperor's fannan, but by a treaty between the Company and the Emperor. It was in order to 
give its conquests a sense of legitimacy, that the Company maintained the fiction of the 
Emperor, and pretended that the diwani was a grant from Shah Alarn 11.61 
The reason however why the Company did 'not constitute yet another successor state to the 
Mughal empire' was the servants dissatisfaction with having to submit to the authority of an 
Indian ruler. The reason for this dissatisfaction will be considered below, but the important point 
here is that when the Company acquired the ability to use military might to resolve its disputes 
with the nawabs, it did not lack the will to use it. In other words, it was not a notion of absolute 
sovereignty but the servants' perception of how best to preserve the Company's interests, which 
led them to take political power. The Company's interests, in turn, (as chapter I showed) were 
increasingly seen as an important component of Britain's wealth and the Company's acquisitions 
as part of the British Empire. Given these organising premises of the Company's servants, the 
Company's regime of Bengal could never have been merely another successor state. " 
111. The Nawabs of Bengal and Private Trade 
The structural changes that occurred in the Mughal Empire, as well as the Anglo-French rivalry 
explored below, and the Company servants' increasing ability to use force, all informed the 
broader context in which the Company rose to power. Another important area of explanation is 
the policies pursued by the servants abroad. In the historiography of the Company's rise to 
power there has been a tendency, as Marshall points out, to see the British 'as having done little 
if anything to create the opportunities from which they were to profit so spectacularly'. In this 
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scheme of things, the Company's acquisition of defacto sovereignty of Bengal was the result of 
external circumstances rather then any preconceived plan. Central to this argument was the 
claim that the British were not involved in Indian politics, until they were forced to be so by the 
actions of the French and the decline of the Mughal Empire. " 
This was also an argument that was current at the time; one contemporary observer argued that 
prior to the revolutions that occurred in Bengal's government in this period, the Company had 
never participated in the political affairs of the province, but now it had become a necessity: 
Before the [ ... ] battle of Plassey, the Company's concerns in Bengal were entirely of a 
commercial nature. They had factories, [ ... ] carried on a pretty extensive trade [ ... ]; but 
they were never permitted to interfere in any political affairs. The fortunate epoch above 
mentioned gave a total change to the system of that country. Ever since that period the 
English have been under the necessity of concerning themselves [ ... ] in the [ ... ] Durbur (or administration) and sometimes to interpose their authority, or their influence, for the 
sake of the Company's interest. 72 
Such arguments ignore the privileged status the Company enjoyed abroad, which could only 
have been achieved by the Company's participation in the courts of successive nawabs, and of 
the emperors. The Company had never been wholly aloof from the politics of the sub-continent, 
and at the very least, the mid-1750s did not mark its first foray in this arena. 
Before 1756, the year when Siraj ud-Daula ascended the throne and attacked the British 
settlement in Bengal, the Company had been forced to make various payments to the nawabs of 
Bengal in order to maintain their trading advantages. In 1756 however the British appeared to 
procrastinate on the demanded payment, which provided one of the immediate reasons for Siraj 
ud-Daula's attack. The Company in turn argued that the retaliatory measures they took 
constituted self-defence - they were protecting their 'rights' as guaranteed them by the 1717 
farman. Successive nawabs of Bengal had however clearly regarded the Company's 'rights' as 
defiance of their authority. Rajat Kanta Ray argues that thefannan's bestowal of duty free trade 
was 'a serious injustice to the merchants of the country and a gross violation of the provincial 
71 Marshall, 'The British in Asia: Trade to Dominion 1700-1765', in 71e Oxford History of the 
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government's right to customs revenue'. 3 
Successive nawabs had sought to rectify this state of affairs by demanding payments from the 
Company in order to enforce the orders of thefarman. Yet the Company's trade had also shifted 
the centre of foreign trade from the Mughal port of Hooghly to the Company controlled port of 
Calcutta. In 1733 the nawab complained: 
I am scarce able to recount the abominable practices of this people. When they 
came to this country they petitioned the then government in a humble manner for liberty 
to purchase a spot of ground to build a factory house upon, which was no sooner 
granted but they ran up a strong fort, surrounded it with a ditch which has 
communications with the river and mounted a great number of guns upon walls. They 
have enticed several merchants and others to go and take protection under them and 
they collect a revenue which amounts to Rs 1000,000.74 
The development of the Company's settlement undermined the authority of the local ruler and it 
displayed the potential of becoming 'an alternative political centre'. Therefore, the tension 
between Bengal's rulers and the Company servants had been brewing for some time. Siraj ud- 
Daula's immediate reasons for attacking the British, besides the failure to pay the demanded 
sum, included: the strengthening of the fortifications surrounding the Company's settlement, the 
servants' harbouring of and refusal to surrender Mughal subjects wanted by the nawab, as well as 
the long standing issue of the extent of the Company's free trade . 
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In a letter written by Siraj ud-Daula to an Armenian merchant, he stated that he was willing to 
pardon the English, if they rectified the above mistakes, and agreed to pay some duty on trade: 'I 
will then pardon their fault and permit their residence here, otherwise I will shortly expel that 
nation'. " It is unlikely, given the extensive trade the Company conducted, that Siraj desired to 
permanently exclude the British, but, in any case, from the Company's point of view, the 
demands were unreasonable; they required them to forego all their hard won 'rights'. Even after 
the successful coup against Siraj ud-Daula, the point of contention between the nawabs (Mir 
War and then Mir Qasim) and the Company, remained that of the Company's trading 
privileges, but now also included the amount of money that the nawabs were to pay to the 
Company in return for the military assistance that they had been given. On Mir War's accession 
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to throne he had been expected to pay Rs. 28,000,000; in order to ensure that this sum was 
recovered Clive demanded (in 1758) that the revenues of certain parts of Bengal should be 
assigned to the Company temporarily. 71 In 1760, the servants demanded that these assignments 
were made permanent, and that they were ceded additional territory: Mir War refused, but his 
son-in-law, Mir Kasim, was willing to accept the demands, which led to Mir War being deposed 
by the servants. 78 
After Plassey, European private enterprises (as opposed to the Company's trade) had increased 
into the internal trade of Bengal; this was an area from which they had previously been excluded. 
In addition, the traders used force to buy and sell to their advantage, and utilised the Company's 
free trade passes for their private commercial activities. The latter abuse had become a long 
standing one, but the dramatic growth in private trade after 1757 increased the scope of the 
problem and seriously challenged the nawabs' authority. For instance, Mir Qasim complained: 
All the English chiefs with their gomastahs, officers and agents, in every district of the 
government, act as collectors, renters, zemindars and talookdars, and setting up the 
Company's colours, allow no power to my officers. [ ... I And every man with a Company's dustuck in his hand, regards himself as not less than the Company. 71 
In addition, the extensive use of the dastaks by Europeans and Indians meant a reduction in the 
custom returns of the nawabs. 1 High ranking Company servants had especially large private 
commercial interests in the internal trade of Bengal in this period. Henry Vansittart, the governor 
of Fort William, was reported to have an enormous stake in the salt trade. His interests were in 
direct competition with other members of the Fort William Council, John Johnstone and 
William Hay. " This rivalry was to have important consequences for the events that developed 
during Mir Qasim's short reign. 
Marshall points out that after 1757 superficially very little had changed, but in reality, he argues, 
Plassey had brought about a 'political revolution'. In the lands ceded to the Company in 1757 
and 1760, British influence expanded into new areas of Bengal, and provided the servants who 
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were posted there with lucrative trading opportunities. The Indian officials' powers in the 
annexed territories were undermined and Company servants were appointed as residents to the 
nawabs' court. ' Mir Qasirn attempted to take steps to reform British abuses of trade and the 
Treaty of Monghyr was negotiated by Vansittart under which European traders had to pay a9 
percent duty on 'inland' items (such as salt) and European Indian agents came under the 
jurisdiction of the nawab's courts. ' This treaty was rejected by the council, but Mir Qasirn took 
measures into his own hands: 'Since all this wrangling on the part of the gentlemen has arisen on 
account of duties, I have for that reason, put a stop to the collecting of duties and customs in all 
districts of the provinces, subject to me. " 
Mir Qasirn thereby effectively eroded the advantages of the Company, without actually altering 
its trading privileges. In a revealing comment, one Council member (John Johnstone) declared 
that the nawab was attempting 'to ruin our trade, superiority and influence through the country, 
by reducing us on a footing with all other Europeans [ ... ], and even with the very Bengal 
inhabitants'. " The rejection of the treaty, and the subsequent hostilities that followed owed much 
to some of the servants' suspicion of the intentions of each other as that of Mir Qasim's. 
Members of the council felt that Vansittart had negotiated a treaty to his private advantage - 
mistrust of Vansittart's intentions stemmed from earlier evidence that he had obtained 
preferential treatment for his trade at the expense of that of his fellow-servants' concerns. In 
addition, Marshall points out that the traders could easily have borne the nine percent duty - 
what the private traders fundamentally objected to was any degree of dependence on the 
nawab. " 
The servants' actions did not go without protest from the Company in London. News of the 
dispute with Mir Qasim led the directors to call for inland trade to be halted and for 'all 
European agents and private gumashtas be recalled, 87 but significant reform would have to await 
Robert Clive's appointment as governor of Fort William for the second time in 1765. Ray 
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contends that the Company's concern for the reformation of the abuse of free trade stemmed not 
from any sense of responsibility, but from the fact that it was harming their profits. " He argues 
that the 'it was the private aggrandizement of the Company servants that provided the cutting 
edge of the expanding English imperialism'. " This is also an argument put forward by Sushil 
Chaudhury, who argues: 'conquest [ ... ] followed not because of any internal crisis, either 
political or economic, in Bengal. The conquest became necessary for the retrieval of the private 
trade fortunes of the Company servants'. Furthermore, argues Chaudhury, the servants were 
fully aware that their actions would be vindicated in the eyes of the directors, if the end result 
augmented the profits of the Company" - Private and Company interests were very difficult to 
separate. 
IV. Anglo-French Rivalry 
When J. R. Seeley argued that it was not until the British had abolished the influence of the 
French in India, that they were able to get 'rid of that feeling that the French were driving us out 
of it', he expressed a feeling that was prevalent amongst eighteenth-century policy makers. India 
was, in Seeley's words, 'a prize of absolutely incalculable value"' - contemporaries may not 
have regarded the Indian acquisitions as equivalent to the American ones, but they were 
significant enough to lead British policy makers to take steps to preserve them from French 
ambitions. The actions of other Europeans, real or imaginary, were a strong influence upon the 
policies pursued by the British. The rivalry of the British and the French for the control of the 
Asian trade was only part of their broader struggle in the international arena for supremacy. 
Their competition with one another to dominate the East India trade explains their increasing 
interference in Indian politics through the course of the eighteenth century, but it was a process 
that intensified in the 1740s. Holden Furber has argued that both the English and French 'felt 
compelled to interfere in Indian politics' - that is, each of them suspecting the other might 
conspire against them, in conjunction with Indian powers, led them to adopt a more 
interventionist approach in sub-continental politics. 
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The AngJo-French rivalry that unfolded in southern India during the 1740s led to a 
concentration of European troops in the region. This fact would prove decisive for the way the 
British responded to Siraj ud-Daula's attack on Calcutta. It was also during this time that the 
practice of hiring out European troops to Indian princes was established. In return, the 
Companies were assigned the revenues of certain areas of the rulers' territories. These 
developments, Furber argues, set 'the stage [ ... ] for the plots, marches and counter-marches' . 
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An example of the English Company's involvement in Indian domestic disputes includes its 
unsuccessful attempt to help the Maratha chief, Shahji, to regain the throne of Tanjore in return 
for the right to set up a factory at Devicottai (1749). " But it had been the French Company that 
had developed the practice of hiring out troops to the Indians. In 1748, The French Company 
became involved in the Hyderabad succession struggle, where two contenders, Nasir Jang and 
his nephew Muzzafar Jang, both claimed the throne; the French decided the issue by militarily 
supporting the nephew. The cost of the involvement was extremely high for the French, but they 
were compensated by the receipt of grants of land, which 'more than doubled the French 
94 Company's possessions'. It was the potential of achieving such dividends that made an 
interventionist policy in Indian politics so attractive to Europeans. 
Bruce Lenman argues that the French Company had learrit that it could achieve its objectives by 
'backing a compliant Indian prince militarily' in succession disputes. 95 This was a fact that was 
not lost on the British who realised, when the French became involved in the Carnatic dynastic 
struggle, that they could not afford to remain aloof. " The governor of Fort St. George, Thomas 
Saunders (1751) argued: 
But since the French have put themselves in possession of extensive domains and have 
raised their flags at the bounds of our territory and have striven to strain our settlements 
to such an extent that they can neither receive supplies or goods, it has been judged 
essential to thwart their designs less their success render our situation worse 97 
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The British supported Muhammad Ali - the son of the previous ruler; the French had already 
installed, in 1751, another contender to the throne, Chanda Sahib. Ultimately, the English 
Company's troops, under the command of Stringer Lawrence and Clive, were successful in 
defeating the French. However, the significant legacy of this, from the perspective of events that 
were to unfold in Bengal, was the increased British n-fflitary and naval presence on the sub- 
continent and Indian Ocean: the British government, in 1753, had decided to send 'four king's 
ships' and '900 royal troops' to India, "' and, in addition, the English Company, in imitation of 
the French, had increased its military ranks by recruiting and training Indians; these soldiers 
were known as sepoy forces. Lenman observes that this rivalry left the English Company with an 
'independent military muscle which was to enable them to expand [ ... ] territorially'. " It left 
them, in other words, with the option of using force without which they might have resolved 
their dispute with Siraj ud-Daula by the means of negotiation. In any case, it is certainly true that 
had the dispute taken place ten years earlier, the Company would not have possessed the 
resources to respond in the same manner. That past disputes, whether with Indian rulers or other 
Europeans, had not erupted into 'warfare in the seventeenth or early eighteenth century', 
Marshall has argued, 'owed more to the lack of force at the disposal of the Company's servants 
in India than to the peaceful intentions of their employers'. " 
In Bengal, it was also the fear of the French influence on the local ruler that led the Company to 
use the opportunity provided by Siraj ud-Daula's actions to attack the French settlement at 
Chandernagore, in March 1757. The select committee at Fort William did not unanimously 
support the action that was taken. In one letter written before the attack, the committee 
suggested that they should agree to a treaty of neutrality with the French rather than creating 
another point of controversy with the nawab. 111 Yet Clive and Watson, who had been dispatched 
from Madras upon the news of the loss of Calcutta, had received prior instructions to 'dispossess 
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the French of Chandernagore' if it proved practical. "' 
S. Chaudhury argues that the British motivation for attacking the French was the private trade of 
the servants. He points that in the 1750s, the French share of private trade had increased - by 
the mid-1750s they were seriously undermining 'the supremacy of the British private trade'. It 
was this decline in their private trade, he contends - rather than the complaints of the nawabs 
- that actually led the Company to reform the dastak system. It also explains their decision to 
attack the Chandemagore. In Chaudhury's opinion, arguments that suggest the Company 
attacked the French settlement because Britain had just embarked on the Seven Years War, or to 
prevent the collusion of the nawab and the French, are inadequate. 103 While these may have 
provided the rhetoric by which to justify their actions, he states, the real motivation was to 
eliminate French competition. 
The paranoia that existed within the Company regarding French activities and intentions on the 
sub-continent cannot be overstated. The directors were extremely concerned that French trade 
did not surpass their own; in one letter to their servants they complained: 'the Cargos of the 
French and Dutch Ships lately arrived from Bengal seemed to appear much [more] valuable than 
ours'. "' In another letter written by the select committee at Fort William, it was stated 'there was 
the greatest reason to imagine he [Siraj] was an utter enemy to the English and privately 
endeavouring to bring in the French with promises of joining them against us'. "' The servants 
did not seem to have any specific intelligence of an alliance being formed, but their suspicions 
were aroused nonetheless. The servants' perception of the nawab as deceitftd and untrustworthy 
did nothing to ease this climate of uncertainty under which the servants operated. The view of 
the nawab as dishonest was one that was developed by Clive in a letter to Laurence Sulivan: 
But you, Sir, who have resided so long in India, are well acquainted with the nature and 
dispositions of these Mussulmen, gratitude they have none, bare Men of very narrow 
conceptions, and they have adopted a system of Politicks more peculiar to this Country 
than any other, viz.; to attempt everything by treachery rather than force. Under these 
circumstances may not so weak a Prince as Meer Jaffeir be easily destroyed, or 
influenced by others to attempt destroying us. What is it then can enable us to secure 
Chaudhury, Prosperity, p. 322. 
Ibid., pp. 310-11,318-19. 
""Letter from Court' (4 March 1767), in F97HC, V, p. 18 (see also p. 43). 
"'Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Secret Committee, London' (14 July 1757), 
in Indian Records, H, p. 447. 
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our present Acquisitions or improve upon them, but such a force that leaves nothing to 
the power of Treachery or Ingratitude. "' 
Ultimately, the only way that Clive could envisage the Company trading freely, without being 
obliged to pay duties was by becoming'Nabobs ourselves in Fact, if not in name'. "' 
V. British Perceptions of the Mughal Empire 
By pointing to the untrustworthy character of the Muslims, Clive was drawing on a long existing 
set of attitudes. Roe, in the early seventeenth century, had argued that diplomacy with the 
Mughal Empire had to go hand in hand with the threat of force; he contended that the 
Company's best guarantor of trade in India was fear and therefore, in order to protect their 
interests, the Mughal rulers had to be kept in awe of the English. As he advised factors at 
Bantam: 'nothing but fear keeps a Mughal in awe; use him kindly and he win abuse you, but 
deal with him in smooth words and nipping deeds and he win respect and reverence you. '" Yet 
at the same time, Roe advised against engaging in land wars and building fortified settlements in 
India, arguing that they were incompatible with profitable commerce. The rationale for this 
advice was based on his recognition that the Company could not match the military strength of 
the Mughals; instead, he believed that the English should make use of their naval superiority to 
gain concessions for their trade on land.: 'Lett this bee receiued as a rule that if you will Profitt, 
seeke it at Sea, and in quiett trade; for without controuersy it is an error to affect Garrisons and 
Land warrs in India'. " 
The relative strength and weaknesses of the Mughal Empire and the Company has led Om 
Prakash to argue that both were able to coexist without significant conflict for many decades 
because 'at work was indeed a rather finely tuned balance between the Europeans' unquestioned 
sovereignty on the sea as against their almost total vulnerability on land for a long timeY 11 K. N. 
11 (30 Dec 1758), quoted in: Forrest, Life ofLord Clive, II, p. 120-21. It was similarly argued in 
Anon., 'Review of the History of Bengal from the Death of Aliverdy Cawn', that the 'Moors' 
had 'no idea of personal honour among Princes, nor of that True Policy, which is founded on 
moderation and good faith' (OIOC, MSS Eur. E12, p. 254). See also: 'Clive to Directors' (30 
Sept 1765), in FWHC, IV, p. 339. 
'Clive to Rous'(17 April 1765), quoted in: Forrest, Life ofLord Clive, H, pp. 257. 
Quoted in I. Bruce Watson, 'Fortifications and the "Idea" of Force in Early English East 
India Company Relations with India, Past and Present, 88 (1980), 70-87 (p. 7506). 
109 Readings, p. 4. 
110 Om Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Chaudhuri also points out that the reason why the Company's representatives were treated by 
Mughal rulers with greater respect than might otherwise have been accorded to merchants, was 
because 'the chartered Companies were [ ... ] 
in a position to inflict material damage to the 
seaborne trade of the [Mughal] Empire'. ` Roe in fact advocated attacking Mughal fleets 
whenever their trade at Surat met with interference. "' However, as Chaudhuri stresses, actual 
recourse to arms could be extremely damaging to the trade of both parties, "' which encouraged 
both sides to maintain cordial trading relations; but once the military balance tilted in the 
Company's favour, as it had by 1756, the Company was no longer inhibited by fears that its 
actions might result in its being forcibly expelled - as it had been in 1689 after a disastrous war 
with the Mughals. 
The role that the idea of 'force' played in the Company's policy in India, has been analysed by 
Bruce Watson. He demonstrates that Roe's set of attitudes towards the Mughal empire was 
widely shared; but while the empire was still militarily powerful, it commanded a degree of 
respect. Watson points out that the 'official guide for action' from 1687 was: 'suaviter in modo, 
fortiter in re' (courteous in manner, firm in deed). '" In Watson's study of the impact the idea of 
force had on the servants' relations with Indian rulers, he argues that the Company's 
establishment of forts in order to defend their trade from perceived threats facilitated the 
development of an offensive use of force. The servants could and did use the forts as bases from 
which to launch military attacks on Indian rulers, but the Company's fortified settlements also 
undermined the power of the rulers in a more subtle manner. For instance, the English lived 
according to their own laws in their settlements and regarded their territories 'as havens for 
themselves', Indians, 'and their property'. "' This, as Watson observes, 'challenged Indian 
authority around' the English settlements" I- in 1756 one of the causes of the dispute between 
the Company and Siraj was the servants' failures to give up the Indians wanted by the nawab. 
University Press, 1998), p. 139. 
"' Chaudhuri, Trading World, p. 109. 
its Watson, 'Fortifications', p. 74. 
Chaudhuri, Trading World, pp. 125-26. 
14 Watson, 'Fortifications', p. 79. 
15 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
116 Ibid., p. 87. 
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Chaudhuri implies that the policy that the Company adopted in India was based on its 
understanding of the Mughal regime as arbitrary - the trading concessions that the servants 
sought from the Mughal rulers, such as the 1717fannan, was their means of providing stability 
for their trade under a government whose fiscal demands were perceived as capricious . 
117 
Chaudhuri argues that it was a 'fixed and long-term objective' to 'impose a certain degree of 
control over the Company's political environment in Asia'; ` the Company believed that the 
political reality of Mughal India left them with no alternative but to invest in forts, naval 
protection and troops: 'if no Naval Force no Trade, if no Fear no Friendship'. "' What changed 
over time was the 'degree of control' that the Company could aspire to and realistically 
demand. "' Robert Travers's 'Ideology and British Expansion' presents a similar argument to that 
of Chaudhuri and Watson, but concerns itself more specifically with the period 1757-72. Travers 
argues that the British held 'deeply entrenched assumptions about Indian politics', which, he 
contends, provides an 'important ideological context for British actions during the conquest of 
Bengal'. He believes that there existed a certain 'frontier patriotism' amongst the servants in 
India according to which the servants defined themselves in contradistinction to the Mughals - 
the servants' rights and freedoms as Englishmen were opposed to the despotism and faithlessness 
of the Muslims. "' 
At the same time, Travers complicates this argument by drawing attention to the fact that the 
Company also wanted to legitimise its status on the sub-continent by making use of Mughal 
forms of government - the Company's initial regime in Bengal sought to preserve what it 
regarded as the ancient Mughal constitution. 122 Yet, while Travers does not believe that British 
117 Chaudhuri, Trading World, p. 121. See also: Anon., Conduct ofthe East India, pp. 11-12. 
"I Chaudhuri, Trading World, p. 121. 
119 Abstract of Letters Received from Bombay, (20 Dec 1718), OIOC E/4/449, para. 30, p. 322, 
quoted in Chaudhuri, Trading World, p. 113. In 1774, it was argued in Anon., Conduct ofthe East 
India, pp. 45-46, that upon the second enthronement of Mir Jafar, the Company realised 'that 
their situation was such, that they could trust no Nabob, nor could any Nabob trust them. The 
military Force which was at first found necessary for the Protection of Commerce, and which 
could not be supported without a terTitorial Revenue, was found equal to the enthroning and 
dethroning of Nabobs'. 
120 Chaudhuri, Trading World, P. 12 1. 
121 Travers, 'Ideology and British Expansion in Bengal 1757-72', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 33,1 (2005), 7-27, (pp. 8-9). 
122 This is a theme that Travers has explored in greater detail in his 'Contested Notions of 
Sovereignty in Bengal under British Rule: 1765-1785' (Ph. D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 
2001). 
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perceptions of the Mughals: can be reduced to any simple formulation of the Muslims as the 
European 'other', he does believe that the inherent British belief that the Indians could not be 
trusted provided 'ideological coherence' to the Company's expansion. "' The policies that the 
servants pursued from obtaining dastaks to acquiring diwani to standing forth as diwan in 1772, 
were all consistent, Travers contends, with the servants' perception of the Indians as corrupt and 
untrustworthy. 124 These perceptions were ftirther shared by the directors in London who, after 
the acquisition of the territorial revenues of Bengal, questioned the integrity of the naib, 
Muhammad Reza Khan and increasingly urged the servants to take greater control of the 
management of diwani. 125 
There is no doubt that the attitudes that Travers explicates can be widely found in the 
contemporary published literature, private papers and amongst the Company's official 
correspondence. However it is also possible to find evidence of another strain of opinion that 
placed the responsibility for the Company's misgovernment of Bengal upon the shoulders of the 
servants. For instance, in one letter the directors blamed the Europeans for the alleged 
unreliability of the Indians: 
It is a sad truth [... ] that in all parts of India where the Europeans generally come the 
natives soon learn to flatter, cheat and wreak their malice whereas in the inland 
countries where few Europeans ever are, they are generally harmless and innocent and 
not inclined to mischief. "' 
After the Plassey revolution, the directors saw native depravity as a reason for why the Company 
was not prospering according to their expectations, but at the same time, the behaviour of the 
servants was also censured; a significant amount of the directors' attention after the revolution 
would be concerned with establishing control over their servants abroad and public attention 
would come to be focussed on the conduct of the Company in Bengal. As the next chapter will 
show, it was (though not exclusively) the Company's depravity abroad that engaged the 
attention of informed observers in Britain. This is not to deny the argument that Travers puts 
` Travers, 'Ideology', pp. 9,18. 
""See: ibid., pp. 13,15-17. 
Ibid., p. 16; see also, for instance, Fff7HC, VI, pp. go, 119-24. 
Despatch Book, 10 Jan 1711, OIOC, E/3/97, para. 83, pp. 179-80. Another example of a 
similar attitude is the remarks of John Carnac on the dispute with Mir Kasirn: 'Cossim Ally Cawn 
was determined from the beginning to set himself out of the Reach of the English power as 
expeditiously as possible: and that it was natural he should do so, having no security for the 
English Faith being better kept with him than his predecessor', RCHC, III, p. 302. 
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forward, but to emphasise that British perceptions of the Indians was only one component of 
British expansion. 127 
Conclusion 
When Mir War was installed as nawab in 1757, the British may not have entertained the 
possibility of taking political control themselves; however, as Marshall has pointed out, by then, 
'the British [ ... I had a compelling interest in the survival of a stable and well-disposed regime in 
Bengal'. "' It gradually became politically inconceivable and then practically impossible for 
successive nawabs to take measures that the Company did not approve of. The revolution in the 
balance of power in Bengal was the result of Company and private trade considerations, Anglo- 
French rivalry and the internal politics of Bengal - as well as being helped by the wider changes 
taking place in eighteenth-century Indian society. Further, assumptions that the servants held 
regarding the manners of the Muslim rulers, also played an important role in British expansion. 
Such perceptions reveal a dissatisfaction with the Company's dependence on the nawabs; 
consequently, when circumstances led to the growth of the Company's military power in India, 
the servants demonstrated that they had the will to use it. 
The degree of force that the Company servants had at their disposal by 1765 had increased 
significantly. This was the consequence of Anglo-French rivalry, but it proved to be decisive for 
the way disputes with Indian rulers were resolved. The servants were not forced into a policy of 
conquest - it was not the only option open to them - it was the route they could and did take 
increasingly in the second half of the eighteenth century, as being the best means of furthering 
the interests of their own and Company trade. Their actions demonstrated that they no longer 
faced the same constraints as servants earlier in the century had faced upon the scope of their 
actions. They could consequently afford to enlarge their vision of how their trade and interests 
could be preserved from the perceived and actual encroachments of the Mughal government, and 
the ambitions of the French: from privileged traders with fortified settlements, to rulers of 
"I It is noteworthy that both concerns regarding the conduct of Company servants in India and 
the depravity of the Indians were articulated in Burke's speeches during the impeachment of 
Warren Hastings. See for instance Burke, 'Speech on Opening of Impeachment, in Writings and 
Speeches, VI, India the Launching of the Hastings Impeachment, ed. Marshall (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 199 1), pp. 292-93. 
` Marshall, Bengal, p. 81. 
92 
Bengal. 
Commerce with India was of significant interest to Britain, which was why the state, after all, 
supported and sustained the Company. From the very start, the Company had sought 
advantages from the Mughal Emperor by which to undercut the trade of her rivals. Political and 
military dominance gave the Company freedom to conduct their trade as they desired: by paying 
no custom duties and facing no threat of interference from local Indian officials. As Clive 
observed in 1765: 
Can it then be doubted that a large Army of Europeans would effectually preserve to us 
the Sovereignty, as I may call it, not only keeping in Awe the ambition of any Country 
Prince, but by rendering us so truly formidable, that no French, Dutch or other Enemy 
could ever dare to molest us? 
He went on to state that becoming 'Nabobs ourselves in Fact, if not in name' was the only way 
of providing the Company with security for their trade on the sub-continent. 129 What had shifted 
by 1765 was the perception of what was necessary for the Company's security and the level of 
security that the Company could hope to demand. The desirability of territorial empire would be 
contested when it did not pay the dividends that it at first promised, but relinquishing it was 
never a viable alternative. "' Attention and debate would instead turn to the consequences of 
mercantile government. 
" Quoted in Forrest, Life ofLord Clive, II, pp. 256-57. See also the 'Fundamental Maxim' stated 
in 'Hints for a Political System, OIOC, MSS Eur. E12, p. 37: 'That as our influence and 
possessions were acquired, so they must be maintained by force; and that the princes of the 
country are only to be kept in order by fear'. 
131 For instance, [Smith] argued: 'it might be wished, that the original plan of trade, upon which 
the Company was first constituted, had still continued [ ... ], and that they had not been from 
merchants erected into sovereign princes', but he went on to state it was now impossible for the 
Company to return to its original foundations: 'we must preserve what we have acquired upon 
the principles of self-defence', he continued: 'let us relinquish our possessions whenever we will, 
other Europeans are in readiness to lay hold upon whatever we leave, Observations, p. 5. 
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Chapter 3 
'New and Monstrous Species of Despotism': Responses to the East India Company's 
Rule of Bengal 
The relationship between the Company's servants and the nawabs of Bengal, during the period 
1756-65, was soured by the private trade abuses of the Europeans. The latter continued to be an 
issue after the acquisition of diwani, but it also became a cause of friction within the Company 
because of the steps that were being taken to reform it. Robert Clive had been sent back to 
Bengal in 1765, upon the news of the breach with Mir Qasim, in order to rectify the Company's 
affairs in the area. The measures he took, however, alienated a number of individuals, including 
John Johnstone (1734-1795)' and William Bolts, who from 1766 onwards began to air their 
grievances in London. They questioned the legitimacy of the actions the Company had taken to 
rectify its affairs in Bengal, and drew attention to the deterioration of the condition of the 
acquired territories following the Company's acquisition of political control. This chapter 
analyses responses to the Company's government of Bengal as these were presented in the most 
significant pamphlets published on the subject in this period. The succeeding chapter will adopt 
the same approach in order to investigate the principles of the plans that were put forward for the 
reform of the Company. Importantly, since those who wrote to point out the ills of Company 
rule also proceeded to give advice on how it could be rectified, many of the individuals that 
figure in this chapter will also make an appearance in the next. 
The responses to the Company's rule of Bengal, between 1769 and 1773, can be divided into two 
separate camps. Firstly, there was a strain of opinion that regarded the acquisitions as being of 
national importance, and saw the Company's regime in Bengal as destructive because of its 
anomalous character as a sovereign-merchant. ' Publicists that expounded this view argued that 
the only remedy for reforming the Company's affairs - if Britain did not want to lose her 
I Johnstone was appointed to the post of writer in the service of the Company in Bengal (in 
1750); after the Baffle of Plassey, Johnstone became a member of the Fort William Council, and 
was put in charge of territory (Midnapore, and then transferred to Burdwan in 1762) ceded to the 
Company by the nawab. His activities at Burdwan would ultimately lead to conflict with Clive, 
which will be discussed below. See: D. L. Prior, 'Johnstone, John (1734-1795)', in ODNB 
<http: //O-www. oxforddnb. com. consull. uU. ac. uk: 80/view/article/63515> [accessed 27 July 
20051 
1 Anon., True. 41ann, p. 2; Anon., Present State, p. 5. 
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acquisitions - was for the British government to administer the territories itself. 3 This Viewpoint 
was expressed by Alexander Dow and William Bolts, ' and win be considered in this chapter in 
conjunction with such important anonymous publications as the True Alann and the Present State. 
Ile second strain of opinion saw the Company's problems in Bengal as the result of Clive's 
actions and his dual system. This group wanted the Company's affairs to be reformed, but were 
against the British government taking over the responsibility of managing the territories. George 
Johnstone, who will be explored in the next chapter, and the author of the Plan for the 
Govanment, considered here, thought that the Company would be capable of managing the 
acquisitions if they were given the appropriate powers. 
Central to both of these groups' arguments was the notion of despotism; this was a concept that 
was heavily influenced by the ideas of Montesquieu, and this chapter will consider, in section 
two, his understanding of the term. Yet while Montesquieu's definition of despotic government 
was clearly employed by the theorists considered here, at the same time, they distinguished 
between different degrees of despotism. This chapter will proceed to demonstrate how the idea of 
'imperfect' despotism, implicit in Montesquieu's theory, and a differentiation between arbitrary 
despotic regimes and absolute despotisms - which had been formulated, for instance, in David 
Hume's Essq)i - explains the way in which contemporaries could describe the Mughal empire 
as both despotic and as a government by law. The difference was employed by the Plan for the 
Govemment in order to indict Clive's dual system, but it was also called upon to vindicate Clive's 
policies, as Luke Scrafton, Clive's dose supporter, set out to do. Robert Travers has shown the 
ways in which the idea of the 'ancient Mughal constitution' was utilised in the construction of 
the Company's regime in Bengal. 5 However, in Britain the very same concept was employed to 
indict Company rule. 
This chapter will then show how mercantile despotism was defined as a new species of 
despotism and used by the True Alarm and the Present State, to justify the British government's 
take over of responsibility. Despotism, in its precise sense, was understood to be an arbitrary and 
3 Anon., True Alarm, p. 100n; Anon., Present State, p. 67. 
4 Bolts, Considerations, p. 220-21; Dow, History, III, cxvi. 
5 See: Travers, 'Contested Notions', pp. 1-43. 
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absolute system of government! but the Praent State, the True Alarm, Bolts, Dow and the Planfir 
the Govemmmt, all employed it more loosely. They argued that all governments, including 
despotic ones, faced restraints on the exercise of power. These restraints diflered according to the 
form of government, but fundamentally, the self-interest of all rulers dictated that they took care 
of the interests of their people! This was not true of the Company's government of Bengal, 
which demonstrated that it was wholly unqualified to exercise what in practice amounted to 
sovereign power. Firstly, however, this chapter Will turn to the private trade issue which provides 
much of the necessary context for this and the succeeding chapters. It was the events that 
unfolded between 1757 and 1769 which created much of the problems and disaffection that led 
to increased focus on Indian affairs between 1769 and 1773. 
1. Private Trade 
The desirability of a Company post in India did not lie in the nominal salary that it paid, but 
rather in the opportunity of supplementing that income by engaging in lucrative private trade. 
There were only limited openings in the Europe to Asia (as well as Asia to Europe) trade for the 
servants due to the Company's exclusive trading privileges; the servants could, however, freely 
participate in the country or intra-Asian trade. This had become Company policy in the late 
seventeenth century, and thereafter, the private trade of the servants within Asia gradually 
increased. Individuals not employed by the Company could also obtain permission to trade in 
the sub-continent and were known as free merchants - fifty-nine were licensed during the years 
1736-56. There also existed large numbers of Europeans who traded in Asia with no formal 
permission, but the Company found it almost impossible to prevent them. " 
After the battle of Plassey, the significant decline in the power of the nawabs had enormous 
repercussions upon the private trade of the servants, and that of the free merchants. Prior to 
1757, European private traders were excluded from dealing in inland articles; these were goods 
that were bought and sold within Bengal, such as salt, betel nut and tobacco. This exclusion had 
' For explorations of the concept of despotism see, Franco Venturi, 'Oriental Despotism', Journal 
of the History of Ideas, 24 (1963), 133-42; Melvin Richter, 'Despotism' in Didionary of History of 
Ideas, vol. 2, Stud(es of Sekcted Political Ideas, ed. P. P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner, 
1973). 
'This view was espoused, for example, in the Present State, pp. 21-23. 
' Marshall. East Indian Fortunes, pp. 18-2 1. 
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been accepted by the Company (which was not itself involved in the trade) in order to placate the 
nawabs who derived especial advantages from it. The specific benefits that the rulers gained were 
higher custom returns on inland goods and an ability to grant exclusive monopolies to deal in 
particular commodities to individuals of their choice. Any attempt by the British traders to 
encroach in this field not only undermined the monopoly rights the nawabs had granted and 
their powers of patronage, but also threatened their revenues because the British traders made 
use of the Company's trading pass, which precluded them from paying custom duties. However, 
although the British did not officially trade in inland goods in the early eighteenth century, in 
practice there is evidence that they did on a limited scale. ' 
The extension of the political power of the Company after 1757 enabled the servants and free 
merchants to expand their involvement in the internal and, more significantly, inland trade of 
Bengal. ` The Company had already, by this date, freed themselves from the nawabs' courts, 
gained the right to trade duty-firee and obtained the right to exercise coercive power over people 
that worked for them, but this influence, as Marshall points out, was restricted to Calcutta and to 
the Company's factories. " After this date, the Company's influence expanded into additional 
sections of Bengal, and with it the opportunity for private trade, which the private traders fiffly 
exploited. The nawabs did attempt to maintain their authority, as the conflict between Mir 
Qasim and the Fort William Council discussed in the last chapter showed; but in the territories 
ceded to the Company in 1757 and 1760 by Mir Jafar and Mir Qasim respectively, the nawabs 
ceased to exercise any degree of restraint over the private European traders at all. " 
As Marshall describes developments in this area, the 'size of internal ventures [of the Europeans] 
grew spectacularly' after Plassey. " European merchants had traditionally hired Indian agents 
(gumashtas) to manage their concerns outside Calcutta; their numbers grew after 1757, reflecting 
the increased level of European activity but, in addition, European agents also began to be 
utilised. For the purposes of this chapter, the increased involvement of high ranking Company 
'Ibid., pp. 108-12. 
Internal trade of Bengal referred to the buying of goods for export and the selling of imports. 
These factories were located at Dacca, Kasimbazar, Patna, Balasore and Lakshmipur (ibid., p. 
112). 
2 Ibid., pp. 112-14. 
' rbid., p. 114. 
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servants in the salt trade is of significant importance due to the individuals involved, and the 
policies of reform that would follow. Henry Vansittart, who was appointed governor of Fort 
William after Clive returned to England in 1760, had a large stake in this trade, but his concern 
was in direct competition with other members of the Fort William Council, namely John 
Johnstone and William Hay. These two, in conjunction with Bolts, formed a commercial 
enterprise in March 1762 in order to exploit the opportunities presented by the salt trade. The 
rivalry of these two parties played a crucial role in the breakdown of the relationship between 
Mir Qasirn and the servants. 
In addition to the expansion of private trade into inland commodities, the authority of the 
nawabs was further undermined by the way that the trade was conducted. Firstly, the 
Company's trading privileges, namely its daszak, was used extensively even by 'Indians who had 
no real connection with the British'. Secondly, private traders also exercised the Company's right 
to deal with Indian workers and traders who did not fulfil their contracts directly, rather than 
relying on the nawabs' courts. This led to European trade being conducted in an oppressive 
manner, with agents of the European merchants using force to buy and sell goods to their 
advantage. It was because of the oppressive practices used by European agents that they were 
recalled to Calcutta in 1764 by the Council. 14 
Vansittart had attempted to broker an agreement with the nawab Mir Qasim regarding European 
involvement in inland trade, as the previous chapter showed. Hay and Johnstone however 
opposed the treaty that had been negotiated by him, and their defiance led to their dismissal by 
the directors in 1764 - Hay had already been killed by the time the orders reached Fort 
William, after fighting had erupted in Patna in 1763. ` Peace would only be restored by the 
Company's victory at Buxar in October 1764, in which Mir Qasim and his allies would be 
defeated. " Yet, due to events that unfolded in London, Johnstone was subsequently reinstated; 
in England, Clive exploited the concerns of the Company's proprietors regarding events which 
were transpiring in Bengal to his advantage. With the aid of John Johnstone's supporters in 
" Ibid., pp. 116-18. 
'Also dismissed were Major John Carnac and Peter Amyatt (Sutherland, East, p. 11 6n2). 
" Kuiters, BrWA in Bengal, pp. 87,118. 
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London - the Johnstone Group, a powerfid faction in Court of Proprietors - Clive was 
successful in regaining the advantage in the Company in London from his rival, Sulivan. Clive 
also secured the continuation of his jaghire and appointment to the post of governor of Bengal 
(for a second time) with extensive powers. Ironically, the actions that Clive would take in Bengal 
as governor would lead to Sulivan's return to power in 1768.17 Johnstone was reinstated as a 
result of the manoeuvrings in the Court of Proprietors that accompanied Clive and Sulivan's 
battle-, a motion for restoring John to his seat on the council was put forward by Johnstone's 
supporters in the General Court, and neither the parties of Sulivan nor Clive opposed it due, 
respectively, to their desire of gaining, and fear of losing, the support of this significant faction. " 
Upon Clive's return to Bengal, he set about reforming the Company's affairs - his reforms were 
responsible for creating discontent amongst the Company's military and civil servants. One of 
the first problems that Clive encountered was Johnstone and Ralph Leycester's objection to the 
powers that Clive had been given, and to the establishment of a select committee in Calcutta. 
Clive oven-ode the objections, but his uncompromising approach did nothing to dispel the 
tension. Before Clive's arrival in May 1765, orders from London had been received by the Fort 
William Council ordering the servants to sign a covenant agreeing not to accept presents from 
Indian officials without the consent of the directors. This order was not executed, and Clive 
discovered that many of the servants had accepted 'presents' (bribes) from the nawab and Indian 
officials upon Mir Jafar's death and the succession of Najm-ud-Daula. As the select committee 
began investigating into the affair, individuals implicated - including Johnstone - resigned and 
returned to England; " Clive recommended to the directors that Johnstone should be prosecuted 
once he returned home. In light of the support that the Johnstone faction had given to Clive in 
1764, Johnstone's supporters felt that Clive had betrayed them, and were never to forgive him. 
Sutherland, East, pp. 117-32,136. 
Ibid., p. 13 1. 
Khan, Transidon, pp. 90-98; Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, pp. 172-75. The House of 
Commons Select Committee (set up in 1772 to inquire into the Company's affairs) later 
investigated the transactions that took place upon the accession of Najm-ud-Daula, see: RCHC, 
M, 304-12. 
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When Clive returned to England, members of the Johnstone group made use of every 
opportunity to harass Clive and cast doubt on his character. 20 
Clive's military reforms also made him many other enemies such as the officers that resigned 
after Clive abolished the 'double batta' (field allowance). Yet, the most controversial part of 
Clive's reforms was his establishment of a Society of Trade. This was his solution for the abuses 
that had taken place in the inland commerce of Bengal, and at the same time, his acceptance that 
the servants required a necessary supplement to their income. The plan was that the Society of 
Trade would enjoy exclusive rights to deal in salt, betel nut and tobacco; profits from the venture 
would be shared amongst the senior servants of the Company - lower ranking servants, free 
merchants and Indians were excluded. The plan however was condemned by the directors who 
ordered the society to be disbanded - this order was belatedly implemented in 1768.11 To 
individuals who found themselves excluded from this lucrative trade, it appeared that Clive, and 
his successor Harry Verelst (1734-1785), were attempting to protect the interests of senior 
servants, rather than providing an 'equitable solution%' 
As a consequence of Clive's and Verelst's policies, there existed in England, by the late 1760s, a 
number of former servants of the Company and free merchants who had personal grievances 
against the organisation. They were prepared to publicise their discontent in print, and work with 
each other to gain restitution. By far the most significant individuals, in terms of the publication 
and dissemination of their works, were Dow and Bolts. The former had been implicated in the 
batta mutiny, whilst the latter had been Johnstone's business partner. Bolts had remained in 
Bengal after Johnstone had returned to England, but was then forcibly deported from the sub- 
" On his return to England, John Johnstone wrote (in his defence): A Letter to the Proprietors of 
Fast India Siockfivm John Johnstone Late One of the Coumil at Cakutta Bengal (London, 1766); The 
Johnstone Group worked with Henry Vansittart and Laurence Sulivan's group (who were also 
hostile to Clive) to ensure the case against John was not pursued; this was achieved by May 
1767, see: Sutherland, Fast, 140,171, and M. M. Stuart, 'Lying under the Company's 
Displeasure', South Asian Retiew, 8,1 (1974), 43-53 (p. 50). Clive (in a paper drawn up with the 
intention of being given as evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee in 1773) 
argued that the directors' practise of beginning prosecutions and then dropping them was the 
cause of the Company losing control over its servants in India, see: OIOC, MSS Eur. E12, p. 69. 
21 M. E. Monckton Jones, Wamen Hastings in Bengal., 1772-1774 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918), 
pp. 58-59; Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, pp. 130-37. See also: Kuiters, British in Bengal, pp. 88- 
89. 
22 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, p. 137. 
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continent on the orders of Verelst, after Bolts had defied orders for him to leave Bengal upon his 
having resigned from the Company's service. At the time that he was deported, he had been 
elected as an Alderman of the Mayor's Court in Calcutta; this gave him rights to reside in India 
without the Company's consent. The latter fact, and doubts regarding the legitimacy of the steps 
Verelst had taken in deporting Bolts by force, provided Bolts with ample ammunition by which 
to attack the Company in London. " 
Back in England, Bolts cooperated with his former business partner John Johnstone who was 
supported by the powerful Johnstone Group. Besides the influence it wielded in the Court of 
Proprietors, two of John's brothers (George and William - the latter had changed his surname 
to Pultency) were also Members of Parliament. It was around this group that many of the 
dissident voices came to be loosely united. Lieutenant John Petrie was another figure who had 
been dismissed by Clive and returned to Britain at the same time as Bolts; he had been John 
Johnstone's acting attorney in India, and he had collected information against Clive and Verelst, 
which in 1771 he presented to the directors! ' Both Petrie and Bolts provided John's brother, 
George, MP for Cockermouth (1768-1774), with information on which he based his attacks on 
Clive - both in parliament and in the presO In addition, Sulivan actively recruited the support 
of disaffected individuals in order to bolster the base of his support in the Court of Proprietors. 
George Johnstone will feature prominently in the following chapter. Here a large part of the 
focus will fall on writings that expressed the same viewpoints as Bolts and Dow - namely that 
the Company was incapable of governing Bengal. During the time in which the writings under 
discussion here were published (1769-1773), Indian affairs had come to the fore of British 
Kuiters, British in Bengal, chs 10,13. 
Petrie's allegations against Clive and H. Verelst are contained in OIOC, MSS Eur. F218/23; 
Verelst's counter allegations in a letter addressed to the Directors are also contained therein. 
Verelst also wrote a book, A Kew of the Rise and Progress and the Present State of the Eng&h 
Government in Bengal (1772), defending his conduct in response to Bolts' work, but the latter's 
work was more widely circulated, see: Patrick Tuck, 'Introduction', in 7he East India Company 
1600-1858, vol. III, ed. Tuck (London: Routledge, 1999), p. xiv. 
25 Tuck, 'Introduction', p. xiii; see George Johnstone's attack on Clive in his speech during the 
debate in the Commons on the East India Judicature Bin (30 March 1772), which is reproduced 
in Parliamentary History, vol. 17, pp. 366-80. In addition, Bolts also introduced George to another 
recently returned figure from Bengal, Richard VvWttall, who also claimed to have incriminating 
evidence against Clive and the Fort-Williarn select committee. See: Kuiters, British in Bengal, p. 230n14. 
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political debate. The writings of Bolts and others played their part in publicising the Company's 
problems, but news of continued instability in India at this time, and the Company's financial 
dffriculties, also raised the profile of Company affairs. In 1769 news of the Company's losses 
against Haidar Ali had reached London causing a fall in the Company's stock. Ibis had grave 
financial implications for many prominent individuals in the Company in London; in addition, 
given that the Company had acquired an enormous source of wealth in 1765, the fact that it 
needed to ask the government for a loan by 1772, led to a broad consensus that 'something' had 
to be done regarding the Company's affairs. What that something should be was not so clear. " 
Undoubtedly individuals, such as Bolts, had personal axes to grind in attacking the Company, 
but the arguments considered here were clearly more than the ravings of self-seeking men. They 
constructed sophisticated arguments and drew upon enlightenment debates in order to 
demonstrate the unsuitability of the Company to rule Bengal. Some of the works under 
consideration in this chapter are well known to contemporary scholars, but their arguments have 
never been sufficiently analysed. Consequently, a gap exists in our knowledge of the full range of 
ideas which informed the development of the reform of the Company in this period. The 1773 
legislation may not have embodied the extreme stances advanced here, but the arguments put 
forward formed part of the spectrum of contemporary political argument, and for that reason 
deserve to be recovered. 
111. Despotism 
The influence of Montesquieu can be found throughout the range of constitutional and imperial 
debates in Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century. Debate about the status and rights 
of the East India Company was no exception. In the Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu provided a 
definition of despotism that would become widely used in this period. " He had argued that 
11 Burke argued that the 1773 Regulating bill had been 'forced in at the end of a fatiguing session, 
by the unfortunate words, do something, 'Speech on East India Regulating Bill' (10 June 1773), in 
Writings and Speeches, II, p. 396. 
17 Sharon Krause, 'Despotism in the Spirit of Laws', in Montesquieus Science of politics.. Essays on 
12'he Spirit ofthe Laws' ed. D. W. Carrithers et. al. (Oxford: Rowman, 2001), p. 233. One of the 
sources of Montesquieu s theory of despotism was contemporary travel literature. See also 
Voltaire's denial of oriental despotism, which he developed, as Pocock points out, to counter 
Montesquieu's implicit attack on the despotism of the French monarchy, see: Pocock, Barbarism 
andRefigion, H, pp. 110-12. 
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'when the savages of Louisiana want f1ruit, they cut down the tree and gather the fruit. There you 
have despotic government'ý' The point that Montesquieu. sought to convey by this analogy was 
that a despotic government strove to gratify its whims without considering the long term 
prosperity of its subjects -a despot sacrificed his long term interest for a transient gain. 
In the ancient Greek usage of the term 'despotism', it had meant the rule of a master over a 
household of slaves; later, Tacitus had designated certain Roman emperors' rules as despotic, 
wanting to suggest thereby that they 'treated Rome as if it was their private property'. " Aristotle 
had used the term 'tyranny' to describe the abuse of political power, while despotism was 
legitimate authority exercised over slaves. " In the seventeenth century, theorists in France had 
used the concept to describe the French monarchy's growth in power at the cost of the nobility's 
privileges. 31 By the time that Montesquieu was writing, the concept of despotism was no longer 
distinct from tyranny; 32 neither did Montesquieu subscribe to a notion of 'slaves by nature' . 
33 He 
stated that despotism was a government of one with no laws. ' It referred to a rule that reduced 
the people to a condition of slavery, rather than being a form of rule necessary for governing 
slaves. 35 
The analogy that Montesquieu provided of a despotic government being akin to the savages of 
Louisiana cutting down a tree to obtain its fruit referred to the policy of a despotic ruler. The 
despot was only concerned with his immediate interest, which was why Montesquieu argued 
that under despotism the 'preservation of the state is only the preservation of the prince, or rather 
of the palace in which he is enclosed"' - his interest did not extend beyond maintaining his 
own possessions. Montesquieu described the principle (which was the 'human passions that set' 
Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 59. 
R. Boesche, 'The Politics of Pretence: Tacitus and the Political Tbeory of Despotism', History 
ofPhlitical Thought, 8,2 (1987), 189-2 10 (p. 197). 
11 Krause, 'Despotism', pp. 233-34; Boesche, 'Fearing Monarchs and Merchants: Montesquieu's 
Two Theories of Despotism', Western Political Quarterly, 43,4 (1990), 741-61 (p. 74 1). 
11 Boesche, 'Fearing Monarchs', pp. 741-42. 
32 For the development of the term despotism see Richter, 'Despotism', pp. 1-17. The fact that 
no differentiation was made between tyranny and despotism in this period can be seen in the 
True Alarm, where the Company's actions are denounced as both mercantile despotism and 
mercantile tyranny, see: Anon., True Alarm, pp. 84,92. 
31 Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 252. 
1 Ibid., p. 10. 
11 Krause, 'Despotism, p. 235. 
16 Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 60. 
103 
the 'particular structure' (nature) of each government in motion) of despotism as fear - subjects 
remained obedient to the ruler because of their dread of him. " Montesquieu went on to argue 
that it was not the despotic prince that actually governed - he was too concerned with enjoying 
the pleasures of the seraglio; the day to day task of government was instead left to a deputy, a 
vizir. The vizir was given full authority - was the 'despot himself - which was something that 
did not occur under a monarchy: 'he [a monarch] distributes his authority in such a way that he 
never gives a part without retaining a greater part'. " The immense power of the vizir, however, 
did not constitute a threat to the prince because he had no independent power; in addition, he 
remained fearful of the ruler: 'the head of the lowest subject must be safe, and the pasha's head 
always exposed'. " Consequently fear worked as a restraint on the power of the despotic prince's 
subordinate officials; but while the people may have been protected from the vizir, they remained 
exposed to the arbitrary justice of the ruler himself. In such a context there could be no security 
of life or property. 'O 
Montesquieu's description of a despotic regime remains incomplete without a consideration of 
the way that climate was believed, by him, to influence the behaviour of men. He contended that 
people residing in hot climates were naturally more subservient than people inhabiting colder 
ones - these he regarded as being more 'vigorous'. He explained this difference of disposition as 
being the result of the opposing ways in which hot and cold temperatures impacted on the 
human body. "' It was in the hotter climate that Montesquieu believed that 'despotism usually 
reigns'. ' He did not however suggest that despotism exclusively existed in the east, but rather 
argued that it was the type of government that 'most people' lived under as it was the easiest one 
to establish. Moderate governments, he contended, were 'a masterpiece of legislation' whereas 
despotism was based wholly on the passions. " 
37 Ibid., p. 21. 
3s Ibid., pp. 20,65-66. 
39 Ibid., p. 28. 
ao Ibid., pp. 28-29,64-65,73-74. 
41 Ibid., pp. 231-22. 
' Ibid., p. 64. 
43 Ibid., p. 63. 
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Despotism was only one of the three types of government that Montesquieu identified in his 
treatise; the other two were republics and monarchies. " The latter two, however, faced the 
possibility of degenerating into despotic regimes if their foundations were corrupted. Republican 
governments, which Montesquieu defiried as ones where 'the people as a body, or certain 
families have sovereign power', required the existence of virtue. " Virtue here meant political 
virtue, which he described as 'love of the laws and the homeland' which required 'a continuous 
preference of the public interest over one's own'. " Where political virtue ceased to exist, the laws 
would be exposed to the danger of being overturned and it followed that despotism would come 
into being. 
Montesquieu's third class of government, the monarchical one, was similar to despotism in that 
it was also a government by one, but differed crucially as the monarch ruled according to 
established laws, while the despot was free to follow his passions. What ensured that the laws 
were not violated was the existence of an intermediary subordinate power - the nobility - and 
a 'depository of laws'. " The functioning of monarchy also rested on the principle of honour, 
which animated individuals into pursuing the common good. " However the antithesis of 
despotism was properly neither monarchy nor republics and democracies, but rather moderate 
governments. This was a system of government where the separation of the powers of 
government, specifically the separation of the judicial from the executive and legislative powers, 
prevented the abuse of sovereign authority and thereby guaranteed its people liberty. " Moderate 
government, in other words, was one where the ruler could not act according to his desires, but 
was constrained by the constitutional arrangements of the state. This gave the citizen security of 
both life and property: 'political liberty consists in security or, at least, in the opinion one has of 
44 Ibid., p. 10. 
45 Ibid., pp. 21-22 (although, he pointed, out that virtue was less necessary under an aristocracy 
than under a democracy, see pp. 24-25). 
1 Ibid., p. 36. 
47 Ibid., pp. 18-19; 600-01. 
48 Montesquieu described the principle of honour 'like the system of the universe, where there is 
a force constantly repelling all bodies from the centre and a force of gravitation attracting them to 
it. Honour makes all parts of the body politic move; its very action binds them, and each person 
works for the common good, believing he works for his individual interest' (ibid., p. 27). 
41 Ibid., pp. 155-57. 'Political liberty in no way consists of doing what one wants. Liberty is 
the right to do everything the laws permit' (ibid., p. 155). 
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one's security'. " The significant point was that the political system prevented the existence of 
despotism rather than the virtue of the ruler; failure of the system meant that despotism - an 
arbitrary form of government - could come into existence. 
The threat of despotism to the British political system was a preoccupation of thinkers and 
politicians throughout the eighteenth century. The perceived consequences that the British 
acquisitions in India, and government intervention in Company affairs, had upon the British 
constitution will be considered in the following chapter. However in the wider British political 
debate of the time, as has been explored by H. T. Dickinson, there was a close alignment 
between political liberty, property and the British constitution. The establishment Whigs sought 
to justify limited political participation in terms of the aim of government being to preserve 
private property. It was only men of property, theorists of this persuasion argued, that had the 
required independence and civic virtue which enabled them to exercise power without being 
tempted to attack the property rights of others. In order to maintain the current order, it was 
argued that the existing British balanced constitution should be defended because it was 
calculated for upholding liberty. " The virtues of the British constitution had also been famously 
celebrated by Montesquieu, whose ideas were utilised by opposition groups in Britain; the 
arguments formulated by such groups, often dubbed 'vulgar' Whigs as a consequence of their 
stark opposition of despotism to liberty, have been explored by Duncan Forbes. He argues that 
vulgar Whiggism not only regarded liberty as existing under a government by law, but also that 
'liberty of any sort in civil society is impossible unless all people share in the making of laws and 
give their consent freely'. " 
For individuals that agreed with this particular vulgar Whig argument, including for example, 
Bolingbroke and Blackstone, such liberty was a peculiarly English achievement. " In Walpole's 
era, the opposition feared that corruption was threatening British liberty by undermining the 
balance of the British constitution. There existed a whole series of debates regarding the ways the 
" Ibid., p. 188. 
51 H. T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property. - Political IdeoloV in Eighteenth-Century Britain (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), pp. 142-43,128. 
1 Forbes, Hume ý Philosophical, p. 142. 
53 Ibid., p. 143,143nl. 
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patronage exercised by the crown, and the existence of a standing army, undermined the 
independence of parliament; as well as debates about the impact that the growth of the monied 
interest and the perceived corruption of the manners of the people would have on British 
politics. " The debates that took place in parliament regarding the East India Company between 
1767 and 1773, raised issues that were consonant with this broader, pre-existing, concern - the 
loss of British liberties and a decline into despotism. These dates also encompass the cries of 
'Wilkes and Liberty' ignited by the expulsion of John Wilkes as MP for Middlesex in February 
1769 after his election in March 1768. Interestingly however, some observers believed that East 
India affairs raised issues of greater constitutional importance than the Wilkes affair. " 
Yet while Wilkite protests associated their cause with 'freedom', Hume, for instance, regarded 
Wilkite agitation as detrimental to the very British liberty that it purported to uphold. Liberty 
was, Hume argued, 'the perfection of civil society', but authority was also necessary to its 
existence; in all governments, he contended, authority and liberty continued in 'intestine 
struggle' without either ever prevailing, but the excessive liberty associated with Wilkes would 
plunge Britain into disorder and eventually an absolute government. ' Montesquieu as well, in a 
way that vulgar Whigs did not recognise, regarded British liberty as precarious. 57 The 
opposition's connections between the violation of the Company's property rights and harm 
coming to the British political system opened up another front from which it appeared that 
British liberties were under attack. During the debates on the East India Dividend Bill, Edmund 
Burke argued that the proposed measure of restricting the rise of the Company's dividend was an 
'arbitrary Regulation'; he went on to state that the defining difference between 'Law and 
Freedom from Violence and Slavery' was that property (as long as it had not been 'forfeited' by 
'delinquency') could not be taken away from a subject by 'any power or authority whatsoever'. 58 
-1 See ibid., pp. 195-98. 
51 Cf. Anon., True Alarm; [Samuel Johnson], The False Alarm (London, 1770). 
11 Hume, 'Of the Origin of Government, in Essays, pp. 40-41; Hume, 'Whether the British 
Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy or to a Republic', in Essays, pp. 52-53; 
Forbes, Hume's Philosophical, pp. 190-92. 
51 Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 166; Forbes, Hume's Philosophical, p. 165. 
51 Burke, 'Speech on East India Dividend Bill' (26 May 1767), in Writings and Speeches, H, p. 65. 
107 
Burke made a similar point in 1773 when North's East India Resolutions were under discussion. 
Lord North had argued that the territorial acquisitions and revenues of the Company rightfully 
belonged to the crown, but for practical reasons, the management of the possessions should 
continue with the Company for the next six years. " North's resolutions were based on an 
assumption of the crown's rights to the territorial revenue in India - an assumption that Burke 
did not share. In response, Burke argued that North's proposals 'had the completion of the plan 
of despotism for their end' - that is, by appropriating the Company's property, the government 
made private property more generally insecure. The inability to possess property without the 
threat of violation was of course a feature of arbitrary regimes. Burke presented North's 
proposals as an attack on the liberties of the people. ' These varied examples reflect the ways in 
which 'liberty' was identified within the British political system, and any potential threats to its 
balance were perceived as the encroachment of despotism - that is, 'despotism' was understood 
as the exercise of arbitrary power. 
131. Imperfect Despotism 
Scholars have noted the factual inaccuracies of Montesquieu's description of the British political 
system, but as C. P. Courtney has suggested, this should be seen as an 'ideal model' rather than a 
factual representation. The same is true of his analysis of the three types of government. " 
Montesquieu. stated that the springs of a republic, monarchy and despotism were, respectively, 
virtue, honour and fear, but it did not follow that people in each of the different kinds of regimes 
would act according to the appropriate springsý' Montesquieu. himself provided examples of the 
way that despotism existed as an 'imperfect' system in contemporary Asia - in practice, he 
acknowledged despotic power did not exist in the absolute way he had described; in reality, it 
was limited by factors such as religion and mannerO For example, while the Turkish prince 
could take the entire inheritance of a person, custom regulated that he only took three percent. " 
This difference between the theory of despotism, and existing governments which were 
denominated 'despotic', was to be of significant importance for the arguments put forward by 
Bowen, Revenue, pp. 162-63. 
Burke, 'Speech on North's East India Resolutions', in Writings and Speeches, II, pp. 392-93. 
61 Courtney, 'Montesquieu and English Liberty', in Montesquieu's Science ofPolitics, p. 279. 
62 Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 30. 
61 See for example: Montesquieu, Spirit, pp. 19,61,211; Richter, 'Despotism', pp. 8-9. 
64 Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 61. 
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both critics and supporters of Clive's dual system. Specifically, critics of the Company would 
contend that the Company's government of Bengal had given rise to a new breed of despotism. 
The idea of a 'regulated despotism' pointed to the fact that there could exist different degrees of 
arbitrary government. Enemies of Clive recognised this fact and presented the Company's 
government of Bengal as the most extreme instance of a despotic regime. In addition to the way 
that despotism was used to denounce the practices of contemporary European governments, it 
was implicitly associated in this period with Islamic rule. This is demonstrated by the way that 
some of the individuals considered in this section felt that they had to preface their discussion 
with statements along the lines that Mughal, or Indian rule, was not as despotic as was popularly 
conceived. "' The connection between despotism and Islamic rule was maintained by publicists of 
various political persuasions, but a distinction was drawn between the theory of despotism, and 
the actual 'despotic' government of the Mughals. These observers suggested that the governing 
system of the Mughals had been more humane than any conception of despotism which may 
have been familiar to an eighteenth-century audience - conceptions that would have been 
influenced not only by Spirit of the Laws but also Montesquieu's Persian Letters. Their point was 
that despotic Indian rule differed qualitatively from despotic Company rule. This section 
considers the ways in which the idea of despotism was utilised in relation to the sub-continent, 
and the significance of the distinction that was drawn between the theory of despotism and 
actual Mughal or Indian rule. 
The term 'despotism' and its associated words - 'tyranny' and 'arbitrary power' - were a 
used to describe Mughal rule of India. But the usage of these terms in relation to the Mughal 
Empire - in the sense of their precise definition as the government of one by whim - rendered 
them obsolete as, for different reasons, the writers under scrutiny here were concerned with 
proving that Mughal despotism was not arbitrary. Consequently the continued association of 
despotism with Mughal rule, by strict definition, failed to be an appropriate description of that 
government - at least in their depictions of Mughal rule. However, the fact that there could exist 
different degrees of despotism explains why the term continued to be used in relation to a range 
65 For example, it was argued by Anon., Planfor the Govemment ofthe Prosinces, p. 6, that Bengal's 
Indian 'government was not so much abused as has been represented. 
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of distinct regimes; for instance, 'despotic' Mughal rule was used favourably to oppose 'despotic' 
Company rule. Distinctions were also made between 'despotic' Mughal rule prior to the invasion 
of Nadir Shah in 1739, and the growing independence of 'despotic' local rulers after his 
incursions. The exercise of power in all these instances differed from each other, but they were 
all labelled 'despotic. These varied uses not only reveal that despotic government, in point of 
practise, existed in many different hues, but also suggests a useful distinction between despotism 
in theory and in practise. Without this distinction, the significance of accusations such as 
$mercantile despotism' aimed at the Company and at Clive, are lost. Publicists who employed 
this term were suggesting that despotism in fact was limited, but the Company, because of its 
unique position - that of it being both sovereign and merchant simultaneously - had broken 
this mould and exercised despotic power to an extent that had hitherto had only a theoretical 
existence. 
The point that despotism could exist in different degrees, and could actually be seen as a 
legitimate government, was an existing strain of wider Enlightenment political thought of the 
time - exemplified, for instance in the writings of Hume. A consideration of his thought reveals 
the kind of despotic regime that could be considered acceptable, and consequently the 
foundations on which the mercantile despotism of the Company was condemned. He argued 
that no ruler actually enjoyed unrestricted power, but, also significantly, that liberty did not exist 
without limitations; in every government, he stated, there existed a constant 'struggle' between 
authority and liberty: 'neither can ever absolutely prevail in the contest. A great sacrifice of 
liberty must necessarily be made in every government'; but, at the same time, authority - that 
restricted liberty - could not be 'entire and uncontroulable'. Consequently, the rulers of Turkey 
and France, both examples of 'despotic' rulers (but not of the same degree), found that their 
power was not wholly unlimited. " Hume then went on to ftirther define his understanding of the 
terms 'despotism' and 'liberty' by drawing a distinction between his usage of the terms, and that 
of (what Hume regarded as) vulgar Whigs such as Wilkes. In Forbes' analysis of vulgar 
Whiggism, he points out that its adherents at times displayed a belief that there was no difference 
between the regime that existed in Turkey, and that which was current in France. Hume 
' Hume, `Origin of Government', p. 40. 
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attempted to show that there was indeed an important difFerence between the two, and further, 
that the gap between the 'free' government of Britain and the absolute monarchies of Europe was 
no longer as significant as it had been in the past. 
Hume argued that 'barbarous' monarchs (and the examples he gave were drawn from the east) 
enjoyed arbitrary power, and delegated the same authority, 'unrestricted, to their subordinate 
officials. " 'Civilised' monarchs, on the other hand, exercised absolute power (not bounded by 
any thing but custom, example and the sense of his own interest), but their deputies, by contrast, 
were governed by 'general laws'. " Under the latter type of government, inhabitants could enjoy 
security of life and property; such governments could 'answer most of the ends of political 
society' - which, in his Enquiry, Hume identified as 'liberty and security of the individual under 
the rule of law'. " Hume regarded both these types of government as being 'despotic', but in the 
case of the civilised monarchy, the term 'despotism' did not carry any negative connotations. It 
simply denoted the exercise of absolute power, as it was utilised by, for instance, Blackstone. " 
However, it was precisely because Hume's contemporaries did not always used the concept of 
'despotism' in its neutral sense that he changed the title of his essay 'Of Liberty and Despotism' 
to 'Civil Liberty' . 
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Hume's civilised monarchies refer-red to European ones, and his understanding of them reveals 
the kind of 'despotic' regime that could be regarded as legitimate. Hume believed that in modem 
times, the civilised monarchies had undergone a significant degree of improvement. Their 
'perfection' had led them to develop a system of government by law, and advance in the arts and 
sciences - all enabled, however, by the progress made in 'free' governments. ' Hume believed 
that barbarous regimes could never have begun the process of refming their system of 
government, by themselves, because they did not recognise the benefits of laws; instead it was 
presumed that full discretionary power invested in every magistrate was the best way of 
" Hume, 'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences', in Essays, p. 116. 
61 Ibid., p. 125; Forbes, Hume's Philosophical, p. 15 7. 
6' Hume, 'The Rise of Arts and Sciences', p. 125. See also: Forbes, Hume's Philosophical, p. 153. 
71 Parliament was described as 'the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all 
governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms', (William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, 4 vols (Oxford, 1765-69), vol. 1, p. 156). 
11 Forbes, Hume's Philosophical, p. 156. 
12 Hume, 'The Rise of Arts and Sciences', p. 125. 
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governing. 73 Under such conditions, the people were reduced to a state of servitude, and 
consequently no advances could be made in the arts: 'the same barbarism and ignorance, with 
which the government commences, is propagated to all posterity, and can never come to a period 
by the efforts or ingenuity of such unhappy slaves. 74 
It was only under free governments that the requisite conditions prevailed under which progress 
could be made in the perfection of civil society. As Hume argued: 'though a republic should be 
barbarous, it necessarily, by an infallible operation gives rise to LAW From law arises 
security: From security curiosity: From curiosity knowledge'. " The reason why European 
monarchies came to be 'civilised', Hume argued, was by imitating advances pioneered in free 
states. " In modem times, he believed that European monarchies had advanced to such a degree 
that they could be described as a 'a government ofLaws, not ofMen', encouraging learning, industry 
and providing security of property; they stiff fell short 'in gentleness and stability' to 'popular 
ones', but Hume conjectured that the two would be brought into greater 'equality' by the growth 
of public debt - the inability of popular governments to cancel debt would render them more 
unstable than absolute ones. 77 
The distinction between absolute-civilised monarchies and arbitrary-barbarous ones, 
demonstrates that despotism was not the monolithic concept that Montesquieu had suggested by 
the analogy of savages cutting down a tree to obtain its fruit. Hume had presented the former as 
a legitimate form of government because it secured its inhabitants protection from arbitrary 
power; Sir James Steuart also argued in his Inquiry that a people could enjoyed liberty where 
they were governed by laws that could only be altered in 'a regular and uniform way'; he went 
on to state: 'according to this definition of liberty, a people may be found to enjoy freedom under 
the most despotic forms of government'. " Such varied usages of the term despotism by the 
11 Ibid., p. 124. 
74 Ibid. See also p. 117. 
75 Ibid., p. 118. 
1 Ibid., p. 125. 
77 Hume, 'Of Civil Liberty', in Essays, pp. 94-96. 
78 James Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political 0economy, ed. Andrew S. Skinner, 2 vols 
(Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966), pp. 206-07. The connection between absolute 
monarchy and despotism was also rejected by Voltaire, see: Pocock, Barbaristn andReligion, H, p. 
75. 
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enemies of Clive can be found in the anonymous pamphlet Planfir the Government. " Its author's 
overall intention was to provide principles on which he thought that Bengal could be governed 
without being despotic - that is, arbitrary. The author stated very clearly that he considered the 
Mughal Empire to be despotic: he argued that the Indians were as happy as they could be 'living 
under despotism'. " Yet, at the same time, he suggested that the Mughal government was a 
limited one; " clearly, the idea of despotism as a whimsical regime was not the type of despotism 
under which, he believed, the Mughal Empire had subsisted. 
Instead, the Plan for the Government argued that the Mughal rulers had tempered despotism by 
separating the fiscal power from the civil and military offices. They had also fixed the amount of 
rent that it collected 'in the Emperor's books': ' 'so that the husbandman was allowed to draw 
more of the profits of his industry in India, than he ever was, or is allowed to do in Europe'. " 
The Mughal Empire did display features that were consistent with the concept of despotism (as 
stated by Montesquieu), for example, that the officials of the Empire were kept in check by the 
fear of the emperor, and that the people did not feel secure in their lives or property, 84 but these 
features coexisted with others that were inimical to the concept - fixed rents and the powers of 
government at least divided if not separated. The point that this writer was making was that the 
Mughal Empire enjoyed some codes of government, and therefore was not, in practical terms, an 
absolute despotism. This point was in perfect accord with Montesquieu's argument that 
contemporary examples of despotic governments did not exist in the precise manner he had 
described. 
19 The author of this work was supportive of Bolts and George Johnstone, see Anon., Planfor the 
Government ofthe Provinces, pp. 12n, 15n. 
110 Anon., Planfor the Government ofthe Provinces, p. 6. 
"A similar idea was expressed by Dow (despite the fact that he considered Islam 'peculiarly 
calculated for despotism'): 'the despotism of Hindostan, it ought to be observed, was never a 
government of mere caprice and whim. The Mahommedans carried into their conquests a code 
of laws which circumscribed the will of the prince'. History, III, pp. xiii, Iii; in the same manner, 
Archibald Keir argued that the manners of the Bengalis had functioned like laws before the 
Company's take over of power, thereby regulating despotism (Thoughts on the 4ffairs of Bengal 
(London, 1772), pp. 13-14). In addition A. B., A Letter to the Right Honourable Lord North etc. on 
the Present Proceedings Concerning the East-India House (London, 1773), pp. 12-13, argued: 'India 
became lawless from the moment she passed under our government; the sceptre, wrested from 
the gentle grasp of Asiatic despotism, was thrown aside, and rods of iron put into the hands of 
British barbarians'. See also: Montesquieu, Spirit, pp. 461-62, where he suggests that Islam is 
designed for despotism whereas Christianity is 'suited' to moderate governments. 
82 Anon., Planfor the Government ofthe Provinces, pp. 3-4, Scrafton cited as an authority. 
Ibid., pp. 3-4, Bolts cited as an authority. 
Ibid., p. 5-6. 
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The Planfor the Govemment constructed an image of the Mughal Empire as a regulated despotism 
in order to differentiate between the mercantile despotism of the Company and the corrupted 
system of the nawabs. He argued that the Mughal government which had prevailed prior to the 
invasion of Nadir Shah in 1739, had become corrupted by the invasion - the people had been 
plunged into a greater despotic system. It was this corrupted system that the Company came to 
possess and uphold in 1765. After the Persian invasion, he explained, local administrators 
(subahdars) had exploited the confusion it wrought to become virtually independent, and to 
amalgamate the offices of diwan and subahdar. These new rulers had then increased the taxes on 
their subjects in order to maintain their new armies. The result of this had been that the 'landed 
interest' of these new states had disappeared, and with them the protection they had given to 
farmers from oppressive officials. In their stead, there appeared a new 'monied interest' which 
began oppressing the farmers and manufacturers. These new local rulers had subsequently begun 
squabbling amongst themselves, and the Europeans had exploited these 'dissensions' for their 
own benefit - in Bengal, the East India Company benefited by obtaining power. 
" Upon 
becoming the defacto ruler, the Company, he argued, had not reformed the corrupted system or 
implemented a new one, but allowed the continuation of the distorted Mughal system and its 
abuses - as well as creating additional ones. 
' This was a clear indictment of the settlement 
achieved by Clive in 1765 as well as the governorship of Verelst. Clive, while he had accepted 
the post of diwan for the Company, had left the actual administration in native hands: there had 
been a change of power - not a change in the system. 
" 
The Plan for the Government considered the rule of the nawabs, such as that of Siraj-ud-Daula, as 
illegitimate and referred to them as 'usurping' princes. " It was however the Company's 
government of Bengal, consisting of a president and a council, where the three powers of 
government were concentrated in one body, that constituted 'a complete system of despotism'. "' 
11 ibid., pp. 6,7-9. Luke Scrafton set out a similar trajectory, stressing that before the invasion, 
merchants were no where better protected than in India (Reflections on the Government ofIndostan, 
(London, 1770), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 61, pp. 25-26). 
81 Anon., Planfor the Government ofthe Provinces, p. 10. 
17 Travers, 'Contested Notions', pp. 47-48. 
Ibid., p. 11. 
ibid., pp. 14-15; Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 157. 
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The writer went on to suggest how Company despotism could be reformed, and in so doing he 
revealed the kind of 'despotic' regime that was acceptable for governing Bengal. He argued that 
since it was not possible for the nawabs to retain their powers without the Company's interest 
being compromised, 'a single government should be established in your Company, but cloathed 
in the old forms of an Indian government'. " The Company, as the ruler, could 'gain the affection 
of the natives' by restoring the 'condition' of the Indians 'as far as is consistent with good 
policy ... back to the easy state which they enjoyed 
before the Mogul empire was overturned'. " 
He drew on the argument, central to the Spirit ofthe Laws, that laws had to relate to the manners 
of the people and stated that the best system of government that the Company could frame, with 
the legislative assistance of the British government, ' was one that conformed to the Indians' old 
system of rule. For this end he recommended the collection of Indian laws into codes for the use 
of administrators. " His recommendations would not stop the regime from being 'despotic' but it 
would bring it into line with the kind of regimes associated with the absolute monarchies of 
Europe described by Hume: personal security and government by law would all be guaranteed. 
The excesses of the Company's rule of Bengal was brought into focus by the presentation of the 
Mughal Empire as enjoying a regulated government. Yet it also served to make the principle that 
laws had to suit the manners of the people an applicable one. If arbitrary governments based on 
whim were illegitimate forms of government, then they could not form the basis of a legitimate 
regime that the Company wished to construct in Bengal; on the other hand, if Mughal 
government was not, in fact arbitrary, then its forms could be appropriated by the Company to 
govern the acquired territories. "' Luke Scrafton, who wrote to defend Clive and his colleagues' 
9' Anon., Planfor the Government ofthe ProWnces, p. 13. 
91 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
92 Ibid., p. 41. 'Ibis author did not suggest that the rights to the revenue of Bengal belonged to the 
crown, but he did argue that the public had a right to a share of the revenue as 'the public 
defends you [the Company] by its fleets and its armies'. 
93 Ibid., pp. 13,24. Besides codes of law, he wanted Indian Courts to make use of British 
procedures; his precise ideas are set out on pp. 20-24. He went on to argue that 'these codes and 
forms of procedure will for a-while embarrass the natives of India, but they will soon find out, 
that these embarrassments are the price which they pay for the securities of their properties and 
persons', p. 25. 
94 Travers suggests that writers such as Dow refashioned Mughal government so that it became a 
system that was suitable for British rulers to administer. It was a way for theorists to avoid the 
contradiction of advocating principles of political liberty at home and a system of despotism 
abroad, while still ruling the Indians according to their customs. See: Travers, 'Contested 
Notions', pp. 25-26,98. 
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actions in Bengal, drew on an image of Indian government as a regulated one for precisely the 
latter end. His analysis differed significantly from the previously considered pamphlet, but 
Scrafton's purpose was to defend Clive's settlement, whereas the Plan had used the same strategy 
to condernn it. 
Firstly, Scrafton argued that the general category of despotism - that is, a system of rule based 
on the passions of the ruler, where the people were motivated by fear and where there was no 
security of property - did not cover the condition of India: 
I am amazed to see, that all writers have asserted, that there are no laws in this 
country [India]; that the land is not hereditary; and that the emperor is universal 
heir. I am ready to allow, there are no written institutes; no acts of parliament; 
and there is no power to controul the emperor; but I must assert, that they 
proceed in their courts of justice by established precedents; that the lineal 
succession, where there are children, is as indefeasible here as in any country 
that has no check on the supreme power. 91 
He went on to state that the Tartar conquerors, although they had few laws to govem 
themselves, because of their 'roving life', nevertheless distinguished 'the use of them in the 
countries they conquered', which was why they had left the local laws in force after their gradual 
conquest of India. " The claim that the conquerors had left local laws in operation, rather than 
instituting new ones, was crucial to Scrafton's argument, because he claimed that it was the 
'foreign' Mughal system that was despotic, not the pre-existing 'native' one. 
It was the continued existence of Hindu laws, even after the Muslim conquests, which ensured, 
in Scrafton's opinion, that India had escaped the full rigours of despotic rule, although he did not 
employ the term 'despotism' itself. He argued that Islamic laws had not spread further than the 
capital cities of the Mughal Empire, and this was the reason why India had continued 
prosperous. "' Throughout his Reflections Scrafton displayed deep animosity towards Muslims 
arguing that the 'Moors' were of the most 'detestable character', a character that he stated was 
Scrafton, Rejkcdons, p. 24. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., pp. 23-24. Montesquieu had said that it was duseless' to talk about commerce under 'the 
despotic state'; he laid it down as a 'general rule' that 'a nation that is in servitude, works 
more to preserve than to acquire' (Spirit, p. 34 1). 
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formed in the seraglio -a place of 'perfidy and sensuality'. 98 This harangue against the Muslim 
character also served a purpose in Scrafton's argument which was ultimately to justify the 
transactions that occurred in Bengal during the period 1756-7. He argued that given the 
treacherous character of the Muslim rulers, the servants in Bengal had had no choice but to form 
an alliance with Mir War against Siraj ud-Daula. " 
The Planfor the Government used the idea of a regulated despotism to make the point that Clive's 
dual system was worse than existing examples of despotic rule. Scrafton formulated another 
version of the ancient constitution, which predated Muslim rule and used it to enforce the point 
that it was the inherent treacherousness of the Muslim nawabs, that had led the servants 
ultimately to take power. In either case, the application of the term 'despotism' to Indian rule, 
whether Mughal or Hindu was, according to its definition as a wholly capricious government, a 
misnomer. Montesquieu had provided a short example of the policy of a despotic government 
but that did not fit the presentations of Indian rule explored here. He had, in any case, also 
claimed that despotism in reality was tempered in various ways. In addition, he and Hume had 
also shown how absolute government was consistent with security of life and property. This was 
an argument that was employed by the Planjor the Government, and it was an idea central to the 
plans of reform that were put forward at this time. 
Montesquieu's definition may only have been intended as a theoretical construct, but enemies of 
the Company claimed to have discovered an actual example: the Company's government of 
Bengal. Dow argued that when the nawabs began to rule their provinces independently, they had 
practised oppressions, but they had had the 'sense [ ... I to see, that their own power depended 
upon the prosperity of their subjects', hence they had maintained an adequate judicial system. By 
this measure, they had ensured the continuing prosperity of their provinces and provided 
11 Scrafton, Reflections, pp. 21,19-20; for his opinion on the character of the Hindus see pp. 3-17. 
The writer of the Anon., Planfir the Govemment of the Prminces had not made this distinction 
between Hindu and Muslim government. 
99 'Whoever considers human nature will easily perceive, that the harmony between the Soubah 
and us was liable to many interruptions. As the brute creation retain no longer their affections for 
their parents than while they need their help to nourish them, so the Soubah, now feeling his 
own strength, forgot the authors of his greatness. He seemed to look on us rather as rivals than 
allies; and his first thoughts were, how to check our power, and evade the execution of the treaty' 
(Scrafton, Reflections, pp. 98-99). 
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security, enabag the continuation of industry: 'commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, were 
encouraged; for it was not then the maxim to take the honey, by destroying the swarm'. " The 
Present State ofthe British Interest in India (1773) made the same point but by using another parable: 
'A herd of hogs, broke into a well dressed vineyard, will gorge their voracious maws; but that 
which they eat and devour doth not destroy the vineyard, it is their manner of eating, their 
rutting up, their tearing down, and trampling under foot'. The True Alarm stated: 'Military 
conquerors devour the fruit, but these mercantile tyrants root up the tree'. "' Historically, 
despotic governments had been limited, but this was not true of the Company's government 
which was why it was designated by these critics as a new species of despotism. 
IV. Mercantile Despotism 
The categories of despotism and moderate governments as originally theorised by Montesquieu 
clearly influenced British political debate. With such a sharp distinction, opponents of the 
Company and its rule of Bengal faced an enormous ideological barrier in attempting to argue 
that the British government should take over the government of the acquisitions in India. A 
move like this required a justification for depriving the Company of its (albeit disputed) rights. 
The only circumstances under which any 'violation' could be acceptable was to demonstrate that 
the Company had forfeited its rights - as Burke had suggested, property could be 'forfeited' by 
, delinquency defined by a known Paw(? )]"" - this is precisely what individuals such as Bolts 
and the author of True Alann attempted to do. They argued that the British government should 
take over the responsibility of governing the territories on the sub-continent; this was something, 
... Dow, History, III, pp. 1xvii-lxviii; Adam Ferguson had similarly argued that the 'barbarous 
invaders' of India had not harmed the commerce of India; rather they, and their successors, had 
been content to 'foster the hive, in proportion as they taste more of its sweets' (An Essay on the 
History of Chi/ Society, ed. Duncan Forbes, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), p. 
111). 
101 Anon., Present State, p. 28; Anon., Thie Alann, p. 85. See also A. B., Letter to North, p. 36. The 
London Chronicle (18 February 1772) quoted from Bolts, Considerations, as saying: 'while this 
nation is gazing after the fruit, the Company and their substitutes are suffered to be rooting up 
the tree'. In addition, Anon., Reflections on the Present State, pp. 20-2 1, argued that the Company 
held Bengal 'in more absolute vassalage than ever did the monarch of France the meanest of his 
Feudatories'. Clive also made a similar point (but in a different manner) in a letter to the 
directors in September 1765: 'the Necessity of securing the confidence of the Natives, is an idea I 
have ever maintained, and was in hopes would be invariably adopted by others; but Ambition, 
success, and Luxury, have, I find, introduced a new System of Politics, at the severe Expence of 
English Honour, of the Company's Faith, and even of common Justice and Humanity' (Fff7HC, 
IV, p. 336). 
101 Burke, 'Speech on East India Dividend Bill', in Writings and Speeches, II, p. 65. 
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as we have seen during the debates on the 5 April 1773, that North was not prepared to do. 
Nevertheless the rationale on which the Company could be replaced was clearly articulated at 
this time, and it is that rationale that this section will now consider. 
The most widely circulated presentation of the Company's misgovernment of Bengal and 
consequently the basis on which the state should take over, was Bolt's Considerations . 
103 
Undoubtedly his argument was coloured by the alleged ill-treatment he had received at the hands 
of the Company in India, but that does not invalidate the perceptive points that he made. He 
argued that the Company, after accepting the post of diwani in 1765, had failed to recognise that 
the whole tenor of their responsibilities had been altered - they could no longer afford to act like 
merchants: 
From a society of mere traders, confined by charter to the employment of six 
ships and six pinnaces yearly, the Company are become Sovereigns of extensive, 
rich and populous kingdoms, with a standing army of above sixty thousand men 
at their command. In this new situation of the society, so widely different from 
its original institution, their true commercial interests appear almost entirely 
misunderstood or neglected; and it may be safely said, there is scarcely any 
public spirit apparent among their leaders either in England or India. " 
Bolts suggested that, as a ruler, the Company had to take responsibility for the welfare of the 
Indians; they had to act with 'public spirit' and not be concerned with profits alone. "' The 
Company's failure to alter its priorities meant that it was destroying what it most wanted to 
enhance: wealth. Bolts was criticising the Company for the way it was pursuing its interests - it 
was a way, in his opinion, that destroyed the possibility of future commerce by the destruction of 
the present traders. To continue this abuse, Bolts argued, in a manner that perfectly fitted 
Montesquieu's definition of despotic government, 'can no otherwise be considered than like the 
ideot-practise of killing the prolific hen to get her golden eggs all at once'. 106 
103 See Osborn, 'India, Parliament', pp. 121-23. 
101 Bolts, Considerations, pp. vi-vii. 
105 For an exploration of idea of public spirit in eighteenth-century political thought, see: J. A. W. 
Gunn, Beyond Liberty and Property. the Process of SeIr-Recognition in Eighteenth-Century Political 
Thought (Kingston: McQuill-Queen's University Press, 1983), pp. 11,30,267-71. 
"' Bolts, Considerations, p. 192. Steuart utilised this analogy arguing 'it is vain to think of a 
remedy without sacrificing the interest of Great Britain, and the Company itself to that of Bengal 
[ ... ]. Not to 
kill the hen which lays the golden eggs, but to feed and preserve her' (Yhe Principles of 
Money Applied to the State of the Coin of Bengal- Being an Inquiry into the Methods to be used for 
Correcting the Defects of the Present Currency, for Stopping the Drains ; Mich Carry off the Coin; andfor 
Extending Cirrulation by the Means of Paper Credit, in The Works, Political, Metaphisical and 
Chronological ofthe late Sir James Steuart of Coltness Bart, 6 vols (London 1805), V, p. 69). The anti- 
ministerial Public Advertiser (24 November 1772) satirising a banquet held by North's 
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Bolts endorsed the opinion expressed in the True Alarm"' whose author designated the 
Company's government of Bengal a 'new and monstrous species of despotism, the mercantile 
one'. "' The True Alarm saw the commerce and the recent acquisitions of the Company as a trust 
reposed in it by the nation for which reason, he believed, that the government had the right to 
interfere in the Company's affairs if the trust was abused - such as by being mismanaged. In 
any case, he did not believe that the territories could be managed by the Company because 
firstly, commerce was incompatible with the responsibilities of government, and secondly, the 
Company lacked the appropriate character to be a ruler. The interests of the nation demanded 
that the government took action: 'our sole aim is, with all due respect to arouse government to a 
just exertion of its legal authority. "' 
The Tme Alarm believed that the task of governing Bengal had to be separated from the 
Company whose primary object was commerce. In this respect, this writer shared the view of 
Bolts but was opposed to the stance of George Johnstone and the author of Plan for the 
Government who both did not endorse any radical change of the Company's structure; Johnstone 
harboured grievances against Clive, but he was not an enemy to the East India Company as a 
whole. The True Alarm, in common with the Present State, expressed views which in the 
parliamentary debates were similar to those of William Meredith who, by 1773, was aligned with 
the Chathams; as well as those of Burgoyne who chaired the select committee on Indian affairs. 
They were hostile to the Company and favoured greater government intervention in Company 
affairs, especially in light of the abuses circulating in the press. "Me idea of separating the 
commerce and government from the Company had also been espoused by Clive. "' What 
government, described the dishes served as being equivalent to a weakness of the ministry; one of 
the dishes served was 'The Hen with the golden Egg: Killed in India'. Osborn interprets this to be 
a 'reference to the Company's resentment towards the State's regulation of its activities in India' 
(0sborn, 'India, Parliament, p. 94). Equally however it could represent exasperation with the 
government's failure to take decisive action over Indian affairs. 
"I See: Bolts, Considerations, pp. 214-15. 
"'Anon., True Alarm, p. 92. 
11" Ibid., p. 14; In addition, the True Alarm argued that the government should not be fearful of 
interfering 'by the clamour of a few wicked, or selfish individuals. Nor will the pretext of lenity, 
or delicacy of interfering with what is, by a previous grant of the nation, become private 
property, be at all admitted, p. 15. 
110 Clive's plan for government of Bengal is summarised in John Bruce, Historical View ofPlansfir 
the Government of British India and Regulation of Trade to the East Indies and Outlines of a Plan of 
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conn" these two pamphlets is the desire to provide the government of Bengal with a new, clear 
fountain head of authority: the British state. "' The accusation of mercantile despotism was used 
to justify this end. 
Mercantile despotism was the 'tide' that the author of the Tme Alarm designated the Company's 
system of government of Bengal. He argued that all governments normally faced constraints on 
the exercise of power and Montesquieu had shown that this was also true of despotic 
governments. The Company, this writer argued, by contrast, did not face any restrictions on its 
governing powers and therefore was unfit to be a ruler. "' It was this reality that had allowed 
mercantile despotism to exist. One way that the True Alarm identified the Company as enjoying 
unregulated power - and thus as differing from all other governments - was in its officials. The 
author argued that the servants of the Company in India, had no long term desire to remain in 
the country; their ambition was to make a fortune and return home. They were not interested in 
the task of governing, and they had not been educated for it. He stated that the servants arrived 
in India when they were young (sixteen years old), and then lived in an environment inimical to 
their intellectual development - it was a place where 'gaiety and jollity prevails'. Further, in the 
post-diwani period, the pace at which fortunes could be made had increased, and this had meant 
that advancement in the Company's service was achieved more quickly with many young 
Foreign Government, of Commercial Oeconomy, and of Domestic Administration, for the Asiatic Interest of 
Great Britain (London, 1793), pp. 55-59. See also: Lord Ove's Speech in the House of Commons, on 
the Motion Madefor an Inquiry into the Nature, State, and Condition, of the East India Company, and the 
British Affairs in the East Indies, in the Fifth Session ofthe Present Parliament (1772), pp. 1,46-47,54. 
Anon., Thie Alarm, p. 94; Anon., Present State, p. 104. 
Alexander Dalrymple's response to such criticisms was to argue that the Company's role as 
government was limited to implementing Indian laws and customs: 'the idea of the Company's 
Government does not extend to legislation. It takes up the Indians where it finds them, under a 
regular system of civilisation, secured by casts and religious ceremonies, and leaves them 
perfectly free in the exercise thereof, not assuming the power of enacting general laws, it can 
never promulgate the institute of destruction, by subverting the manners and customs of the 
Indians' (A Second Letter Concerning the Proposed Supervisorship (London, 1769), BL, OIOC Tract 
vol. 424, pp. 8-9). Dalrymple had been in the Company's service in Madras between the years 
1752-68, where he had enjoyed the protection of Lord Pigot and the friendship of Robert Orme. 
He would be appointed hydrographer to the Company in 1779; in his writings, he espoused 
views that were associated with the Rockingham group. See: Andrew S. Cook, 'Dalrymple, 
Alexander (1737-1808)', in ODNB, 
<http: //O-www. oxforddnb. com. consuH. ull. ac. uk: 80/view/chapter/7044> [accessed 30 Nov 
2004]. 
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people, as a consequence, being put in 'the highest trusts, in a very early time of life'. 113 
Iberefore, not only did the servants lack interest in the government of Bengal, they were also ill. 
equipped to execute the trust, both in terms of training and experience. "' Such a state of affairs 
meant that power would be abused. 
Another feature that the True Alarm found to demonstrate the dcficiency of the Company's 
capacity as a ruler, was the way that selfish interests had come to motivate Company policy. The 
author did not regard the Company as a whole, as disreputable, but felt that its organisation had 
allowed a group of men to establish themselves in the Company and use its apparatuses to 
promote their private advantage: 'a wicked, ambitious, and avaricious cabal, of a few men [ ... ] 
have been enabled by the defective constitution of the company, (defective, indeed, in respect of 
political government) and, by virtue of wealth, mostly plundered from those miserable foreign 
dominions, to establish a tyranny over the company itself. "' He charged this cabal with 
following an interest that was opposed to the true interest of the Company and the nation, and of 
supporting'the views of those men, which do thus exactly tally and coincide with their own'. "' 
The argument that the True Alann put forward was similar to the one advanced against the 
perceived consequences of the increased influence of the crown, articulated for instance by Burke 
in his Thoughts on the Present Discontents. Burke suggested that the Court had formed a plan for 
undermining the independence of parliament and for governing the country 'without any 
concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to 
"I Anon., True Alarm, pp. 35-36; the argument that the servants did not have the necessary 
education or experience to govern was also made by [Smith], Observations, p. 77. 
111 Dow, demonstrating more sympathy than the author of the True Alarm, made allowances for 
the servants' inexperience, stating that Bengal was suffering from neglect due to ignorance, 
rather than deliberate misgovernment: 'falling upon the shoulders of men unexperienced in the 
regulation and management of the great machine of state, it was impossible for them to give the 
necessary attention to all departments. The multiplicity of affairs overwhelmed them [ ... I and the kingdom suffered more from a total want of system, than from any premeditated design' (Dow, 
History, 111, pp. cvi-cvii). Burke similarly argued that 'men must be arbitrary' where there were 
4no laws' to guide them, that is, given the Government's failure to provide the Company with a 
dwell-digested code of laws, for the rule of every man's conduct', it was not surprising that 
mismanagement had occurred ('Speech on East India Select Committee' (13 April 1772), in 
Wtifings and Speeches, II, p. 373). He also implied that the government had deliberately allowed 
the abuses in India to continue in order to provide themselves with a convenient excuse to 
appropriate the revenues of Bengal, see: Parliamentary History, vol. 17, p. 672. See also: Annual 
Register, no. 16, p. 64. 
Anon., TrueAlarm, p. 161. 
Ibid., pp. 161-62. 
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the affections of the lower sorts'; for this end, Burke stated, the Court had formed a party, 'the 
Cabal', by which to further its interests. 117 Burke went on to argue that it was not simply enough 
to ensure that the Prince governed 'according to law', but that it was also of 'equal importance' 
that the necessary discretionary powers that the ruler enjoyed, such as 'conducting the affairs of 
peace and war, were 'exercised upon public principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or 
pr4udices [ ... 
] ofa Coure. " Hume had also pointed out that when a body of men acted together in 
politics, they could promote an interest contrary to the common one. He argued: 'if [ ... ] the [ ... I 
separate interest be not checked, and be not directed to the public, we ought to look for nothing 
but faction, disorder, and tyranny from such a government'. "' Tyranny and disorder were 
precisely the results that the True Alann identified with the avaricious cabal's ascendancy over 
the Company. 
In its reference to a cabal, it is possible that the author of the True Alarm had in mind the 
Johnstone group, which had used their financial strength in the Court of Proprietors to prevent 
the prosecution of John Johnstone, and worked with other groups, such as Sulivan, to achieve 
this. It is also true that they had supported people like Vansittart who shared their enmity against 
Clive, and Bolts. In addition, they had used their influence to force a rise in the Company's 
dividend. "' Clive's supporters too had used their influence in the Court of Proprietors to ftwther 
his interest, specifically the continuation of his jaghire; `1 however, given the proximity of Clive's 
views with this pamphlet, it is likely that the intended target was the Johnstone Group. It is clear 
that the TrueAlarm thought that the Company in London had become a forum for certain groups 
to further their interests. This was a defect of the Company's structure, but only in its capacity as 
an effective sovereign, not as a merchant; it did not have the 'constitution' to prevent private 
interests directing the policy of government 
The intrusion of private interests in the sphere of government was not simply prevented by 
appropriate laws; 'normal' rulers were also restrained from abusing their powers by the fear of 
"'Burke, Thoughts on the Present Discontents, in Mitings and Speeches, H, pp. 259-61,264. 
Ibid., p. 277. 
Hume, 'Of the Independency of Parliament', in Essays, p. 43. 
Sutherland, East, pp. 140,144,17 1. 
121 Ibid., pp. 156-57. 
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rebellion on the part of their subjects. The True Alarm identified two parties, which had an 
interest in the good government of the provinces and that should have acted as a curbing 
influence on the Company: the first was the British nation, and the second was the Indian 
people. It was argued that the abuses of trade and power would not have occurred - mercantile 
despotism would not have been established - if both of these groups had been in a position to 
exert influence over the Company's servants. These potential restraints had not been realised as 
the first group, the British nation, had voluntarily abdicated its responsibility to the Company 
because of the belief that the trade to the East Indies was best conducted by a monopoly. These 
rights could be regained if the Company breached the trust reposed in it to conduct the trade in 
the interests of 'public utility'. 122 
In the context of the Company's failure to manage its affairs, this author believed that the trust 
had been betrayed; the Company had failed in its duty to the nation, and the British government 
consequently had the right to interfere in the Company's affairs. "Me True Alann went on to state 
that it was the British government's responsibility to ensure that the acquired territories were 
governed in the interests of the nation, rather than to the advantage of a cabal of merchants . 
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He argued that despite the settlement the state and the Company had negotiated in 1767 and 
1769,124 the British government could not absolve 'itself of the right to superintend, and carefully 
examine, the manner in which the company conducts the charge of that important branch of 
121 national concern'. 
The second group, the Indians, had also failed to act as a restraint on the Company due to their 
disposition. This group was ineffectual because of their 'pliant' and 'submissively obedient' 
Anon., TrueAlarm, pp. 6-8,6n. 
The True. 41ann had applied the criterion that all power was held in trust for the community by 
the ruler and had to be exercised in their interest, associated with John Locke, to the situation of 
the Company. In the same manner that power reverted back to the community when it was 
abused, so the British government had the right to take control when the Company failed in its 
responsibilities to the state. See Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 412. Colonel Burgoyne, who made the motion in 
parliament for a select committee to investigate Company affairs also spoke of the Company as 
being a trustee for the state, see: Parliamentary History, vol. 17, p. 457. The same is also true of 
Bolts, see: Considerations, p. 2 10. 
11 On the 1767 settlement, see: Bowen, 'Question of Sovereignty, pp. 155-76; on the 1769 
settlement, see Sutherland, East, pp. 184-85. 
"I Anon., TrueAlarm, p. 5. 
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character. "" This same point was made by the author of the Present State, who shared the views 
of the True Alarm: 
For the inhabitants of those countries, being disposed by nature or climate to 
passive obedience, and by long custom habituated to despotic authority, and 
being further impressed with a particular awe of Europeans, from a notion of 
their natural superiority, implicitly submit to the will of their present 
government, without once daring to examine its right, dispute its authority, or 
question its conduct. The subject therefore holds not the smallest voice in the 
administration of government. "' 
Both of these writers were clearly drawing upon the wider debate concerning the connection of 
manners and climate; the assertion that the Indians were mild and submissive, was repeated 
throughout the second half of the eighteenth century by various writers including Scrafton, Dow 
and Bolts. The Present State and the True Alann were arguing that all rulers, to some extent, were 
contained by the resentment of their subjects, but given the state of Indian manners, this restraint 
on the exercise of power was wholly missing. The Company servants were 'superior to the 
resentment of the subject', and as a result could commit oppressive acts with impunity. The 
servants were also unrestrained by the opinion of their colleagues and family as 'glory' was 
associated with 'acquiring and bringing home a mighty fortune' - not in governing well. ", The 
failure of these constraints - of the British nation and the Indians - had facilitated the new 
species of despotism. 
All the failures of the Company's organisation that were identified by the True Alann had their 
root in the Company's position as both defacto sovereign and merchant. The author argued that 
the corruptions would persist no matter what system of reform the Company initiated as 'the 
corruption is lodged in the head': 'let the company divide their substitution into twenty different 
degrees or orders, and let them distinguish each of those degrees by a different epithet, 
governors, supervisors [ ... ]: this difference of title will make no matter of difference in the nature 
126 Ibid., p. 37. Sir William Meredith, during the debate on Burgoyne's motions relating to the 
conduct of Clive in India (10 May 1773), used arguments that were similar to the ones expressed 
in the True Alarm. He argued that 'mercantile avarice' was the principle of the Company's 
government in India, and that it had surpassed past examples of tyranny. He also argued that the 
Company servants did not care about the opinion of the Indians and 'so much in reverse are they 
of fear of shame, that their ambition is spurred by knowing that they are to secure honour ... in 
proportion to the riches they bring home' (Parliamentary History, vol. 17, pp. 858-59). 
127 Anon., Present State, 20. 
"I Ibid., p. 31; Anon., True, 41ann finiher reflected that if the governors in India were so negligent 
of their own masters' interests, to whom they were accountable, 'it could only be imagined how 
'despotic' they would be towards the natives 'who possess neither the means nor the spirit to 
resent or repel injuries', pp. 43-44. 
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of things'. The Company in Bengal would remain 'the substitute government of a subject, 
sovereign, mercantile company'. The problem with the Company - the reason why its servants 
faced no restrictions - was, simply, that it had not been created for governing; its servants in 
India were under the command of the directors in London, and the Company, as a whole, was a 
subject of the British state. This sub ect however had become, to all practical intents, the j 
sovereign of Bengal. In these terms the Company's government appeared not only ridiculous but 
also unconstitutional. The Company was subject to the British government, but had been acting 
'like a haughty superior state'. 129 
It was in order to correct this state of affairs that the True Ala? m desired the British state to take 
on the government of Bengal for itself. He argued that the Company had been fully aware in 
1760 that sovereignty was against its interest, which was why it had previously rejected the grant 
of diwani. '30 Now however, the Company was trying to maintain the pretence that it held the 
post of diwani as a grant from the Mughal emperor (who was the 'Mogul of only the English East 
India Company') to prevent the British state from appropriating it. 131 In this author's mind, there 
was no doubt that sovereignty over the acquired territories and the revenue belonged by right to 
the state and it was time the state used its 'legal authority' before an asset of national importance 
was loSt. 132 
The Present State, in a similar fashion to the True Alann, also shared the belief that the affairs of 
the Company were of national importance, and had only been 'leased [... ] by government to the 
Company'. "' The author of the Present State argued that the Company's mercantile character was 
what separated it from 'normal' governments. He stated that 'the idea of actual despotism in a 
supreme government is merely imaginary'; " in other words, governments could not, in practice, 
be despotic as the power to govern was implicitly derived from the people. "' History provided 
Anon., True Alarm, pp. 95-96,160. 
Ibid., p. 96n. The grant of diwani had previously been rejected by Clive in 1758 and by 
Vansittart in 1761 (Travers, 'Contested Notions', p. 46). 
Anon., True Alarm, p. 31 
Ibid., p. 14. 
Anon., Present State, p. 9. 
Ibid., p. 2 1. 
By suggesting that power was implicitly derived from the people, the author avoided the 
notion of a contractual origin of government. This author argued that consent to a particular 
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examples of the way people revolted against a transgressing ruler - that is, a ruler who failed to 
promote the common good. He believed that the people were 'superior' to the actual ruler and 
acted as a restraining influence on him; ` no such relationship existed between the Company 
(ruler) and the Indians (ruled) in Bengal. Another, more powerful restraining influence was the 
ruler's self-interest; this dictated that he took care of the welfare of his people: 
For a government that is sovereign, and perpetual (or durante Wta and hereditary) 
cannot possibly separate its own private interest from that of the community: 
and this is so evident, that no prince ever attempted to advance a distinct interest 
of its own, at the expense of the general weal, who was not a fool, before he 
became a tyrant. But a wise sovereign considers his people as the channel 
through which alone he can receive substantial good or evil. "' 
A government, such as a hereditary monarchy, faced restraints on the exercise of its power, 
external controls, such as the fear of the resentment of its people and 'internal checks', such as its 
self-interest. A true despot on the other hand did not face these constraints; he did not fear the 
revolt of his people and his interest was distinct from theirs. This was precisely the condition of 
the Company's government - it was the 'only government that can, with propriety, be termed 
arbitrary and despotic'. 138 
The final conclusion of the Present State was that the British government had to take over the 
responsibility of ruling, because only it was 'perfectly free from all the defects of the Company'. 
These defects, in sum, were the fact that the Indians did not dispute the authority, or question 
the conduct of the Company's government, because of their passivity, and the 'awe' in which 
they held the Europeans; the servants of the Company who were only interested in making their 
fortunes and therefore lacked the 'ability or power' as well as the 'will or inclination' to act as 
government may not be 'specially expressed', i. e. in a contract, but it was 'perfectly understood, 
(Anon., Present State, p. 22). This was an idea that had been developed by the Court Whigs, see 
Dickinson, Liberty, pp. 129-30. 
136 Anon., present State, p. 22. Similarly the Court Whigs, despite their reluctance had not denied 
that the people ultimately had the right to revolt against a tyrannical ruler. This fact operated as a 
restraint on all governments and ensured that they governed according to the common good 
(Dickinson, Liberty, 128-29). It was the argument of Anon., True. Alarm and Anon., Present State 
that a reciprocal relationship between the rulers and the ruled had not been established in 
Bengal, consequently, abuse had gone unchecked. Bolts however suggested that the Indians, 
despite their meekness, were capable of revolting. Consequently, he argued, the Indians' 
resentment was to be feared: 'let those who despise the Asiatics farther reflect, that the most 
despicable reptiles will turn when trod upon; and the history abounds with instances of nations 
driven into madness by the cruelty of oppression. It must certainly be best to avoid giving 
occasion for such extremities' (Considerations, p. ix). See also: Muthu, Enlightenment, pp. 87-90. 
"' Anon., Present State, p. 23. 
1311 Ibid., p. 21. 
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rulers. The latter meant that the servants were bereft of all motivation firstly, to learn the art of 
government and, secondly, to govern - the consequence of which was that 'the machine of 
political government stops in their hands, and stands stock still'. The former meant that the 
Company's government, as a deputed one, lacked the necessary powers of enforcing the 
obedience of its servants and of punishing them. Finally, the existence of the Company as both 
sovereign and merchant was another flaw that separated it from other rulers. "' For all of these 
reasons it was advocated that the 'national government' should take over: 
But the nature of the Bengal government differs in every circumstance, from that 
of a supreme government; being deputed, foreign, mutable and temporary, it is 
no way interested in the lasting prosperity of the community which it governs; 
on the contrary, this government holds an interest which is not only distinct 
from, but diametrically opposite to that of the subject. " 
The British government, he believed, would not act in the same arbitrary and despotic manner as 
the Company because they faced the appropriate restraints on power. This had also been the 
conclusion of the author of the True Alarm; he argued that the British government's assertion of 
power would bring to an end 'that new and monstrous species of despotism, the mercantile 
one'. 141 
Conclusion 
Montesquieu's argument that a despotic government was akin to the savages of Louisiana 
cutting down a tree in order to obtain its fruit was an ideal type. It referred to the policy of a 
theoretical despotic ruler. Historical examples of despotic rule had not been uniform in the 
exercise of power: 'circumstances, a religious opinion, a prejudice, received examples, a turn of 
mind, manners, mores, can leave considerable differences among them'. Furthermore, the 
existence of religious books had provided them with a 'religious code' in place of a 'civil code' 
and thereby fixed what was 'arbitrary'. " Despotism, in reality, was not boundless; it was, in 
fact, limited. It was this difference - between despotism in fact, and despotism in theory - that 
made it possible to argue that Mughal rule had differed qualitatively from Company rule: the 
latter was arbitrary, while the former had been regulated. 
Ibid., pp. 67,20,28-29,31,51-52. 
Ibid., p. 24. 
Anon., True Alarm, pp. 90-92. 
112 Montesquieu, Spifit, p. 211. 
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The argument that Mughal or Indian rule had enjoyed codes of government (the ancient Mughal 
constitution) was made by Dow, the Planfor the Government and Scrafton; in addition, it was to 
figure heavily in later developments of British rule of India. These writers maintained that the 
Mughal Empire was despotic but they also argued that the Empire displayed features that were 
inimical to the concept of arbitrary regimes - such as fixed rents and the division of the powers 
of government. Yet the continued use of the term despotism in relation to the Mughal Empire 
remained consistent because contemporaries also differentiated between absolute and arbitrary 
power. As Hume had shown, there was a distinct difference between Turkish and French 
despotism; the former was arbitrary and reduced its people to a condition of slavery, while the 
latter enjoyed the benefits of free governments - namely, rule by law. "' 
The view that absolute monarchies were legitimate types of governments and the idea of the 
ancient Mughal or Indian constitution made the principle that laws had to suit the manners of 
the people an applicable one. For example, when the author of the Planfor the Govemment urged 
for the 'condition' of the natives to 'be brought back to the easy state which they enjoyed before 
the Mogul empire was overturned', '" he was arguing for the Indians to be rescued from the 
boundless despotism of the Company and restored to the regulated despotism of the Mughals. 
The belief in an ancient Mughal or Indian constitution meant that calls to rule Indians according 
to their manners did not involve a call to rule the acquired territories by an unregulated 
despotism. 
Mercantile despotism was the phrase that the True Alarm used to differentiate the Company's 
rule of Bengal from both other regulated despotisms, which had historically existed (such as the 
Mughal Empire), and other types of governments. The point that the True Alarin and the Present 
State made was that all governments were regulated in the exercise of power in point of practice 
- except the Company. This was because the Company was opposed, in every way, to the true 
character of a ruler. Rulers cared for their people, were fearful of their revolt and their self- 
interest was associated with governing well. The Company's administration was temporary and 
foreign, its interests were commercial and its servants did not care about the opinion of the 
Hume, 'The Rise of Arts and Sciences', pp. 116,125. 
Anon., Planfor the Govemment ofthe Prmiwes, pp. 13-14. 
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Indians - on the contrary, the servants associated 'glory' with 'acquiring and bringing home a 
mighty fortune'. "' The Company did not possess any of the necessary characteristics of a ruler, 
which was why it had managed to establish what the Mughal rulers had not: a boundless 
despotic government. The idea of mercantile despotism was used to indict Company rule, and to 
thereby support the British government's case for taking control of the administration of the 
territories - the British government was 'perfectly free from all the defects of the Company'. "' 
The aim of the True Alarm and the Present State, in denouncing the Company's rule of Bengal, 
was to justify the British state's take over of the responsibility of government of the acquired 
territories. For this end, they also utilised the concept of trust: power was entrusted to the ruler 
by the people and ultimately had to be exercised for their benefit. The people had the right to 
regain their powers, if the trust was betrayed. In the specific case of the Company, it was not the 
Bengali people that had the right to regain power - they were considered too meek - but the 
British government. It was the British government that had invested the Company with powers 
to conduct commerce in the interests of the nation; it was they that had the right to take the 
powers away from the Company if they were abused or exceeded. This was a point that 
Johnstone, associated with the Rockinghams during the 1773 debates on North's Regulating bill, 
could not disagree with. "' The argument of mercantile despotism was used to prove that a 
breach of trust had occurred, but the Rockinghams disputed this fact; they did not believe that 
the Company had forfeited its rights. At the same time however, they could not deny that reform 
of East Indian affairs was now due. What were the principles on which reform should proceed? 
It is to that question that this dissertation now turns. 
145 Anon., Present State, p. 3 1. 
146 Ibid., p. 67. 
147 Johnstone argued that the only foundation on which the Company could be deprived of its 
acquisitions was if it was incompatible with the common good, see: [George 
Johnstone(? )]/ [George Dempster(? )], Independent Proprietor, A Letter to the Proprietors of East 
India Stock (London: 1769), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 378, pp. 6-7. On authorship see n104 in ch. 4 
below. 
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Chapter 4 
Supervisors, Despotic Power and Checks and Balances: Plans for the Reform of the 
East India Company, 1769-1773 
In Lord Clive's speech in parliament of February 1769, he had described the wealth and 
opportunity that the East India Company had come into in consequence of its obtaining defacto 
sovereignty over Bengal in 1765. He had also pointed out that the wealth was in danger of being 
lost unless the Company was made equal to the task of governing the territories it had so 
suddenly acquired. ' In the years immediately following Clive's speech, increased allegations of 
Company corruption and abuse in India, made by former disaffected servants of the Company 
and circulated widely in the press, ' together with the investigations of the House of Commons 
Select and Secret Committees and the Company's financial crisis, all contributed to a sense that 
the territories could be lost or irrevocably damaged, unless some action was taken by the British 
government. The preceding chapter set out the arguments put forward against what publicists 
saw as the Company's despotic regime in Bengal. This chapter explores the principles underlying 
the plans put forward for the reform of the Company by an examination of a representative 
sample of pamphlets published on the subject in this period. 
The period with which this chapter is concerned, namely 1769-1773, was a crucial period in the 
formation of ideas regarding empire in India. The broad arguments that were advanced at this 
time continued to be reiterated later in the century, specifically during the debates on Fox's and 
Pitt's India Bills, and the impeachment of Warren Hastings. The need for reform of the 
Company's affairs was already widely accepted - but the shape that any reform should take was 
fiercely contested. The major point of controversy hinged upon the question of whether the 
Company was a suitable agency for the government of the acquired territories and the 
management of its revenues. Enemies of the Company called for a complete separation of the 
responsibilities of government from the Company. 
'BL, Eg. MSS 218, pp. 148-53. 
' Osborn, 'India, Parliament', pp. 116-18. 
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This was a stance that can be identified with individuals such as Meredith and Burgoyne, who 
both took prominent parts against the Company during the various debates in Parliament on 
East India affairs in this period. -' In this chapter, this position is explored through the writings of 
Bolts and Nathaniel Smith. Bolts, as we saw in the previous chapter, proved to be a significant 
figure in this period because of the wide circulation and publicity of his Considerations on India 
Affairs (1772), sections of which were widely reproduced in other publications, ' as well as due to 
his association with the powerful faction in the Company's court of Proprietors, the Johnstone 
Group, and the tenacity with which he pursued restitution for the 'injustices' he had suffered in 
India, which included his forced deportation. His book drew attention to the Company's 
inadequacies as a ruler - especially its misgovernment of Bengal - and served to focus public 
attention on Company affairs-5 
Nathaniel Smith, who was affiliated with Lord Shelburne and had served in the Company's 
maritime service 6 began from the same premise as Bolts in that he believed that the Company 
could not continue as merchant and sovereign simultaneously! He did not however share Bolts' 
extreme emnity towards the Company, which ultimately coloured the tenor of Bolts' proposals 
for the Company's reform! Smith's works did not have the same impact as Bolts' and were 
published anonymously, but reforms that he supported would be enshrined in Pitt's 1784 India 
Act, while he was a director of the Company. ' His position was opposed by the Rockingham 
party and is explored in this chapter through the writings of George Johnstone (part of the 
Johnstone group), 'O Alexander Dalrymple" and Archibald Keir. " 
3 During the period 1768-74, Burgoyne spoke 47 times and Meredith 39 times on East India 
affairs in the House of Commons, see Table 1 in Bowen, Revenue, p. 33. 
4 Osborn, 'India, Parliament', pp. 117-19. 
5 See: Tuck, 'Introduction', pp. viii-ix; Kuiters, British in Bengal, ch. XIV. 
6 Parker, 'Directors', p. 249. 
1 [Smith], Measures to be Pursued, p. 12; [Smith], General Rernarks, pp. 49-51. See also: Bolts, 
Considerations, p. 222. Kuiters, British in Bengal, p. 272, argues that Bolts did not want the British 
state to take over the responsibility of governing Bengal; however Bolts' call for the 'British 
legislature to separate the Merchant from the Sovereign' clearly demonstrates that he did not 
want the Company to continue as the rulers of Bengal. 
' The extent to which Bolts was motivated by his personal experience can be gauged by the title 
of chapter xi of his Considerations: 'On the Assumed Right of the East India Company to Seize 
their Feflow Subjects in India and Send them by Force Prisoners to England; on their Abuses of 
Power in so Doing and the Evil Effects thereof. See also Bolts, Considerations, pp. 86,147. 
'Parker, 'Directors', p. 25 1. 
See n6 in Introduction above. 
See nl 12 in Ch. 3 above. 
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The Johnstone group's aim was originally to prevent the prosecution of John, which awaited 
him on his return to England, but their enmity against Clive was to persist even after the case 
against John was dropped. George Johnstone, John's brother, used his position as a member of 
parliament and as a member of the House of Commons select committee (instituted to 
investigate Company affairs in 1772) to attack Clive and his administration of Bengal. " 
Significantly, however, the Johnstone group was not an enemy of the Company itself - its 
members did not support any government measure that eroded the privileges of that 
organisation, which was why they worked with the Rockingham party to oppose North's 
Regulating Act. Dalrymple shared this stance but he criticised the specific plan that George 
Johnstone put forward for the reform of the Company, which is why they are both considered 
here in order to encompass the range of argument involved. 
Keir, writer of Thoughts on the Affairs, had much in common with Bolts; he had also been a 
former free merchant in Calcutta, and had suffered from the policies of Clive's administration - 
specifically by the creation of Clive's society of trade. " However, unlike Bolts, Keir wished the 
administration of Bengal to continue with the Company. What he advocated was for it to be 
equipped with powers appropriate for its altered status on the sub-continent. " His circle of 
associates is difficult to ascertain, but he was a keen observer of Company affairs. " In any case, 
12 Keir originally served in the East India Company's maritime service (1751/2) and then in the 
Madras army (from April 1753) as a surgeon. He was in the force that accompanied Clive to 
Bengal in 1756. He then joined the Bengal infantry in 175 7; he was made a captain in 1758 but 
resigned in August 1758, and went back to England. He subsequently returned to India as a free 
merchant and was based at Patna. He rejoined the Bengal army as a captain in 1766, resigning 
again on I st September 1768, see: Anthony Farrington, A Biographical Index ofEast India Company 
Maritime Service Offlcers 1600-1834 (London, 1999), p. 436. 
Bowen, Revenue, pp. 134-35. 
14 As a free merchant, Keir was involved in the production of salt: he employed 13,000 men and 
produced 12,000 tons of salt a year. Keir's enterprise was terminated by Clive's Society of Trade, 
which enjoyed a monopoly of trade in (amongst other things) salt, see: Alex N. Cain, The 
Comchest for Scotland: Scots in India (Edinburgh: National Library of Scotland, 1986), p. 14; 
Travers, 'Contested Notions', p. 54. 
15 Keir, Thoughts, pp. 7-8,14-16. 
11 Bolts argued that the Company in London was prevented from obtaining 'unconstitutional' 
powers over their servants in 1770 by a petition entered by Keir: in March of that year, the 
Company had put forward a bill in parliament 'for compelling persons dismissed the service of 
the East India Company to depart the East Indies, and for better regulating servants of the said 
Company'. Keir's petition against it was based on the argument that it deprived British men of 
their rights and privileges of the British constitution. The petition was considered by the 
Committee of Correspondence (of the Company), who decided to drop the first part of the bill. It 
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Keir, Smith, Johnstone, Dalrymple and Bolts' writings are the principal (although not the 
exclusive) writings considered in this chapter. 
Their ideas are considered in the broader context of the reform of the Company that took shape 
in this period; the 1773 Regulating Act came after other attempts by the British government to 
reform the affairs of the Company, as well as after the Company's own efforts to remedy its 
problems. The scheme of a supervisory commission in 1769 marked a key stage in the Company 
in London's attempt to control its affairs abroad, and ultimately the concept of a strong executive 
authority, embodied in the notion of supervisors, was to find expression in the creation of the 
post of Governor-General. This chapter begins by firstly considering the debate regarding 
supervisors; secondly, the arguments raised against a strong unified authority in India (what 
critics termed 'despotic' power), and it then considers the way that the concept of checks and 
balances was used to provide an alternative to schemes of reform that relied on 'despotic' 
governors. The authors of the various plans were clearly not detached observers but implicated in 
different ways and to different degrees in the affairs of the Company. From their opposing 
political and personal considerations, these Company supporters and critics drew on 
contemporary ideas regarding the British constitution, moderate governments, and the 
relationship between laws and the spirit of the people, to create plans for the government of 
Bengal. These broader ideological commitments led to plans for the administration of that 
territory that did not fully endorse either despotism (where the ruler governed according to his 
whim) or liberty (where the people participated, in some way, in the political process). 
1. Supervisors 
In May 1769 the value of Company stock dropped sharply. The crash had been caused by news 
of Haidar Ali's successes in the Carnatic against the Company and the potential threat he posed 
to Fort St. George. In addition, other intelligence also pointed to possible threats posed to British 
was ultimately passed as 'An Act for Better Regulating Persons Employed in the Service of the 
East India Company' (10 Geo. III, c. 47). See: Bolts, Considerations, pp. 134-38; BL, OIOC 
B/86, p. 6; BL, OIOC D/26, pp. 177,178-9,182; Bowen, Revenue, p. 92. 
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interests in India by the French and Shuja-ud-Daula, wazir of Oudh. 11 These developments had, 
in the words of one Company critic, led to a 'pause' in the Company's 'delirium' that it had 
experienced following its successes in India, namely the victories of Plassey and Buxar and the 
grant of diwani. The Company's preoccupation with its spoils, he suggested, had led it to neglect 
its interests - specifically the pressing need to develop a policy that would protect its 
acquisitions. " The directors blamed their losses against Haidar Ali firmly on their servants in 
Madras' ill conceived foreign policy. " Since the acquisition of diwani the directors in London 
had constantly urged their servants in India against any fin-ther extension of Company 
responsibilities, but the foreign policy of the Madras Presidency showed that this warning was 
not being heeded. " The directors decided to deal with the crisis by sending a supervisory 
commission who were intended to coordinate polices between the three different presidencies in 
India, and to oversee their servants abroad. " 
The Company also requested from the British state naval support in order to counter the 
continuing threat the French posed to the Company and Britain's interests in India. 22 Thetwo 
separate issues of naval support and of a supervisory commission became connected when 
controversy arose regarding the powers that the naval commander (Sir John Lindsay) was to be 
entrusted with. This raised the fundamental question of what the limit of the British 
government's interference in the Company's relations with Indian powers ought to be. The 
Southern Secretary, Lord Weymouth, wanted the naval commander to be involved 'in the 
development of policy and strategy in situations where Crown interests and resources were at 
17 Sutherland, East, p. 191; Bowen, Revenue, p. 76; see also: Bowen, 'The Pests of Human 
Society: Stockbrokers, Jobbers and Speculators in Mid-eighteenth-century Britain, History, 78, 
252 (1993), 38-53. 
18 Anon., Address to the Proprietors ofIndia Stock Shewing, pp. 9-10. 
19 Lenman, Britain ý Colonial Wars, pp. 185-88. 
11 The Madras council had entered into a treaty (12 Nov 1766) with the ruler of the Deccan 
(Nizarn Ali) to support him militarily in exchange for the grant of the five sarkars, which Clive 
had obtained from the Mughal Emperor in 1765 by the treaty of Allahabad. The Madras council 
assisted the Nizam against Haidar Ali, the ruler of Mysore, but were deserted by him and 
ultimately forced to make peace on Haidar Ali's terms. See: Dodwell ed., Cambridge History of 
India, pp. 273-77. 
21 Bowen, Revenue, p. 77; on the powers they were to be given see also p. 78. 
22 Lenman, Britain's Colonial, p. 187; Bowen, Revenue, pp. 77-78 (on the French threat see ibid., 
pp. 73-75). 
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stake' rather than policy being conducted by the servants alone. " The directors had initially 
agreed to Weymouth's request, but had then subsequently withdrawn their assent and disputed 
the right of what was effectively the Crown's representative in India to interfere in its relations 
with Indian powers. 
While Weymouth did not enjoy the full support of his government for the powers he claimed for 
14 
the naval commander, they represented an effacement of the Company's freedom of diplomatic 
action in India. '5 Ultimately, Weymouth did not succeed in gaining the powers that he sought 
for Lindsay; ` however, the controversy generated a number of publications as interested parties 
tried to influence the outcome of the debate in the Court of Proprietors. " Lord Weymouth's case 
was argued by an anonymous supporter in An Address to the Proprietors. He cast doubt on the 
Company in London's ability to develop a coherent policy to deal with the threats they were 
facing in India, because of the 'spirit of faction' that characterised Company politics at home. " 
What he was referring to was the stock-splitting and speculation in Company stock that had 
characterised the elections of the Company directorships since the 1760s. 1' The government had 
attempted to reform this aspect of the Company's organisation, but the 1769 election had proven 
to be one of the most 'fiercely contested of the century', with agents of the government and of the 
various factions within the Company, headed by Clive, George Colebrooke, Sulivan, as well as 
the Johnstone Group, dividing large holdings of stock amongst their supporters in order to 
" Bowen, Revenue, pp. 79-80. Specifically, Weymouth had demanded 'extraordinary and 
plenipotentiary powers' for the naval commander. 24 Ibid., pp. 81,8 1 n65. 
25 Ibid., p. 79. Bowen also points out that the Treaty of Paris had recognised two Indian Kings, 
and consequently raised questions about whether the Crown was to manage its relationship with 
these monarchs by its own ambassadors and pursue a separate foreign policy; or whether it was 
to be represented by the Company (ibid., pp. 75-76). 
26 Publicly Weymouth conformed to the decision of the General Court, however Lindsay was 
given 'secret instructions which defizied the Commander's role along the lines originally desired 
by Weymouth', see: ibid., p. 82. 
27 C. D., A Letter to the Proprietors of East-India Stock. Relative to some Propositions intended to be 
Moved at the next General Court, on Wednesday the 12th July (London, 1769); Ajexander Dalrymple, 
A Letter to the Court of Directorsfor Affairs of the United Company qfMerrhants ofEngland trading to the 
East Indies Concerning the Proposed Supervisorship (London, 1769); Dalrymple, Second Letter, 
Palrymple], Pox Populi Vox Dei., Lord Weymouth's Appeal to a General Court of Indian Proprietors 
Considered (London, 1769); Anon., An Enquiry into the Rights of the East-India Company of Making 
War and Peace; and of Possessing their Territorial Acquisitions without Participation or Inspection of the 
British Government. - in a Letter to the Proprietors of East-India Stock Wtitten in the Year 1769 and Now 
First Published (London, 1772). 
Anon., Address to the Proprietors ofIndia Stock Shewing, pp. 5-7. 
This is ftilly explored in Sutherland, East, see esp. chs 4 and 5. 
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qualify them to vote in the directorship elections. " The Address argued that the factionalism was 
inimical to the interests of the Company: ` the Company's problems required a coordinated and 
robust response to the several threats that they faced in India. " 
The Address was written in favour of the supervisory commission, but it argued in favour of the 
naval commander being a member of it, " on the basis that India was a part of the 'British 
empire'. " Ironically however, while the Address predicted doorn" unless the factionalism was 
overcome and wide-sweeping powers were given to the commissioners, the Commission itself 
received impetus from the private financial considerations of the factions within the Company in 
London; with the fall in the value of Company stock following the 1769 directorship elections, 
Sulivan, Clive, Colebrooke, and their respective supporters, suffered severe financial losses. They 
had invested significant amounts of money in the Company's stock, in order to influence its 
outcome by stock-splitting. ' In the wake of the crash, many of the parties were more interested 
in salvaging their fortunes than the affairs of the Company. The supervisory scheme provided an 
opportunity for the parties of Clive and Sulivan to recover their fortunes, " although the directors 
at the same time recognised the need to regulate their affairs in India. With Weymouth's 
demands, the scheme of a supervisory commission became conflated with the issue of naval 
assistance. 
opinion amongst the Court of Proprietors, as wen as amongst the Directors, was against the 
extensive powers sought by Weymouth. Alexander Dalrymple, a supporter of the Company, was 
Sutherland, East, 188-89; cf. also Bowen, "'Dipped in the Traffic"', pp. 41-42. 
Anon., Address to the Proprietors ofIndia Stock Shewing, pp. 6-7. 
See, for example, ibid., pp. 26-27. 
33 Ibid., pp. 25,32. 
34 'A commission vested intirely in three gentlemen, who are only accountable to the Company 
for their conduct abroad, may certainly answer all the immediate purposes for which it is 
intended: but it is to be remembered that the Company's dominions in the East, are a part of the 
British empire, and that unless the state views the transactions of that country, as those of the 
great body of the nation, there is wanting that harmony and universal bond of interest which 
secures the prosperity of national affairs', Ibid., p. 30. Cf. Bowen, 'British Conceptions ', p. 6. 
31 Anon., Address to the Proprietors ofIndia Stock Shewing, conceived the history of India in terms of 
a cycle of 'bloody war and profound peace'; he implied that the latest developments in India 
showed that the Mughal Empire was recovering its Ivigour' and the British, consequently, faced 
the prospect of being ousted by the Indians (pp. 11-13). 
36 Sutherland, East, pp. 187-93. 
37 See Bowen, Revenue, pp. 77-78; Sutherland, East, pp. 193-95. The Johnstone group did not 
support the scheme of supervisors because they feared investigation in India, see: ibid., p. 196. 
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against any innovation of die Company's organisation and infringements of its established 
powers. " He pointed to the instance of naval assistance given by the crown in 1754, which had 
been offered 'without a requisition on of any extraordinary powers'; he therefore questioned the 
necessity of such powers in 1769.11 Dalrymple saw the consequences of ceding to Weymouth's 
demands as leading to the growth in the powers of the Crown. 10 Dalrymple then proceeded to 
undermine the rationale for sending out supervisors to India in the first place. He argued that it 
was the directors and proprietors in London that had betrayed the Company - not the servants 
in India. In his opinion, the servants in India had better understood the interest of the Company 
and consistently followed it. " He believed that the directors had sufficient control over their 
servants, " and what was needed was not to send supervisors to India, but to entrust the 
commission to 'a committee of the Madras council. " 
The Address defended the plan of supervisors from critics like Dalrymple; " its author 
acknowledged the problems that a commission might present, such as abusing its wide-sweeping 
powers. Precedents for this could be found in Classical history, which had been raised, according 
to the Address, during the debates in the Court of Proprietors. The Address argued however that 
the abuse of power usually only occurred after the terms of the commission had expired! ' 
31 [Dalrymple], Fox Populf, p. 2; cf. Anon., Enquiry into the Rights of the East-India Company of 
Making War and Peace, which argued that Weymouth's demands were perfectly just and in no 
way infringed the rights of the Company. 
39 [Dalrymple], VoxPopull, p. 3. 
40 ibid., p. 6. Dalrymple implied that if the crown had a direct representative in India (in the form 
of the naval commander empowered with plenipotentiary powers), he would gain access to an 
independent source of revenue; he argued that Britain's liberties relied on the principle that 'the 
crown shall depend on the House of Commons for revenue. It seems to be totally inconsistent 
with the principles of the Constitution that the crown shall have any independent revenue' (ibid., 
p. 12). 
41 'The very nature of the Company's affairs makes that part of the Constitution necessary, by 
which a dispensing power is left with the administration abroad. I confess, therefore, the charge of 
disobedience does not to me appear an objection of so much weight as it seems to the Directors, 
I conceive it cannot be denied that persons on the spot have documents of knowledge, which it is 
impossible for the Directors to have' (Dalrymple, Letter to the Court, p. 3). 
42 Dalrymple, Letter to the Court, p. 10, remarked caustically 'I dare say the man of least capacity 
in the Direction thinks if he had sufflcientpowers, he has suffldent ability to make India Utopia'. 
"' Ibid., p. 9. 
44 See: ibid., p. 5. Dalrymple also cast doubt on the ability and integrity of those who had been 
selected as supervisors, as well as the number which composed the commission, see: ibid., pp. 
13-15; see also Dalrymple, SecondLetter, p. 5. 
11 'In times of distress, or apprehension, the best regulated communities have always committed 
that absolute power, of which they are at other times scrupulously tender, into the hands of 
individuals, in whom they had reason to confide. This power has sometimes been made bad use 
of; but never till it had answered the end of its commission. Here you have a most material 
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Misuse of power, he contended, could be prevented from occurring by ensuring that the 
Company in India resumed its powers as soon as the commissioners' aims had been achieved. 
He justified the investment of despotic powers (what he termed 'ample' and 'absolute' power) in 
the commission by arguing that the context of Asia necessitated it - 'an Asiatic government' 
could not 'be regulated on the principles of an English one" - and by the fact that their 
possessions were under threat: 'You have already very severely felt how a misconduct, at one of 
your presidencies, may bring ruin; nor is it possible, that without one supreme council for all 
your affairs abroad, they can ever prosper' . 
4' He even suggested that a 'despotic governor 14' Was 
necessary for controlling their territories in India. By implication, such power was to be exercised 
over Europeans as well as Indians. The issue of 'despotic' power, as we shall see, was to be 
fiercely debated. 
The three selected supervisors, Vansittart, Scrafton and Forde, left for India in October 1769. '9 
Great expectations of reform were riding on them, but they were lost at sea, and the merit of this 
policy was consequently left open to question. " The scheme of sending supervisors to India was 
again broached by the directors in 1772, when they were faced with a financial crisis. 51 It was 
also an idea advocated by Archibald Keir at the same time. He acknowledged the criticisms that 
the plan of supervisors had met with in the past, but he argued that his new plan was different. " 
advantage; after your purpose is fulfilled, you can immediately take back the power to 
yourselves, which was not the case with the Romans and Athenians; so the objections that have 
been made to the commission, from the tyrannies of Sylla and Pisistratus, arose from want of 
reflection', Anon, Address to the Proprietors of India Stock Shewing, pp. 25-26; d. however 
[Dalrymple], VoxPopuli, p. 5. 
" Anon., Address to the Proprietors ofIndia Stock Shewing, pp. 25-26. 
47 Ibid., pp. 26-27; see also p. 29. 
48 'The Dutch, the most politic European nation that is established in Asia, owe the strength and 
success of their government to its being centred in one despotic governor and council. His 
command is that of majesty itself, yet he finds his duty, his interest, and his pleasure not to be a 
tyrant' (ibid., p. 27). Cf. also p. 26. The Dutch example of a governor with extensive powers was 
also cited by Sulivan, see: Harlow, Founding, H, p. 62. 49 Bowen, Revenue, pp. 77-78. 
" The Annual Register, no. 16, p. 66, commented that the loss of the three supervisors 'was 
undoubtedly one of the greatest misfortunes that could have befallen the company. They must 
have remedied many evils'. 
The Company's financial difficulties will be considered in chapter 5 below. 
Keir, Thoughts, pp. 20-21; see also pp. 16-19. Cf Friend to Fair Discussion, A Letter to the 
Proprietors ofEast-India Stock on the Subject ofsending supervisors with extraordinary powers to India by 
A Friend to fair dLsrussion (London, 1772), which attempted to refute all objections to supervisors 
that had been made, point by point. See also: Old Proprietor, and Former Servant of the East 
India Company, A Letter to Sir George Colebrooke, Bart. on the Subjects of supervision and dividend 
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Keir was a supporter of the Company - he did not want the responsibility of government to be 
separated from it, " which was, for instance, advocated by Nathanial Smith. -' Keir was in favour 
of continuing the existing system, but he did not preclude the need for government legislation. 55 
This was a stance that was consistent with the policy of the directors in this period. The 1769 and 
1772 schemes of supervisors were not the only attempts by the Company in London to reform 
itself. The directors also attempted to initiate reform of their military and judicial affairs. Two 
bills were submitted relating to the recruitment of soldiers by the Company in April 1770 and 
February 1771, whilst in 1772 the Judicature Bill was put forward in the House of Commons. " 
These bills however were not passed onto the statute book as they ultimately lacked the full 
support of the British administration. In this manner, successive governments proved themselves 
reluctant to interfere in the Company's internal affairs. However, by 1772, the government's 
attitude of leaving the Company to deal with its own internal affairs was changing, although 
ultimately it was the financial crisis that forced North to address the problems of the Company. 
Prior to the 1773 Regulating Act, legislation concerning the Company had been related to 
reforming the Company's organisation in BritairOl In 1767, legislation aimed at curbing the 
practice of stock splitting which occurred prior to directorship elections was passed. It required 
proprietors to have held the minimum f500 worth of stock for at least six months before they 
(London, 1772), which argued that supervisors were intended simply to enrich 'needy 
dependents of your [Colebrooke's] own', p. 10. 
51 In refuting the argument that merchants could not be sovereigns Keir argued, 'is not our own 
legislature composed principally of merchants, and of mercantile menT (Thoughts, p. 5). Kuiters, 
British in Bengal, p. 228, argues that Keir tempered his criticisms of the Company because he 
hoped 'to return to Bengal in the service of the Company'. This certainly explains why Keir's 
criticism of the salt monopoly was so muted, considering that it considerably affected his own 
business (see n14 above). Keir himself refers to the fact that the monopoly brought to an end his 
trade, and argued that a monopoly in salt was not as bad as others had contended (Thoughts, p. 
57). Kuiters' argument offers an explanation for why he was so conciliatory towards Clive and 
the Company. 
m Smith asked what use supervisors were: 'they can establish no fund to supply the husbandman 
with cash on easy terms, for the purposes of cultivation, nor can they increase the circulating 
cash of the country; they cannot recover it from the scarcity occasioned by that imprudent drain 
it suffered when we first got possession of the duannee' ([Smith], General Remarks, pp. 103-04). 
11 Keir, noughts, p. 51. 
56 Bowen, Revenue, pp. 85-93; see also: Tuck, 'Introduction', p. xxiv n3 1. 
" One exception to this was the 1770 Act for Better Regulating Persons Employed in the Service 
of the East India Company, see n16 above. 
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became qualified to vote. " Yet, as the 1769 elections proved, this did not prevent stock splitting, 
but only protracted the duration in which the deals were concluded. Other legislation (7 Geo. III, 
c. 49 and 8 Geo. M, c. 57) placed restrictions on the Court of Proprietors relating to the raising 
of the dividend. Government had also been concerned with obtaining a share of the Company's 
revenues for the British state. 51 Chatham's inquiry of 1767 set out to assert the government's 
rights to the territorial revenues, but in the face of opposition, including from members of 
Chatham's own administration, the issue of sovereignty was allowed to remain unresolved and 
an agreement was reached by which the Company agreed to pay f4OO, OOO to the government (7 
Geo. III, c. 5 7, renewed in 1769,9 Geo. III, c. 24). 61 
By the time that Keir was writing in support of a new plan of supervisors, Company 
mismanagement abroad had been highlighted by the publications of works by former disaffected 
servants of the Company. These writings were disseminated widely and the most notorious were 
Bolts' Considerations and Dow's preface to his History. Other enemies of the Company chose to 
publish their attacks on the Company anonymously, but publications such as the True. 41arm" 
and National Mirror were of the same ilk. It was in this context that the House of Commons 
Select Committee was set up to investigate the Company's affairO' Upon the creation of this 
committee, the directors had postponed their decision to send supervisors; however by August 
the directors decided that their affairs in India, specifically in Bengal, required immediate action 
and they proceeded with their plans. " 
The problems that the Company faced with its administration of Bengal and its commercial 
affairs generally would be the subject of a House of Commons Secret Committee. With respect 
to Bengal, the problems related to: the collection of revenue - with reports of extortion and 
embezzlement; the monopolisation of different branches of trade by the servants; the conflict of 
7 Geo. III, c. 48; Bowen, 'Investment and Empire', p. 198. 
Cf. Anon., Essay on the East-India Trade and its Importance to this Kingdom, p. 3, which 
complained that the British government had been more interested in obtaining the revenue from 
the Company than the nation's commerce. 
Bowen, Revenue, pp. 64-65. 
Anon., True Alarm was cited by Bolts in his Considerations, 214-15. 
12 Bowen, Revenue, pp. 95-96. 
13 The Directors began the process of appointing supervisors in August 1772, but once appointed, 
they were prevented from going to India by the Dec 1772 Restraining Bill, see: ibid., pp. 148-49. 
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interest faced by the servants due to their dual roles as rulers and private traders or landholders 
and the ruthless conduct of the servants' banians, who managed their private trade. This context, 
and the 1769-70 drought and famine, had seen a decline in the revenue yield - the demands 
had in any case (at least by some accounts) been set at unrealistic levels. In addition, the famine 
had given rise to reports of deliberate hoarding of grain and profiteering. " Added to this was the 
disobedience of the servants regarding the limit that the Company had set on bills issued by the 
council in Calcutta that could be cashed in Londoriýs (which was one of the ways in which the 
servants could transmit their private fortunes back to England). All contributed to the 
Company's financial crisis, which provided the impetus for the second supervisory scheme and 
ultimately for North's Regulating Act. 
The central problem that Keir identified with the Company's administration of Bengal, and 
therefore a key area in which the supervisors needed to act, was the lack of an adequate judicial 
system. 66 Sulivan had of course, introduced a Judicature Bill in parliament in 1772, which had 
ultimately been rejected, but Sulivan had argued that Indians should have access to English 
justice. 67 Keir, on the other hand, ultimately wanted to see a system of government that was 
suited to the manners of the Indians established in India; this would become a familiar argument 
in the following years, and it was an argument that drew explicitly upon the wider ideas current 
in the century regarding the relationship of climate, manners and laws (associated originally with 
Montesquieu), and the connection between material progress and government. In order to create 
a system tailored to the disposition of the people of Bengal, Keir argued that detailed knowledge 
of the Indians' 'disposition and humours [ ... ]; their religion, prejudices, and 
fancies; also the 
virtues and vices they are most prone to' had to be ascertained. The transplantation of a British 
system, he stated, would not render the Indians 'peaceable and happy'; this had already been 
Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, pp. 144-45; Khan, Transition, pp. 222-23. 
Bowen, Revenue, p. 119. 
'Wholesome and just laws are the very essence and fundamentals of all good government. For 
as no civil society can subsist, where neither property is secured, or crimes are punished, as has 
been too much the case, perhaps for some time past in those rich and fruitful countries; so it is 
clear, I believe, even without a demonstration, that settled and established rules, to protect the 
helpless, and punish crimes, to secure both the persons and properties of individuals, against the 
lust and rapacity of others, ought to be the first and grand object, with those who want to avail 
themselves of the advantages to be drawn from any kingdom, country, or society of men' (Keir, 
noughts, pp. 8-9). 
` Cited in Bowen, Revenue, p. 100. 
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proven, in his opinion, where English laws had been 'introduced into some of our principal 
settlements [ ... ] the natives there would 
have been greatly better without W. " 
Keir believed that prior to the Company's rule, Bengal had been governed despotically, but he 
did not believe that this rule had been wholly arbitrary. He drew on the notion of an 'ancient 
Mughal constitution' -a notion widely utilised in this period and beyond. This was essentially 
the idea that although the Mughal Empire had been despotic, it had still enjoyed codes of 
government in the form of giving due recognition to manners and customs. Keir argued that the 
present system which prevailed in Bengal (that is, the Company's rule) preserved all the 
'disadvantages of a despotic and absolute government', but none of the 'advantages'. " These 
advantages, according to Keir, had been the Indians' customs, which had regulated government 
in the place of laws. Hence while the Indians' former rulers may have been despotic, they had 
faced restraints on the exercise of power in point of practice. This idea was consistent with the 
theory of despotism espoused by Montesquieu in his Spirit of the Laws; he had argued that 
despotism was the government of one with no laws '70 but he had conceded that historical 
examples of despotic rule were not uniform: 'circumstances, a religious opinion, a prejudice, 
received examples, a turn of mind, manners, mores, can leave considerable differences among 
them' . 
71 His point was that despotism, in practice, was not boundless. Keir hoped that by 
constructing a system of rule that adhered to the true principles of Indian government, they could 
rule without the need of discretionary power, and according to the spirit of the people. 
The system of government that Keir envisaged for Bengal required the institution of laws, which 
were compatible with the manners of the Indians. These laws however could not be framed by 
the Directors of the Company or the British government. " Instead this was a responsibility that 
" Keir, 7boughts, pp. 13-14. Also important to Keir's plan was the settlement of land ownership; 
although he did not expand on this point, he did argue that he was in agreement with the plans 
of Dow and Henry Pattullo. His plan rested upon the amassing of information such as that 
relating to land tenures, revenue and law; without such information, he suggested, it would be 
impossible to create a coherent and viable system of rule, see: Keir, Thoughts, p. 51. For a 
discussion of H. Pattullo's, An Essay upon the Cultivation of the Lands, and Improvements of the 
Revenues ofBengal (London, 1772) and Dow's ideas see: Guha, Rule ofFroperty, ch. 2. 
" Keir Thoughts, pp. 13-14. 
71 Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 10. 
71 Ibid., p. 211. 
72 Keir, Thoughts on the Affairs, pp. 14-15. 
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he envisaged entrusting to a supervisory commission, which was to consist of two or more 
people, who were to observe and collect information about India. 13 Based upon this research, 
these supervisors were to frame an appropriate system of rule for the provinces and present this 
plan to the British government (who were to act as 'ultimate judges' of any plan) and the public. 
The supervisors were to act as information-gatherers and specialist advisers to the government on 
how to reform the Company's affairs; they were immediately to be entrusted with limited powers 
of reform to correct some aspects of the Company's affairs in Bengal, such as those relating to its 
revenue and trade, but they were not intended as the solution to the Company's problems. " 
U. Despotic Powcr 
The debate surrounding supervisors raised questions regarding the degree and extent of power 
that the Company was to exercise in India; however, as Keir's work showed, it also led to debate 
regarding how the Indians were to be governed. The supervisors represented the directors' desire 
to have a stronger executive power in India by which they could control their servants and 
ensure that their policies were implemented abroad. However, to critics of the scheme, whose 
position is exemplified in this chapter by George Johnstone and Smith, the authority given to the 
supervisors amounted to despotic power. Their schemes of reform moved away from the idea of 
having a strong central authority to a system of government in Bengal that diffused power over 
separate bodies. This section is concerned with why Johnstone and Smith believed that greater, 
centralised authority in a few men, what they saw as despotic, that is to say arbitrary, power, 
would not bring an end to the corruption abroad. They argued that despotic power, whether it 
was exercised over Europeans or Indians, was an abuse of the legitimate powers of government. 
The use of such power by Company servants in India, specificafly by Clive and Verelst, had been 
the complaint of disaffected individuals such as Bolts. He had drawn attention to the arbitrary 
73 Cf. Anon., Planfor the Government of the ProWnces, p. 24. 
74 Keir argued: 'I admit the people there [Bengal] have of late been rather worse off than they 
were formerly under their own native sovereigns, I can at the same time very clearly perceive, 
that with a little just policy and good management, they may not only soon be relieved, but be 
put even in a much better situation than whatever they enjoyed before [ ... ]. Numerous laws, indeed would not answer the purpose, so well as a few clear and distinct laws wisely framed and 
rightly adapted to the meridian of the country' (Thoughts, pp. 52-53); Significantly, Montesquieu 
had said that despotic governments did not require many laws, 'everything should turn on two or 
three ideas' (Spirit, 59); cf. A. B., Letter to the Right Honourable Lord North, pp. 30-32. 
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acts to which he, other Europeans and Indians had been exposed at the hands of the Fort 
William Council, and complained: 
In England, and other parts of the British dominions, while so great a stir has been made 
about the liberty of the subject and the security of private property, it is amazing that so 
little attention has been paid to the situation of British subjects in Bengal, groaning, as 
they have been, under the intolerable oppression of this enormous and unconstitutional 
power. " 
Johnstone, Smith and Bolts, while not in complete agreement with each other in point of the 
reform that they wanted to see implemented in India, saw the task of reform as preventing the 
exercise of arbitrary power. They implicitly accepted that the Company had become the rulers of 
Indians as well as of British subjects residing in their territories and they saw their task as 
protecting them from Company despotism. Bolts clearly stated that the Europeans and the 
Indians that had come under British jurisdiction deserved protection from arbitrary acts. "' This is 
not to deny that Bolts was deeply influenced by the way that he had been deprived of his 'rights' 
under Company rule of Bengal: that is his trading activities had been terminated and he had been 
deported without due process of law. " He was concerned with preventing the Company from 
being able to treat British subjects (as distinct from Indians) in the same despotic manner. 
However, at the same time, individuals such as Bolts, Johnstone and Smith, developed their case 
against plans of reform that relied on the use of 'despotic' power (as chapter 3 set out) by 
pointing out that the condition of the Indians had deteriorated under Company rule. They 
argued that the pre-existing Mughal system of government had not been arbitrary in point of 
practice: what they were at pains to stress was that the good government of Bengal required the 
power of the servants to be regulated (by checks and balances) - not greater discretionary 
power. 
75 Bolts, Considerations, p. 147; Bolts made it clear that he believed that the Asian subjects that 
had come under the Company's jurisdiction were British subjects, see: ibid., p. vi. 
16 He argued that the laws of England did not give protection to those that went to India 'and 
none at all to the natives of those countries: who nevertheless, are now the subjects of the state; 
and ought to be under the protection of the supreme legislative power', ibid., pp. 75-76. Cf 
Anon., Authentic Papers Concerning India Affairs which have been under the Inspection of a Great 
Asse? nbly (London, 1771), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 202, pp. v-vi. 
77 See: Kuiters, British in Bengal, chs 8-13. 
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Smith claimed to offer an independent view in his writings, " however he was patronised by Lord 
Camden, and he was a supporter of Chatham and Shelburne. 79 Smith was in favour of placing 
the responsibility of administering the territories in the British government. Writing in 1771, and 
not yet aware that the supervisors had perished, he argued against them because of the 
discretionary powers they had been given. He pointed out that the authority that they had been 
entrusted with was greater than the 'almost despotical' powers which currently resided in the 
Company's servants. This was a problem, he argued, because the abuses that had occurred in 
India were the result of a lack of control over the servants: the supervisors, in turn, would not be 
above temptation. He stated: 'it is the controul of laws over the rulers, that constitutes the sole 
difference betwixt the state of tyranny and freedom'. " This was a significant statement as it 
revealed that he did not believe that liberty necessarily required political participation - which 
was a connotation that the concept 'liberty' could carry at this time - but rather that a form of 
freedom could be compatible with security from unregulated power. A ruler could be absolute, 
but this was not the same as exercising discretionary power. " 
The point that Smith was making drew upon current Enlightenment political thought, and had 
been clearly articulated by Hume; he, as we saw in chapter three, suggested that the difference 
between civilised and barbarous monarchies was that the former enjoyed government by law, 
while the latter was based on the arbitrary will of the ruler. Hume argued that in 'high political 
rant', a civilised monarchy was referred to as a tyranny, but, in actual fact, it enjoyed the benefits 
of liberty: 'private property seems to me almost as secure in a civilised EUROPEAN monarchy, 
7' [Smith], Observations, pp. 1-2. 
79 Sutherland, East, p. 378n. 
80 [Smith], Observations, p. 82; cf. Anon., Planfor the Government ofthe Provinces, pp. 14-15, which 
identified the source of the Company's misgovernment of Bengal in the fact that the three powers 
of government, as well as the military power, were vested in the same body of men (that is, the 
president and council); the author remarked: 'if human invention can contrive a system of 
government more open to abuse, I am greatly mistaken'. CE also: Anon., A Plan for the 
Government ofBengal andfor the Protection ofthe other British Settlements in the East Indies in a Letter to 
the Right Honourable Lord North First Lord of the Treasury etc. to which is added the Speech of an East 
India Proprietor upon the Extraordinary Commission for Regulating the Company's Affairs Abroad 
(London, 1772), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 107, pp. 38-39, which drew a distinction between 
'unlimited' power and 'unchecked' power. The author contended that 'power may be unlimited, 
and yet be sufficiently checked'. 
` During the impeachment of Warren Hastings, Burke was to similarly develop a distinction 
between absolute sovereignty and arbitrary power, see for instance: 'Speech on Opening of 
Impeachment' (16 Feb 1788), in Writings and Speeches, VI, India: the Launching of the Hastings 
Impeachment, ed. Marshall (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 352. 
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as in a republic'; the danger (to the subject) from the violence of the ruler, contended Hume, was 
as remote as a threat of a natural disaster - it existed but was too small to admit of 
'calculation'. " The main thrust of Smith's overall argument was that the abuse of power (by the 
servants) could not be reformed by giving despotic powers to supervisors: that could only 
possibly amount to the further abuse of power. What was required instead was a government by 
law. 
Smith believed that the Mughal Empire had ensured that its officials did not enjoy wholly 
discretionary powers. He developed the argument, widely articulated at this time, that the 
Mughal Empire had been a regulated government; their customs, he contended, had acted in the 
capacity of laws. Smith saw the root cause of the corruption in Bengal as resulting from the 
disruption of the 'native' system of government. He argued that the dual system, which was the 
settlement that Clive had achieved between 1765-7, had left Bengal in a worse condition than 
Clive had found it. The dual system had set up Najm-ud-daula as the nominal ruler, but the 
effective administration of the territory rested in the hands of the naib, M. Reza Khan. This 
system, in Smith's estimation removed the only check (the local ruler) that existed on the powers 
of the landowners and led to abuses in the collection of land revenue. " The directorship, by 
1770, also blamed irregularities in the collection of the revenue and its decline on the corruption 
of native officials, which was an attack on Clive's dual system. 84 
However while Smith had suggested that corruption had been kept at bay under the Mughal 
administration due to the existence of customs, he had also implied that customs did not have 
the full force of law because the despot was not restrained from violating them - there could 
exist no security of life and property where their existence depended merely on the goodwill of 
the ruler. The observance of custom could not be enforced by the inhabitants since a despot, by 
his very nature, required 'absolute obedience to his will', and this in turn required that men be 
kept under 'oppression and fear', the consequence of which was that no 'generous sentiments, or 
81 Hume, The Rise of Arts and Sciences, p. 125; Hume, 'Of Civil Liberty', pp. 92-93; Forbes, 
Hume's Philosophical, p. 154. 
13 [Smith], Measures, p. 4; d. A. B., A Letter to the Right Honourable Lord North, pp. 12-3; Plan for 
the Government ofthe Provinces, pp. 3-6. 
84 Khan, Transition, pp. 103,189. cf. Anon., Planfor the Government ofthe Provinces, pp. 9-11. 
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enlarged ideas' could exist. " In Hume's thought this fact had meant that despotisms (barbarous 
monarchies) were intrinsically unable to make any progress in the sciences, arts or government. 8' 
The parameters of the argument that Smith was making had been explicitly articulated by 
Montesquieu and, as we shall see, by Adam Ferguson. Ferguson's own contribution, as will 
become clear, was to make a significant impact on arguments for the reform of the East India 
Company. Smith was suggesting that a despotic government was oppressive and kept its people 
in a state of fear, but at the same time it could be restrained in the exercise of its powers - these 
restraints, however, were of a precarious nature. 
Smith wanted to remove the element of chance from the political structure of Bengal. This would 
be beneficial for the Company, because despotism, as he had described it, influenced men to 
'hide or dissipate their money' and was therefore detrimental to their trade. Some Indians, he 
contended, had hoped for British ascendancy, as they had heard that the British government was 
not arbitrary. These Indians had hoped that British rule would bring security, so that they could 
accumulate 'wealth with safety'. " Smith was not saying that the Indians should be given the 
degree of liberty 'our laws ensure to us' but rather that they should live under 'such a controul, as 
the wisest and best of their own princes exerted over them; only, instead of it depending on the 
will or caprice of any individual, I wish to see it secured by [ ... ] fixed laws'. 
88 Smith wanted to 
take the best examples of Indian rulers and customs, and to have their implementation 
guaranteed by law. Thereby the Indians would enjoy a government that was compatible with 
their manners, "' but that did not depend on the precariousness of human nature; it would free 
them from the tyranny of the Company's administration as it currently existed. 
[Smith], General Remarks, pp. 4-5,3. 
Hume, 'Tbe Rise of Arts and Sciences', p. 124. 
[Smith], Observations, pp. 34-35; this idea was associated with the body of thought known as 
mercantilism, see: Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory ofInternational Trade (London: Harper, 1937), 
ch. 1. 
[Smith], Measures, pp. 12-13. 
Cf. Pownall, Right, Interest, and Duty of Government as Concerned in the Affairs of the East Indies, 
rev. edn (London, 1781), pp. 29-33, wherein he argued that the forms of Indian government had 
to be upheld in Bengal, even though Indian rulers had been replaced by British ones; in support 
of this policy Pownall cited the precedent of the Romans' treatment of the people of Macedonia 
and Myricum: they had kept them 'free' and governed them by their existing laws; see also: 
Anon., Planfir the Government ofthe Provinces, pp. 13-14. 
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Many of the arguments that Smith made relating to despotism were also stated by George 
Johnstone, in a pamphlet published in 1771. However Johnstone denied that the government 
had any right to the acquired territories. " On this issue he was in close agreement with the 
Rockinghams, who also spoke out in defence of the Company's chartered rights. " Smith on the 
other hand was aligned with a group that, when in power, had tried (unsuccessfully) to assert the 
government's right to the territories. " Despite these differences Johnstone argued, in a way that 
Smith could not have disagreed with, that the idea of 'erecting a dictatorial or despotic power in 
one or more men, without controul, in order to prevent oppression or corTuption, is a solecism, in 
government'. Abuse, he stated, was the result of despotic power, and could not be reformed by 
it. " The difference between the two writers was that Johnstone believed that a reform of the 
Company's structure would bring to an end the abuses occurring in India. Smith wanted a 
complete separation of commerce and government. The latter was to be entrusted to the British 
state, whilst the former was to remain with the Company. " 
Johnstone said that he had presented his ideas to some of the directors in 1769, but no change 
had been wrought in the 'system of despotism' current in India. As the same issues had once 
again come to the fore of public debate, he had decided to publish his Thoughts. " The system of 
despotism that Johnstone referred to was an allusion to the governorship of Clive and Verelst, 
" 'I am clear we hold these lands by conquest [ ... ]. I deny that conquest by a subject lawfully 
made vests the property in the state though I maintain it conveys the sovereignty' (Johnstone, 
'Speech on the East India Judicature Bin' (30 March 1772), in Parliamentary History, vol. 17, p. 
377). By the latter point, Johnstone demonstrated that he did not deny the right of the British 
government to regulate the Company's affairs, but this did not convey the right to own its 
property, i. e. the acquired territories and their revenues (Cf. Pownall, Right, Interest, and Duty, pp. 
23-24). Johnstone, in the same speech, attempted to provide a solution for the question of 
property and sovereignty of Bengal by arguing that 'the crown, under certain conditions, should 
grant the lands to the East India Company, as was done in the cases of New England and several 
other of our chartered colonies' (Parliamentary History, vol. 17, p. 377); cf. also Pownall, Right, 
Interest, p. 28; Harlow, Founding, II, p. 25. 
91 W. M. Elofson, 'The Rockingham Whigs in Transition: the East India Company Issue 1772- 
1773', Eng&h Historical Review, 104 (1989), 947-74, (p. 955). Cf. however Bowen, Revenue, p. 
14109. 
" See Bowen, 'Question of Sovereignty'. 
93 [George Johnstone], Thoughts on our. Acquisitions in the East Indies Particularly Respecting Bengal 
(London, 1771), BL, OIOC Tract vol. 107, p. 23. 
9' [Smith], Measures, pp. 14-22. 
9' [Johnstone], Thoughts, p. iii. 
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under whom attempts had been made to reform the Company's affairs in Bengal. " These 
reforms however had alienated servants who had found their scope for material gain reduced. 
Johnstone was specifically against Clive and the creation of the select committee in Calcutta 
(which had been instituted to deal with the Company's problems in 1765), because of the 
treatment John, his brother, had received in India; further, Clive had recommended to the 
directors that they prosecute John on his return to England. Johnstone was especially bitter as 
the Johnstone group had supported Clive in his bid to retain his jaghire in 1764, in the hope that 
he would, in return, support the interest of John in India. 97 
What Johnstone found extremely objectionable about Clive's second tenure as governor (besides 
the dismissal of his brother) was the fact that Clive, on his return to Bengal as Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief, was given wide ranging powers. " The directors had also agreed to a select 
committee, composed of five people (one of whom was Clive), that could override the existing 
council in Bengal. " Clive was given the casting vote so he did not need a majority for his 
decisions to be enforced. The directors had envisaged this organisation to be a temporary 
expedient 'in order to restore peace and tranquillity'; when this was achieved, it was ordered that 
'the said extraordinary powers are immediately to cease'. Despite this qualification, the power 
given to Clive was considerable, which was Johnstone's complaint; it left the initiative, in terms 
of retrieving the Company's position, in Clive's hands and the select committee were instructed 
to'pursue whatever means theyjudge most proper to attain' the Company's objectives. 110 
Whether Johnstone would have had less to say about this organisation if his brother had 
benefited from it can not be known with any degree of certainty; under different circumstances, 
he may have chosen to ignore events transpiring in the Bengal. In the event, he argued that it was 
the directors that deserved punishment for 'abrogating the old authority of the different 
presidents and councils, and appointing their incongruous secret and select committees, armed 
" Johnstone, during the debate on the East India Judicature Bill in the Commons (30 March 
1772) referred to Clive's reforms as 'a monstrous heap of partial, arbitrary, political 
inconsistencies' (Parliamentary History, vol. 17, p. 379). 
97 Sutherland, East, pp. 122-23; Parker, 'Directors', p. 150; Stuart, 'Lying', pp. 48-50. 
Company proclamation of 1/6/1764, cited in Lawson, East India Company, p. 104. 
Harlow, Founding, II, pp. 28-29. 
" Forrest, Life ofLord Clive, 11, p. 204. 
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with plenipotentiary authority, for crushing every honest spirit, who might be daring to oppose 
their iniquitous acts'. "' Johnstone blamed the condition of Bengal on the actions of the 
committees and the powers they had been given. He argued that the degree of despotic power 
already given to the servants had resulted in them amassing illicit fortunes and a decay in the 
prosperity of the province. " Given this context, he stated, the idea of sending supervisors with 
additional powers was ridiculous: 'with such glaring examples before our eyes, we are ready to 
huffy our fellow subjects, and the miserable inhabitants under our protection, into yet a higher 
degree of despotism; and this attempt is not only tolerated, but supported by ministers of a free 
government'. "' Johnstone saw the problem with the Company's government of Bengal as being 
the result of suspending the existing system of administration of the Company and investing 
discretionary powers in a few servants. However he conceded that the responsibilities of the 
Company had increased, and therefore it was necessary to invest her with the appropriate 
apparatuses to deal with her altered state of affairs. But he did not believe that the Company's 
problems could be dealt with by giving a few individuals wide-sweeping powers. 
The significance of Johnstone's and Smith's arguments against despotic power can best be 
appreciated, as Johnstone himself argued, with reference to Ferguson's An Essay on the History of 
Cisil Society. " Ferguson had argued that a despotic government was 'naturally' established 'in 
"I [Johnstone], Thoughts, p. 24; Dalrymple also endorsed this view, arguing that restoring the 
Company's organisation to the 'antient Constitution' was the only way of correcting abuses 
(palrymple], Considerations on a Pamphlet entitled "Thoughts on our Acquisitions in the East-Indies, 
Particularly Respecting Bengal" (London, 1772), pp. 4,19). By contrast, Clive thought that the 
abrogation of the powers of the select committee in Calcutta (by the directors) was the cause of 
the Company's problems. He also blamed the British government for not working with the 
directors to form a 'plan adequate to such possessions', and for being concerned with 'immediate 
advantage' instead, see: Lord Clive's Speech, pp. 59,57. 
101 [Johnstone], Thoughts, pp. 24-25. 
101 Ibid., p. 26. 
"I Ibid., p. iv. There was no direct connection between Johnstone and Ferguson, however 
Johnstone was extremely close to Lord Elibank, who was a founding member of the Select 
Society and introduced Johnstone to John Home (the latter, when he became secretary to Lord 
Bute, helped Johnstone to gain the post of governor of West Florida). See: Fabel, Bombast and 
Broadsides, pp. 3,14-6. Furthermore George Dempster NIP (1732-1818), who was part of the 
Johnstone group and director of the Company in 1769 and 1772, was a member of the Select 
Society and Poker Club. He recommended Adam Ferguson as a potential candidate for the 
second supervisory scheme; Johnstone and Dempster would clearly have exchanged ideas; 
Dempster has been discounted as a possible author for the 7"houghts (which has been attributed to 
Johnstone, by for example, F. T. H. Fletcher, Montesquieu and English Politics. 1750-1800 (1939; 
repr. Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1980)), on the basis that Dempster was in favour of the 
second supervisory commission (the fact that he had been opposed to the first one was remarked 
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the termination of a continued and growing corruption'. It could come into being before this 
point by 'tyrants' trying to 'augment their power', but despotism would always increase the 
corruption that it was intended to counter: 
This method of government cannot [... ] fail to introduce that measure of corruption, 
against whose external effects it is desired as a remedy. When fear is suggested as the 
only motive to duty, every heart becomes rapacious or base. And this medicine, if 
applied to a healthy body, is sure to create the distemper that it is destined to cure. "' 
Any scheme of reform, in other words, that relied on the use of despotic power showed up the 
existence of corruption, as well as increasing it. Furthermore, despotism obtained obedience by 
fear; as Johnstone had said, it crushed 'every honest spirit' - it did not provide people with 
elevated sentiments or morals; rather, it corrupted their morals in the same way that the polite 
culture current in Europe debased them and made them incapable of living under any other 
system but despotism. The polite culture was one where merit was held to consist in 'prosperity 
and power' and disgrace in 'poverty and neglect'; 'real sentiments of humanity and candour' had 
been sacrificed for politeness. " It was only when men's moral sentiments became corrupted that 
despotism became possible: 'the rules of despotism are made for the government of corrupted 
men'. ` Despotism, in other words, based on moral depravity, could not be expected to reform 
abuses, it would have been akin to vice promoting virtue. 
By implication, the prevention of despotism relied on the maintenance of a nation's mores. This 
was why Johnstone's plan for reform took into account the passions of men. Good government 
in Bengal - that is government without recourse to arbitrary power - required the appropriate 
manipulation and balance of men's passions. He argued that there were three main passions that 
incited men into action; these were: ambition, which encouraged people to excel in comparison 
to their 'fellow citizens'; avarice which was the desire to increase one's social standing by 
amassing wealth; and whim, which was the skiff of invention. "' He argued that differences 
between nations could be explained by the extent to which these three passions were 'repressed 
on in Letter to Sir George Colebrooke, p. 6). In addition Johnstone's admiration of Ferguson was 
clearly stated in Speech of Mr George Johnstone in the General Court of Proprietors, p. 2, where he 
argued that Ferguson was the 'greatest author this Age had produced'. On Dempster see: A. M. 
Lang, A Life of George Dernpster: Scottish AM of Dunnichen (Queenston, Ontario: Edwin Mellon, 
1998). 
Ferguson, Essay, pp. 240-41. 
Ibid., p. 40. 
Ibid., p. 240. 
... [Johnstone], Thoughts, pp. 3-4. 
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or excluded'. " The best course of policy for any government, he stated, was to leave men to be 
stimulated by the passion they liked; if rulers interfered in this process, they would only harm the 
productivity of their inhabitants: 
When government will take upon itself to prescribe their (men's) stimulus, and repress 
all others, it deprives itself of the fruits of the activity of the greater part of its subjects, 
whose activity, when founded on a stimulus of their own choice, will infinitely surpass 
all activity founded on authority. This is no wonder, when we consider, that the very 
love of life itself is found, in every individual to be built, not on what we think we ought 
to value, but on the value, habit or fancy have taught him to set upon it'. "' 
Johnstone argued that government had to be established in such a way that it encouraged the 
good aspects of these three passions 'without admitting more of the evil than is necessary, in 
obtaining the very good proposed'. The whole idea of managing rather than suppressing the 
passions has been explored by A. Hirschman; he relates how the idea of harnessing the passions 
had gradually become a solution considered more in 'harmony' with man's nature than 
repression. "' Johnstone was drawing on such ideas as a basis for reforming British rule of India. 
Johnstone went on to describe how, he believed, the passions that he had identified as being the 
cause of human action, were moderated in society. He argued that 'ambition' was checked by 
the 'emulation of other men', but the judge of conduct was the public - it was public scrutiny 
that forced people, 'in the uncorrupted stages of society, to be moral. This was why Tacitus had 
argued 'whoever contemns; fame contemns virtue'. The negative effects of avarice, in turn, were 
moderated by ambition and the security of private property. "' The best type of government was 
one where the passions were 'permitted to have their fiffl exercise, in order to balance and 
controul each other'. "' Despotism, by contrast, suppressed and destroyed the passions of men . 
114 
This was the interpretation that Johnstone offered of Montesquieu's description of despotism 
being like the savages cutting down a tree in order to obtain its fruit. "' Johnstone argued that the 
essence of Montesquieu's point was that all the passions were suppressed under despotism - 
Ibid., p. 2. 
Ibid., p. 4n. 
A. 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its 
Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 17. 
[Johnstone], Thoughts, pp. 6-7. 
Ibid., p. 9. 
... Ibid., p. 14. 
"' 'When the savages of Louisiana want fruit, they cut down the tree and gather the fruit. There 
you have despotic government. ' Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 59. See also the remarks of George 
Dempster during the debate on the Regulating Bill (3 June 1773), BL, Eg. MSS 249, pp. 262-63. 
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neither the negative nor the positive aspects of the passions were allowed to operate; instead all 
was destroyed. "6 
The implications of Johnstone's argument was that British rule of India should move away from 
a system that suppressed the passions - as had been the case of the despotism of the recent 
select/secret committees - and move towards its antithesis, which he identified as a system of 
liberty. Although the Indians were ill-quaffied for liberty, there were 'many progressions 
between despotism and liberty"" - the passions of the natives could not be given their full 
reign, he implied, but neither did they have to be suppressed or destroyed. Here Johnstone's 
treatment of despotic and free governments focussed on the impact they had on human passions, 
but the idea that there could be different degrees of despotism and liberty was precisely the point 
that Hume had made in his Essays. The French, for instance, could not be considered slaves 
simply because they did not 'share in the making of laws and give their consent freely" "- they 
still enjoyed personal security. There is no doubt that Hume believed that 'liberty' - where 
power was divided amongst different bodies that were all forced to 'act by general and equal 
laws' - was 'the perfection of civil society'; yet civilised monarchies were also legitimate forms 
of government because they provided their inhabitants with security. "' Montesquieu had 
similarly identified political liberty as 'security' or the 'opinion one has of one's security', which 
ultimately rested on the quality of criminal laws: 'it is the triumph of liberty when criminal laws 
draw each penalty from the particular nature of the crime. All arbitrariness ends; the penalty 
does not ensue from the legislator's capriciousness but from the nature of the thing'. "' The 
equation of political liberty with laws led Montesquieu to argue that it was possible for a people 
to be free where the constitution was not. "' 
While Johnstone and Smith understood that the rule of law could provide the Indians with the 
benefits of liberty in the sense of security, their understanding of the term 'liberty' encompassed 
[Johnstone], Thoughts, p. 5. 
Ibid., p. 27. 
Forbes, Hume ý Philosophical, p. 142. 
Hume, 'Origin of Government', p. 4 1. See also Forbes, Hume's Philosophical, pp. 167-68. 
"o Montesquieu, Spirit, pp. 188-89. 
"' Ibid., p. 187. A free constitution was one where the powers of government were separated, see 
ibid., pp. 155-56. 
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more than that idea. This was why they insisted that the Indians could not enjoy liberty; the 
rationale that underpinned this statement was clearly articulated by Dalrymple, whose 
Considerations was written in response to Johnstone's Thoughts. Dalrymple argued: 
I must insist that freedom can be enjoyed only by men who enact their own laws, or who live 
under equal laws of ancient usage- it is impossible for that state to be free, where the 
inhabitants in general, have no share in the government; and therefore no plan, to be 
executed by Europeans only, can convey the smallest portion of ficedom to the Indians; 
abuses may be corrected, their persons and properties may be secured but these are very 
compatible with an absolute despoticgovernment. "' 
Consequently, for Dalrymple, as for Johnstone and Smith, liberty implicitly implied political 
participation. Their understanding of the term liberty did not admit of a distinction between a 
free constitution as enjoyed by Britain, and security of life and property. They accepted that the 
latter could exist without the former, but it was only where both were present that the people 
could be said to enjoy liberty. Dalrymple went on to demonstrate the consequences that would 
ensue if liberty was ever given to the Indians: 
Admit, for a moment, the possibility of communicating, to the Indians, the Liberty we 
enjoy; the consequence of this Liberty must be that-forre and elevation of mind which has 
been so distinguishable in the British character. Does he [Johnstone(? )] think Britons, 
with this spirit, would submit to Foreign Rulers-therefore making the Indians fee, We 
expel ourselves from India. "' 
The fact that Dalrymple did not recognise a difference between what Montesquieu. termed civil 
and political liberty - which was implicit in Hume's thought - was ftirther illustrated by the 
fact that he argued that Indians should be governed as slaves. Dalrymple contended that the 
Indians in the British acquired territories were a 'conquered people, who must be still slaves, 
however light the yoak: Slaves can only be governed by despotick power, and they will be happily 
governed, if that despotickpower is constantly amenable to impartial Justice'. Hume did not believe 
that the subjects of civilised monarchies were slaves and Montesquieu. had stated that civil liberty 
existed under a despotic government, although without political liberty, Montesquieu. conceded, 
the people's condition was little better than slavery. 114 
[Dalqmple], Considerations, p. 20 (see also pp. 21-22). 
Ibid., P. 21. 
Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 256. 
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Johnstone and Smith may have objected to Dalrymple's argument that the Indians should be 
governed as slaves, but they were all in agreement with the proposal that the Indians should not 
be governed arbitrarily - Smith and Johnstone had termed such a government as despotic, but 
Dalrymple used the same term in the sense of absolute power. In addition, while their vision of 
liberty did not fall short of the British political system, enlightenment ideas regarding absolute 
monarchies provided them with a framework on which to build their plans for the reform of the 
Company's regime in Bengal. In addition, Johnstone and Smith were aware that it was not 
simply enough to establish laws in order to rescue Bengal from the excesses of arbitrary 
government, but that safeguards needed to be established in order to ensure that those laws were 
not violated. Their solution, was again drawn from the theory of free governments; Hume 
argued that good government under an absolute system wholly depended upon the character of 
the ruler, by contrast, under a republican and free system, the ruler was constrained from abusing 
power by the existence of 'checks and controuls'. 111 It was this fundamental idea, articulated by 
Hume in his 'That Politics may be Reduced to a Science', which pervaded Johnstone's Thoughts. 
What Johnstone envisaged was a system so created that it did not wholly rely on the virtues of 
the servants in order to prevent corruption. In the same way that he believed that morality did 
not have to depend on intention, but was the consequential result of ambition, so he wanted 
good government in India to be the result of the system, rather than the actors . 
126 
I[I. Checks and Balances 
The problem of how the metropolis could maintain control over governors of its distant 
provinces was an ancient one. Smith and Johnstone believed that misgovernment of Bengal was 
the result of unregulated power being exercised by the Company's servants; consequently they 
both wanted to ensure that the servants did not enjoy arbitrary power. In order to achieve this 
they drew upon the enlightenment idea that politics could be reduced to a science: 
So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so little 
dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as 
Hume, 'Politics a Science', pp. 14-16. 
"I 'Any constitution of government, which requires from the conductors more than a moderate 
share of sense, a moderate share of experience, and a moderate share of virtue, does not deserve 
to be considered an establishment' ([Johnstone], quoting Chevalier de Ramsay, in Thoughts, 
28n); the specific proposals of Johnstone's plan can be found on pp. 28-37. Cf. Anon., A Planjor 
the Government of Bengal, p. 5; see also [Dalrymple], Considerations for criticisms of Johnstone's 
plan. 
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general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the 
mathematical sciences afford us. "' 
A political system could be arranged in such a manner that it ensured that those in power 
promoted the well-being of its people; the common good, in other words, did not rest upon the 
virtue of the ruler. Hume argued, with implicit reference to the ascendancy of Robert Walpole in 
the 1740s, that it was not the character of the minister that determined how well or ill Britain was 
governed, but the quality of Britain's constitution -a well constructed constitution 'would never 
have suffered a wicked and weak minister to govern triumphantly for a course of twenty 
years'. 128 
Hume's argument received its most well known rebuttal in John Brown's Estimate ofthe Mannen 
for whom manners was of critical importance to the functioning of a political system - freedom 
depended on virtue. "' In Ferguson as well, as Johnstone had shown, mores were crucial to the 
well-being of the political system. By contrast, in Hume's thought it was the constitution which 
influenced manners rather than virtue or vice influencing, in any way, the process of a well 
constructed political system. 130 Johnstone and Smith's plans reflect their implicit belief in the 
idea of a science of politics, although Johnstone's work, as we saw above, also stressed the 
importance of managing the passions; they both turned their attention to placing constraints - 
checks and controls - on the Company's exercise of power, but, at the same time, were also 
concerned with the impact the acquisitions would have on the balance of the British constitution, 
specifically the influence of the crown. Johnstone dismissed the idea of placing the acquisitions 
in the hands of the king, arguing that it would set a dangerous precedent for private property; he 
also argued that the Company could not survive without its political and military influence. He 
stated that the present ills in Bengal were the result of 'some corrupt deviation' - Clive and the 
"'Hume, 'Politics a Science', p. 16. 
"' Ibid., p. 29. 
""We all wish to continue free; tho' we have not the Virtue to secure our Freedom. The spirit of 
Liberty is now struggling with the Manners and Principles, as formerly it struggled with the Tyrants 
of the time', John Brown, An Estimate ofthe Manners and Principles ofthe Times (London, 1757), p. 
18; see also: Forbes, Hume's Philosophical, p. 224. 
"0 Forbes, Hume's Philosophical, p. 227. See also Hume, 'Politics a Science', p. 25, where it was 
argued: 'good laws may beget order and moderation in the government, where the manners and 
customs have instilled little humanity orjustice into the tempers of men'. 
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select committee. This could be rectified, he believed, by 'props and balances' being added to the 
old system rather than by the creation of a new one . 
131 
Johnstone was drawing on the concept of the balanced constitution, which was an idea used to 
explain the way that the equilibrium between the different components of the mixed government 
(of Britain) was preserved. The three elements (monarchical, aristocratic and democratic), 
although dependent on each other, were given separate functions and privileges by which means 
they prevented one another from abusing power; "' significantly however, these separate 
functions were not the demarcation of the three powers of government espoused by the 
separation of powers theory. "' The distribution of power amongst separate interests ensured that 
a balance between the interests was maintained. 
Ile poise could be disturbed by one of the constituent parts of government acquiring additional 
influence. Where this occurred, the other component parts had to combine together in order to 
preserve the balance. However it was also espoused by some theorists that the balance could be 
preserved by the powers of government pulling in opposing directions - as opposed to forming 
coalitions. " Both of these ways of thinking about the maintenance of the balance found 
expression in Ferguson, who was used by Johnstone to support his argument. "' David Wootton 
points out that 'checks' and 'balances' had originally been associated with two separate ideas: the 
latter with the doctrine of the separation of powers, and the former with the theory of mixed 
` [Johnstone], Thoughts, pp. xi-xii. 
132 M. J. C. Vile, Constitutiona&m and the Separation ofPowers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 
68. 
133 Dickinson, Liberty andFroperry, pp. 144-45. 
11 David Wootton, 'Liberty, Metaphor, and Mechanism: "Checks and Balances" and the 
Origins of Modem Constitutionalism', paper delivered to the School of Public Policy Seminar, 
University College London (13 Nov 2002), pp. 14,18. This paper can be viewed on the web at: 
<http: //www. constitution. org/Ig/check_bal. htm> [accessed 27 July 2005]. 
135 'Liberty is maintained by the continued differences and oppositions of numbers, not by their 
concurring zeal in behalf of equitable government. In free states, therefore, the wisest laws are 
never, perhaps dictated by the interest and spirit of any order of men: they are moved, they are 
opposed, or amended, by different hands; and come at last to express that medium and 
composition which contending parties have forced one another to adopt'. 
, It is well known, that constitutions framed for the preservation of liberty, must consist 
of many parts; and that senates, popular assemblies, courts of justice, magistrates of different 
orders, must combine to balance each other, while they exercise, sustain, or check the executive 
power. If any part is struck out, the fabric must totter, or fall; if any member is remiss, the others 
must incroach', Ferguson, Essay, pp. 128,267. Sections of above quoted by [Johnstone], 
Thoughts, pp. 2 1,10. 
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governments. However, Wootton argues that the second interpretation of the process by which 
a balance was achieved in the constitution, brought the concept 'close enough to the idea of the 
separation of powers for checks to be routinely identified with balances'. "' 
Johnstone's plan for the government of Bengal drew on the idea of both checks and balances. He 
wanted 'props and balances' to be added to the existing structure, and 'control', one meaning of 
'check', to be placed on power. "' The same point is also true of the plan formulated by Smith, 
explored below. However, by contrast to Johnstone's argument, Smith thought that fears 
regarding the influence of the crown were misplaced. He argued that the returning rich 
individuals from India posed a greater threat to the British constitution: these men, he argued, 
'have no fixed nor permanent interest in the state, they are consequently more easily induced to 
encrease the influence of the crown, than the gentlemen of landed possessions, who are now 
growing too weak, to balance the overgrown weight of that monied property'. "' 
The potential threat that the Company's acquisitions represented to the British constitution led 
Smith to urge for government intervention, and Johnstone did not preclude the need for 
legislation. The balance of the British constitution, in other words, was not self-stabilising. Yet 
the plan of rule for Bengal, advocated by Johnstone and Smith, drew on the idea of government 
as a system or 'machine' that was 'self-regulating';... a system that was constructed in such a way 
that any abuses committed by one part of the structure were automatically prevented by another. 
This concept was enshrined in Smith's plan. He argued that checks had to be grafted onto the 
dancient principles of government' of India in order to prevent 'anarchy and oppression': 'my 
plan is to establish two great powers, whose public interests shall be the same but private 
interests opposite; so that one will consequently take the alarm, whenever the other shall attempt 
to pursue its own private advantage at the expense of the public'. "' Smith wanted a viceroy and 
"I Wootton, 'Liberty, Metaphor', p. 17. Wootton points out that the two ideas are kept distinct 
in Montesquieu's Spirit, see: 'Liberty, Metaphor', p. 17. 
Ibid., p. 18. 
[Johnstone], Thoughts, pp. xii, 23; Wootton, 'Liberty, Metaphor', p. 15. CE also Johnstone, 
BL, Eg. MSS. 249, p. 30, where he argued that absolute power may be necessary for conquests 
but 'check', 'control' and 'regulation' was needed for the collection of revenue. 
[Smith], General Retnarks, pp. 56-57. 
Wootton, 'Liberty, Metaphor', p. 23. 
141 [Smith], Measures, p. 12. 
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council (representatives of the King) to be put in charge of the territories 'political and civil 
affairs', whilst the Company was to retain enough powers to conduct their commerce and protect 
themselves from oppression. " These were the two powers that would keep each other in balance 
by their separate interests and functions. 
The clearest expression of a plan for Bengal that relied on the idea of checks and balances can be 
found in the present State. 143 Its author spoke of the 'machine of political government', 144 and 
wished to create different institutions in India, which would each enjoy separate functions and 
privileges, and would keep each other in check. 141 The author of the Present State argued that 'a 
regular gradation of effectual political checks' had to be established' in order to prevent the abuse 
of power. "" He proposed that sovereignty should belong to the 'national government' 14' and a 
dcontrolling deputation' to be established in India. This was to be distinct from, and supervise, 
the executive parts of government that would be created in all the 'territorial governments. The 
4controlling deputation' would be restrained from interfering with the executive by the terms of 
its powers, and by the fact that it would be physically located at a distance from the 'territorial 
governments'. 148 
The author of the Present State thought that his scheme would remove 'the principal source of 
corruption; and the grand stumbling block of virtue' - that is, trust would not have to be 
reposed in the integrity of the administrators; "' he even proposed the setting up of mixed 
142 Ibid., pp. 15,22. Wootton, 'Liberty, Metaphor, p. 28, argues that the doctrine of 'checks and 
balances' also encapsulates a third tradition, that of the 'need for precautions against the tyranny 
of the majority', associated with de Lolme. In the context of governing India, it was not the 
Indians, as a 'meek' race, that might act tyrannically, but, as had already been seen, the 
Company. Checks and balances would prevent the Company from abusing power, but it would 
still retain sufficient influence to prevent the British government from treating it, and the Indians, 
despotically in turn. Cf the remarks of Johnstone and Sulivan during the debates on the 
Regulating Act; Johnstone felt that concerns of the Company could not be separated, whilst 
Sulivan similarly argued that the Company could not function if its powers were separated into 
different bodies, BL, Eg. MSS 249, pp. 138,168. 
"I Other publications that relied on the concepts of checks or balances or both include: Anon., 
Enquiry into the Rights ofthe East-India Company ofMaking War and Peace, p. iv; Anon., True Alarm, 
112; Anon., Planfor the Government ofthe ProWnces, pp. 15-19. 
Anon., Present State, p. 3 1. 
Ibid., pp. 127-28. 
Ibid., p. 153. 
141 Ibid., p. 67. 
Ibid., pp. 125-27. 
Ibid., p. 128. 
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European and native juries arguing that 'these juries would prove the Magna Charta, the 
palladium, the true security of Indian liberty and property, against the despotism and extortion of 
their foreign government'. "' Whilst he wanted sovereignty to rest with the British government, "' 
he wanted the Company to continue to exist as a powerful interest. He envisaged them existing 
as a middle interest, between the natives in India and the British government, and functioning as 
a weight against the despotism of government. "' In the end, the desire to prevent despotism led 
to a coming closer to its antithesis. While the liberty enjoyed in Britain could not be conveyed to 
the natives, some of the principles that safe guarded it in Europe, would nevertheless be used to 
prevent Company despotism in Asia. 
Conclusion 
By the end of 1772 there were three different committees investigating the Company's activities: 
one appointed by the General Court of the Company, and two by the House of Commons (one 
Select and the other Secret). ` In 1773, the British Government, after much negotiation with 
(and opposition from) the Company, passed the Regulating and Loan Acts. " The Regulating 
Act attempted to rectify the problems of the Company both at home and abroad, which had been 
highlighted in the debates that had taken place in parliament, in the general court and the 
150 Ibid., pp. 147-49. Earlier, on p. 47, he had argued that Indian juries would undermine British 
power in India; here however he advocated the establishment of Indian juries as long as they 
were conscious of their dependence on Europeans. Cf. also Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 158. 
I" The writer did not think that sovereignty could be shared between the Company and the state, 
as instead of keeping each other in check, they would collude to 'screen' the abuses of one 
another, see: Present State, 102-03. 
152 Ibid., pp. 67-68. Montesquieu had argued that the existence of the nobility as an intermediary 
power prevented a monarchy from being a despot, Spirit, p. 18. The nobility were distinct from 
the eunuchs; in Montesquieu's Persian Letters, in that the eunuchs did not have autonomous 
power, and they could not therefore moderate the power of their master, (see: Spirit, p. 66). In 
this context, both Smith and the Present State's insistence that the Company retained some 
privileges demonstrated that they wanted it to act as a restraint on the British government in the 
same manner as the nobility in a monarchy. In this way the Company would also act to 
maintain the balance of the British constitution. The Present State argued that the 'middle state' 
(Company) would carry a 'mighty poise into the scale of liberty, in opposition to the despotism 
of the government', p. 68. 
153 Bowen, Revenue, p. 148; Johnstone was part of the Company's Committee and the 
Parliamentary Select Committee, see: ibid., pp. 134,148. 
114 13 Geo. III, c. 63 and 13 Geo. III, c. 64 respectively; for the protracted negotiations between 
the Company and the administration, which led to these pieces of legislation, see: ibid., chs 10 
and 11. 
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literature (ephemeral and otherwise) of the time. 151 Amongst other provisions, the Act altered the 
way the directors were elected, "' changed the voting qualification in the Court of Proprietors"' 
and created the position of Governor-General; "' Warren Hastings was appointed to this post 
and, in addition, four councillors were also appointed. They were: Sir John Clavering, George 
Monson, Richard Barwell and Philip Francis. It also provided for the establishment of a 
Supreme Court of Judicature by the Crown. "' 
The Company and its supporters fiercely opposed the passage of the Bill arguing that the sanctity 
of private property and the balance of the constitution were at stake. " However this opposition 
was ultimately overcome and the bills were passed. The subsequent implementation of the 
Regulating bill, specifically in Bengal, would reveal its inadequacies, however individuals with 
extensive knowledge of East Indian affairs, such as Clive and Sulivan, felt that the Regulating 
Act had addressed the problems that the Company had faced in London as well as in India. "' 
All the writers explored here, despite their differing convictions, accepted the need for reform; it 
was acknowledged that the nature of the Company's enterprise had been altered and 'something' 
had to be done in order to meet its additional responsibilities. However, without any agreement 
on the demarcation of the powers and responsibilities of the British government and Company, 
there could be no consensus on how best to deal with the affairs of the Company. 
"I For examples of the ways the Regulating act addressed the specific problems that had been 
identified with the Company's government of Bengal during the course of the debates that took 
place at this time, see: Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, pp. 139,141,143,179. 
116 Only six directors were to be elected every year under the Act, see: Bowen, Revenue, p. 178. 
North remarked 'if there is any want, if there is any defect in the present constitution universally 
complained of it is in the weakness of the Court of Directors compar[e]d to the immensity, and 
importance of the concem'(BL, Eg. MSS 249, p. 84). 
117 The qualification to vote in the General Court of Proprietors was raised from L500 to 0000, 
see: Bowen, Revenue, p. 178. 
"I Cf. Johnstone who argued during the Commons debate on the Regulating Bill: 'presidents 
acting under federal union, are infinitely stronger than established under one head' (BL, Eg. 
MSS 249, pp. 143-44). 
Dodwell, The Cambridge History ofIndia, vol. v, pp. 18 8-89. 
Cf. the speech of James Adair, who presented the Company's objections to the bill to the 
Committee of the whole House on the East India Company's affairs, BL, Eg. MSS 249, pp. 65- 
66. Cf. also the long exchange between Johnstone and North reported in BL, Eg. MSS 250, pp. 
291-301. 
"" Bowen, Revenue, p. 189. 
162 
The Regulating Act saw the creation of a stronger executive authority in India and sought to give 
stability to the Company's affairs at home by reforming the directorate: these were measures that 
Clive had advocated in his speech in 1769 referred to at the beginning of this chapter. "' The 
plans put forward by Johnstone, Smith and the Present State, attempted to provide an alternative 
to the solution that was adopted. "' They did not believe that a more powerful council and 
governor would lead to better government: it would not prevent corruption and disobedience, 
and furthermore such powers were incompatible with the British constitution. The existence of 
Company despotism abroad presented to these would-be reformers a unique problem. They 
wanted to protect Europeans and Indians from despotism, but considered the 'natives' to be ill- 
qualified for the kind of liberty enjoyed in Britain. '" Yet it became clear from their arguments 
that one depended on the other. Governments in Europe, Montesquieu, had suggested, were 
moderate because the three powers of government were not placed in one person; further, 
political liberty existed in those moderate governments where power was not abused; this in turn 
could only be guaranteed where government was so organised that power checked power. "' In 
addition, moderate governments also rested on the complex interplay of passions. Governments 
were underpinned, as Montesquieu, phrased it, by certain springs - for example the existence of 
honour in monarchical governments, which encouraged all to promote the common good. '" 
By the definition of the term 'liberty' as freedom from the danger of arbitrary power, a system of 
checks and balances clearly communicated 'liberty' to the Indians and protected the liberty of the 
British residing in India. However liberty, as it was employed here, clearly entailed more than 
11 See: BL, Eg. MSS 218, pp. 154-56; cf. Sir John Malcolm, The Life ofRobert Lord Clive. Collected 
ftotn the Family Papers Communicated by the Earl ofPowis, 3 vols (London: J. Muff ay, 1836), 111, pp. 
265-72,30345. 
163 In response to Clive's recommendation for a governor and council general in India, Johnstone 
had remarked 'this savours of the same arbitrary despotism, that one man should rule over the 
whole' (BL, Eg. MSS 218, p. 169). However, see also: '[Hastings (? )] to the Directors', BL, Add. 
MSS 38398, fol. 97, where it was recommended that greater power should be concentrated in 'a 
single point' and in order to prevent such power from being abused, 'powerful checks' should be 
provided. 
161 Johnstone likened giving freedom to Indians as being akin to 'letting in the light upon those 
who have long been confined in a dungeon' ([Johnstone], Thoughts, p. 23). Smith also made a 
similar point, General Remarks, pp. 11,65, yet he also acknowledged that granting liberty to the 
Indians was incompatible with Britain possessing Bengal as a 'conquered tributary state', 
suggesting that if the Indians did enjoy freedom, they would not submit to foreign rule ([Smith], 
GeneralRemarks, p. 68). Cf. also A. B, Letter to the Right Honourable LordNorth, pp. 34-35. 
161 Montesquieu, Spirit, pp. 155-57. 
" Ibid., pp. 26-27. See: Nannerl 0. Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France: the Renaissance to 
the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), ch. 14. 
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freedom from capricious power. It implied some form of political participation: this was not on 
offer to the Indians. Smith, Johnstone and the writer of the Present State, in their respective plans, 
drew on the ideas of the separation of powers and the balanced constitution, in order to construct 
their plans for the government of Bengal. They wanted different functions assigned to separate 
bodies, which would keep each other in check, and they envisaged a system that would regulate 
itself without the need of discretionary powers or an excess of virtue. What they wanted to 
construct was a system of government in India with the apparatuses and processes of a 'free' 
government, but without the (British) liberty that should normally have accompanied it. 
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Chapter 5 
Sir James Steuart (1): Bengal and the Drain of Wealth 
The reform of the East India Company in London and India was ultimately aimed at restoring a 
beneficial commercial relationship with the acquired territories. As Nathaniel Smith argued: 'an 
extensive commerce is the great and capital advantage which England ought to expect from 
these acquisitions; and consequently the politics of India should be principally directed to this 
end'. ' Chapter three showed how critics believed that the Company's position as a merchant- 
sovereign was harming the prosperity of Bengal, and reducing the benefit that Britain derived 
from her. It revealed that the servants, in their dual capacity, followed policies which were 
against the long-term interests of Bengal - policies that obtained the golden-eggs from the 
chicken by killing it. One of the negative policies that was identified by the range of publicists 
explored in section two of this dissertation was the 'drain' of Bengal's wealth to Britain. On this 
topic, the 1773 issue of the Annual Register stated: 
However great the opulence of Bengal may be it was not founded upon any 
inherent treasure in mines but depended solely upon the labour and industry of the 
people, upon commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, it cannot be supposed that it 
could long bear the sending of between seven and eight hundred thousand pounds 
sterling of its capital stock, annually out of the country, without a possibility of its 
return. ' 
Arguments such as the one set out above, betrayed a belief in mercantilist principles. That is, the 
belief in the importance (for the power of the state) of sustaining the level of money in a country 
by ensuring greater sales of exports than imports, and the importance of maintaining the 
circulation of money for the continued industry of the people. While these views were not 
universally held in this period, the directors acknowledged that, by 1772, Bengal was facing 
acute monetary problems. By this date, the wider financial problems of the Company also came 
to a head: Parliament was reconvened in late November 1772, specifically to deal with the affairs 
of the Company, and a House of Commons Secret Committee was established by Lord North in 
order to investigate the Company's management of its concerrisý This chapter firstly considers 
the causes of the Company's distress that ultimately led it to seek a loan from the government. It 
' [Smith], Observations, p. 5. 
2 Annual Register (1773), no. 16, p. 65. 
3 Bowen, Revenue, pp. 130,144-45. 
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then proceeds to consider the drain of wealth theory as it was advocated by Harry Verelst during 
his tenure as governor of Fort William. 
Sir James Steuart was engaged by the Company's directors to find a solution for the monetary 
problems afflicting the Company in Bengal! He identified substantially the same causes of the 
problem as Verelst had highlighted before him. ' The third section of this chapter considers 
Steuart's theory of international trade in the broader theoretical context of enlightenment 
political economy, specifically in relation to David Hume's ideas regarding money and trade. 
The chapter then considers Steuart's proposals for the reform of Bengal's problems. The fact that 
Steuart was aware of the wider difficulties faced by the Company, other than the specific one he 
had been called upon to address, is borne out by the fact that his treatise was not solely 
concerned with the principles of money; it also provided hints as to the foundations on which the 
Company should conduct its commerce with Bengal. He believed that the Company's altered 
status in Bengal - from traders to rulers - should also have transformed the policy the 
Company pursued in that territory. ' Central to Steuart's plan, and to his thought generally, was 
the concept of self-interest -the execution of his reforms relied upon this concept, and it will be 
fully explored in the next chapter. 
1. The Company, Diwani and Trade 
After the acquisition of diwani in 1765, the Company's trade had been restructured to enable the 
transfer of Bengal's revenue to Britain. The directors believed that the revenue could not be sent 
directly to England in the form of gold and silver, because it would reduce the quantity of coins 
circulating in Bengal. Instead the realisation of Bengal's revenue in Britain was dependent upon 
the successful sale of Indian goods and tea in Europe. Upon becoming the diwan of Bengal, Bihar 
and Orissa, the Company had ceased its shipments of bullion to the sub-continent, by which it 
had traditionally financed its trade in India. The directors now expected to meet their investment 
needs from the acquired revenue; surplus revenue was used to purchase Indian goods that were 
either sold in China or sent to Britain. The money that was gained from the sales of goods in 
Sen, Economics ofSteuart, p. 155. 
Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 62-63; Terelst to Court' (25 Sep 1768), in F97HC, V, pp. 467- 
68. 
1 See for instance: Steuart, Pfinciples ofMoney, p. 69. 
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China was used to purchase tea, which was then sent to Europe! This new organisation of the 
Company's trade, and the assumptions that underwrote it, proved to be financially disastrous in 
the decade after the revenue was acquired. This was a fact that was noted, for instance, by one 
contemporary observer who complained that the 'original plan' of the Company's commerce had 
been more beneficial to the Company than its current course! 
Lord Clive had of course negotiated the treaty of Allahabad by which the Company had 
acquired Bengal's revenues. He had established the dual system of rule in Bengal believing it to 
be the most expedient method by which the Company could profit from its newly obtained 
source of wealth. Under this system, while the Company enjoyed the benefits of diwani, the 
actual administrative responsibilities of the office were entrusted to Indian officials. Muhammad 
Reza Khan was the naib (or prime minister as the British called him), who oversaw, and was 
crucial to, the running of Bengal's government - especially as the Company servants in Bengal 
did not have the requisite resources to manage the concern themselves. ' This system increasingly 
came under attack when the valuation of the acquired territorial revenues made by Clive in 1765 
was not realised in practice. After the first year of collection by the Company, the revenue yield 
began to decline. " Clive's successor, Harry Verelst argued that Clive's estimation of Bengal's 
revenues had been over-inflated, which had led to unrealistic demands being placed on them. " 
The directors, however, thought that the problem lay in Clive's dual system, and advocated a 
more direct policy of administering the collection process. As a consequence, Reza Khan saw his 
position and integrity gradually undermined, and by 1772, the revenue collections had been 
wholly reorganised and were firmly in the control of the Company's servants. " 
I Bowen, 'Tea, Tribute', p. 163; Bowen, 'Sinews of Trade and Empire: the Supply of Commodity 
Exports to the East India Company During the Late Eighteenth Century,, Economic History 
Review, 55,3 (2002), 466-86, (p. 469). Cf. Holden Furber, John Company at Work a Study of 
European Expansion in India in the late Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1948; repr. 195 1), pp. 164-66. 
1 Anon., A Letter to a Late Popular Director Relative to India affairs and the Present Contests (London 
1769), pp. 9-10. 
1 Khan, Transition, pp. 102-05; Jones, Warren Hastings, pp. 61-62. For Clive's defence of the 
system he established, see: OIOC, MSS Eur. E12, pp. 76-80. 
'0 Bowen, Revenue, pp. 103-04. See the 'Statement of Bengal Revenue' from May 1758 to April 
177 1, in: 4th Report (24 March 1773), Secret Committee, in RCHC, IV, pp. 98-100. 
'Verelst to Court' (25 Sep 1768), in FWHC, V, p. 469; Khan, Transition, p. 13 1. 
See: Khan, Transition, pp. 199-263; Bowen, Revenue, pp. 114-15. 
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The Company in London's financial commitments to the British exchequer, and to the 
Company's proprietors in the form of high dividend paymentsý led the directors to call for greater 
control of the revenue collections of Bengal. " They believed that Clive's system had left scope 
for corruption in the hands of the Indian collectors; direct control of the revenue was meant to 
eliminate this problem and increase efficiency, thereby ensuring a rise in the Company's income 
from this source. " The changes in the collection, which occurred gradually, did not however 
avert the financial crisis of the Company: territorial control of Bengal increased the Company's 
military and civil expenses; the directors had expected the acquired revenues to be sufficient for 
defraying their costs abroad, and for financing their investments, but the Fort William Council 
found, in October 1769, that it needed to create an emergency fund. " This was financed by 
accepting cash from servants who wanted to transfer their private fortunes to Britain, and issuing 
them instead with paper bills that were payable in London. The Company set limits in 1768 and 
1769 on the number of bills that the servants in India could issue, but these were not adhered to, 
and by 1772, the directors found that there had been a significant growth in the number and 
value of bills that they were required to honour. " This proved to be disastrous as the demands 
fell at a time when the Company in London was least able to meet them. 
The directors' reliance on reaping the ftuits of diwani by the sale of tea and Indian goods in 
Britain and Europe meant that a failure to sell sufficient quantities of stock would leave them 
short of funds. This is precisely what precipitated the Company's crisis in 1772. There were two 
articles of trade that the directors particularly relied upon and were keen to encourage, because 
of their demand in Britain. These were raw silk and tea; they became the principal way that the 
revenues of Bengal were transferred to Britain and were both, for this reason, considered to be of 
national importance. 17 This was why the directors encouraged innovation in the Indian silk 
industry; they aimed to expand the production and improve the quality of the silk the Company 
obtained. However the Company did not become a leading supplier of this commodity in Britain 
" Khan, Transition, pp. 246-47. 
14 Ibid., p. 189; Jones, Warren Hastings, pp. 63,119. 
's 'Verelst to Court' (5 April 1769), in FMHC, V, p. 552. 
16 Bowen, Revenue, p. 119. See also: 8th Report (I I June 1773), Secret Committee, in RCHC, IV, 
pp. 355-59. 
17 Bowen, Revenue, p. 106; Bowen, 'Tea, Tribute', p. 163. 
168 
until the 1790s. 11 In the case of tea, the directors instructed their servants to purchase ever greater 
quantities of it from China by the shipment of bullion from Bengal - the sale of Indian goods in 
Canton did not provide the requisite funds. " The export of bullion contributed to the specie 
shortages problems of Bengal that Steuart was asked to address - and that led the Fort William 
Council to create an exigency fund. 
The expansion of the Company's tea trade in the late 1760s did not represent sound commercial 
sense as by the middle of this decade they possessed large quantities of unsold tea in their 
warehouses! ' In other words, the Company's supply of tea exceeded domestic demand. As 
Bowen, in his 'Tea, Tribute', points out, the Company increased its supply of tea without 
considering how demand for this product in Britain could be augmented. In theory, the 
Company was the sole supplier of this commodity, but in practice, its trade was increasingly 
undermined by the existence of an illicit trade in tea. The legal, Company, tea-trade was also 
hampered by the way it was structured: the Company sold its tea to dealers who then sold it to 
consumers; the dealers did not share the priority of the Company directors of encouraging the 
growth of tea consumption. " The Company's trade was aided by a reduction of government 
duties payable on tea (Indemnity Act, 7 Geo. IH, c. 56) making it cheaper; this was also true of 
tea that was re-exported to the colonies despite the Townshend duties Act (1767). 1 This 
advantage was however cancelled by the protests of the colonists against the duties, and the tea 
dealers who did not communicate the cheaper price to their customers. " 
By 1772, Bowen estimates that the amount of unsold tea possessed by the Company accounted 
for sixty-three per cent of its total of unsold goods ý4 In other words, the Company's capital lay in 
its warehouses, in the form of tea, at a time when it needed liquid funds. This deficiency did not 
present a novel problem to the Company in London: it frequently relied on credit from the Bank 
Bowen, Revenue, pp. 106-07; Marshall, Bengal, p. 108. 
Bowen, Revenue, p. 108. 
20 Bowen, 'Tea, Tribute', p. 16 1. 
21 Ibid., pp. 164-68. 
Ibid., pp. 168-70. See also: Bowen, Revenue, pp. 122-23. 
Bowen, 'Tea, Tribute ', p. 170. The protests that the Townshend Duties gave rise to in North 
America, and the conflict that ensued has been explored in P. D. G. Thomas, The Townshend 
Duties Crisis. the Second Phase of the American Revolution 1767-1773 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1987). 
2" Bowen, Revenue, p. 122. 
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of England to relieve its cash-flow problems. 15 In 1772 however, there was a general credit crisis 
in the City of London; this, along with the high dividend the directors had maintained despite 
their realisation that it was unsustainable, and the increased number of bills of exchange that 
were issued by the Fort William Council, meant that the Company was unable to meet its 
fmancial commitments to the British government. The directors were forced to turn to the 
government for help, and so began the process that was to culminate in the 1773 Regulating and 
Loan Acts. " 
11. Verelst and the 'Drain' 
The way the Company's trade was organised after the acquisition of Bengal's territorial 
revenues, increasingly came under fire as the financial difficulties of the Company unfolded. 
Verelst, as governor of Fort-William Council between 1767-1769, was well placed to point out 
the errors of the policy the directors were pursuing. The directors, as we have seen, entertained 
the prospect of great profit from the diwani grant and financed greater investment in Indian 
goods and tea from China by using surplus funds from the revenue as a means of transferring the 
wealth to England. Verelst, however, firstly believed that the value of the territorial grant had 
been misrepresented, and secondly, that the desire to extract as much money as possible from the 
acquisitions - which had seen the abandonment of Clive's dual system - harmed the long term 
interests of the Company. 
Verelst argued that Clive's projection of the profit the Company could hope to reap from the late 
acquisitions in India represented an optimum amount - it was a sum the Company could hope 
to collect 'by prudential management rather than as an accurate account of what has really been 
27 or could be in this present state collected'. Verelst pointed out that Bengal had been 'much sunk 
in opulence' when she had come under the control of the Company. What he meant by this was 
that Bengal's trade had been recently disrupted by political unrest and she had, as a consequence, 
lost significant amounts of her treasure. Specffically, he stated, Bengal had been plundered by the 
Marathas and Bengal's recent rulers - he accused Mir Kasim alone of withdrawing 'three and 
"Bowen, 'Investment and Empire', p. 188. 
Bowen, Revenue, pp. 126-28. 
Terelst to Court' (25 Sep 1768), in F47HC, V, p. 469. 
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five Crores of Rupees' from the country when he had fled in 1763.11 This trend (of a 'drain' of 
treasure from Bengal) had continued under Company rule; the servants had used Bengal's 
revenues to pay the requisite tribute to the Mughal emperor, to finance the Company's tea trade 
in China, and to meet the needs of the other Company Presidencies in India. " Further, treasure 
had been lost by the acquisition of private fortunes by the servants in Bengal and its transmission 
to England. Similar 'drains' were also identified by Steuart in his report, and by many other 
contemporary publicists of the time. " 
The policy the Company had pursued upon becoming defacto sovereign, Verelst argued, had not 
been calculated to increase the 'opulence' of Bengal. Verelst argued that the basis of that 
country's wealth rested upon the quality of her manufactures, which were highly demanded 
abroad, and her extremely limited demand for imported goods. Foreign merchants, Verelst 
explained, had been forced to purchase her goods with imported bullion, which was how Bengal 
had increased her stock of gold and silver. " Revenue collected by Mughal officials had been kept 
in circulation by being distributed to court favourites and nobles, whose extravagant expenditure 
had diffused the money amongst 'the people in general'. " This process had been disrupted by the 
Company's activities: the directors had ceased sending bullion to India in order to finance its 
activities, and foreign companies had found it unnecessary to bring bullion from Europe because 
the prohibition faced by the servants of the English Company relating to the transmission of their 
private fortunes placed these funds at the disposal of the foreign companies (as the English 
28 Ibid., p. 467. A crore was the term for ten million. See also: Steuart, Ptinciples ofMoney, p. 61; 
[Smith], Ohservations, pp. 8,28; [Smith], General Remarks, p. 83. 
29 'Letter to Court' (25 Sep 1768), in FR, 7HC, V, p. 468. [Smith], Ohservations, pp. 26-27,28-29, 
observed that the directors, when the revenues ('great stream of riches') 'flowed into our 
treasury', had 'thought themselves in possession of an inexhaustible source of wealth-at least 
their conduct gave room for the supposition; for money was lavishly sent away in specie every 
year to Bombay, Madrass, and China, until the source was almost dried up. -This the Company 
could not have afforded, if the county could have borne it'. Smith further stated that the directors 
needed to examine their own policy of 'sending money out of the country', instead of 
dexclaiming against the conduct of their servants abroad'; the directors' policy, he argued had 
been equally destructive of Bengal's prosperity. 
11 'Verelst to Court', (5 April 1769), in FP7HC, V, p. 548; Steuart identified five drains on the 
wealth of Bengal, they were: imports paid for by the money of the country, investment capital 
sent to China, tribute sent to the emperor, purchase of diamonds (that were given as presents to 
servants) and the lending of money to foreign companies, see: Steuart, Pyinciples of Money, pp. 
62-63. In addition, Anon., True Alarm, pp. 64-75, calculated that the private fortunes 
transmitted to Europe every year amounted to E700,000. See also: Keir, Thoughts, pp. 28-29; 
Anon., Present State, pp. 35-36; Khan, Transition, pp. 174-75. 
'Verelst to Court' (5 April 1769), in FWHC, V, pp. 546-47. 
Ibid., pp. 547-48. 
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servants used them to transmit their fortunes back to Britain). " In Verelst's opinion, these recent 
developments had removed wealth from circulation, and left Bengal with a negative balance of 
trade: 
I have observed that one great advantage the Country formerly reaped, was the diffusion 
of its Revenues by large grants to different Families, and by the Expensive luxury of its 
Governors, but now the whole amount of the Lands is swallowed up in one Gulph your 
Treasury, nor does any part of it return into circulation, except the Sum issued for our 
Investment & necessary Expences; so that there ensues an annual Loss to the 
Currency. -'4 
The context of the identified 'drains of wealth' and the negative balance of trade, argued Verelst, 
accounted for the shortage of specie in Bengal that the council had complained of since at least 
1767 
. 
35 He pointed out that they, the servants in Bengal, had continued to collect the revenue at 
the highest rate possible despite believing personally that the Company should have moderated 
their demands. Even with their best efforts, their present situation, he asserted (he was writing in 
36 September 1768), could only be described as 'distressed'. He went on to state that they could no 
longer 'remit a single Rupee in specie home'. 37 Verelst ultimately held the directors responsible 
for the Company's financial dffriculties; he observed: 
A superficial or weak observer may estimate a Country like an Estate from its Rent Roll 
but the man of Experience and reflection will Easily see that its Annual Income must 
depend on the proportion of its produce which can be realized in Specie; and that the 
Intrinsic value of it must fluctuate, as the Quantity of Specie which is the measure of it 
multiplies or decreases in the Kingdom where it is placed. " 
33 ibid., pp. 546-48; cf [Smith], General Reniarks, pp. 29-3 1. In addition, Marshall, East Indian 
Fortunes, pp. 224-26, relates that the French were reported to have raised 'twenty million francs 
from British sources'. 
m 'Verelst to Court' (5 April 1769), in Fff7HC, V, p. 551. In a similar vein, it was argued in 
Anon., True Alar? n, pp. 80-8 1, that while Bengal had been part of the Mughal Empire, the tribute 
paid to the emperor had not harmed her as the circulation of money within the empire ensured 
that it was returned: 'the prodigious expense of a luxurious court did quickly dissipate the greater 
part of them (revenues); and the rich manufactures of Bengal, forming a considerable part of this 
luxury, did quickly recall from that court a sum exceeding the tribute paid by her'. The money 
that the Company extracted, on the other hand, did not return into circulation in Bengal. See 
also: Verelst, View, p. 81, for his calculations of the amount of money that had that been drained 
from Bengal. 
35 'Letter to Court' (10 Dec 1767), in Fff7HC, V p. 353 (see also: pp. 377,395). The Directors 
dismissed the fears as 'speculative Terrors', as well as being convinced that the problems had 
been caused by the introduction of a gold currency, see: FWHC, V, p. 144. See also: Orn 
Prakash, 'English East India Company', pp. 10-11. The gold currency had been introduced by 
Clive; for his defence of this measure see: OIOC, MSS Eur. E12, pp. 124-26. 
1 'Verelst to Court' (25 Sep 1768), in F37HC, V, p. 468. 
17 Ibid., p. 469. 
31 'Verelst to Court' (5 April 1769), FWHC, V, p. 55 1. 
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Verelst's analysis drew upon a particular understanding regarding the basis of a country's wealth, 
and the means of accumulating it. He believed that Bengal's prosperity was the result of the fact 
that her balance of trade had always been favourable - that is, she had always gained from her 
commerce with other nations; " this balance had become negative under the East India 
Company's administration, as the imports of bullion into Bengal had ceased, while 'drains' on 
the currency had continued. This trend had reduced the amount of money in circulation in the 
country, which in tum. had adversely affected the industry of the workers: 'a rapid diminution of 
the cuffent coin must necessarily impede the internal commerce of the country, and discourage 
the exertions of industry in all'. It was this latter point, which was of crucial importance to 
Verelst's argument: Bengal's impoverishment was not due to the drain of currency in itself, but 
rather due to the impact this had on the industry of the people. The value of Bengal, for Britain, 
did not rest in mines of gold and silver - she did not possess any - but in 'die exertions of 
industry in all, whose labour alone could render Bengal a valuable possession to the British 
nation'. ' 
The theory of the drain of wealth that Verelst advanced was one that was articulated by many 
observers of East Indian affairs of the time. In the True Alarm it was argued that 'Bengal hath, for 
above five years past, suffered, by the means of her present government an annual diminution of 
[ ... ] one tenth part of 
her capital stock of wealth'. The author contended that some of these 
drains had been compensated by the 'hoarded wealth' that Bengal possessed, but this was finite 
and therefore could not be relied upon to maintain the level of the currency in the long run. He 
went on to argue that, eventually, the commerce, manufacturing and 'spirit of industry' would all 
be ruined so that even if the oppressors were to leave, there would be nothing left in Bengal to 
salvage. " Such arguments were strongly refuted in State ofthe East India Company's Affairs, which 
stated that it was impossible for a country to be 'drained' of its currency: 'it is an undoubted Fact, 
that Money must and will flow into every Country where Arts and Industry prevail'. ' The 
precise parameters of this particular argument, as will become dear, were articulated by Hume, 
Cf. Chaudhuri, Trading World, p. 156. 
Verelst, View, p. 86. See also Pattullo, Essay, pp. 23-24, who also stated that the reduction in 
the circulating specie of Bengal had led to her decline. 
41 Anon., True Alarm, pp. 75-77,79,8344. 
4' Anon., State ofthe East India, pp. 18-19. 
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and it was based on a different understanding of the mechanics of international trade. However, 
itwas arguments similar to the 'drain of wealth' theory advanced by Verelst that commonly 
recurred in the publications relating to the Company in this period. 
While the theoretical foundations of Verelst's argument could be contested, by 1772 the problem 
of a shortage of specie in Bengal became one that the directors felt they had to address. Steuart 
was brought to the attention of the Company by Lord Barrington (secretary at war from 1765 to 
1778)913 and it was through him that Steuart later came into contact with Philip Francis, one of 
the members of the Fort William Council in Calcutta created by the 1773 Regulating Act. "' 
Steuart's plan was based on information that he gathered while he was in London between May 
and July 1772,15 and his correspondence with the Company official, Mr. Wilks. " His plan was 
published in July 1772, entitled PyYndples of Money . 4pplied to the Present State of the Coin of Bengal, 
and was sent by the Directors to the Council in Calcutta in March 177V7 Verelst raised doubts 
regarding the specific proposals that Steuart put forward for reforming the currency of Bengal, 41 
the following section will consider the principles upon which Steuart based his reforms - 
recoverable from his main treatise on political economy - and place Steuart's thought in 
relation to rival theories of trade, which will shed light on the foundation of Verelst's own ideas. 
Ibis chapter will then proceed to consider his specific plans for stemming Bengal's drain of 
currency. 
41 Dylan E. Jones, "Barrington, William Wildman, second Viscount Barrington (1717-1793), " in 
ODNB, <http: //O-www. oxforddnb. com. consuU. uU. ac. uk: 80/view/article/1535> [accessed 19 
July 2005]. 
14 Francis worked under Barrington at the war office before he resigned in 1772. 
45 Sen, Economics ofSteuart, p. 155. 
46 Steuart's correspondence can be found at OIOC H/62. 
41 'Letter from Court' (30 March 1774), in FR, 7HC, VII, p. 69; in a letter from the servants in 
November 1775 it was reported that for various reasons no steps had yet been taken on the 
coinage problem, see: 'Letter to Court' (20 Nov 1775), F97HC, VH, p. 3 74. 
48 See: Vcrelst, View, ch. 3. Steuart's plan also invited criticism from Francis, see his: 'Minute on 
the coinage problem, OIOC H/125, pp. 427-62, and 'Letter from Mr. Francis, one of the 
Supreme Council of Bengal', in Works, Political, Metaphisical and Chronological of Steuart, V. For 
Steuart's response to these criticisms see: Steuart, Principles ofMoney, appendix, and 'Sir James 
Steuart's Answer to Mr. Francis's Letter, in Works, Political, Metaphisical and Chronological of 
Steuart, V. 
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1H. Intemational Trade 
The object of commerce for thinkers influenced by ideas associated with bullionism and 
mercantilism was to increase the power of the state by augmenting the wealth of the country. 
Theorists of these respective schools of thought believed that this could only be achieved by the 
government's regulation of international trade, such as by placing restrictions on the 
consumption of imports, rather than by allowing market forces to dictate their own terms. 
National benefit was measured in terms of the impact a particular policy had on the power of the 
state, instead of the difference it made to the welfare of the individual. " Such theorists also 
believed that the advantages of international trade were of a strictly limited nature, that is, each 
country was in competition with every other for the globe's static resources - commerce was a 
zero-sum activity. " Mercantilists and bullionists recognised that a country's wealth consisted of 
more than its stock of precious metals, thus acknowledging the importance of labour and natural 
resources to any calculation of a state's power, " but nevertheless, they advocated the 
implementation of policies that would restrict the movement of gold and silver. Bullionists 
sought to prevent the exportation of a country's precious metals altogether; mercantilists, by 
contrast, did not prohibit their export, but were concerned with ensuring that a greater volume of 
gold and silver entered a country than departed from it. " 
The term 'mercantilism' has been commonly criticised for masking the diversity of ideas 
regarding political economy that were formulated from the seventeenth century onwards. 
Heckscher's treatment of the subject has received criticism for similar reasons, as well as for 
suggesting that mercantilist ideas and polices were not based on an accurate 'empirical 
" Eli F. Heckscher, Memantilism, rev. 2nd edn, ed. E. F. Soderlund, 2 vols (London: George 
Allen, 1955) H, pp. 15-16. The author however points out that free trade theorists did not reject 
the right of the government to regulate the market in order to protect national interests. Adam 
Smith's endorsement of the Navigation Acts is one well known instance. However as Miller 
points out, the circumstances under which free traders would allow this was very limited. Cf 
Heckscher, Mercantilism, U, p. 359; Millar, Defining, p. 411. 
Heckscher, Mercantilism, U, pp. 23-27 
Viner, Studies in the Theory, pp. 19-2 1. 
Heckscher, Mercantilism, H, pp. 176,296. For ideas of trade, as they related to India in the 
seventeenth century see: Barber, British Economic Thought, chs. 1-3; P. J. Thomas, Mercanti&m 
and the East India Trade. an Early Phase of the Protection v. Free Trade Controversy (London: P. S. 
King, 1926). 
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knowledge of economic reality'. " Despite such criticisms, Heckscher's treatment provides a 
usefid survey of the collection of ideas that were held regarding political economy throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The influence of these ideas can be seen in the proposals 
that were put forward for the reform of the East India Company's commercial affairs in the 
period 1757-1773, but also throughout the Company's early history. The cluster of ideas that 
Heckscher identifies were also the concepts that Hume and Smith set out to challenge. It is for 
these reasons that Heckscher's treatment of mercantilism is utilised here. Heckscher points out 
that mercantilist theorists were preoccupied with increasing a country's stock of treasure which 
they believed embodied 'all economic resources'. Specifically, they held that money was the 
$sinews of war' and consequently believed (as Defoe, for instance, expressed it) that the country 
with the 'the longest Purse, not the largest Sword, gets the Day in the End; and as nothing can 
furnish Money like Commerce, so the Trading Countries have manifestly the Advantage in a 
war). 54 Commerce was beneficial for a country where it enjoyed a favourable balance of trade - 
that is, where a country exported more goods than she imported, and received payment in gold 
and silver to make up the difference. " 
The Mercantilists' desire to increase the nation's quantity of gold and silver - an increase in 
what they saw as the country's wealth - was motivated by the desire to augment the amount of 
currency in circulation, rather than in accumulating unproductive hoards of treasure. Heckscher 
points out that in a significant portion of mercantilist writing it was argued that the circulation of 
money in society kept industry and trade alive, while a shortage of money, by the same logic, 
brought trade to a halt. ' The most well-known criticism of mercantilist principles was 
formulated by Adam Smith; he rejected the mercantile system because he believed that it was 
inimical to the true interests of the nation. In his view, the mercantile system was one where 
merchants and government had collaborated together to construct a system of trade that placed 
artificial impediments in the 'natural' path of commerce - impediments which enriched 
merchants rather than the nation. The mercantile system was based, according to Smith, on a 
" Lars Magnusson, Mercantilism: the Shaping ofan Fconomic Language (London: Routledge, 1994), 
pp. 8,15-17,32. 
" Heckscher, Mercantilism, H, pp. 46-47 (cE also pp. 209-10); [Defoe], Advantages ofFeace and 
Commerce, p. 23. 
" Heckscher, Mercantilism, H, p. 178 
5" Ibid., p. 217. 
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mistaken notion regarding the benefits of international trade. A country undoubtedly needed to 
acquire gold and silver, reasoned Smith, but commerce did not need to be regulated in order to 
achieve this end, and neither was treasure the sole basis of a country's wealth. " 
In Smith's view, it was the interest of the consumer rather than the producer that was of 
paramount importance in political economy, but the consumer's interest was not promoted by 
the intervention of the government in the workings of the market. Rather, he believed that all 
individuals had to be left free to pursue their own desires (what he termed a 'system of natural 
liberty'), and the role of the government was confined to the spheres of defence, justice and 
particular public works. 58 The question of whether the prosperity of a country could be better 
promoted by some form and degree of government control of trade, or by its relative freedom, 
was then the defining difference between mercantilist and free trade theories. Yet even on this 
foundation, determining what label best describes Steuart's work is by no means straightforward; 
Smith famously chose to ignore Steuart's Inquiry, but whether Steuart can be designated a 
'mercantilist' is a matter of controversy amongst contemporary scholars. " The influence of 
mercantilist thinking upon Steuart's (and Verelst's) analysis of Bengal's problems is abundantly 
clear: they both identified her problems as those of 'drains' on her currency, a negative balance of 
trade and a reduction in her circulating specie. However Steuart's thought was more complex 
than this list may suggest. In the discussion that follows, the points of agreement with and 
dissension from mercantilist thought will become apparent, but in any case, his Inquiry, as the 
next chapter will show, was written very much in the tradition of the Enlightenment. 
51 See for example: Adam Smith, . 4n Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. 
R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976; repr. Indianapolis: 
Liberty, 1981), IVA. 11,17. 
58 Millar, Defining, pp. 410-12 (citation, Smith, Wealth ofNations, IV. ix. 5 1). 
51 For examples of arguments that present Steuart as a mercantilist thinker, see: Magnusson, 
Mercantilism, p. 159; G. M. Anderson and R. D. Tollinson, 'Sir James Steuart as the apotheosis 
of mercantilism and his relation to Adam Smith', Southern Economic Journal, 51, (1984), 456-68. 
For refutations of such arguments see: Ramon Tortajada, 'Rate of Interest, Profit and Prices in 
the Economics of James Steuart', in The Economics of James Steuart, ed. Tortajada, (London: 
Routledge, 1999), p. 237; Hong-Seok Yang, The Political Economy of Trade and Growth: an 
. 4nalytical Interpretation of Sir James Steuart's Inquiry (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994), pp. 128, 146; M. A. Akhtar, 'An Analytical Outline of Sir James Steuart's Macroeconomic Model' Oxy5rd 
Economic Papers, 31,2 (1979), 283-302 (pp. 289-90); A. S. Skinner, 'Sir James Steuart: 
International Relations', in Dasid Hume (1711-1776) and James Steuart (1712-1780), ed. M. Blaug 
(Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1991), pp. 159-60. 
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Theories of trade were of course concerned with the dynamics of exchange between different 
commercial countries. We have seen that mercantilists regarded commerce as a zero sum activity 
- trade could only benefit one country at the expense of another. This was a belief that was 
present in Steuart's treatise on political economy. As he argued: 'when one nation is growing 
richer, others must be growing poorer. ' Being rich, as Steuart pointed out, was not simply a 
superfluous advantage that a trading country enjoyed, but it was integral to her very 
independence. The prosperity of a trading country required that an advantage was maintained 
over her competitors in commerce. Steuart remarked: 'the whole system of modem politics is 
founded upon the basis of an active foreign trade' and 'a nation which remains passive in her 
commerce, is at the mercy of those who are active'. " 
The observation that Steuart made regarding the connection between modem politics and 
commerce was one that Hume would have understood well; he had argued in his essay 'Of Civil 
Liberty' that, since the late seventeenth century, trade had become 'an affair of state'. ' Politics, 
as Istvan Hont points out, was originally concerned 'with the ordered and peaceful life of the 
po&, the cisita?; in the international arena, it came to be concerned with preserving the state's 
sovereignty; ` by the late seventeenth century thinkers regarded commerce as a crucial object of 
state policy. The interest of a trading nation, in Steuart's scheme of things, was to make its 
commercial partners dependent upon the goods that it manufactured. Steuart contended that the 
original object of foreign trade had been to obtain goods that were not readily available at home. 
Therefore, a country without money (equivalent) sought to sell goods abroad in order to acquire 
specie, while a country with money desired to exchange it for foreign commodities. However, 
although trade may have received its initial impetus from the desire of meeting the country's 
needs, successful statesmen could use foreign trade as a means of obtaining superiority over their 
neighbours: 
By diminishing, on the one hand, the quantity they [other nations] have of this general 
equivalent (wealth); and by increasing, on the other, the absolute quantity of it at home; 
in such a manner as not only to promote the circulation of that part which is necessary 
I Steuart, Inquiry, p. 363 (see also p. 228). Cf. Smith, Wealth ofNations, IV. iii. c. 9-1 1. 
61 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 180. 
6' Hume, 'Of Civil Liberty', pp. 88-89; Hont, 'Free Trade', pp. 41-120. 
61 Ibid., p. 44. 
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to supply the wants of all citizens, but by a surplus of it, to render other nations 
dependent upon them, in most operations of their political occonomy. " 
In other words, a successful trading country could convert commerce -a way of satisfying 
mutual wants by a system of exchange - into a tool of foreign policy, and render other countries 
subservient to herself due to their dependence on her for money. 
Accordingly, a country that did not actively pursue its commercial advantage - one that was 
passive - exposed itself to exploitation by a state that did aggressively pursue its interests. A 
passive country would find her stock of precious metals decline as her inhabitants purchased 
goods from foreigners; only countries that enjoyed great 'natural advantages', or mines of gold 
and silver, could afford to remain passive in their foreign trade - they could afford a 'drain', that 
is a continual outflow, of precious metals. " In a similar manner, a nation that enjoyed a 
favourable balance of trade could export bullion without any danger of decreasing the amount of 
money in circulation at home; this was because 'a favourable balance cannot fail to bring it back 
again with an additional supply'. ' By such statements Steuart revealed that he did not regard 
advantageous trade as simply consisting of obtaining gold and silver - his conception of a 
favourable balance was more complex than simply achieving an excess of exports over imports. 
He pointed out that a favourable balance could be achieved without the nation's stock of gold 
and silver being necessarily augmented. It could also be increased by acquiring additional 
subsistence, increased shipping and 'by the importation of many durable commodities, which 
may be considered also as articles of wealth; as a well furnished house, a well stored cellar, an 
ample wardrobe, and a fine stable of horses, are articles which enhance the value of the 
inheritance of a landed man'. 67 
Any calculation of the balance of trade also had to consider the 'value of labour', which was the 
amount of work that went into the manufacture of a good. A country, Steuart explained, gained 
where it exported more labour than it imported, and lost where it sold abroad more 'matter' than 
it brought home. By 'matter', Steuart had in mind raw materials which required further 
" Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 261-62. The bracket is Steuart's own (see also p. 367). 
65 Ibid., pp. 162,180. 
66 Ibid., p. 582. 
67 Ibid., p. 365 (see also p. 366). 
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production in order to be usable; their exportation represented a loss to the country as instead of 
being manufactured and providing work at home, they would augment the industry of another 
country. 6' For Steuart, maintaining the industry of a country's workers was central to the 
continued prosperity of a country - the benefit of a favourable balance (of an increase in the 
quantity of money in circulation) was the increased labour of a country's inhabitants. " 
Steuart went on to clarify that a favourable balance of trade (and therefore successful 
international commerce) ultimately rested upon the maintenance of a balance between work and 
demand - which could only be achieved by the active intervention of the statesman. The 
various connections that Steuart drew between work, trade and demand can only be properly 
appreciated with reference to the different stages of development that he identified in a country's 
material development. Steuart argued that in a society's earliest stages, its mode of subsistence 
had been improved by the reciprocal wants of the different members of the community (farmers 
and free hands). Specifically, the free hands' need for food, and the farmers' desire for 
manufactured goods impelled both of them to produce superfluous products - superfluous to 
their own needs - which they then exchanged with one another. What led the farmer and the 
free hand to produce goods in excess of their own wants was their anticipation that the goods 
could be used in payment for other goods - individuals did not labour, Steuart argued, except to 
ftdfd their desires; where the superfluous goods of the farmers and freehands could not be 
exchanged, individuals would return to producing for themselves only, and the path of material 
progress would abruptly come to a halt. " 
A balance between work and demand was therefore crucial in maintaining the industry of the 
inhabitants. Steuart went further and identified 'reciprocal wants' as the cohesive force of society 
itself . 
71 Exchange between people was facilitated and infinitely expanded by the introduction of 
money, which also became an object of desire in itself. 'when money becomes the object of our 
Ibid., p. 291. 
Importantly, Steuart did not simply envisage greater money circulating domestically, on the 
contrary, he connected the domestic market to the global one, and saw wealth as briskly flowing 
throughout the world. It returned however to the successful trading nation, 'as blood returns to 
the heart, to be thrown out again only by new pulsations' (ibid., p. 18 1). 
Ibid., p. 39. 
Ibid., pp. 39-40. Steuart believed that the tacit contract of society was broken where reciprocal 
obligations were missing, see: ibid., p. 88. 
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wants, mankind become industrious, in turning their labour towards every object which may 
engage the rich to part with W. " The circulation of money in society, in other words, encouraged 
the poor to work; consequently, where the rich were unwilling to part with their money, the poor 
would accordingly cease to work. Steuart argued that 'when money does not circulate, it is the 
same thing as if it did not exist'; it was the 'swift circulation' of money in society that was the 
cause of greater industry. " Industry and prosperity were maintained in a country as long as the 
balance between work and demand was preserved: 
When we say that the balance between work and demand is to be sustained in 
equilibrio, as far as possible, we meant that the quantity supplied should be in 
proportion to the quantity deinanded, that is, wanted. While the balance stands justly 
poised, prices are found in the adequate proportion of the real expence of making the 
goods, with a small additional profit to the manufacturer and merchant. "' 
The work-demand balance was also crucial to Steuart's theory of successful international trade. 
A country, he contended, that managed to maintain a balance between work and demand, could 
supply goods more competitively than her rivals. This advantage could not be undermined unless 
the poise was disturbed. Steuart argued that while the trade of one country was growing, it was 
impossible for others to undermine it, as all the advantages of price and dexterity were on the 
side of the growing nation. However where, for example, supply was deliberately kept short of 
demand in order to profit from the resulting high prices, other nations would discover the deficit 
and work quickly to provide the shortfall - the misalliance between demand and work provided 
rival nations with a perfect foothold in a previously impenetrable market. ' 
It was also in terms of this balance that Steuart accounted for the rise and fall of nations. He 
argued that it was 'for want of this just balance' - that is 'a perfect balance between the hands 
employed in work and the demand for their labour' - that 'no trading state has ever been of a 
long duration, after arriving at a certain height of prosperity'. Where the balance was 
maintained, the industrious could live off their earnings; this ceased to be true when oversupply 
" Ibid., p. 45. 
71 Ibid., p. 46. See also: Douglas Vickers, Studies in the Theory ofMoney 1690-1776 (Philadelphia: 
Chilton, 1959), p. 247. 
74 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 189. 
75 Ibid., pp. 202-03. 
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led to a fall in prices or where high prices due to undersupply meant goods were not sold at all. " 
Foreign trade also became impossible where foreign countries could disrupt a country's work- 
demand balance and where luxury had taken root at home. By luxury, Steuart here specifically 
meant the consumption of manufactured goods at home that were originally intended for 
markets abroad. Where this occurred, Steuart believed that the country concerned should cease 
its international commerce, and concentrate instead on the home market. This was a stage that 
Steuart identified as that of inland commerce; it now became the task of the statesman to ensure 
that the desires of the rich were met by the industry of the poor, so that the wealth circulated 
within the country, between the affluent and the industrious. " 
Steuart's vision of successful international trade rested upon the constant vigilance of the 
statesman; his precise responsibility Steuart described by using an analogy of a fleet of ships, 
which represented the trading countries of Europe, sailing towards a port. The ship that was 
steered with the greatest skill by its captain would of course reach the destination first and work 
to maintain its advantage. " Yet, no matter how dexterous the statesman was, a country's 
dominance in foreign trade was not indefinitely sustainable, and it ultimately had to be 
abandoned in favour of inland commerce. The premise which underlined this reasoning - that 
international trade was a zero sum activity - had been rejected by Hume. In response to such 
arguments Hume had stated that nations should not regard one another as rivals in trade: the 
increase of 'riches and commerce' in one country was not achieved at the expense of another. 
Instead it worked towards promoting the prosperity of all; for instance, Hume argued, every 
advancement that had been made in agriculture and manufactures in Britain had been the result 
of 'imitation of foreigners'; furthermore, Hume reasoned, foreign trade could only take place 
between countries that were similarly advanced; to illustrate this point Hume pointed out that 'a 
single man can scarcely be industrious, where all his fellow citizens are idle. The riches of the 
several members of a community contribute to encrease my riches, whatever profession I may 
Ibid., pp. 194-95. 
Ibid., pp. 205,243,264. 
Ibid., p. 203. 
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follow. They consume the produce of my industry, and afford me the produce of theirs in 
retum'. 79 
While Steuart clearly recognised that trade rested upon the mutual wants of nations, Hume's 
point was that commerce between nations could be complementary and advantageous to all 
parties concerned, rather than only benefiting the dominant country. Hume's theory did endorse 
the idea that richer countries gradually lost their advantages of trade to poorer ones (who 
enjoyed the benefits of cheap labour and goods), and he also argued, prior to Steuart, that the 
industries of a rich country did not have to be abandoned when international trade was lost, but 
resources could instead be switched to cater for domestic demand. ' However, Hume's thesis, as 
Hont has shown, did not simply mean to suggest that manufactures were lost by rich countries to 
poorer ones" (or that the rich country should resort to 'inland' commerce), but more specifically, 
that the former could not compete with the latter in the same products. Hume envisaged a 
division of labour between the two, by which means foreign trade was not immediately lost to a 
richer country when she encountered higher costs than her poorer rivals: rich countries could 
specialise in skilled goods, while the poorer ones could enjoy advantages in unskilled 
production. ' 
Underlying both Hume's and Steuart's respective theories were different assumptions regarding 
the impact the increase or decrease of the quantity of money in circulation had on industry and 
prices, as well as the way in which a country could retain sufficient quantities of specie in 
circulation. Hume believed that prices were influenced by the level of money and goods in the 
economy; 8' Steuart, on the other hand, thought that they were determined by the interaction of 
Hume, 'Of the Jealousy of Trade', in Essays, pp. 328-29. 
Hont, 'Rich Country', p. 273; Hume, 'Of Commerce', in Essays, p. 264. 
'Manufactures, [ ... ] gradually shift their places, leaving those countries and provinces which 
they have already enriched, and flying to others, whither they are allured by the cheapness of 
provisions and labour till they have enriched these also, and are again banished by the same 
causes', Hume, 'Of Money', in Essays, pp. 283-84. 
12 Hont, 'Rich Country', pp. 274-76. See also: J. M. Low, 'An Eighteenth Century Controversy 
in the Theory of Economic Progress', in Dasid Hume and James Steuart, pp. 27-46. 
13 'It seems a maxim almost self-evident, that the prices of every thing depends on the proportion 
between commodities and money, and that any considerable alteration on either has the same 
effect, with of heightening or lowering the price. Encrease the commodities, they become 
cheaper; encrease the money, they rise in their value', Hume, 'Of Money', p. 290. 
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demand and supply. Hume's rich country-poor country model, " was based on the premise that as 
a country got richer and greater money entered into circulation, the general level of prices would 
rise; in other words, an increase in the quantity of circulating money led to an increase in the 
prices of goods and wages. It was this relationship, in Hume's theory, that prevented the 
concentration of riches in one country: the centre of manufacturing constantly moved away from 
high priced economies to lower priced ones; however, the poor countries were then 'enriched' 
(resulting in a rise in prices), which caused manufactures to fly 'to others' yet again. 85 11is was 
Hume's automatic self-correcting mechanism of international trade put forward to refute the 
balance of trade theory. It was this mechanism that ensured that every country received 'the 
appropriate amount of money in proportion to its trade' - that ensured a country was not 
'drained' of its currency. 86 
Hume believed that the future of international trade rested upon a division of labour between 
countries with different levels of wealth; each country would acquire the money she required for 
her needs by the industry of her workers. In the context of Bengal's currency problems, Hume's 
reasoning would suggest that the country could not be 'drained' of her money as the specie 
adjustment mechanism would ensure that adequate money returned to her. Hume argued that 
the 'force of this principle' made it 'impossible for money to lose its level, and either to rise or 
sink beyond the proportion of the labour and commodities which are in each province'. 87 This 
was an argument that was fully comprehended by the author of State of the East India Company 
who argued that money would always flow to where arts and industry existed: 'it is impossible to 
prevent its (money's) coming there, as to prevent water from running downwards'. " Hume tried 
to prove his point by demonstrating that a change in the level of money circulating in a country 
did not in itself alter the wealth of the country. " He argued that the annihilation of 'four-fifths of 
all the money in GREAT BRUAIN'would not result in the destruction of British manufactures; 
instead it would result in a reduction in the prices of labour and goods - making her exports 
I" On the origin of this term see: Hont, 'Rich Country', p. 274n7. 
85 Hume, 'Of Money', p. 283. 
" Hont, 'Rich Country', p. 282. 
97 Hume, 'Of the Balance of Trade', in Essays, p. 313. 
Anon., State ofthe East India, p. 19 (see also: pp. 18,20). 
Hont, 'Rich-Country', p. 28 1. 
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cheaper than her rivals'. Money would then be drawn back to Britain until her advantages were 
cancelled and the level of money returned to its level. " 
Steuart, in common with others of Hume's contemporaries, misunderstood the point that Hume 
wanted to make in the example he had given, that is that the quantity of money remained in 
proportion to the labour and commodities of each country (whereas Steuart believed that an 
adequate level of money had to be maintained by a favourable balance). " However the 
misunderstanding reveals Steuart's own assumptions - which were the premises from which he 
set out to reform Bengal's cuffency problems. Steuart argued that in the context of free trade, the 
consequences of Hume's scenario would be the annihilation of 'industry and the industrious'; he 
reasoned that low prices at home would mean that goods were exported abroad where they 
would fetch a higher price; this would lead to inevitable starvation at home, and consequently 
there would be no industry at home to attract money back. " Money in Steuart's opinion was not 
automatically adjusted between nations: 'a nation though industrious and populous, may reduce 
itself to poverty in the midst of wealthy neighbours, as a private person, though rich, may reduce 
himself to want, in the midst of the amusements and luxury of London or Paris'. " 
In Steuart's scheme of things, prices would only increase, upon the inflow of additional money, 
if demand increased. "' Where demand remained unaffected, Steuart held that the additional 
money did not come into circulation, but was 'locked up, or converted into plate'. " He believed 
that prices were maintained at a level consistent with the cost of production and a small profit, as 
long as the 'quantity supplied should be in proportion to the quantity demanded. " Furthermore, 
Hume, 'Of the Balance of Trade', p. 311; Hont, 'Rich Country', pp. 282-83. 
For example: Steuart, Inquiry, p. 283. See also: Hont, 'Rich Country', p. 296. 
1 Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 358-59. 
93 Ibid., p. 359; see also Pattullo, Essay, p. 23, who argued: 'the activity, the industry and, in a 
great measure, the ingenuity of every nation, is always in proportion to the mass of circulation in 
specie, and well established paper currency; if that is abundant, all is alive and in action; and in 
proportion that the mass is lessened, all becomes paralytic and languid'. 
91 Akhtar, 'Analytical Outline, p. 29 1. See also: Andrew Skinner, 'Money and Prices: a Critique 
of the Quantity Theory', Scottish Journal ofTblitical Economy, 14 (1967), 275-90. 
11 Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 343-44 (Steuart cited an exception to this rule on p. 346, but said that it 
was too particular to be general). See also ibid., p. 444, where he argues that in contemporary 
times, money is no longer locked up. 
16 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 189 Oater on in his treatise, Steuart argued that 'when trade and alienation 
increase, caeteris paribus, so will money; that is more solid property will be melted down; and 
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Steuart's belief that the statesman had to maintain the balance between work and demand was 
consistent with the overriding aim of political economy that Steuart had stated at the start of his 
Inquiry, which was to maintain the employment of the workers and ensure their subsistence; " the 
policies that Steuart advocated in the domain of international trade were calculated to this end. It 
followed therefore that trade with other countries had to cease when it undermined home 
industries: there did not exist any specie adjustment mechanism that would prevent the loss of 
money from a wealthy country - the rich nation could not compete with the low cost 
advantages of poorer countries. Steuart argued that if a prosperous country found itself faced 
with high prices, then 'humanity' and 'prudence' required that foreign trade was cut off, and that 
the inhabitants accepted the higher prices: 'in humanity, because by the introduction of foreign 
manufactures, you starve those very people, who by their labour have enriched you: in prudence, 
because by opening your ports to such importation you deliberately throw away that superiority 
of riches you have been at so much pains to acquire'. " 
IV. Monetary Reform 
The basis of Bengal's ancient wealth was identified by Verelst and Steuart as consisting of her 
manufactures; these had been demanded and purchased by foreign merchants with gold and 
silver rather than merchandise, because the inhabitants of Bengal had displayed little desire for 
foreign goods. Steuart stated that recent events in Bengal had led to the disruption of the 'trade 
and industry of the inhabitants, which for many ages had been the means of heaping them 
[treasures] up'. " Bengal had therefore enjoyed a favourable balance of trade: her exports had 
exceeded imports - she had exported more work than she had imported. " Under Company 
rule however, the balance of trade turned against Bengal, and she was faced with several 'drains' 
on her currency. While Steuart clearly recognised that the wealth of a country did not consist of 
when trade and alienation diminish, caeteris paribus, so will money; that is, some of the solid 
property formerly melted down, will consolidate, ibid., p. 498). 
" 'The Principle object of this science is to secure a certain fund of subsistence for all the 
inhabitants, to obviate every circumstance which may render it precarious; to provide everything 
necessary for supplying the wants of society, and to employ the inhabitants (supposing them to 
be free-men) in such a manner as naturally to create reciprocal relations and dependencies 
between them', ibid., p. 17. 
Ibid., p. 363. 
Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 61. 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 29 1. 
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her stock of treasure alone, he nevertheless stated that wealth was the 'circulating adequate 
equivalent'. "' A favourable balance may rest upon exporting more work than was imported, but 
the industry of the worker was dependent upon him receiving an 'adequate equivalent', that is 
money, for his service. This could not happen where there existed drains on the currency, and 
the quantity of money in circulation was consequently reduced. Steuart's reforms concentrated 
upon providing Bengal with a way of compensating her for her drains"' and increasing the 
quantity and velocity of circulating money. 
Steuart began his report by stating the principles of money and coin that he had established in his 
Inquiry. "' He believed that these basic principles had been ignored in Bengal, which had resulted 
in the present disorders of the currency. The major problem that the Company faced was 
establishing the value of the coins that were in circulation. Newly minted coins in Bengal were 
known as siccas; after a year in circulation, due to erosion, they lost their value and were known 
as sunats. The value of the coin was determined by the content of its silver, and by an arbitrary 
batta added to it by the shroffs, "' as their payment for minting the coins. This had led to a 
situation, where there was a discrepancy between the actual value of coins, and the value they 
were made to circulate at. This violated one of Steuart's basic principles of money and coin; he 
argued that it was 'absurd ... to call by the term pound what does not contain one ounce. From 
this abuse has been introduced the confusion which prevails everywhere in questions concerning 
money. From being the plainest of all regulations, money is become an almost inextricable 
science'. 'Os 
The situation in Bengal had reached such a pass, argued Steuart, that 'no person can tell the 
value of the coin he is possessed of until a shroff be consulted upon the matter'. " The confusion 
of coins had placed the shroffs in a powerful position: they were indispensable for establishing the 
"' Ibid., p. 310. 
101 'Were trade to run constantly against a country, the consequence would be, that the whole 
property of it would, by degrees, be transferred to foreigners', ibid., p. 500. 
These principles are set out in Book HI 'Of Money and Coin', see esp. chs 1-6. 
'The shroffs are a sort of bankers, or money-changers, whose business it is to set a value upon 
... ] different currencies, according to every circumstance, either in their favour, or their 
prejudice', Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 18. 
105 Ibid., p. 4. 
"' Ibid., p. 26. 
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value of coins, but, as there were no checks upon their actions, they could easily debase coins 
and defraud their customers; this was what Steuart termed abuse of shroffage. 11' This confusing 
state of Bengal's coins was agreed to be a great source of fraud by the directors in London: 'the 
coinage of Bengal is a visible source of fraud and imposition ... absurd distinction betweensicras 
and sunnaut rupees must ... have contributed to 
destroy the vigour and activity of trade. "' 
Steuart's solution for this was to establish a standard unit of account. " He pointed out that gold 
and silver fluctuated in their value and consequently using them as a measure by which to value 
the coins presented many problems. Nations that had an 'ideal money of account' did not face 
this problem. "' Establishing the value of the current rupee in Bengal, which he believed to be the 
money of account, would provide a fixed standard by which to value all coins in circulation. ", 
In Bengal, the unit of money of account is the current rupee. To suffer this standard 
denomination to be valued by the accidental currency of any coin, is contrary to every 
principle. The current rupee, and not the sicca, or any coin whatever must be the 
standard by which every coin or currency is to be valued, and no precaution ought to be 
omitted, to fix and ascertain its own value. "' 
Steuart argued that it would also give security to all transactions. Without an 'invariable value', 
ffis he stated, there could be no 'security ... for debtors and creditors' and dependence on the shrq) 
would continue. However, with the establishment of a current rupee, which had a fixed weight 
and fineness, all other coins could be valued in relation to it, "' and the role of the shroff in 
ascertaining the value of coins would become obsolete. "" 
After addressing the problem of coinage in Bengal, Steuart turned his attention to the several 
drains that Bengal faced. He pointed out that Bengal's difficulties were peculiar to it due to its 
status as a British acquisition. Steuart argued that 'it is a general maxim, that exportations enrich 
107 Ibid., p. 18. For more information on Bengal's monetary problems and Steuart's plan of 
reform, see: Sen, Economics of Steuart, ch. x; Walter Eltis, 'Steuart on Monetary Reform and 
Economic Development: His Advice for the Restoration of the Indian Economy', in Economics of 
James Steuart, pp. 201-217. Cf also Khan, Transition in Bengal, pp. 175,176; 
(10 April 177 1), in FFffHC, VI, p. 89. 
Cf. Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 408-09. 
Ibid., pp. 420-21. 
Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 19. 
Ibid., p. 12. 
Ibid., pp. 50-52. Cf. Eltis, 'Steuart on Monetary Reform', pp. 212-15. 
114 See: Khan, Transition in Bengal, p. 177, for M. Reza Khan's defence of the shroffsystem. 
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a country, and that importations impoverish W. "' Ibis however was not true for Bengal: money 
was being withdrawn from circulation in the acquired territories, and being used, for example, to 
finance Britain's global tea trade. This, and the other 'drains' that Verelst and Steuart had 
enumerated, were not compensated for by foreign imports of bullion: Bengal's exports were paid 
for by her revenue. This was why Steuart stated that 'the exportations made from Bengal by the 
East India Company do not enrich it, any more than the importation of the spoils of the world 
impoverished ancient Rome'. "' That is, the exports of Bengal did not bring additional wealth 
into circulation that was needed to maintain industry, and conversely imports into Rome did not 
adversely affect the industry of its slave workers. 
In Steuart's opinion, Bengal's problems called for a reorientation of the way that the Company 
viewed its acquired territories. He argued that it was $vain to think of a remedy' for Bengal's 
problems 'without sacrificing the interest of Great Britain, and of the Company itself to that of 
Bengal'. "' As a trading enterprise, it had been the Company's 'interest, and that of the mother. 
country, to export thither every article of British luxury, as well as manufactures', but as defacto 
sovereign, it was not. "' As the ruler, it was no longer in the Company's interest to export items 
to Bengal which would adversely affect the industry of the people, but it was in its interest to 
promote her export trade. It was in its interest, in other words, to ensure that Bengal enjoyed a 
favourable balance of trade - the Company had to stop thinking of Bengal as a competitor to 
Britain's trade. Steuart had argued that when a trading country engaged in trade with a non- 
trading country, it had to inspire the non-trading country with a demand for its goods; this could 
be achieved by giving presents to its leaders; once a taste or demand for the trading country's 
goods was established, then the non-trading country was 'in the fetters of the traders- that is, 
the non-trading country had become dependent on the trading one. ' " 
Steuart, Ptinciples ofMoney, p. 89. 
Ibid., p. 90. 
Ibid., p. 69. 
Ibid. See also: [Smith], Observations, pp. 33-34; Bolts, Considerations, pp. vi-vii, x, 192; Dow, 
History, p. I 10. 
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This same sound policy had become misguided once Bengal became 'our own'. 'European 
luxuries' were an 'article of drain to her treasure' and had to be discontinued. "' The policy that 
the Company had to follow instead was to 'procure for them [Bengal] articles of raw productions 
from every part of the world. We ought to encourage every branch of trade between them and 
the Indian nations; and we ought to protect the industrious inhabitants from the rapine and 
extortions of their Indian as well as of their European lords'. "' This plan therefore had three 
important components; first of all, the workers of the country were to be protected from 
inequitable acts. Secondly, the industrious were to be provided with work by the importation of 
raw materials that were to be finished in Bengal; these imports would not count as a balance 
against Bengal's trade as long as they were re-exported. "' Thirdly, a favourable balance of trade 
was to be established with other Indian nations, which would ensure that Bengal was 
compensated for the losses she incurred with the trade with the East India Company - as 
Steuart expressed it: 'The foreign trade of Bengal is what alone can increase her wealth, or at 
least, keep the cistern ftill in spight of its many leaks'. "' Steuart suggested that preventing Bengal 
from suffering an unfavourable balance of trade on all accounts was not possible, especially 
given that the Company would continue to use the province's revenues to finance its trade, 
however, the consequences of it could be mitigated by enabling Bengal to trade with other 
eastern countries-124 
However, Steuart recommended that the drain caused by the export of bullion from Bengal to 
finance the China tea trade had to be stopped altogether. He insisted that the investment for this 
trade had to be found in Europe. In order to aid the expansion of the Company's tea trade, 
Steuart proposed that the duties on tea should be reduced so that 'the Company' could 'undersell 
125 their rivals in every market'. Currently, he stated, the quantity of foreign tea smuggled into 
Britain, Ireland and America was estimated at 'four million pounds of weight', which was an 
'article of balance of trade against' Britain. By cutting the duties on tea, the British government 
120 Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 70. 
121 Ibid. 
"I Steuart, Inquiry, p. 360; see also [Smith], Observations, pp. 6-7. 
123 Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 89. 
124 See: Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 292-93, where he argued that a nation could not expect a favourable 
balance in all areas of her trade. 
"I Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 71. On the way the China trade was fmanced by private country 
traders, see: Furber, John Company, pp. 164-66. 
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would undoubtedly lose revenue, but the policy would 'indemnify Great Britain for the 
exportation of their coin, carried off by the smugglers'. In other words, by making the 
Company's tea more competitive with the smuggled commodity, the illicit trade would become 
less profitable and decline. 
Further, Steuart contended that the benefit of the duties was not comparable to the advantage 
that Britain would gain if she enjoyed a monopoly of this trade together with the Dutch. He did 
not believe that the English Company should try to undermine the Dutch trade, which was in 
any case, he stated, restricted from growth by the way it was financed by the sale of spices; but 
he did believe that the demand for tea in European and American markets was greater than the 
Dutch were able to fulfil, and therefore, the East India Company should concentrate on filling 
this gap. Steuart reasoned that the Company could buy tea cheaper than her European rivals, 
and if she used the proceeds from the sale of tea in Europe to finance the trade, it would stop the 
drain of Bengal's currency while, at the same time, also undermining her rivals' trade 'and at no 
greater expence to Great Britain than what she pays at present to smugglers, who enrich the 
foreign companies'. "' 
The policy that the British government did actually follow as the Company's financial difficulties 
unfolded included the reduction of some duties, but tea and other goods re-exported to the 
colonies were subject to increases in taxes. It is doubtful that Steuart would have supported this 
mixed measure, which led some Company officials to complain that the government was giving 
with 'one hand while taking away with the other' . 127 Steuart believed that his proposal was one 
that would benefit Bengal, Britain and the Company, and at the same time also address Bengal's 
currency problems. 
Another drain that Steuart had identified and that he turned his attention to stem was that of the 
transmission of the private fortunes of the Company servants back to Britain; currently, the 
servants' lent their money to foreign companies in exchange for bins repayable in Europe. 
Steuart argued that the servants could not be prevented from doing this - as long as they had 
... Steuart, Principles ofMoney, pp. 71-73. 
127 Bowen, Revenue, p. 109. 
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fortunes to transmit - by force; however what the Company could do was to provide their 
servants with an attractive alternative. The Company, suggested Steuart, should offer to borrow 
the servants' money at attractive rates for investment in Bengal: 'I imagine it must ever be the 
interest of the Company to facilitate the investment of property belonging to their servants, in a 
way so beneficial to the servants, as to cut off their desire of lending money to those who are the 
Company's rivals in trade. "' 
The private fortunes of the servants, argued Steuart, could also be utilised to provide much 
needed credit in Bengal by forming the foundation of a paper currency. Credit was a way that the 
Company could overcome the shortage of coin and increase the circulation of money: 'by 
accelerating the circulation of the coin you ... virtually increase the quantity of it; that is to say, a 
less quantity will be necessary for performing the same purposes. `9 Steuart had defmed 
circulation in his main treatise as: 'the successive transition of money or transferable 
commodities, from hand to hand, and their return, as it were in a circle to the point from which 
they set out. ' Ile quantity of coin in circulation he argued had to be kept in proportion to the 
'produce of industry'; where this proportion was not maintained, for instance when there was a 
shortage, 'industry will never be able to exert itself, because the equivalent in the hands of the 
consumers, is then below the proportion of their desires to consume, and of those of the 
industrious to produce'. "' To illustrate his point he described a society where there was only one 
coin in circulation, consumption would halt the minute the coin came into the possession of a 
miser (unless, he conceded, the people resorted to bartering). 131 Steuart saw the lack of credit as 
the greatest obstacle to industry in society's early stages and therefore considered it necessary for 
128 Steuart, Principles ofMoney, pp. 74-75. 
"I Ibid., p. 78. 
110 Steuart, inquiry, pp. 323-24 (see also pp. 325-26). [Smith] Observations, p. 28, argues that the 
Company's trade expanded with the acquisition of diwani, but the drain of money continued, the 
result of this could only have been stagnation: 'The great increase of trade that naturally followed 
the great increase of our riches and power, required a quick circulation, and a large increase of 
money, to answer the additional demands, which will always rise, in proportion as trade and 
manufactures are extended. The want of specie will produce a stagnation of trade, especially in a 
country where no faith rests on paper credit. Drains and oppressions like these no country can 
bear'; this was perfectly in tune with Steuart's point. CE also Pattullo, Essay, p. 23. 
131 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 323. 
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a statesman that wanted to 'increase industry and domestic consumption', to provide a 
'circulating ftmd of one kind or other' . 
132 
Steuart did not believe that paper money could be established on the 'authority, and upon the credit 
of the Company'. This was because, as a sovereign power, there was no security against the 
Company abusing the currency in times of necessity. "' Steuart had stressed the importance of 
maintaining confidence in his main treatise for the security of credit - credit he said was 'no 
more than a well estab&hed confidence between men"' - and he believed that it was the task of 
the statesman to regulate it and keep it 'within bounds'. Steuart's analysis of the collapse of the 
paper currency established by John Law provides an example of 'an abuse of confidence', and 
the reason why the issuing of paper currency on the authority of the ruler was improper. Steuart 
believed that Law had based his paper currency on sound principles: the value of the notes was 
fixed according to the weight and fineness of the coins on the date the notes were issued. These 
principles had been overturned by the French monarch who issued the notes without a fixed 
value rendering credit precarious because the monarch could reduce the value of the notes at 
will. This fact had contributed to the collapse of confidence and of the bank itself.. Steuart 
proceeded to describe the way that a banking fund could be established in Bengal on the private 
fortunes of the servants, 'in the hands and under the protection of the Company, who are to have 
no share of the profit, and the greatest interest in preventing the issue of paper upon precarious 
security'. "' In Bengal, it was the Company's task to ensure that confidence was not abused, and 
by precluding them as an authority that could issue paper money, they were denied any practical 
ability of being able to do SO. 137 
Steuart saw many benefits arising from the bank. He hoped that the bank would lead the money 
possessed by Bengal to flow 'into a channel which may set new engines to work in ordff to 
augment her circulation and encourage her manufactures; instead of serving as a bare equivalent 
Ibid., pp. 327-328. Cf. Anon., Planfor the Government ofthelývvinces, pp. 32-33. 
Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 8 1. 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 440. 
135 Ibid., pp. 438-39,534-37 (see also 557-63). For a description of Law's system, see: 
Sonenscher, 'Nation's Debt, pp. 71-73 
136 Steuart, Principles of Money, p. 87. Cf. also Marshall East Indian Fortunes, pp. 40-41, who 
describes the Bengal system of mercantile credit which pre-existed Company rule. 137 Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 8 1; Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 438-39. 
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for those at present produced'. "' Steuart envisaged paper money and banks as a policy that 
would lead to the development of Bengal; this was consistent with the ideas of Law that Hume 
had rejected despite seeing the benefits that could accrue to a poor country. "' The result of this 
expansion, according to Steuart, would be to encourage the inflow of European silver as long as 
the Company (after they had made their investments and collected their revenue) allowed foreign 
merchants to trade: 'let these [foreign merchants] be considered as the sellers ofsilver, not as the 
purchasers of goods'. He argued that the Company had to be satisfied with the 'highest profits 
compatible with the prosperity of the country which enriches them' rather than the maximum 
amount that could be extorted. He stressed that since Bengal belonged to the Company and it 
was suffering from drains of money: 'it will appear expedient to encourage as much as possible 
the sale of all that is over the investments of the Company, in such a way as to increase the 
demand of strangers, which cannot be so well accomplished as by leaving a reasonable profit 
both to manufactures and to foreign merchants'. 140 
Steuart was suggesting that a reduction in the profit of the Company was needed so that it could 
be enjoyed by the manufacturers and foreign companies. As Steuart had explained in his main 
treatise, industry needed the 'allurement of gain' in order to flourish. "' Similarly foreign 
merchants needed encouragement to buy the remaining manufactures from the Company's 
investments. This reduction in profits may have been hard for the Company to swallow, but he 
had stated from the outset that 'it is vain to think of a remedy without sacrificing the interest of 
"I Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 88. See also Barber, British Economic Thought, p. 81; Anon., Plan 
for the Government ofthe Provinces, pp. 32-33, also argued that the establishment of a paper money 
issuing bank would be beneficial for Bengal as it would lead to increased industry. See also, 
Pattullo, Essay, p. 22. 
139 Hont, 'Rich Country', pp. 276-79. 
140 Steuart, Principles of Money, pp. 89-91. The way that the Company traded with Indian 
merchants changed after 1760. The servants made use of their political power to procure goods 
to their advantage and prevented other European companies from trading with 'their' workers. 
Prakash, who focuses on the textile trade, argued that Company obtained cloth well below the 
market rate. See: Prakash, 'Trade and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Bengal' in The Eighteenth 
Century in India, ed. Seema Alavi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 150-52. 
141 Steuart, Inquiry p. 90. Steuart, Principles of Money, p. 92, argued: 'all proper encouragement 
must be given to manufacturers [ ... ]. Insure to the manufacturer the prices and profits which the Company suppose to be consistent with the interest of their own trade, and sufficient to produce 
a living profit to their industrious subjects, which from abuses they are sometimes deprived of. 
CE Richard Becher's (resident at Murshidabad) minute of 23 Nov 1770, where he argued that an 
'increase of revenue to the Company should [ ... ] arise chiefly from increased cultivation and 
manufactures'; this he believed constituted the 'real' interest of the Company. He also added that 
the merchants and tenants have 'an equitable claim to a proportion of the good things of their 
country as well as the English East India Company', quoted in Khan, Transition in Bengal, p. 261. 
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Great Britain, and the Company itself to that of Bengal' . 
142 This was one clear example of the 
way that the immediate interest of the Company was sacrificed; however Steuart showed that in 
the long run it was beneficial for the Company. He argued that if Bengal had not been in need of 
141 'foreign resources' then he would not have restricted the trade of the Company's servants. 
However, as we have seen, in Steuart's scheme of things, it was only countries that had great 
'natural advantages', such as mines of gold and silver, which could afford to remain passive in 
their foreign trade. " 
The way the revenues were collected by the Company was also scrutinised by Steuart; it was 
another area that he believed was in need of reform by which the circulation of the money in 
Bengal could be improved. Taxation, in Steuart's opinion, was a useful tool of government 
policy as its correct application could promote industry by bringing money into circulation which 
may otherwise have been hoarded. "' Bengal's revenues were principally derived from levies on 
land; Steuart did not pretend to understand how the system of land ownership operated in 
Bengal. "' He believed that that land was rented out by the sovereign to high ranking officials and 
subjects, who sub-rented it to others, who in turn farmed it out to others again - at the end of 
the chain was the labourer. Steuart argued that this system operated at a loss to the Company 
and provided scope for oppression: 'the money paid by the labourers of the ground, is at present 
interrupted in its course, at every change of hands, until by the repeated shroffage, it comes at 
last reduced, as I may say, to a shadow, into the Company's treasure'. "" 'Ibis organisation had 
to be reformed; he proposed that the land had to be valued, the rent payable by each district 
established and the intermediary collectors abolished. The rent was to be paid by the occupiers of 
the land to 'some man of consequence, who may be considered the superior lord of it. In this 
way the Company would receive the rents more directly and money would be in circulation 
141 Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 69. 
143 Ibid., p. 9 1. 
Steuart, Inquiry, P. 180. 
Ibid., pp. 724-25. 
146 See Marshall, East Indian Fortunes pp. 30-3 1, for a description of the wide ranging role of the 
zarnindars (landholders). 
141 Steuart, lWnciples of Money, p. 79. The point that the revenue which finally reached the 
Company was a shadow of the original amount collected was also made by [Smith], Observations, 
p. 19, who argued the revenue 'must always fall short to the Company, so long as the occupiers 
are thus drained by a tribe of Duans and officers of the revenue'. He blamed the fall in the 
quantity of revenue collected on M. R. Khan, which was an opinion shared by the directors in 
London, see: Khan, Transition inBengal, p. 189. See also the evidence inRCHC, IV, pp. 114,301. 
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quicker. The Company, he stated, had to avail themselves 'of the principles of the feudal system 
of government, in the execution of their plan'. '" 
Amongst Steuart's analyses of the Company's problems, there was one fundamental issue that he 
did not address; this was the question of whether the Company was a suitable agency by which 
to govern Bengal and to implement reforms. Adam Smith's condemnation of organisations like 
the East India Company is well known, but Steuart's view of them was significantly diffffent. 
Barber has argued that Steuart's terms of reference precluded him from pronouncing a 
judgement on the East India Company in his Primiples. "' While this may be true, Steuart did not 
face the same constraints when composing his Inquiry; here he set out at length his views on such 
companies and argued that their advantages were also their disadvantages. A joint-stock 
company, he contended, enabled merchants to pool their resources together to undertake costly 
enterprises and, by working together, 'competition between them abroad is taken away'Y" Yet, 
the former also meant that 'private adventurers' were discouraged, while the latter enabled the 
company to sell their goods at home at inflated prices. It was the statesman's task to ensure that 
the benefits of large companies were not cancelled by disadvantages by establishing proper 
regulations. "' Consequently, with the existence of appropriate safeguards, he did not regard the 
dexclusive privileges' companies enjoyed as generally detrimental to trade and 'contrary to that 
principle of impartiality that should animate a good statesman'. 152 
In order to explain the principles on which he thought a trading company could be established, 
Steuart described certain stages in a company's development and pointed out the policy a 
148 Steuart, Pfinciples ofMoney, p. 80. See also [Smith], Observations, p. 76; [Smith], Measures to be 
Pursued, p. 20. In addition, Francis, after 1773, continued to argue that the amount of tribute 
demanded from the Indians should be fixed in order to consolidate British rule of Bengal. He 
contended (in a letter to North) that the 'natives' would willingly submit to the 'barbarous' rule 
of the 'Mahometans, Taftars or Maratthas' because these rulers would not subject them to 'a 
continued series of vexations' that was practised by the British. The Indians, under the 
barbarians, 'would [ ... ] be only subject to a single Tribute, easily paid and easily collected; and find greater happiness in obeying a barbarous nation, than a corrupted Government, under 
which they suffer all the inconveniences of a Liberty which they do not enjoy, with all the 
horrors of positive slavery' ffrancis to North' (23 March 1775), OIOC, MSS Eur. E 15, pp. 73- 
74). On the practical difficulty of establishing the value of the land in Bengal, see: Travers, 'Real 
Value of the Lands'. 
149 Barber, British Economic Thought, p. 76 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 389. 
Ibid., pp. 389-90. 
152 Ibid., p. 391. 
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statesman should adopt in each particular instance. Steuart argued that no protests were raised 
against companies when they were first formed because of the 'considerable losses' that initially 
accompanied their trade. Furthermore, the number of members of the organisation was small 
and their affairs conducted secretly; at this early stage, Steuart stated, the statesman had to 
establish his authority over the organisation. He had to ensure that the individuals running the 
company were capable, and that their proposed plans were sound. He suggested that 
underwriting the losses of the company would ensure that he had access to its accounts, which in 
turn would provide him with an accurate understanding of its trade. Companies, he argued, only 
demanded 'exclusive privileges' and hid their profits because of the high cost of their enterprise. 
If the state assisted them from their very inception, this problem would not arise: 'adventurers' 
he stated would cheerfully submit to the inspection of the state, if they were 'certain of the public 
assistance in every reasonable undertaking'. The state's assistance and inspection would also 
provide security for any credit that the Company was in need of, and as the trade grew, money 
from new investors could be accepted instead of 'permitting the original proprietors to augment 
their stock with borrowed money'. By this method, Steuart suggested that the trade conducted 
under the company would be 'honourable and secure', rather than 'fraudulent and precarious'. "' 
Steuart's analysis preceded the financial crisis of the East India Company in 1772, but from the 
foregoing discussion it is clear that he would have welcomed tighter control of the Company by 
the British state. Companies, in his view, were useful organisations as long as they remained 
under the overall control of the statesmen who would ensure that their policies were consistent 
with the common good. 154 It is unclear, however, whether Steuart would have preferred the 
responsibility of government to have been taken over by the British government. Given the 
importance of the statesman to his theories, it is likely that he would have endorsed such a move. 
Other would-be reformers did not display the same tact; the True Alarm argued that the 
separation of government from the Company would rapidly lead to the improvement of Bengal's 
Ibid., pp. 391-92. 
See: Robert Campbell, 'Sir James Steuart: a Study in the Development of Economic Thought' 
(Ph. D. thesis, University of California, 1947), p. 29. 
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trade: 'the native, who being emancipated from their present commercial slavery would quickly 
restore manufacture and trade to its pristine vigour'. 111 
Conclusion 
Steuart, in his proposal, presented the principles that he believed should underpin Britain's 
commercial policy towards a dependent dominion. He accepted that Britain and the Company 
would still seek to derive material benefit from Bengal but argued that they both should realise 
that their interest lay in the continued prosperity of Bengal. What this meant in practical tenns 
was that Bengal had to be compensated for the money that was exported from her by the 
establishment of a paper currency (which would increase circulation), and by expanding her 
opportunities for trade with other Europeans and Asian countries. What he was suggesting was 
that Bengal's interest was not inimical to Britain's; their relationship was no longer that of two 
trading nations where one would inevitably gain at the expense of the other. Rather, Bengal was 
now'in a manner our own"' - her prosperity could only increase Britain's. 
Verelst also recognised that the Company could not continue to extract a tribute from Bengal if 
her industry did not continue to flourish. However he believed that all that was required was for 
the Company to moderate their demands: 'if the court of Directors will, for the future, be 
contended with an annual investment, not exceeding five or six hundred thousand pounds, and 
discontinue entirely the exportation of silver from Bengal, the foreign trade of that country may 
again revive'. "' He rejected Steuart's proposals for creating a paper currency, arguing instead 
'" Anon., True Alann, pp. 101-02. Similarly, in 1777, Francis also argued that 'as long as the 
interests of the Company and those of Bengal are committed to the same hands', the acquisitions 
could not be governed well. He went on to state that 'if the territorial acquisitions are to 
preserved, it must be under a system of Government, which does not refer all its measures to the 
supposed Rights or Interests of a Body of Merchants, under colour of which their servants in 
reality take little care of any interest but their own. The measure pursued here, under pretence of 
securing everything to the Company, will [ ... ] be found not less ruinous to their true commercial interests than to the country itself. They feel this truth already in the debasement of the 
manufacturers and in the enormous increase of the price. But every consideration of Justice and 
Prudence is absorbed in the vain idea of unlimited revenue and immediate returns' (Trancis to 
North! (14 Feb 1777), OIOC, MSS Eur. E 15, pp. 522-23). See also 'Francis to North' (23 April 
1778), OIOC, MSS Eur. E16, p. 170. 
'm Steuart, Primiples ofMoney, p. 70. 
157 Verelst, View, p. 103. 
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that a gold curTency could be used to fill any cuffent shortages of specie. "' Warren Hastings' 
appointment as governor in 1772 led to the implementation of many reforms; specifically, with 
regard to the drain of cuffency, Hastings halted the payment of tribute to the Mughal emperor, 
established the 1773 sicca rupee as the standard coin and formed a money lending bank. "' 
These reforms were independent of Steuart's report, but his work offers an example of the way in 
which rival idioms of Enlightenment argument affected the diverse responses observable among 
British commentators to the problems raised by the acquisitions in India. Individuals such as 
Steuart, Verelst, Johnstone and Nathaniel Smith, sought to create conditions in Bengal under 
which commerce could flourish. Such conditions necessarily required a system of government 
that was free from the taint of despotism. This was precisely the end that the science of politics 
aimed at achieving to the extent that it was concerned with preventing the exercise of arbitrary 
power. British commentators made use of the schemes of interpretation provided by theories of 
Enlightened politics to approach the task of reforming the Company's government of Bengal. 
Yet, as the science of politics had not given rise to a single theory of Enlightened politics, there 
could not be any one answer for how to govern Bengal. 
Ibid. 
Jones, Warren Hastings, pp. 233-34. 
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Chapter 6 
Sir James Steuart (11): Conjectural History, Self-Interest and Reform 
It is the argument of this dissertation that the Company's search for the optimum protection for 
its trade led it to acquire territorial control, and that the importance of commerce for Britain's 
security led to the acceptance of a landed empire. ' Territorial empire, in turn, however, gave rise 
to a whole host of additional problems. The publicists and thinkers that have been considered in 
this thesis turned their attention to addressing these new challenges, but fundamentally their 
object remained that of maintaining a prosperous commercial relationship with the sub- 
continent. Their aim, in other words - in stemming the drain of currency, in establishing the 
value of the lands, in creating a government and judicial system based on fixed laws and in 
bringing to an end mercantile despotism - stemmed not from any charitable concern for the 
welfare of the Indians (though this was expressed) but from the desire of ensuring that Bengal's 
industries continued to flourish. George Johnstone argued that unless encouragement was given 
to Bengal's farmers and manufacturers, it was impossible to expect the levels of profit that had 
been projected on the acquisition of diwani. 1 The rationale of Britain's global presence, as chapter 
one set out, was commercial; if Bengal's manufacturing, trade, and revenue receipts decayed 
away, then the point of territorial control would be defeated: Bengal, if it was not wrested from 
Britain by France, would be destroyed by Britain's own hand. 
Steuart made the point in his Primiples ofMoney that trade with Bengal had to be conducted in a 
manner that was consistent with the interest of the 'Company and for this nation (Bengal), 
I For instance, it was argued in Anon., Importance of the British Dominion, p. 14: 'the commerce 
with India is not, like that with America, an absolute consequence of dominion, yet dominion is 
now become necessary to the existence of this Indian commerce, that Britain, if she was to be 
despoiled of her dominion there, would along with it be deprived of all benefit arising from that 
commerce'; see also: ibid., pp. 15-17; Anon., Conduct ofthe East India Company, p. 53. 
2 Vohnstone], 7houghts, p. 42. [Nathaniel Smith], Measures, p. 12, further argued that 'the full 
security of property, a free and open trade granted to all the natives, that all the taxes and 
restraints deemed necessary, be laid with as equal and light a hand as possible, are the most 
essential regulations wanted. The inhabitants of Bengal, being sensible of the effect such 
regulations would produce, and persuaded of their stability, a great increase of wealth and 
population would soon follow'. See also: Pattullo, Essay, p. 1; Anon., State of the East India, p. 
19; Anon., Plan for the Government of the ProWnces, pp. 3 8-3 9. 
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consistently with the permanency of W. ' Chapter five explored the principles and proposals on 
which Steuart believed that this could be achieved. However, any plan of reform would 
ultimately be to no purpose if it could not be implemented, for reasons that included local 
resistance. Steuart stated that in Bengal: 'absolute power, supported by justice and common 
sense, will get the better of obstacles, which in other countries would be unsurmountable'ý What 
he was implicitly suggesting was that the Indians' lack of political liberty meant that reforms 
could be imposed without their consent; that is, the ruler did not need to persuade the 
inhabitants of the suitability of any measure before he implemented it. Steuart described, in his 
main treatise, how people in Europe revolted against the imposition of taxes where the ruler 
failed to prepare his people sufficiently' - this, Steuart implied, would not be a danger in 
Bengal. However, despite this comment, Steuart did not envisage 'authority' as the method by 
which to execute his plan. Rather, at many points in his Principles ofMoney, Steuart argued that 
the passion of self-interest would ensure cooperation between Company servants and Indians. ' 
This chapter draws out Steuart's understanding of self-interest and the dynamics of human 
progress, and demonstrates their relevance to the reform of Bengal. Firstly, attention will be 
given to the reasoning behind conjectural history as it was developed by Enlightenment thinkers 
in Scotland, before considering the role that the concept of self-interest played in Steuart's 
trajectory of human development. This chapter will then secondly, relate Steuart's understanding 
of self-interest to the wider contemporary debate - specifically the thought of Mandeville - and 
finally proceed to consider how the object of man's interest was determined, according to 
Steuart, by the spirit of the people. 
The concept of self-interest was integral to many of the pamphleteers considered in chapters 
three and four. Consequently, this chapter also serves to provide the wider intellectual context to 
their arguments. Archibald Keir, for example, stated that an inquiry into the 'temper and 
disposition of the human mind' would reveal 'that mankind in general, pretty much follow [ ... I 
their own interest'! George Johnstone argued, quoting Adam Ferguson, 'men are tempted to 
3 Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 69. 
Ibid., p. 79. 
Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 26-27. 
Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 89. 
7 Keir, Thoughts, p. 11. 
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labour, and to practice lucrative arts, by motives of interest. Secure to the workman the fruit of 
his labour, give him the prospects of independence, of freedom, the public has found an 
industrious servant in the acquisition of wealth, and a faithful steward in securing what he has 
gained'! Nathaniel Smith also contended that if the landowners could be confident that, after the 
payment of taxes, they would be protected from any further arbitrary demands, they would 
willingly pay the sum levied by government: 'mankind are seldom wanting in a knowledge of 
their real interest; and whenever it is blended with our own, we may be satisfied our own will 
never be neglected'. 9 
In addition, systems of government, which were considered in chapter four, also relied upon the 
assumption that individuals universally followed their self-interest. The author of the Planfor the 
Government ofBengal argued that the political art consisted of 'contrasting the selfish passions and 
interests of different men, in such a manner, that without a grain of public spirit, they may 
conspire in promoting the good of the community'. " While the Present State recognised the 
passion of self-interest as the most effective chedc on the power of the sovereign: 'self-interest 
that pfimum and perpetuum mobile of human action operates [ ... ] more forcibly, [ ... ] on the 
will of the supreme government; not simply restraining it from doing or permitting injury but 
impelling it to promote the good of the people governed'. " All these publicists made use of the 
ideas and arguments which were systematically formulated by individuals such as Mandeville, 
Smith and Ferguson, for their own purposes, but this inevitably resulted in a simplification and 
distortion of the original arguments. It will be argued in this chapter that a careful consideration 
of Steuart's scheme of conjectural history holds out additional possibilities of reform and 
, improvement' in Bengal. Fundamentally, conjectural history suggested that by changing the 
circumstances under which people lived, it was possible to wholly change their manners and 
morals. 
1. Conjectural I-listory 
[Johnstone], Thoughts, p. 22. 
[Smith], Observations, p. 36. 
Anon., Planfor the Government ofBengal, pp. 5-6. 
Anon., Present State, pp. 22-23. 
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The debates that took place in Britain regarding the government of the acquisitions in India were 
influenced by the developments in the fields of philosophical and conjectural history associated 
with Enlightenment thinkers in Scotland. The method that writers of such history set out to use 
was articulated by David Hume. He argued that in the same manner as the 'experimental 
method of reasoning' had revealed laws regulating man's natural environment, so the -same 
method in 'moral subjects' would have similar effects. " Hume believed that it was from 
'experience and observation' that we could connect cause and effect to a set of circumstances and 
thereby come to expect certain outcomes from particular actions. " This was the experimental 
method Hume wanted to apply to the study of moral subjects. He believed that human nature 
consisted of 'regular springs', that is passions, which could be uncovered from the historical 
record: 
Its [i. e. history's] chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of 
human nature by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations and 
ftimishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become 
acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour. " 
Hume believed that it was these regular springs of human behaviour that made it possible to 
predict how individuals would act in a given situation - to provide a 'causal explanation' for 
social and political change in human history. " Most theorists did not agree with the limits to 
which Hume took his reasoning, " but a broad similarity of aim and method was one thing that 
they shared. 
12 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40), ed. L. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1888), pp. xx-xxi; Berry, Social Theory, pp. 58-59. 
11 Hume, Treatise ofRuman Nature, quoted in: Berry, Social Theory, pp. 59-60. 
14 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), eds. Selby-Bigge and P. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 83, quoted in: Berry, Social Theory, p. 69. Cf. William 
Robertson, 77ie History ofAmerica, 6th edn, 3 vols (London, 1792), 11, p. 50, where he argued 'In 
order to complete the history of the human mind, and attain to a perfect knowledge of its nature 
and operations, we must contemplate man in all those various situations wherein he has been 
placed. We must follow him in his progress through the different stages of society, as he 
gradually advances from the infant state of civil life to its maturity and decline'; he believed that 
such a history had been facilitated by the discovery of the 'New World', where man could be 
observed in his earliest stage; such information, Robertson argued, had not been available to 
ancient philosophers and historians. See: Robertson, History ofAmerica, II, pp. 50-5 1,1, pp. 3 1- 
34. 
Berry, Social Theory, p. 59. See also Pocock, Barbarism, II, pp. 183-84. 
For example, in Robertson's thought, the progress of human society was also explained with 
reference to God and human intervention (Ibomas Ahnert, 'Religion and the Moderates' 
Enlightenment: the Historiography of William Robertson' (Unpublished Manuscript)). See, for 
instance: Robertson, History ofAmerica, 1, pp. 55-56, H, pp. 31-32; Karen O'Brien, Narratives of 
Enlightenment. Cosmopolitan Historyfirom Voltaire to Gibbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 123,148. In addition, Hume's work was also regarded with suspicion because 
he was suspected of being a heretic. This was, of course, in stark contrast to Robertson, who was 
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Adam Smith, in turn, regarded the end of history as being to instruct the reader; history, he 
stated, 'sets before us the more interesting and important events of human life, points out the 
causes by which those events were brought about and by this means points out to us by what 
17 manner and method we may produce similar good effects or avoid similar bad ones'. Smith 
himself developed a natural history of man, which Dugald Stewart termed conjectural history. 
Pocock, in his study of Enlighteninent thinkers in Scotland, argues that individuals such as 
Smith developed 'a science of morality, which on the assumption that humans were intrinsically 
social beings became a science of society in all its ramifications'. The endeavour took the 'form 
of jurisprudence, which was then organised into history and next [ ... ] into political economy'. 
Smith, as well as John Millar, suggested ways that 'the human mind might have organised itself 
into justice and civility, given certain [ ... ] assumptions about the material and animal 
environment'. " That is, their formulations were a matter of conjecture, but they were based on 
the knowable, constant, outcomes of predictably variable circumstances. 
C. J. Berry has also argued that the term 'conjectural' is misleading to the extent that the 
theorists intended their histories to be based upon reliable sources and make use of scientific 
methodology - conjectural history was the attempt to provide a scientific explanation for the 
diversity of human behaviour whilst assuming the uniformity and constancy of human nature. 
The sources of conjectural history, that is the universal history of man, were the contemporary 
world and the ancient world as described by classical historians such as Tacitus. 11 The 
explorations of the globe, in recent times, had in the words of Edmund Burke laid open 'the great 
Map of Mankind [ ... ] there is no state or gradation of barbarism, and no mode of refinement 
himself a minister, see: Sher, Church and University, pp. 65-67. See also: Pocock, Barbarism, II, 
pp. 266-67. 
17 Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983; repr. 
Indianapolis: Liberty, 1985), p. 90; Berry, Social Theory, p. 55. 
11 Pocock, Barbarism, II, pp. 313-15. See also; A. S. Skinner, 'Economics and History - the 
Scottish Enlightenment', Scottish Journal ofPblitical Economy, 12 (1966), 1-22. 
11 Berry, Social Theory, pp. 61-62. Robertson argued thatIf we push our inquiries concerning any 
point beyond the era where written history commences, we enter upon the region of conjecture, 
of fable and of uncertainty. Upon that ground I will neither venture myself, nor endeavour to 
conduct my readers' (An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients had of India 
and the Progress of Trade with that Country prior to the Discovery of the Passage to it by the Cape of Good 
Hope, in The Works of William Robertson, vol. X (London, 1794; repr. London: 
Routledge/Thoernmes Press, 1996), p. 2). 
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which we have not at the same moment under our view'2' Burke's point was that historians and 
thinkers in his time had access to an array of new information by which to write the history of 
man. The histories were 'conjectural' to the extent that the theorists attempted to fill gaps in the 
available historical records by their own reasoning. However their conjectures were based on 
fixed 'principles of human nature and external circumstances'; what may have occurred on a 
particular occasion could be established from what 'is generally known to be the case'. " In other 
words, humans, in a given context, would act in predictable ways . 
22 
Historians disagreed on the causes which they believed accounted for the variation in human 
behaviour and the organisation of societies. On the one hand, some conjectural historians 
attempted to explain extreme differences between various societies on the globe by a theory of 
polygenesis - that is, that the human race was descended from many different progenitors. " On 
the other hand, individuals such as Robertson believed that the human race sprang from one 
common originator! ' But in either case, neither side denied the common humanity of the 
Indians and Europeans - at least not in the same manner in which some of them had doubted 
the natural equality of the American Indians. " Yet, if human nature was uniform in the Eurasian 
context, how had men in Europe and Asia come to live so differently? Montesquieu, who 
exerted a significant influence over thinkers in Scotland, accounted for the variation in human 
temperament climatically; ' this argument was not wholly discounted by thinkers in Scotland, " 
but primacy was given to other factors. Hume stressed the importance of moral causes, such as 
20 The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, 10 vols, ed. T. W. Copeland et. al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958-78), 111, p. 35 1. 
2' Berry, Social Theory, p. 66. 
22 For example, Robertson argued: 'If we suppose two tribes, though placed in the most remote 
regions of the globe, to live in the climate nearly of the same temperature, to be in the same state 
of society, and to resemble each other in the degree of their improvement, they must feel the 
same wants and exert the same endeavours; to supply them. [ ... ] The same ideas and sentiments 
will arise in their minds. The character and occupations of the hunter in America must be little 
different from those of an Asiatic Instead then of presuming from this similarity, that there 
is any affinity between them, we should only conclude, that the disposition and manners of men 
are formed by their situation, and arise from the state of society in which they live' (History of 
, 4merica, H, p. 30). 23 Such a view was advanced by Henry Homes, Lord Karnes in his Sketches ofthe History ofMan, 2 
vols (Edinburgh, 1774), 1, p. 38 (Silvia Sebastiani, "'Race" and "Progress" in the Scottish 
Enlightenment' (Unpublished Manuscript)). 
21 Robertson, History ofAmerica, H, p. 26. See also: Robertson, Historical Disquisition, pp. 2-3. 
21 For example, Hume, 'Of National Characters', in Essays, p. 208n, famously argued that: 'I am 
apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites'. 
I Montesquieu, Spirit, pp. 231-34. 
2' For example see: Robertson, History of, 4merica, II, pp. 141-42. 
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the form of government - and the tendency of humans to imitate one another (which he 
believed accounted for the similitude of manners amongst the people of a particular nation) - in 
determining the ways in which men acted. " In turn, Smith accounted for changes in the political 
and social organisation of a society by pointing to the modes of subsistence - according to 
which he identified four distinct stages of human development. " The work of such thinkers was 
principally engaged in systematically discovering and explaining the causes of human diversity, 
but in the process also revealed the conditions under which (they believed) humans excelled or 
were debased. Such an insight was particularly relevant to the reform of Bengal, as the recreation 
of conditions which inhibited industry and commerce destroyed the rationale of territorial 
control. 
By the time that the controversy regarding the reform of the East India Company took place, 
between the years 1769 to 1773, individuals such as Hume, Ferguson, Millar, Smith and Steuart 
had put forward their separate trajectories of human development organised around different 
variables. Publicists of East India affairs traded on such conceptions of human progress, but in 
the process distorted the general idea of 'stages' of society into a specific doctrine of Asian 
backwardness - of Asian inability to enjoy political liberty. A range of pamphleteers claimed 
that that the Indians' political and social development had left them in a condition where they 
could only be governed by absolute power. One example of the way in which the Enlightenment 
desire to provide a scientific account for human diversity was crudely utilised can be found in a 
Letter to Lord Notth; its author argued: 
Where-ever the human footstep is found, civil societies are established; and in every 
such society natural freedom is restrained either by a voluntary surrender, or by the 
exercise of force or cunning, qualities natural to some, as imbecility, and pusillanimity, 
producing subjection, are to others: 
In those it is natural to rise, in these to sink. All effects are from the operation of natural 
causes [ ... ]. Tawny complexions are as natural to Asia, as fair are in Europe. They are 
not to be altered; because the cause is permanent, and whatever proceeds from that 
influencing principle, whether in bodily form or the affections of the mind, is equally 
' Hume, 'Of National Characters', pp. 198,203. See also: Tatsuya Sakamoto, 'Hume's Political 
Economy as a System of Manners', in The Rise of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, 
ed. Sakamoto and Hideo Tanaka (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 90-91. 
29 Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978; repr. Indianapolis: Liberty, 1982), pp. 14-16. On Smith's ideas regarding 
human motivation and the progress of human society, see also: Knud Haakonssen, The Science of 
a LqWaton the Natural Jurisprudence of Dmid Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), chs 7-8 (see esp. pp. 183-89). 
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unalterable. If the climate which tinges the Asiatick skin unnerves the hand and heart, 
you may wash the Asiaticks white as easily as make them free. " 
The author of this argument was clearly influenced by a climatic theory of human nature - such 
theories formed only a minor component of Enlightenment accounts of the natural history of 
man, and, importantly, were not accorded any determining role. " However, the significant way 
in which this particular publicist distorted the general claim of conjectural history - that 
changing the causes, altered the effects - was in his contention that the condition of the Indians 
could not be transformed. " He did not then proceed to develop his formulations any more 
systematically. By contrast, the premises upon which Steuart based his Principles of Money, are 
ascertainable from his main treatise, and their consideration provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of Steuart's plans for (as well as the relevance of conjectural history to) the reform 
of the government of Bengal. 
Steuart began his main treatise with the warning that principles of political economy had usually 
been formed on the basis of a narrow set of circumstances. 'Ihinkers, he argued, reasoned 
Oconsequentially on every subject', but failed to consider the 'variety of circumstances which 
render uncertain every consequence, almost, which he can draw from his reasoning'. To 
illustrate his point, he pointed to the contemporary debate regarding luxury, which he believed 
was the result of theorists presenting particular instances as general rules. He contended, that if 
the protagonists on each side of the controversy attended to each other's understanding of luxury 
'with all its consequences, they would have rendered their propositions less general'. His point 
was that the consequence of luxury depended upon the particular circumstances of each 
individual country - under certain conditions luxury was beneficial, but under others it could be 
detrimental. " In addition, Steuart also condemned the acceptance of ideas on the strength of 
one's respect for an individual, what he called ideas 'received upon trust': 'in political questions', 
he stated, 'it is better for people to judge from experience and reason, than from authority; to 
explain their terms, than to dispute about words; and to extend the combinations of their own 
-' A. B., Letter to the Right Honourable Lord North, pp. 33-34. 
31 See: Robertson, History ofAmerica, II, pp. 66-68 (cf. p. 95). 
32 Montesquieu too suggested that the influence of the climate could, to some extent, be 
countered, see: Spirit, p. 236. 
33 Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 7-9. 
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ideas, than to follow conceits'. " Steuart hoped to avoid the same errors himself, especially that 
of deducing general principles from narrow circumstances, by not being circumscribed by the 
context of any one particular country. 'True principles', he stated, could only be discovered by 
becoming 'a citizen of the world', that is by comparing and examining different 'customs' and 
'institutions', and by probing into the causes of the differences between them. " 
Steuart went on to state that 'by tracing out a succession of principles, consistent with the nature 
of man and with one another, I shall endeavour to furnish some materials towards the forming of 
a good' system of political economy. " However, Steuart fully realised that the diversity of 
human political and social organisation could leave any general rule of political economy 
inapplicable in specific circumstances, which was why he argued: 'every supposition must be 
considered as strictly relative to the circumstances presupposed. " In Steuart's thought, the 
system of political economy varied according to the material progress of a particular country in 
question, and principles of political economy could only be implemented in any given situation 
after the people of that country had been prepared for them: 
If one considers the variety which is found in different countries, in the distribution of 
property, subordination of classes, genius of people, proceeding from the variety of 
forms of government, laws, climate, and manners, one may conclude, that the political 
oeconomy in each must necessarily be different, and that principles, however universally 
true, may become quite ineffectual in practise, without a sufficient preparation of the 
spirit of a people. " 
Steuart did not fiffly draw out the implications of this argument for the reform of Bengal in his 
Primiples of Money, but it is reasonable to suppose that Steuart believed (given that it is an 
understanding that pervades his main treatise) that a plan for the government of the acquisitions 
in India could only be created and implemented with a precise understanding of Asian society. 
Steuart stated that his research on the drains of Bengal currency was an invitation to further 
research, " which suggested that a more comprehensive scheme of reform could only emerge 
with greater understanding of Bengal's specific political and social organisation. 
Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
Ibid., p. 17. 
Ibid., p. 19. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p. 17. 
39 SteUart, llýinciples ofMoney, p. 67. 
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Despite Steuart's reticence in relating the premises of his Inquiry to the problem of governing 
Bengal, the point that the principles of political economy varied predictably according to 
circumstance was implicitly one that the Company had to take into account (in Steuart's view) 
when initiating any policy of reform. Steuart argued that any principle of political economy that 
was 'natural' for a people of a particular 'spirit', became unnatural when that spirit was lacking. " 
It was the statesman's task to ensure that the spirit which prevailed in a country was brought into 
line with the particular plan of political economy that the ruler wished to implement. How this 
could be achieved was by the manipulation of men's passions. Steuart argued that men 
universally acted from the same fundamental principles: 'Man we find acting uniformly in an 
ages, in all countries, and in all climates, from the principles of self-interest, expediency, duty or 
passion. In this he is alike, in nothing else'. "' The object of man's passion was determined by 
circumstances in which he existed, but it was the fact that human behaviour and circumstance 
were predictably variable that allowed the statesman to guide a country through a particular 
process of material development, and that ultimately allowed Steuart to frame his principles of 
political economy. 
Steuart began his history of human development - reasoning from 'consequence to 
consequence' - with 'society in the cradle%' He did not develop the idea of man in a state of 
nature, a solitary savage, but proceeded from the premise that men were sociable creatures: 'As 
this noble animal is a sociable creature, both from necessity and inclination, we find also, in all 
ages, climates and countries, a certain modification of government and subordination established 
among thems. 41 Steuart traced the origin of government and society to the natural dependence of 
children upon their parents, and the reliance of servants on their masters for subsistence. The 
legitimacy of rulers was to be found, consequently, in history rather than in an original compact: 
'the rights of kings [ ... ], are to be sought for in history; and not founded upon the supposition of 
tacit contracts between them and their people, inferred from the principles of an imaginary law 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 28. 
Ibid., p. 20. 
Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
Ibid., p. 20. The idea of a savage state was also rejected, for instance, by Ferguson who 
regarded the idea of a 'natural state', as formulated by Hobbes and Rousseau, as empirically 
untrue, see: Berry, Social Theory, pp. 23-24. 
209 
of nature, which makes all mankind equar. " In rejecting the contractarian theory of the origins of 
governments, Steuart was in agreement with the formulations of Hume who had also founded 
obedience to government in opinion confirmed by habiO 
The point at which Steuart began his conjectural history saw the people living under a free 
government, on the spontaneous fruits of the earth, enjoying fertile lands, and a simplicity of 
manners. This stage of society enjoyed a state of equilibrium: the number of inhabitants was in 
proportion to the food that existed, and their simple manners meant that they did not demand 
anything beyond what was necessary for their subsistence. The initial impetus for change, 
according to Steuart, came in the form of the agency of the ruler; he played a crucial role in 
altering the mode of subsistence of his people, which in turn, ultimately, revolutionised social 
and political arrangements. The statesman worked to inspire 'a taste for agriculture and for 
labour' amongst his people - 'who formerly consumed the spontaneous fruits of the earth in 
ease and idleness'. "" This was achieved, in the context of a free government, not by coercion, but 
by making use of an enduring feature of human nature: self-interest. 
it was by using the passion of self-interest that the statesman could fulfil the aims of political 
economy - which were to satisfy the wants of society by creating 'reciprocal relations and 
dependencies' between people of a country, and make 'their several interests lead them to supply 
one another with their reciprocal wants'. "' Importantly, it was in the same manner - that is, by 
the correct manipulation of the Company's servants and Indians' self-interest - that Steuart 
envisaged reforming Bengal's monetary problems: 'by directing the interest of individuals to a 
proper object, good government is established'. "' The same point was also made by another 
observer of East Indian affairs in his plan for the political reform of Bengal: government, he 
argued, was 'the art of contrasting the selfish passions and interests of different men' so that they 
Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 35,209. 
Hume, 'Origin of Government', p. 39. See also: Campbell, 'James Steuart', pp. 30-36. 
46 Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 38-39. By a free people, Steuart meant a people that were 'governed by 
general laws, well known, not depending upon the ambulatory win of any man, or any set of 
men, and established so as not to be changed, but in a regular and uniform way, ibid., p. 206. 41 Ibid., p. 17. 
48 Steuart, P? inciples ofMoney, p. 89. 
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were unconsciously led to promote the common good. " In Steuart's scheme of conjectural 
history, the transition from a stage where people lived upon the naturally occurring fruits of the 
country to a stage where they worked the land to produce their food, the stage of agriculture, was 
achieved by imbuing the people with new wants, and by creating reciprocal relationships 
between them. 
Significantly, Steuart's stadial history did not include a pastoral stage; he presented instead a 
three-stage history of human development, which contrasted with the four-stage theory implicit 
in Smith's work, wherein the ownership of flocks marked an important point in the development 
of private property and was therefore crucial to Smith's theory of jurisprudence. " Importantly, 
however, the relationship that Steuart drew between wants and industry implicitly relied upon 
the security of private property - as people would not work to acquire goods if they did not 
have confidence that their possessions would not be arbitrarily confiscated by those in power. 
Such insecurity was what publicists such as Nathaniel Smith identified as a significant cause of 
Bengal's decline; he argued that under despotic governments (such as existed in Bengal under 
Company rule) people were led to 'hide or dissipate their money', because of fear. By contrast, 
where the fruits of their labour were guaranteed to the inhabitants by law, industry would 
flourish. In such a context, reasonable fiscal demands made on individuals would be willingly 
complied with because people were sure that the remainder of their wealth would not be seized. " 
The establishment of agriculture, in Steuart's trajectory, required that the simple manners 
enjoyed by people in the early stage of society were sacrificed; that is, the people had to be 
encouraged to demand more goods than was necessary for their subsistence. Steuart described 
the way that farmers were led to produce food, surplus to their own needs by the statesman, by 
presenting them with goods manufactured by other inhabitants of the country (free hands) who 
were in need of provisions. People worked to make goods that they did not require themselves in 
order to exchange them for items that they were in need of-, farmers and free hands, in other 
words, were industrious in order to satisfy their mutual and reciprocal wants: 
Anon., Planfor the Government ofBengal, p. 5. 
Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, p. 107. 
[Smith], Observations, pp. 34-36. 
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We may lay it down as a principle, that a farmer will not labour to produce a superfluity 
of grain relatively to his own consumption, unless he finds some want which may be 
supplied by means of that superfluity; neither will other industrious persons work to 
supply the wants of the fannei for any other reason than to procure subsistence, which 
they cannot otherwise so easily obtain. These are the reciprocal wants which the 
statesman must create, in order to bind the society together. " 
Industry and agriculture were the direct result of the reciprocal relations that were forged by the 
intervention of the statesman; accordingly, all work would cease if the new relations between the 
inhabitants failed. Steuart argued that where farmers could not exchange their surplus produce 
for other goods of their choice, then land would once again be 'uncultivated'. Industry could also 
not be established where people continued to have limited wants despite the efforts of the 
statesman: 'if mankind be not forced to labour, they will labour for themselves only; and if they 
have few wants, there will be little labour'. 11 This hints at the way that the physical or the 
material environment in which people lived affected the object of their passion; in a country 
where the people were 'lazy', because of the climate, or were not amenable to luxury (that is, 
persisted in maintaining their simple manners), due to the form of government, the statesman 
would not be able to persuade his people to labour. This is because the people did not recognise 
their interest in the same end as the statesman, and the advancement of society would 
consequently come to a halt. "' 
The statesman's most fundamental task therefore, when he was presented with a community that 
he wished to materially advance, was to create in men wants and make the fulfilment of those 
wants dependent on the cooperation of others. To illustrate the way that such reciprocal 
relationships enabled progress, Steuart gave the example of ancient times; here princes desired 
large armies but were faced with the problem of how to maintain them - farmers were not 
confronted with any incentive to produce surplus food in order to sustain the prince's troops. As 
a remedy to this situation, Steuart argued, slavery was introduced: slaves were created and forced 
to labour in order to provide for the wants of those who were engaged in other occupations (in 
this example, soldiers): 'when states come to be formed, and have occasion for idle hands to 
defend them against the violence of their enemies, food at any rate must be procured for those 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 40. 
Ibid., p. 49. 
Ibid., p. 41. 
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who do not labour [ ... ]. For this purpose slavery was calculated'. 
51 However, the slave's labour 
was inferior to that of free men, as the latter were motivated by their wants and would seek to 
improve themselves in expectation of greater rewards. The slave, on the other hand, was 
dependent upon the instructions of his master, and therefore possessed no incentive to increase 
his productivity: 'set a man to labour at so much a day, he will go on at a regular rate, and never 
seek to improve his method: let him be hired by the piece, he will find a thousand expedients to 
extend his industry. This is exactly the difference between the slave and the free man'. " 
Hence, forced labour might mean that an economy functioned, but only freemen, motivated by 
their wants or self-interest, would guarantee that it functioned at its optimum level. Steuart 
implied that if a ruler managed his people correctly - pointed their self-interest in the direction 
that he wanted - the people could be made to execute the ruler's plans with very little guidance 
from the government; in India, Steuart argued, reforms would come to be implemented as the 
people realised the benefits it would bring them. Specifically, Steuart contended that paper credit 
was a potential 'progressive improvement' which would 'execute itself, as soon as the utility of it 
is perceived'. " Pattullo, who made similar recommendations as Steuart for the corTection of 
Bengal's currency problems, also pointed out the difference between slave and free labour, and 
applied it to the context of Bengal; he argued that inhabitants of a country where private property 
was not guaranteed were no better than slaves - that is they were 'timid and passive' because 
they possessed no reason to work. Such a condition, Pattullo argued, was the state that some of 
France's peasants lived under, and was analogous to the condition of the Indians under 
Company rule. "'Why should we labour"', Pattullo conjectured that the French peasants 
reasoned, "'when we are certain that our tax-masters wou'd always load us equal to our 
industry, and that we and our fan-Wies must in all events for ever remain in poverty and 
indigence? "' Pattullo went on to state that 'subjects of that kind, however numerous, can never 
be of value to any state: whereas the power to acquire and to enjoy, rouses the mind to action; 
Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
Ibid., p. 169 (see also p. 377). 
57 Steuart, JWnciples ofMoney, p. 8 1. 
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encourages industry and populations, and forms valuable subjects to a state and nation'. 58 Both 
Pattullo and Steuart suggested that by changing the conditions under which the Indians lived 
(which, in the process, would also transform their self-interest), it was possible to reverse the 
decline of Bengal. 
The connection between wants, industry and reciprocal relations, in Steuart's treatise, which 
underpinned the transition to the stage of agriculture, was also the key to the further 
advancement of society to the stage of commerce. Since Steuart's thoughts on commerce were 
the subject of the previous chapter, the object here is to consider the foundations on which his 
theory was established. Steuart argued that industry reached a natural barrier to further 
improvement once a free man's wants were satisfied: 'when the free hands have procured by 
their labour, wherewithal to supply their wants, their ambition is satisfied; so soon as the 
husbandmen have prqduced the necessary surplus for relieving theirs, they work no more. Here 
then is a natural stop put to industry'. " This 'stop' however, was only theoretical, as in practise 
the 'taste for superfluity' had no limits and therefore ensured manufacturing's future. Money was 
introduced at the point where bartering ceased to be practical, due to the multiplicity of wants. It 
enabled the continuation of industry and, at its conception, immediately increased mankind's 
desires: 
So soon as money is introduced into a country it becomes, [ ... I an universal object of 
want to all the inhabitants. The consequence is, that the free hands of the state, who 
before stopped working, because all their wants were provided for, having this new 
object of ambition before their eyes, endeavour, by refinements upon their labour, to 
remove the smaller inconveniences which result from a simplicity of manners. ' 
He went on to state that people who were previously satisfied with one type of clothing will now 
part with their money to have a variety of clothes adapted to the different seasons, 'which the 
ingenuity of manufacturers, and their desire of getting money, may have suggested to their 
invention'. "' 
11 Pattullo, Essay, p. 8. See also: Anon., Present State, pp. 4142, where its author argued that the 
goods exported from Bengal were not the product of willing industry, and that the Company 
could not expect to coerce the Indians to labour indefinitely. 
59 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 155. 
Ibid., p. 156-57; see also Vickers, Studies in the Theory ofMoney, p. 247. 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 15 7. 
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Man's desires, then, spurred on industry, and money guaranteed its continuation, as it became a 
commodity of universal desire. The ingenuity of manufacturers ensured that these wants were 
constantly multiplied. At first, man had only been concerned with his subsistence, but once its 
attainment became more or less guaranteed, men could turn their attention to satisfying other 
wants. The desire to acquire wealth in order to meet new desires remained constant: 'as mankind 
seldom remain in a state of contentment, and our nature prompts us to add something new to 
our enjoyments, so it naturally happens, that societies once established, and living in peace, pass 
from one degree of refinement to another, that is to say, man daily becomes more laborious'. " 
Reciprocal relations between members of the country remained crucial; Steuart had initially 
identified a division in society between free hands and farmers and their dependence on each 
other to fulfil their wants as the reason for industry and agriculture; as society however 
advanced, multiple chains of 'reciprocal obligations' were established. " Steuart described how 
such numerous and complex dependencies between people would lead to the common good in 
Bengal. He argued that allowing free trade in districts (of Bengal) that had paid their annual 
revenues to the Company (and after the Company had made their investments), would 
encourage inhabitants to pay their land-tax on time. In order to do this, they would need to 
borrow from the newly established bank, which in turn, would require them to 'establish their 
credit' (that is, their reliability to fulfil their obligations). The shroffs, who would become the 
bank-managers, would be prevented from oppressing the labourers and manufacturers because 
the 'profits of the bank' depended upon 'the credit of the inhabitants, and upon the preservation 
of their property'. " In these ways, their reliance on each other, and their pursuit of their own 
welfare (which was connected to the good of their fellow men), would lead them to promote one 
another's prosperity. 
The circulation and diffusion of increased wealth amongst a people, gained by trade, played a 
pivotal role in the transformation of society; Steuart described the social and political revolution 
a society underwent when it materially progressed from a feudal system to that of where society 
was divided between free hands and farmers. In feudal times (in Europe), Steuart explained, 
11 Steuart quoted in: A. S. Skinner, 'Sir James Steuart: Economics and Politics', Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 9 (1962), 17-37 (p. 25). 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 89. 
Steuart, Ptinciples ofMoney, pp. 88-89; Steuart, inquiry, p. 440. 
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lords had been jealous of, and fought with, one another, but upon the discovery of America and 
the East Indies, the pattern of their interaction with one another was altered. Ibis was because 
trade with those parts of the globe brought increased trade and luxury to the nation, which 
increased the power of the princes, and thereby attracted the lords to their courts: 
The courts of princes then became magnificent; the feudal lords insensibly began to 
frequent them with more assiduity than formerly. The splendour of the prince soon 
eclipsed those rays which shone around them upon their own lands. They now no more 
appeared to one another as objects ofjealousy, but of emulation. " 
The desire to imitate one another caused competition between them to own luxury goods: 'every 
one vied with one another in magnificence of palaces, clothes, equipages. Modes changed and by 
turn enlivened the different branches of industry'. " 
Steuart accepted that, initially, such changes in the economy and society inevitably meant that 
some people would lose their means of subsistence - specifically, the peasants, who would have 
to find other ways of maintaining themselves, after the lords left for the towns. Eventually, 
however, Steuart argued, wealth would trickle down benefiting all of society: 'the children of the 
miserable, who felt the sad effects of the revolution, but who could not foresee the consequences, 
began to profit by it. They became easy and independent in the great city, by furnishing to the 
extravagance of those under whose dominion they were bom'. " The luxurious taste of the 
nobility created a new manufacturing sector and work for the dislocated, as well as redistributing 
wealth within the society. Steuart wanted to take advantage of the same process in Bengal. He 
argued that the tribute the Company paid to the Mughal court could be drawn back to Bengal by 
introducing 'European luxuries' in the Mughal court. " That is, if the Mughal emperor and his 
courtiers developed a taste for European goods they would willingly part with their wealth in 
order to obtain such goods from the Company. 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 60; Cf. Pocock, Barbarism, II, pp. 86-87. 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 61; Cf Pocock, Barbarism, H, p. 223. Steuart here emphasised the material 
and political benefits that accrued to society as a result of the court's growth in power. By 
contrast, Hume emphasised the changes in the manners of the people that the same process 
wrought: 'in a civilised monarchy, there is a long train of dependence from the prince to the 
peasant, which is not great enough to render property precarious, or to depress the minds of the 
people; but is sufficient enough to beget in everyone an inclination to please his superiors, and to 
form himself upon those models, which are most acceptable to people of condition and 
education. Politeness of manners, therefore, arises most naturally in monarchies and courts' 
('The Rise of Arts and Sciences', pp. 126-27). 
67 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 6 1. Cf. Pocock, Barbarism, Il, p. 25 1. 
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Steuart's argument suggested that the principles which animated the European feudal nobility 
could also be used to draw the wealth of the Mughal Court into circulation - the transformation 
of Europe had not been the result of a unique process or set of circumstances. On the contrary, 
Steuart argued that if the nobles had not demanded a variety of goods - had not spent their 
money on, for instance fine clothes - but kept their wealth in coffers, then employment would 
not have been created for the poor, and the material advancement of society would not have 
occurred. In other words, the revolution in the feudal era had been brought about by a specific 
set of circumstances, leading people to act in certain ways. Variations in those circumstances 
would have led people to act in different (but equally predictable) ways. The circumstances that 
Steuart presupposed for the process of development that he was describing were a fertile country 
and a people that were industTious (willing to work) and disposed to luxury (willing to spend): 
'laziness is the greatest of all obstacles to labour and industry. Manufactures will not flourish 
here'; people with a few wants and an aversion to labour could not progress in the manner he 
had described. Instead, amongst an indolent people, Steuart argued, 'riches [ ... ] Will [ ... I be 
adored as a god' but without circulation the riches would do little good. "' If a modem 'polite 
nation of Europe', Steuart conjectured, were to return to the 'simplicity of the ancient 
patriarchs', most of Europe's free hands would face the prospect of starvation. 70 
Industry, and consequently material progress, hinged upon the people contracting a desire for 
luxury. The concept of 'luxury' was of course a concept that was a matter of much debate in the 
eighteenth century. Steuart defmed luxury, in book I chapter 6 as: 
The consumption of any thing produced by the labour or ingenuity of man, which flatters our 
senses or taste of living, and which is neither necessary for our being wellfed, well clothed, well 
defended against the injuries of the weather, orfor securing us against every thing which can hurt 
US. 71 
By this definition Steuart hoped to steer away from the moral debate surrounding the idea of 
, luxury'; he argued that his only intention was to consider the concept in the 'political sense' - 
Steuart, Mquiry, pp. 38-39,46. 
Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
71 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
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that is, to consider the usefulness of luxury for providing work and food for people. ' He stressed 
however that luxury was only beneficial in the first two stages of his implicit stadial history, and 
became harmful to society in the third stage, which was the era of international trade. " 
However, in book two chapter twenty, Steuart proceeded to give the reader a more 
comprehensive treatment of his conception of luxury; here he attempted to distinguish the term 
from the negative connotations with which it had been traditionally associated, namely that of 
moral corruption. 
Fundamentally, Steuart made a distinction between 'luxury' and 'excess'. Extreme luxury, he 
stated, could harm the mind, body and fortune of an individual, as wen as the interests of the 
state, because of the negative results that it produced. However, the harmful consequences could 
not 'be called the necessary effects of the cause Duxury]'; they were instead the result of vice. The 
love of fine food, Steuart argued, was not the same as the vice of gluttony. The 'vicious excess' of 
the latter was unacceptable as it harmed the body, while the luxury of the former contributed to 
the prosperity of society - the luxurious tastes of the lords during the dissolution of the feudal 
structure of society was an illustration of the point that Steuart wanted to make. The lords' 
desires for carriages and other superfluities provided work for the poor and put wealth into 
circulation. Steuart argued: 'no man can become luxurious, in our acceptation of the word, 
without giving bread to the industrious, without encouraging emulation, industry and 
agriculture; and without producing an adequate equivalent for every service'. "' 
The progress from living on the spontaneous fruits of the earth to a stage of agriculture and then 
to that of trade, saw the transformation of the manners of the people - most significantly they 
lost their simplicity. In addition, an alteration in their political organisation was also noticeable: 
the introduction of money caused a change in the relationships between different sections of the 
society. Specifically it caused an alteration in the degree of subordination rulers could expect 
from their people. Steuart argued that subordination 'implied an authority which superiors have 
' Berry, The Idea of Luxury., a Conceptual and Historical Investigation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 138. 
73 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 44n. 
14 Ibid., pp. 265-69. On the concept of luxury in the eighteenth century, see: Berry, Idea of 
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over infffiors'; dependence, in turn, implied 'certain advantages which the infffiors draw from 
their subordination'; the degree of subordination and dependence in a society rested upon the 
material progress of a society. Extreme subordination, slavery, was the result of individuals' total 
dependence upon others for food. Similarly, in the feudal era, vassals served their lords because 
of their need for subsistence. By contrast, in the age of industry and money, liberty had 'extended 
to the lowest denominations of a people', as they no longer relied upon their superiors for their 
food, but subsisted by their own industry. However, crucially, the new liberty had not destroyed 
the 'dependence necessary to serve as the band of society'. " 
In Steuart's thought therefore, authority and subordination had to be 'in proportion to dependence; 
for example, a high degree of subordination could not be demanded where dependence was 
slight. Steuart set it down as a rule that 'industry must give wealth, and wealth uill give power'. 
It was the statesman's task to ensure that subordination between classes reflected the progress of 
society; failure to do so in the past, argued Steuart, had resulted in violent revolutions: 
All these violent convulsions have been owing to the short-sightedness of statesmen; 
who inattentive to the consequences of growing wealth and industry, foolishly imagined 
that hereditary subordination was to subsist among classes, whose situation, with 
respect to each other, was entirely changed. " 
The implication was that if government, in a commercial age, was to avoid revolts, it had to 
increase the amount of liberty its people enjoyed -a new equilibrium, between subordination 
and liberty had to be found. Such a move was in the ruler's interest, if he wanted to be ensured of 
the continued cooperation of his people. 
Steuart argued, in order to demonstrate the accuracy of his argument, that trade might have 
owed its establishment to the ambition of princes, but it had become the means by which the 
people had been freed. The prince had embarked upon trade in hope for greater wealth, but it 
was impossible that he could have appropriated all of it: 
Trade and industry [ ... ] owed their establishment to the ambition of princes who 
supported [ ... 
] the plan [ ... ], with a view to enrich themselves, and thereby to become formidable to their neighbours. But they did not discover, until experience taught them, 
that the wealth they drew from such fountains was but the overflowing of the spring; 
75 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 207-08. Steuart argued that the substitution of money for service was 'the 
palladium of liberty, the fountain of gentle dependence, and the agreeable band of union among 
free societies', ibid., p. 268. 
" Ibid., pp. 208-09,213-15. 
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and that an opulent, bold and spirited people, having the fund of the prince's wealth in 
their own hands, have it also in their own power, when it becomes strongly their 
inclination, to shake off his authority. 77 
In order to preclude these consequences a 'milder revolution' had taken place in European states, 
by which the power of the ruler was curtailed, and greater liberty was conceded to the people. " 
In addition, the idea that subordination had to be in proportion to dependence was also the 
foundation on which Steuart believed that Britain's conflict with the American colonies should 
be resolved: if the colonies were not dependent on Britain, they should be set free. " The context 
of Bengal was different from that of America - for one, the spirit of the people differed, but 
clearly, if wealth gave power to the people, then according to Steuart's reasoning, Bengal could 
not forever be a part of the British Empire. This did not mean that Britain's connection with 
Bengal would be lost, but that their relationship would have to be renegotiated. 
IEL Self Interest and National Spirit 
Steuart's conjectural history set out an account of how human beings progressed from living on 
the spontaneous fruits of the earth to engaging in a complex system of international trade. In the 
process, Steuart also described the political and social transformation which accompanied this 
alteration in a country's mode of subsistence. The statesman's task at any given point in a 
society's development was tailored to those specific circumstances. This was why Steuart had 
argued that when a ruler was faced with the practical task of governing a country, any general 
principle of political economy seemed 'quite ineffectual'. This was a point that Steuart made in 
the opening pages of his treatise. He argued that, in reality, a statesman could be confronted with 
a diverse range of political and social arrangements 'proceeding from the variety of forms of 
government, laws, climate, and manners', which meant that any plan of political economy had 
to be tailored to the specific realities of the country in question. But this did not mean that the 
statesman was constrained by the material and physical environment as to what he could achieve 
-a simple nation, for instance, was not forever precluded from enjoying international 
commerce. Rather, by manipulating the spirit of a people - by changing the circumstances in 
Ibid., pp. 215-16. 
Ibid., p. 215. For a comparison of Steuart's views with John Millar, see: Skinner, 'Economics 
and History, pp. 12-14. 
" David Raynor and Andrew Skinner, 'Sir James Steuart: Nine Letters on the American 
Conflict, 1775-1778', William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., 51,4 (1994), 755-776 (pp. 763-64, 
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which people lived and redirecting their interest to new objects - the statesman could come to 
implement a scheme of political economy that would initially have been incompatible with the 
people's disposition. " 
Steuart's utilisation of the concept of self-interest was informed by the much wider debate 
regarding manners, commerce and the stability of the state that formed part of the preoccupation 
of Enlightenment thinkers in Scotland, and with the controversy which was generated by the 
writings of Bernard Mandeville. The latter had contended that the motive force of all actions was 
self-love; that is, whether an action was virtuous or vicious, the intent or passion that preceded it 
was always selfish. Mandeville argued that any act which seemed to be self-depreciating and was 
aimed at the good of others was in fact wholly self-seeking - apparently virtuous, self-denying 
acts of generosity, by great men, Mandeville remarked, could be compared to ornamental vases: 
, they make a fine Shew [ ... ], but look into a thousand of them, but you'll find nothing in them 
but Dust and Cobwebs'. 8' Mandeville sought to use scientific methodology in his treatise in order 
to discover the laws of human action - Hume, in fact, named him as one of the thinkers that 
had 'put the science of man on a new footing'. "' Mandeville's aim was to demonstrate the 
'unintended consequences' that resulted from 'self-interested action' - which he identified as the 
socialisation of man and the creation of morality. " His thought had a discernible influence on 
Steuart's ideas, but at the same time, Steuart distanced himself from Mandeville's extreme 
formulations. 
Mandeville's Fable aroused public furore on its second publication due to the inclusion of several 
new items, including an essay on charity schools. 84 The central argument of his book however, 
that man was motivated by self-interest rather than any conception of virtue, had its foundations 
in Renaissance thought. The desire, at this time, for a realistic understanding of the way states 
80 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 17. 
11 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable ofthe Bees. or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, ed. F. B. Kaye, 2 vols 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924; repr. Indianapolis: Liberty, 1988), 1, p. 168. Cf Adam Smith, 
The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1976; repr. Indianapolis: Liberty, 1984), pp. 308-13 
11 Hume quoted in E. G. Hundert, The Enlightenment's Fable. Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery 
ofSociety (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; repr. 1996), p. 60 (see also, pp. 44-45). 
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functioned (which had motivated Machiavelli) - as opposed to idealised conceptions of political 
arrangements - was extended to human behaviour. " Spinoza argued that philosophers wrote 
about how human beings ought to behave - the motives that should underpin their behaviour 
- rather than acknowledging the passions that actually motivated them. " Studying man 'as he 
really is' was Mandeville's project, and that of theorists like Hume and Smith, although they did 
not accept the extremities of Mandeville's ideas. The object of a more realistic appraisal of 
human behaviour was to find a more effective method of managing human behaviour. 
This area of thought has been fully explored by Albert Hirschman in his The Passions and the 
interests. He points out that the desire to find alternative ways of curbing the negative passions of 
men stemmed from the feeling that religious instruction no longer exerted an effective control 
upon men. He identified three alternative solutions that were put forward from the Renaissance 
onwards; the first method was that of coercion and repression; the second one was that of 
harnessing the passions and channelling them into socially useful directions . 
87 This was an idea 
that was utilised by Vico who argued that 'out of ferocity, avarice, and ambition, the three vices 
which lead all mankind astray, [society] makes national defence, commerce, and politics'. " Both 
these methods were, Hirschman point out, problematic; the latter method presented the problem 
of how, precisely, private vice was transformed into public benefit, while the former solution did 
not deal with the cause of the problem. The third solution Hirschman outlines was that of using 
'one set of comparatively innocuous passions to countervail another more dangerous and 
destructive set', in other words, to 'fight fire with fire'. " 
The last method is one that can be found at work in the writings of Mandeville and individuals 
such as Hume and Smith. Hume, for instance, argued that often it was only possible to 'cure one 
vice by another%' The word 'interest' became the 'generic term for those passions that' were 
'assigned the countervailing function'. " The idea of 'interest' opposing the passions was then the 
"Hirschman, Passions and the Interests, p. 13. 
Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
Ibid., pp. 14-16. 
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idea of one set of passions tempering another, socially harmful, set. Importantly, the term 
'interest' had originally been associated with the state - the prince worked for the 'interest of the 
state', which meant that he advanced the power and wealth of the state, rather than indulging his 
passions. Hirschman notes that the interest of state became the 'national interest' in England, 
and in the closing decades of the seventeenth century, the term was used in the plural and in 
relation with groups and individuals. The term 'interests' here carried connotations of economic 
advantage; consequently the pursuit of wealth became synonymous with following one's 
interests, and wealth-making was thereby shorn of its association with vice. ' 
Self-interest was seen to contain the 'better nature' of both passion and reason, which 
represented the traditional (but precarious) methods by which leaders had sought to tame human 
behaviour. Self-interest was both 'the passion of self-love upgraded and contained by reason' and 
it was reason 'given direction and force' by self-love. " The new confidence in the passion of self- 
interest to mange human behaviour was not universal; some thinkers felt that reason might not 
always be able to contain the passion of self-love and that, when fully aroused, men would not 
check its impetuosity. Spinoza argued: 'all men certainly seek their advantage, but seldom as 
sound reason dictates; [ ... ] in their desires and judgements of what is beneficial they are carried 
away by their passions, which take no account of the future or of anything else'. " Despite this 
danger, the advantage of a world where behaviour was governed by self-interest was 
predictability and constancy. " The actions of men in a given context could be anticipated if they 
were governed by their self-interest. 
Steuart saw the advantages that self-interest offered to the statesman over other means of 
managing the passions. He argued that 'the best way to govern a society, [ ... ] is for the statesman 
to form a system of administration, the most consistent possible with the interest of every 
individual'. He went on to state: 'were a people to become quite disinterested; there would be no 
possibility of governing them. Everyone might consider the interest of his country in a different 
11 Ibid., pp. 32-42; Keohane, Philosophy and the State, p. 154. 
11 Hirschman, Passions and the Interests, p. 43. 
94 Ibid., p. 44. 
" Ibid., pp. 48-56. 
223 
light, and many might join in the ruin of it, by endeavouring to promote its advantages%" Steuart 
went further and suggested that individual interpretations of the common good were counter- 
productive: 'were a rich merchant to begin and sell his goods without profit, what would become 
of trade? [ ... ] Were people to 
feed all who would ask for charity, what would become of 
industry? ' As long as the statesman was driven by public spirit (which was his self-interest) there 
was no need for the people to be concerned with anything but their own affairs: 'operations of 
public spirit ought to be left to the public [statesman], and all that is required of individuals is, 
not to endeavour to defeat them'. " 
For Steuart then, the public good was achieved by the individual pursuit of private interest and 
the direction of that interest by the statesman. He saw it as the 'ruling principle' of his work - 
not because he considered it the only motive force of human action, but because it was the 
central assumption, the constant, from which he drew his conclusions: 'from this principle, men 
are engaged to act in a thousand different ways, and every action draws after it certain necessary 
consequences. The question therefore constantly under consideration comes to be, what will 
mankind find it in their interest to do, under such and such circurnstancesT Steuart implied that 
there could be no 'laws' if this constant did not hold true: 'were miracles wrought every day, the 
laws of nature would no longer be laws'. Steuart's ultimate point was that a ruler could no more 
govern a people if they did not follow individual self-interest than a natural philosopher could 
discover the laws of the universe in the context of supernatural occurrences. " It was on the 
foundation that people were motivated by their selfish passions, and that the object of their 
passions could be predicted from the circumstances in which they existed, that Steuart could 
state the complex interdependencies that would be formed in Bengal by his proposed reforms, 
such as that between the workers and the money-changers. " 
Despite the fact that Steuart's use of the concept of self-interest had much in common with the 
ideas that Mandeville advanced, Steuart implicitly distanced himself from some of Mandeville's 
Steuart, Inquiry, pp. 143-44; Hirschman, Passion and the Interests, pp. 49-50. 
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assertions at various points in his work. Firstly, Steuart made it clear that self-interest was the 
'ruling principle of his 'subject' rather than the 'universal spring of human action; he argued, for 
instance, that human beings also acted from the principle of duty. Individuals, he stated, had to 
moderate their self-love ('desire for ease and happiness') according to the responsibilities that 
they encountered. For instance, as a parent, duties towards one's child placed constraints on the 
extent to which self-love could be indulged. " Secondly, he pointed out that a 'good action' was 
one where there was 'conformity between the motive, and the duty of the agene. 111 He also added that 
it was 'absurd to say, that no action' was 'truly virtuous' or that 'none' was 'really vicious'. " 
This was an implicit attack on Mandeville's work; the latter had pointed to the discrepancy that 
existed between duty and motive. He contended that people only fulfilled their responsibilities 
because it was in their interest to do so. Virtue and vice, in his thought, were simply social 
inventions created to deceive men into repressing their passions. 103 This was a formulation that 
Adam Smith had been at pains to counter in his own treatise by stressing the difference between 
the 'love of praise' and 'genuine praiseworthiness'. '" 
Mandeville set out to prove his proposition by putting forward his version of conjectural history, 
a consideration of which further reveals the differences between his and Steuart's beliefs. 
Mandeville's source for the early character of man was the behaviour of children. 115 He believed 
that it would be possible to establish the passions that were innate to man, by observing the way 
that children acted. " Man, according to Mandeville, was not innately good, as Shaftesbury for 
instance had suggested, but rather naturally 'selfish and headstrong'. '17 However, it was precisely 
man's socially inimical passions that made it possible for him to live in organised communities. 
As observation of children's behaviour revealed, argued Mandeville, it was natural for man to 
want to establish his superiority over others (Iove of dominion'), and it was this fact that had 
been used by 'Lawgivers and other wise Men' to manipulate man into society. The earliest men 
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were frstly flattered into believing that they were vastly superior to animals; then, they were, 
secondly, taught that indulging their brute passions was a degradation of their 'higher' nature. "' 
Once man was brought into society, his self-love was regulated by the passion of pride; 
Mandeville argued that 'skilful Politicians' played upon man's desire for the praise of his fellow 
men and his fear of their contempt, in order to govern him. Leaders, stated Mandeville, created 
fictitious categories of vice and virtue in order to make man act in accordance with the common 
good. Anything that went against the public good was designated a vice, while actions that 
brought benefit to others - 'contrary to the impulse of Nature' - were defirted as virtuous. To 
illustrate the point that pride was natural to man, Mandeville pointed to the example of children: 
parents, he argued, encouraged their children to behave well by strategies of praise and shame. " 
The case of adult motivation was of course far removed from that of a child, but Mandeville 
suggested that the principle remained the same; the desire for honour and need to avoid shame, 
led men to manage their appetites: 
The Greediness we have after the Esteem of others, and the Raptures we enjoy in the 
Thoughts of being liked, and perhaps admired, are Equivalents that overpay the 
Conquest of the strongest Passion, and consequently keep us at a Distance from all such 
Words and Actions that can bring Shame upon us. "' 
The achievements of Rome were an example of the benefits that could accrue to a country whose 
leaders effectively manipulated the passion of pride. Mandeville argued: 
But if we would know what made them 'em, excel in Fortitude, Courage and 
Magnanimity, we must cast our Eyes on the Pomp of their Triumphs, the Magnificence 
of their Monuments and Arches; [ ... ] and [ ... ] imaginary Rewards they bestow'd on Men of Merit; and we shall find, that what carried so many of them to the utmost Pitch 
of Self-denial, was nothing but their Policy in making use of the most effectual Means 
that human Pride could be flatter'd with. "' 
In Mandeville's view, acting in ways that earned social esteem - acting rationally, virtuously - 
amounted to acting contrary to nature. "' What was condoned and condemned in society was the 
result of custom, which Mandeville believed was a collection of arbitrary rules; he illustrated this 
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point by giving examples such as the fashions that regulated women's dress code. ` Importantly 
however, the desire for esteem meant that man's real passions were only hidden rather than 
subdued, and men were only required to suppress their passions while they were in the company 
of others. "' There was, in other words, no social convention in private: a man, argued 
Mandeville, could be esteemed by society 'without making the least Conquest of his 
Passion'. "s 
The idea that morality was no more than custom was denounced by Francis Hutcheson who 
argued that men did enjoy a moral sense. He contended that men were naturally disposed to act 
in certain ways and felt pleasure when they did; individuals who failed to do so felt unease and 
shame. Virtue and vice were actions that man's moral sense approved and disapproved of 
respectively. "" Significantly however, as Hundert has pointed out, Hutcheson believed that 
actions were the result of the passions rather than reason alone; what restrained the passions was 
not manipulation, as Mandeville had argued, but sociable feelings that men apparently 
possessed. "' Hume, by contrast, did not believe that men recognised an action as virtuous 
because they were pleased by it, rather the source of the distinction between good and bad was to 
be found, as Mandeville had argued, in 'education, habit and custom'. For Hume the 'rules of 
justice' were artificial in that they 'had no plausible natural source capable of accounting for their 
universal and unconditional applicability. The rules were not the result of any innate moral 
sense or human passion but arose out of the progress of human society. Hume's departure from 
Mandeville's thought was in his r6ection of Mandeville's assertion that conceptions of right and 
wrong were created by the politician. Rather, Hume argued that men had 'a natural sentiment of 
approbation and blame, which made categories of honour and shame intelligible to them. 
Morality and justice were not arbitrary enactments of individual action but the 'spontaneous and 
unplanned product of social intercourse' - their evolution in other words was entirely 
gnatural'. 118 
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The relevance of this discussion to Steuart's thought lies in the fact that Steuart subscribed to the 
idea that 'order' was created unintentionally - as the involuntary outcome of individual actions. 
For instance, the encouragement of commerce by kings had led to consequences that they had 
not anticipated - it had led to a new social and political order. In addition, the common good 
was created by the individual pursuit of private interest. However, as we have seen, the initiating 
force of change was the statesman, and he was also the agent that maintained the equilibrium 
between the different forces at work in an economy. Steuart's statesman was analogous to 
Mandeville's scheming politicians, but differed in that he did not invent categories of vice and 
virtue; instead, he appealed to the passion of self-interest in order to lead men into desirable 
directions. Free men, argued Steuart, could only 'be brought to act in general, and in matters 
which purely regard the public' from the principle of 'private interest'. "' This principle held true 
at an stages of human development, and it was this passion that the statesman made use of to 
further the material progress of man: it was self-interest that had induced the farmer to produce 
superfluous products and that had led to the transition from feudal to 'free' societies. 
However, while Steuart had clearly stated that in all ages, climates and countries men 
'uniformly' acted 'from the principles of self-interest, expediency, duty or passion', the object of 
their passion or interest was in Steuart's thought determined by their spirit. All countries, Steuart 
contended, had a particular spirit and had to be governed according to it. The spirit of the people 
was formed by: 
A set of received opinions relative to three objects; morals, government and manners: 
these generally adopted by any society, confirmed by long and constant habit, and never 
called in question, form the basis of all laws, regulate the form of every government, and 
determine what is commonly called the customs of a country. "' 
We have already seen that Steuart saw the legitimacy of monarchs as resting in history, but he 
believed that manners and laws also came to be accepted by people over time. It was habit, in 
other words, which gave credence to a social and political organisation. In particular, Steuart 
argued that the manners of a people could be very distinct to them, and a statesman had to pay 
particular attention to them, especially to what was socially approved and disapproved as they 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 143. 
Ibid., p. 22. 
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had no 'rule' to them: 'opinion of a people with regard to injuries is established by custom only' 
and 'an innocent liberty with the fair sex, which in one country passes without censure, is looked 
121 
upon in another as the highest indignity'. 
The statement that governments had to be in conformity with the spirit of the people was advice 
that was specifically directed at the statesman who wished to change the circumstances in which 
people existed. "' For instance, a ruler that desired his country to engage in international trade 
could only bring about this change, without violence and protest from his people, if he tailored 
his programme to fit the manners of the people. It was also advice that was relevant to 
conquerors of other territories. Rulers and conquerors could not impose what they thought was 
'good' for the people, but only what was good and compatible with their manners. Freedom, for 
instance, a new ruler might reason, would be welcomed by the oppressed, but giving it to those 
whose manners were not prepared for it, only constituted a new refinement upon their 
oppression: 
I might safely say, there is no form of government upon earth so excellent in itself, as, 
necessarily, to make people happy under it. Freedom itself, imposed upon a people 
groaning under the greatest slavery, will not make them happy, unless it is made to 
undergo certain modifications, relative to their established habits. 
It was no wonder then, he asserted, 'that many examples may be found, of a people's rejecting 
the most beneficial institutions, and even the greatest favours, merely because some circumstance 
had shocked their established customs'. " 
The implications of this argument were related to the context of Bengal by Keir. He stated that 
men universally followed their interests, but were not always 'wise'. What he meant by this was 
that men could act foolishly or viciously, and therefore laws were required to prevent men from 
harming one another. Bengal, he believed, was in sore need of a system of laws, but while men 
acted from the same impulse, their notions of right and wrong differed from country to country. 
Ibid. 
'If governments be taken in general, we shall find them analogous to the spirit of the people. 
But the point under consideration is, how a statesman is to proceed, when expediency and 
refinement require a change of administration, or when it becomes necessary from a change of 
circumstances', ibid., p. 24. 
"' Ibid., pp. 23,27. 
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In order to govern. Bengal property - in order fully to benefit from her - Keir argued that a 
system of government consistent with the manners of the inhabitants had to be constructed: 
In framing laws and rules for the right government of any nation of people, if we are 
desirous of rendering them in any degree happy and content; their notions of right and 
wrong, of what is useful and hurtful, or of civil liberty in general, must be attended to; 
and that not in a superficial and slight manner, but with the minutest care and 
exactness. 124 
The idea that laws had to be analogous to the manners of a people had received its most famous 
formulation in the eighteenth century by Montesquieu - from whom Keir probably derived his 
own argument. Montesquieu had stated: 
They Daws] should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to the climate, be it 
freezing, torrid or temperate; to the properties of the terrain, its location and extent; to 
the way of life of the peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they should 
relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to the religion of the 
inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores 
and their manners. "' 
Steuart however significantly modified this thesis; while he accepted that Montesquieu's claims 
were perfectly just where 'natural causes' were allowed to function without interference, he 
argued that Montesquieu's argument did not hold true where natural causes were 'checked' in 
their operation. In other words, Steuart believed that the negative, though natural, outcomes of 
certain causes could be prevented by an able statesman: 
This great man [Montesquieu] reasoned from fact and from experience, and from the 
power and tendency of natural causes, to produce certain effects, when they are not 
checked by other circumstances; but in my method of treating this subject, I do not 
suppose these causes are ever to be allowed to produce their natural and immediate 
effects, when such effects would be followed by a political inconvenience: but I 
constantly suppose a statesman at the head of government, who makes every 
circumstance concur in promoting the execution of the plan he has laid down. "" 
Accordingly, a successful statesman, in Steuart's thought, could lead a people in virtually any 
direction he liked. Steuart accepted that particular natural causes gave rise to certain effects, but 
he contended that these causes could be countered, and different effects created. Steuart reflected 
upon how the statesmen of Europe had made people willingly submit to a new social order - 
even though the people had lost a great deal of their fonnez liberty: 'can any change be greater 
among free men, than from a state of absolute liberty and independence to become subject to 
Keir, Thoughts, pp. 11-13. 
Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 9. 
Steuart, Inquiry, p. 238. 
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constraint in the most trivial actions? [ ... ] Yet we think ourselves more free than ever our fathers 
were'. "' Previously, he argued, landowners enjoyed complete independence regarding the 
management of their estate; they were under no obligations other than the ones they initiated 
themselves, and their harvest was distributed according to their own wishes. Most importantly, 
the state made no demands upon them. In contemporary times, this had all changed because the 
government's need for funds, which had given rise to commerce, taxation and public credit, had 
altered traditional patterns of political and social organisation. 
The fact that the people prided themselves on having gained greater freedom in modem times 
was an illustration of how the proper management of the spirit of the people and sensitivity to 
the specificity of the circumstances in which they lived, could make people submit to schemes of 
political economy that were not immediately to their advantage. To prove this point, Steuart 
gave an example of a policy that was most usually met with resistance: taxation. The people's 
opposition, Steuart contended, was the result of 'too little management [ ... 
] to prepare the spirits 
of the people for such innovations'. By contrast, he argued, people could be made to submit 
cheerfully 'to very heavy impositions, provided they be well-timed, and consistent with their 
manners and disposition'. The statesman was therefore required to work in tandem with the 
spirit of the people - which was not static, and consequently, the statesman was also obliged to 
be aware of changes in it, as well as being the catalyst of change: 'in every new step the spirit of 
the people should be first exan-dned; and if this be not found ripe for the execution of the plan, it 
ought to be put off, kept entirely secret, and every method used to prepare the people to relish the 
128 innovation'. The statesman could only Fulfil these obligations if he was free from 'attachments 
and prejudices' peculiar to each country: 
The great art of governing is to divest oneself of prejudices to particular opinions 
[ ... 
); to consult the spirit of the people, to give way to it in appearance, and in so doing 
to give it a turn capable of inspiring those sentiments which may induce them to relish 
the change, which an alteration of circumstances has rendered necessary. 129 
"I Ibid., p. 26. 
118 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 129 Ibid. 
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Steuart argued that the possibilities for a statesman that learnt to manage a nation's spirit were 
endless: he could make the people submit to any scheme that was consistent with the common 
good: 
When a people can be engaged to murder their wives and children, and to bum 
themselves, rather than submit to a foreign enemy [ ... ]; I think I may say, that by 
properly conducting and managing the spirit of the people, nothing is impossible [ ... ). 
But [ ... ]I must be understood to mean, that nothing essentially necessary 
for the good 
of the people is impossible. " 
While such a statesman may have had obvious affmities with Mandeville's cunning politicians, 
Steuart argued that statesmen should not use 'artifice' to trick their people into accepting certain 
policies as it would destroy 'confidence' between the ruler and ruled, which, in turn would mean 
that the statesman would face difficulties in implementing subsequent plans necessary for the 
preservation of the state. "' Steuart did not specifically construct this argument with the problem 
of governing Bengal in mind, but clearly his advice was one that was extremely pertinent to the 
Company as ruler of Bengal. It was the ability of the ruler, according to Steuart, that defined 
whether a country was well or ill-govemed. The importance of a good system of government for 
Bengal did not go unnoticed in the literature concerning East Indian affairs; the necessity of 
establishing a 'fountain head of command', which was 'free from corruption', was a reform that 
many observers of East Indian affairs agreed upon; it was argued, for instance, in the Planfor the 
Government ofBengal that without a corruption-free authority, any other regulations for the reform 
of Bengal would faR. 132 
A successful statesman, Steuart argued, was distinguished by his relationship with his people, 
which was free from conflict; such a relationship became possible where the principles of 
political economy were understood by all: the people willingly submitted to the ruler's plans 
because they understood the wisdom behind them, and in turn, the statesman did not abuse his 
powers and follow policies contrary to the common good. "' Steuart accorded great power to the 
statesman, but he also made it clear that in modem times, that is the age of commerce, the ability 
of the statesman to abuse his power had been severely curtailed. A modem prince, Steuart 
130 Ibid., p. 25. 
"I Ibid., p. 27. 
131 Anon., Planfor the Government ofBengal, p. 5. 
133 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 18. 
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argued, could no longer depart from the principles of political economy without doing violence 
to the economy, and therefore to the prosperity of the country itself. 
The power of a modem prince, let it by the constitution of his kingdom, ever so 
absolute, immediately becomes limited so soon as he establishes the plan of oeconomy 
which we are endeavouring to explain. If his authority formerly resembled the solidity 
and force of the wedge (which may indifferently be made use of [ ... ], and which may be 
thrown aside and taken up again at pleasure), it will at length come to resemble the 
delicacy of a watch, which is good for no other purpose than to mark the progression of 
time, and which is immediately destroyed, if put to any other use, or touched with any 
but the gentlest hand. 134 
The conflict-free relationship which Steuart described was of course not a feature of the 
connection that existed between the Company and Bengalis. Here, as Steuart must have been 
aware, many publicists argued that the Company had no interest in governing well, and that the 
whole 'machine of political government' had come to a halt. "' Steuart sought to change this 
state of affairs; by reminding the Company that the prosperity of Bengal required that she was 
looked after, Steuart was providing the Company with a selfish reason for governing Bengal 
well. '-'6 
It is evident that in Steuart's thought, the statesman had to make circumstances conform to the 
principles of political economy - in other words the market place needed the intervention of the 
ruler in order to function optimally. "' Steuart did not envisage it as a system that regulated itself 
without the need of external interference. This was one of the fundamental differences between 
Steuart and Adam Smith. In one of the earliest fragments of Smith's work, Smith declared: 
Man is generally considered by statesmen and projectors as the materials of a sort of 
political mechanics. Projectors disturb nature in the course of her operations in human 
affairs; and it requires no more than man to let her alone, and give her fair play in the 
pursuit of her ends, that she may establish her own design. "' 
Letting 'nature' establish her own design was precisely what Steuart wanted to prevent when it 
entailed negative consequences from the point of view of national prosperity. Nature, in other 
words, did not always produce positive results, and it was down to the statesman to ensure the 
Im ibid., pp. 278-79. 
111 Anon., Present State, p. 3 1. 
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common good by directing the interest of his people; ` Smith, by contrast, in his Theory ofMoral 
Sentiments, criticised what he called 'the man of system' who believed that they could 'arrange 
the Merent members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different 
pieces on a chess-board'. The reality was, Smith stated, that 'every single piece has a principle of 
motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to impress 
upon je. 140 
The fundamental incompatibility of Steuart and Smith's thought extended into the field of 
international commerce. The only circumstance under which Steuart believed that free trade 
could subsist was under a plan of universal monarchy. The reasoning behind this was consistent 
with his overall thought: he believed that the same harm would accrue to trading nations under 
open commerce as would be inflicted on an individual country if its citizens were animated by 
public spirit rather than self-interest. In a context where the states of Europe had separate trading 
interests from one another, Steuart was afraid that a common interest would not emerge 
spontaneously - without a common good, free trade would only result in bringing 'poverty to 
all the states of Europe': 'while there are different states, there must be separate interests; and 
when no one statesman is found at the head of these interests, there can be no such thing as a 
common good; and when there is no common good, every interest must be considered 
141 separately'. In Bengal, the Company had followed an interest that was separate to the common 
interest of the Indians. As a merchant, this had been perfectly acceptable, but as the sovereign, its 
true interest became the same as Bengal's. The Company's failure to see this, Steuart implied, 
had contributed to Bengal's decline. 
Condusion 
There is no doubt that the range of publicists that were the particular focus of attention of 
chapters three and four recognised that Company rule of Bengal had created conditions that 
Sen, Economics ofSteuart, p. 23. 
Smith, Theory ofMoral Sentiments, pp. 233-34. See also: Winch, Riches and Poverty, p. 88. Cf. 
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Triangle" in the Shaping of Political Economy: David Hume, Sir James Steuart and Adam 
Smith', in Rise ofFolitical EconotnY, p- 113. 
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were detrimental for the prosperity of Bengal. In their different ways, they put forward plans for 
the government of the territories, which they hoped would bring to an end the abuse that had 
taken place there, and restore Bengal to a state where industry and commerce could flourish. 
Commentators such as Nathaniel Smith and Pattullo recognised that where individuals were not 
protected from the arbitrary will of the ruler, they would not labour - unless they were coerced. 
Given that Bengal had no mines of gold and silver, the value of Bengal rested in her 
manufactures; if these decayed away, Bengal would cease to be an important acquisition. As 
Verelst had argued, the potential for prosperity rested in 'the exertions of industry in all, whose 
labour alone could render Bengal a valuable possession to the British nation'. "" 
By replacing the arbitrary political system under which the Indians lived, with a system based on 
fixed laws, would-be reformers hoped to establish conditions under which Bengal could prosper. 
Their reasoning was informed by Enlightenment debates regarding human nature, and the 
factors which accounted for the diversity of human political and social organisation. However, 
unsurprisingly, publicists who made use of Enlightenment thought (especially as it was 
developed in Scotland) did not pay attention to the detail of the original argument. While many 
publicists traded on an understanding that human nature varied according to enduring 
circumstance, they failed to appreciate that changing the circumstances in which people lived 
would give rise to different consequences. In other words, if the Indians were known to be servile 
because of the despotic government they lived under, a different type of government would give 
rise to a correspondingly different set of manners. Some particularly astute observers of East 
Indian affairs acknowledged the implications of changing circumstances for British rule of 
Bengal - specifically, that Britain could not hold Bengal as a dependency, and under an 
absolute system of government, while at the same time allowing the Indians the same degree of 
liberty enjoyed by Britons. Therefore, it was not that the Indians were inherently incapable of 
liberty, but that the latter was incompatible with ruling a conquered province. On the whole, 
however, as the example from the Letter to Lord North demonstrated, the premises of conjectural 
history were most usually misapplied. 
141 Verelst, View, P. 86. 
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This was of course not a criticism that could be applied to Steuart's work. His thought 
demonstrates the importance of attending to the variety of arguments that the Enlightenment 
gave rise to. It also reveals the additional possibilities of reform and consequences that an 
accurate understanding of conjectural history (or at least one version of it) held out for the future 
government of Bengal. One of the fundamental ways in which Steuart believed that reform of the 
territorial acquisitions in India could be achieved was by the manipulation of the passion of self. 
interest. This same passion was the key to Steuart's main treatise: 'from this principle [i. e. self- 
interest], men are engaged to act in a thousand different ways, and every action draws after it 
certain necessary consequences. The question therefore constantly under consideration comes to 
be, what will mankind find it in their interest to do, under such and such circumstances? ' This 
was a question that Steuart asked regarding the inhabitants (including Company servants) of 
Bengal. Steuart hoped that his reforms would make it in the interests of individuals to act in 
ways conducive to the common good -a good common to both Bengal and Britain. Self- 
interest would ensure that the Company maintained the credit of the bank Steuart wished to 
establish, "' that rents were paid on time'" and that the money changers (shroffs) did not oppress 
the labourers: 'interest does all [ ... 
]. By directing the interest of individuals to a proper object, 
good government is established' . 
14' By making reforms a prerequisite for the realisation of 
individual self-interest, their implementation appeared guaranteed. 
Steuart however knew that unintended consequences flowed from the implementation of a new 
scheme of political economy. Steuart had described in his Inquiry how the transition from the 
feudal age to the modem commercial one had altered the country's social and political 
arrangements. In the modem era, the former peasants were no longer dependent on the lords for 
their subsistence, and the lords in turn could not demand the labour of their former peasants. 
This change in the level of dependence had forced rulers to alter the degree of subordination they 
demanded from their people - the change was a necessary consequence of 'growing wealth and 
industry'. Steuart believed that the same principles regulated the relationship of a mother country 
and her subordinate territories: the American colonies, he argued, could not be forcibly held by 
"3 Steuart, Principles of Money, p. 8 7. 
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Britain if their dependence on her was slight. All this did not necessarily suggest that Britain 
would eventually lose her connection with Bengal, but rather that, as circumstances changed, a 
new relationship would eventually have to be forged. 
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Conclusion 
The territorial acquisitions on the sub-continent were not the result of a national imperial policy. 
Once acquired however they became a matter of national concern. Successive governments in 
Britain before 1772 may not have concerned themselves with the administration of Bengal - 
they set their sights instead on obtaining a share of the acquired revenues - yet this did not 
demonstrate that they failed to recognise the importance of the possessions for Britain. More 
generally, the East India Company itself was the vehicle by which British interests in Asia were 
advanced and the British government was ultimately prepared to provide it with financial (as in 
1773) and military (as in 1769) support. The rationale of Britain's overseas enterprises was 
commercial, but this did not preclude the use of force; in Asia trade had long been supported by 
the use of naval power and fortifications. The acquisition of political power in Bengal became 
the logical extension of the way the Company traded: it had always sought to gain trading 
privileges and to limit its degree of dependence on Indian powers - political control gave the 
Company the highest degree of security that it could hope to possess for its trade. With the 
widespread belief that France was simply waiting for an opportunity to undermine Britain's 
global position, abandoning territorial control was never on the agenda. 
The timing of the British takeover of power in Bengal can only be explained with reference to the 
long term developments of the Mughal Empire, Anglo-French rivalry and the local politics of 
Bengal. Through the course of the eighteenth century, Bengal had emerged as a de facto 
independent state and the privileges negotiated by the Company with the emperor could only be 
enforced by the cooperation of the local rulers. With the accession of Siraj ud-Daula to the 
throne of Bengal in 1765, relations between him and the Company's servants broke down. The 
causes of their strained relationship included procrastination by the Company in the payment of 
a sum demanded by the nawab, the building of additional fortifications (by the Company), and 
the nawab's underlying resentment against the Company's growth in commercial power and its 
duty-free trade. However, what proved to be decisive after Siraj ud-Daula attacked and captured 
Fort William - for the way their mutual grievances were resolved - was the Company's ability 
(and willingness) to use military force. Military might was an option the Company could use at 
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this date because of the concentration of its troops in the Camatic - had these events transpired 
earlier in the century, the Company would not have been able to respond in the same way. 
The servants' initial ambitions may not have extended beyond the recapture of Calcutta and the 
reestablishment of the Company's position, but the servants subsequently became part of an 
Indian conspiracy to overthrow Siraj ud-Daula. The plotters included leading merchants and 
disaffýcted elites, and their plot provided an opportunity for the Company to increase their 
advantages; besides this, the servants had ample additional reasons of their own for desiring a 
change of ruler: they mistrusted the intentions of the current nawab and believed that he was in 
secret contact with the French. The 1757 revolution gave the Company the chance to alter this 
state of affairs, and it ultimately proved to be a turning point in Company-nawab relations 
because it revised the balance of power in favour of the Company: it became inconceivable for 
any ruler of Bengal to follow a policy which could be detrimental for the interests of the 
Company. 
Britain's ideological misgivings concerning the acquisition of a territorial empire in the east were 
enormous and cannot be overstated. Politicians and thinkers well versed in Classical history took 
the Roman Empire as an example of the consequences that followed from territorial 
aggrandisement: introduction of luxury, corruption of manners, erosion of metropolitan political 
liberty and the establishment of military dictatorships. These fears had been clearly articulated in 
various histories and analyses of the Roman Empire written by (for instance) Machiavelli, 
Montesquieu and Ferguson. Istvan Hont has shown the ways in which practical considerations 
- international balance of power and market forces - placed constraints on national politics 
and ideological commitments! That is, a state's need for finance and its fear of other nations 
undermining its power and independence, forced leaders to sacrifice what was theoretically 
desirable for what was practically necessary for the state's survival. So Charles Davenant argued 
that trade, despite its 'pernicious' consequences, had to be cultivated in order to provide the 
necessary resources for national defence. ' Territorial empire was rationalised in the same 
manner; Marshall has argued that 'the contours of British expansion overseas were largely 
I Hont, 'Free Trade', pp. 66-68 
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shaped by government's sense of what was essential to national survival'; 3 the same perception 
also set the terms by which the debates about empire in India were conducted. 
Initial responses from the British government were restricted to regulating the Company's 
dividend, reforming the Court of Proprietors and obtaining a share of the revenue. 7be 
Company in London attempted to obtain powers from the government by which it could 
manage its altered affairs in Bengal, but it was fi-ustrated by the government's lack of support. 
Bowen argues that until 1772, the administrations of Chatham, Grafton and North 'were not 
prepared to involve themselves in any reassessment of the nature and purpose of British activity 
on the Indian subcontinent' - their interest was in finding sources of finance for governmenO 
By 1772, the British government was forced to reconsider whether the Company remained the 
most suitable agency for the administration of the acquired terTitories and the management of its 
revenues-5 This was a realisation that had dawned earlier upon individuals like Robert Clive, 
Nathaniel Smith and the author of the publication, True Alarm. The title of the latter is especially 
revealing because also published in the same year as the True Alarm (1770), was The False Alarm, 
which argued that the recent public furore surrounding the expulsion of John Wilkes as MP for 
Middlesex, did not constitute a national crisis. ' The True Alarm, by contrast, in choosing that 
title, was suggesting that Indian affairs were worthy of public agitation - were a matter of 
national concern and were the issues that should occupy the public's imagination. 
This may have been a relatively lonely cry in 1770, but just two years later it had been joined by 
many others, most noticeably those of William Bolts and Alexander Dow. ' In addition, the 
profile of the Company's affairs was also raised by the publications of the House of Commons 
Select Committee's reports. This dissertation has utilised the arguments advanced in 
3 Marshall, 'Introduction', in Free Though Conquering, p. x. 
I Bowen, Revenue, p. 188. 
1 However strong arguments were put forward against the expediency of the government 
assuming direct territorial control of Bengal, see the points made in 'Considerations on East 
India Affairs', in BL, Add. MSS 38398, fols 107-117'. See esp. fol. 109', where it was argued 
that 'die Errors which must be committed in the management of such acquisitions, at so great a 
distance from the seat of Government had better fall upon the Directors of the Company, than 
fall directly upon the Ministers of the King'. This piece, according to internal evidence, was 
written after North's Act, but nevertheless the arguments advanced here are still relevant for the 
debates that took place in 1773. 
6 [Johnson], False Alann, p. 53. 
7 Compare the number publications for the year 1772 with 1770 in the appendix. 
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contemporary pamphlets and books in order to recover the ways in which empire in India was 
theorised. This source material gives the historian access to far greater information regarding the 
ideas of the actors because the genres enabled the writers to present their arguments 
systematically and at length. The pamphlets were most usually written in response to particular 
events or to the formulation of controversial policies whether by parliament or the directors; for 
example, in 1769 much of the literature was concerned with the issue of supervisors. 
Consequently the writings do have a circumstantial character, but individuals such as George 
Johnstone and Alexander Dalrymple used the occasion provided by the current controversy to 
air their beliefs regarding the respective rights and responsibilities of the Company and 
government to the acquisitions. In 1772 and 1773 however, the topic of controversy was reform 
of East Indian affairs and the publications in these years therefore engaged more 
comprehensively with how empire in the east was to be managed. 
Amongst the range of arguments that were advanced throughout this period, none of them 
advocated renouncing territorial responsibilities in India. 11is is not to suggest that empire in 
India was universally accepted by all sections of British society; on the contrary, Marshall has 
pointed out that its acceptance and rejection can be divided along generational lines, with older 
Whigs adamantly opposed to any empire in the east. ' Yet forgoing the territorial acquisitions 
was no longer a viable policy option as both critics and supporters of the Company pointed out: 
'let us reaquish our possessions whenever we will', argued Nathaniel Smith, 'other Europeans 
are in readiness to lay hold upon whatever we leave'. ' With this inescapable fact in mind - the 
fact that if Britain did not secure the possessions other European nations (most notably France) 
would, thereby undermining Britain's position of relative strength - would-be reformers set out 
principles and plans by which they believed Britain could safely administer an empire in the 
subcontinent. At first, arguments centred on the issue of property rights: the question of whether 
the territorial revenues belonged to the state or the Company was bitterly contested in 1767,1769 
and 1773. Ultimately the question of 'right' remained undecided in this period, " but the 
Marshall, 'Free Though Conquering', p. 9. 
[Smith], Observations, p. 5. Also, in [Smith], General Re? narks, P. 59, it was argued: 'whast we 
continue to exist, we must follow the cur-rent which impels us, we must make the best advantage 
of whatever is in our grasp, and that is all human wisdom can do for the benefit of any state'. 
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controversy raised wider constitutional problems, which were problems of empire, that theorists 
were forced to confront. 
The challenges that empire in India posed to British politics were the potential impact of newly- 
acquired wealth on the balance of the British constitution if it was invested in the state, and the 
legitimacy of British officials' exercising despotic authority in India. The plans of reform that 
were developed by thinkers from diverse backgrounds attempted to rind ways of governing 
Bengal that did not rely on absolute power or threaten the balance of the constitution. In so 
doing they implicitly, and in some instances explicitly, made use of the legacy of Montesquicu's 
Spifit ofthe Laws and the characteristically Enlightenment belief that politics could be reduced to 
a science. George Johnstone, Nathaniel Smith and the writers of the Present State, Plan for the 
Govemment and the True Alarm sought to bring an end to the mercantile despotism of the 
Company's government of Bengal by making use of the concept of checks and balances. 7bey 
wanted to assign different functions to separate bodies, which would keep each other in check; 
place deliberate impediments and delays in the process of decision making and they envisaged a 
system that would regulate itself without the need of discretionary power or an excess of virtue. 
Such systems were meant to prevent British officials misusing power and as a consequence 
would provide both Indians and Britons resident in the subcontinent protection from arbitrary 
power. " 
The reports of the proceedings in Parliament give tantalising glimpses of the broad terms in 
which the debates regarding the government of Bengal and imperial rule of India were 
conducted. For instance, Johnstone argued through the course of the debate on the East India 
Judicature Bill that the evils in Bengal were the result of 'radical defects in the system' Clive 'had 
established'. " Burgoyne in 1772 referred to the Company as 'trustees' for the state that had to 
11 Significantly, Francis, Clavering and Monson (members of the Fort-Williarn Council), later 
argued against a system of government for India that relied on a separation of powers; they 
contended that 'the natives of Asia in general, and Bengal in particular, form their conception of 
the strength and Dignity of a Government, from its Unity, by which they accordingly measure 
their obedience; and that to minds such as theirs, incapable of judging of the Refinement of our 
political Instititions, the view of separate independent powers in the same state, can suggest no 
idea, but that of Division, weakness and confusion' (Trancis, Clavering and Monson to the Earl 
of Rochford' (3 Aug 1775), OIOC, MSS Eur. E 13/B, fols 232ý-2331. 
12 parliamentary History, 17, p. 379. 
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work for its interest. " William Meredith argued that 'Comparisons of other tyrannies give no idea 
of English tyranny in Bengal': 'never did such a system exist as that where mercantile avarice 
was the only principle, force the only means of carrying on a government'. " From the pamphlet 
literature it is possible to understand a great deal more of the principles that underpinned 
formulations such as these. What impact they had on the decision makers cannot be estimated 
with any degree of certainty. North's Act lacked the comprehensive vision embodied in some of 
the plans analysed in this dissertation, yet nevertheless North did address some of the 
fundamental problems that had been identified with the Company's organisation both in London 
and in India. The fact that the legislation was inadequate quickly became apparent; however one 
area that North's reforms did not tackle was the economic or commercial aspect of Britain's 
relationship with Bengal. As Bowen points out, no attention was given by the policy makers 
regarding how Bengal's economy could be regenerated. " 
This was of course not true of Company officials, like Verelst, and the plans that were put 
forward for instance by Smith, Keir, Dow and the True Alann. They all turned their attention to 
how Bengal's economy could recover its former vitality. Steuart's plan, while its principal brief 
was the specie problem in Bengal, also engaged with that debate. He suggested ways in which 
the drain of currency from the acquisitions could be prevented and compensated. He argued that 
Bengal's trade with other parts of Asia had to be encouraged, while other Europeans were to be 
allowed to trade after the Company had finished making its investments. He advocated the use 
of paper money and credit to increase the amount of money in circulation, and pointed out ways 
in which the velocity of the circulating currency could be increased. What was especially 
interesting about the plan Steuart put forward was his suggestion that the interest of a 
dependency was not necessarily inimical to that of the metropolis - Bengal's interest was not 
inimical to Britain's: 
But now that this very country is in a manner our own, if we wish long to draw 
advantage from it, we must endeavour to indemnify it for the gratuitous exportation of 
the many manufactures which we formerly brought with silver... instead therefore of 
furnishing them with articles of European luxury, which we have enumerated as one 
article of drain to their treasure, we ought to fall on every expedient to procure for them 
articles of raw productions ... ought to encourage every branch of trade between them 
13 Ibid., p. 457. 
14 Ibid., p. 858. 
Bowen, Revenue, p. 189. 
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and the Indian nations; and we ought to protect the industrious inhabitants from the 
rapine and extortions of their Indians as well as their European lords. 16 
Britain and Bengal's relationship was no longer that of two trading nations where one would 
inevitably gain at the expense of the other. Rather, Bengal was now 'in a manncr our own' - 
her prosperity could only increase Britain's own. 
Central to all the plans considered was a preoccupation with the manners of the people, because 
it was widely accepted that any proposed method of administering Bengal had to conform to the 
spirit of the Indians if it was to be successful. Consequently, systems of government, programmes 
of reform or plans of political economy were organised around an understanding of human 
motivation, which were derived from the ideas systematically formulated by Enlightenment 
theorists including Mandeville, Montesquieu, Hume and Adam Smith. Inevitably, publicists 
who made use of this wider body of thought distorted the general claims of the original thinkers. 
Specifically, many publicists argued that due to the physical and moral environment which die 
Indians had come to live under, they could only be governed by an absolute system of rule. What 
such publicists failed to appreciate was that in Enlightenment accounts of human diversity, such 
as that put forward in the conjectural history of Smith, it was held that an alteration of the 
conditions under which people existed would give rise to a different set of manners and form of 
government. 
Conjectural history was the attempt to provide a scientific account for the predictable variation 
of human societies. Enlightenment thinkers stressed different factors (such as climate, divine will 
and mode of subsistence) in order to explain the causes of human diversity. In Adam Smith's 
account, differences in social and political organisations between different sets of people in the 
world were explained with reference to the prevailing means of subsistence. Smith suggested that 
as people advanced from a stage where they lived off the natural occurring produce of the land, 
to one where they lived by farming, so too did the political arrangements under which they lived, 
predictably vary. By such reasoning, the Indians were not inherently incapable of political 
16 Steuart, Principles ofMoney, p. 70. 
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liberty, but only currently living under conditions that made its rcalisation impossible. " Not all 
publicists believed that the Asians were precluded from enjoying political liberty because of their 
nature, but such individuals also recognised that liberty and foreign rule were incompatible; 
Dalrymple argued that the British would expel themselves from India by 'making the Indians 
free', because as a free people they would not submit to foreign rule. " However, it is Steuart's 
work that makes it possible to investigate ftu-ther the implications of conjectural history for the 
reform of Bengal by the existence of his main treatise which was organised on the assumptions of 
this type of inquiry. 
Steuart's report for the East India Company did not systematically apply the principles which 
informed his Inquiry, but he clearly would not have endorsed any plan for the reform of Bengal 
which did not adhere to those principles. The benefit of Bengal for Britain, as the range of 
publicists in common with Steuart agreed, lay in its commercial prosperity. Yet, any plan 
calculated to promote Bengal's welfare could only be of benefit if it could be implemented. 
Steuart argued that his reforms would be realised because they appealed to the universal passion 
of men - their self-interest. In his main treatise, Steuart contended that as men could be made to 
act in different ways by engaging their self-interest, the question that a ruler needed to consider 
was 'what will mankind find it in their interest to do, under such and such circumstances? "' It 
was this same question that Steuart applied to the context of Bengal, and as a result, produced a 
set of reforms which created circumstances (as he believed) that directed the self-interest of both 
the Company and the Indians to promote the common good. Steuart accepted that the object of 
a people's interest was determined by the 'received opinions' which had come to regulate their 
manners, religion and politics over time (in sum, the spirit), 10 but this spirit was malleable. A 
successful statesman, according to Steuart, could make 'every circumstance concur in promoting 
11 This was an insight that was grasped in Anon., The Origin and Progress of Despotism in the 
Oýientaland OtherEmpires ofAfiica, Europe and America (Amsterdam, 1764). Its author argued that 
if the principles according to which people lived were changed, 'then we may rest assured, that, 
independent of any virtue or of any influence of the climate, we should, in consequence, see 
liberty in Asia; reason in America, and slavery in Europe' (pp. 9-10). 
Is palrymple), Considerations, p. 2 1. See also [Smith], General Remarks, p. 68; Anon., Present State, 
p. 47. 
11 Steuart, Inquiry, P. 142. 
20 Steuart, Inquiry, p. 22. 
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the execution of the plan he has laid down"' - the 'progress' of a society was not restricted by 
the spirit of the people. However, the statesman's plan would give rise to consequences that he 
had not intended, such as changes in the patterns of authority and subordination in society, but 
this was an integral part of the process which occurred as a people progressed from one stage to 
another. What this specifically meant for Bengal was that her relationship with Britain could not 
indefinitely continue in the same vein, but with proper management it did not necessarily have to 
be lost. 2' 
The Company's government of Bengal had shown the consequences that followed when the 
interest of the ruler did not correlate with the interest of his people. In such circumstances, the 
entire country was devastated by the ruler in order to satisfy his wants - he, like the savages of 
Louisiana described by Montesquieu, chopped down the tree in order to obtain its frUitS. 23 Such 
a state of affairs destroyed the very rationale of territorial empire; the Company had obtained 
political power in 1765 for the same reason it had, earlier in the century, sought trading 
privileges and fortified its settlements: in order to provide security for its trade. Company rule 
however was destroying the very foundations of that trade. This was ultimately the problem that 
thinkers who engaged with the Company's affairs set out to address - it was the problem that 
Steuart attempted to solve by appealing to the selfish passions of the Company servants and 
Indians so that 'their several interests' led 'them to supply one another with their reciprocal 
WantSt! 4 Events after 1773 would prove that the question of how to conduct imperial affairs on 
the sub-continent was by no means resolved in this period, but Bengal had become an accepted 
and indispensable part of Britain's empire. Fears regarding the consequences of territorial 
expansion were not forgotten, but thinkers and politicians had demonstrated a belief in Britain's 
ability to overcome them. 
11 Steuart, inquiry, p. 238. 
22 [Smith], General Remarks, p. 122, conjectured: 'time indeed may Overthrow and destroy the 
state; and with the best concerted plan of government it may sink again under tyranny and 
oppression; and we perhaps be obliged to abandon the country; or else verging up towards 
freedom under the conduct of some future Clive, it may become an independent kingdom, and 
the west give a race of monarchs to the empire of Hindostan'. 
21 Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 59. 
24 Steuart, Inquiry, P. 17. 
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